Opinion
The defendant, Mark P. Kuncik, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a juiy trial, of interfering with a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a), operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (a) and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222 (a).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting him to proceed to trial as a self-represented party and, during oral argument in this court, he sought to have his cases remanded to the trial court for a competency hearing under this court’s supervisory powers.2 We decline to exercise our supervisory powers and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.
This case originated from a motor vehicle stop by state police Trooper Justin Rheiner, which occurred *290in the early morning of August 21, 2009, on Route 8 northbound in Watertown. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant, whose license was under suspension, was the operator of the vehicle, which had been traveling at ninety-three miles per hour. During the stop, the defendant was irate and noncompliant with Rheiner, who, as a consequence thereof, requested backup and drew his gun. When other officers arrived, the defendant was removed from the vehicle and subsequently placed under arrest after refusing to perform field sobriety tests.
The defendant was charged by substitute amended informations with one count of interfering with a police officer in violation of § 53a-167a (a), one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drags in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1), one count of operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in violation of § 14-215 (a) and one count of reckless driving in violation of § 14-222 (a).3 During the course of pretrial proceedings, the defendant was canvassed by multiple judges on numerous occasions about proceeding as a self-represented party, and he continually elected to proceed as such with standby counsel. The defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges. A jury trial followed on March 28 and 29, 2011. The defendant was found guilty of interfering with a police officer, operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended and reckless driving. The defendant was found not guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drags. Thereafter, the trial court *291rendered judgments in accordance with the jury verdicts and sentenced the defendant to a total effective prison term of one year, execution suspended after sixty days, with three years probation. This appeal followed.
The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in permitting him to proceed to trial as a self-represented party because he was not competent to conduct the trial proceedings without the assistance of counsel. In particular, the defendant argues that his pattern of behavior and his comments during the course of the pretrial proceedings and, ultimately, the trial demonstrated that he was not competent to represent himself and that he did not adequately grasp the issues pertinent to the proceedings.4 This claim is not properly *292preserved, and the defendant did not seek review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or the plain error doctrine. See Practice Book § 60-5. Rather, during oral argument in this court, the defendant sought to have his cases remanded to the trial court for a competency hearing under this court’s supervisory powers.5 We decline to exercise our supervisory powers.
“Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . The standards that [are] set under this supervisory authority are not satisfied by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason[s] which are summarized as due process of law .... Rather, the standards are flexible and are to be determined in the interests of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory authority [however] is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . [T]he integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers. . . . [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration *293of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 518 n.23, 973 A.2d 627 (2009).
“Supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of the utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole. . . . Additionally, [i]n certain instances, dictated by the interests of justice, we may, sua sponte, exercise our inherent supervisory power to review an unpreserved claim that has not been raised appropriately under the Golding or plain error doctrines.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elson, 125 Conn. App. 328, 361, 9 A.3d 731 (2010), cert. granted on other grounds, 300 Conn. 904, 12 A.3d 572 (2011).
The controlling case in this area, and the case relied upon by the defendant, is State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 483. In Connor, our Supreme Court established that, in accordance with precedent from the United States Supreme Court and pursuant to its supervisory authority over the administration of justice, “we do not believe that a mentally ill or mentally incapacitated defendant who is competent to stand trial necessarily also is competent to represent himself at that trial. Accordingly ... we conclude that, upon a finding that a mentally ill or mentally incapacitated defendant is competent to stand trial and to waive his right to counsel at that trial, the trial court must make another determination, that is, whether the defendant also is competent to conduct the trial proceedings without counsel.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 518-19; see also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008). In doing so, our Supreme Court recognized that such a conclusion is not constitutionally mandated; see State v. Connor, supra, 528 n.28; but that, in accordance with Edwards, the court was “free *294to adopt for mentally ill or mentally incapacitated defendants who wish to represent themselves at trial a competency standard that differs from the standard for determining whether such a defendant is competent to stand trial.” Id., 517.
Ultimately, in Connor, our Supreme Court remanded that case for a determination by the trial court as to whether the defendant, at the time of trial, was competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself, notwithstanding any mental disability, “[b]ecause Edwards had not been decided prior to the conclusion of the trial [and the trial court] had no alternative . . . but to permit the defendant to represent himself once it was determined that he was competent to stand trial.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 528. Our Supreme Court further noted that “[o]ther courts have adopted this approach when . . . the trial of a mentally ill defendant had been completed before Edwards was decided.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 528 n.30.
The defendant claims that he was not competent to represent himself pursuant to the standard set forth in Connor and seeks to have his cases remanded to the trial court for a competency hearing under this court’s supervisory powers. Although our Supreme Court in Connor established, pursuant to its supervisory powers, the heightened standard for competency in order for a defendant to represent himself or herself, our Supreme Court remanded that case “[b]ecause Edwards had not been decided prior to the conclusion of the trial [and the trial court] had no alternative . . . but to permit the defendant to represent himself once it was determined that he was competent to stand trial.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 528.
All the proceedings in the present case occurred after both Edwards and Connor. The court was required to make a determination under the heightened standard *295set forth in Connor and, although the record does not reveal that the court ever expressly found that the defendant was competent to represent himself under such a standard, “the court is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly to its legal determinations.” Iacurci v. Sax, 139 Conn. App. 386, 396, 57 A.3d 736 (2012). The defendant was canvassed in depth by multiple judges on numerous occasions and the court repeatedly permitted the defendant to proceed as a self-represented party with standby counsel.6 In light of these considerations and the record in the present case, we find that this is not the “rare circumstance” where our supervisory powers may be invoked and, therefore, we decline to do so.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.