OPINION
Case Summary
Appellant-defendant Ruben Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") appeals his waiver of his right to a jury trial on a habitual offender charge. We affirm.
Issue
Gonzalez raises a single issue for review, which we restate as whether he knowingly waived his right to jury trial.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts most favorable to the judgment indicate that on the evening of January 21-22, 2000, Jose Germain was managing a bar in East Chicago, Indiana. That evening, Gonzalez fought at least once with two other bar patrons, and Germain asked him to leave the bar. After last call, Ger-main locked the front door and let customers out through the side door. When Gonzalez re-entered the bar through the side door, Germain told him that the bar was closed and that he had to leave. Gonzalez ignored Germain and began arguing with the two men he had fought with earlier. Germain approached Gonzales and again told him that he had to leave, whereupon Gonzalez drew a knife from his pocket and stabbed Germain under his chin, causing profuse bleeding. Germain was initially *204treated for the laceration at the local emergency room; after he began vomiting blood, however, x-rays and a CT scan revealed a severe injury to the back of his throat. Germain was transferred to a hospital in Chicago, where he underwent a tracheotomy and specialized surgery to repair the injury. At the time of Gonzalez trial, Germain had undergone additional surgery, had difficulty talking and eating, and had difficulty moving, feeling, and tasting food with his tongue.
The State charged Gonzalez with aggravated battery,1 a Class B felony, with battery 2 as a Class C felony, and with being a habitual offender3 On November 15, 2000, a jury found Gonzalez guilty of aggravated battery and battery. After polling the jury, the trial court entered judgment on the aggravated battery verdict and initiated the following sidebar:
THE COURT: We talked earlier about the Habitual Offender phase.4 Is it your client's wish to proceed with the trial by a jury or is he willing to waive the jury and be tried by the Court?
BY MR. WOLOSHANSKY: He is willing to waive. And I ask the Court to bring him up here.
THE COURT: Mr. Gonzalez, will you come up here, please? You understand-can you hear me all right? On the habitual offender you have the right to be tried by the jury or you can waive the jury and submit that to the Court. Your attorney has indicated you wish to waive the jury and submit that to the Court. Is that what you want to do? You have to respond audibly so the court reporter can pick you up.
[GONZALEZ]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you understand what I have told you?
[GONZALEZ]: Yes, siv.
THE COURT: Okay.
The trial court dismissed the jury, heard evidence that Gonzalez had accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions,5 and found him to be a habitual offender. On December 22, 2000, the court vacated the battery "verdict and judgment6 and sentenced Gonzalez to twenty years on the aggravated battery charge, with an additional twenty years on the habitual offender charge, for a total of forty years.
Discussion and Decision
"The United States and Indiana Constitutions guaranty the right to trial by jury." Poore v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind.1997) (footnotes omitted); see U.S. Const. amend. VI (guaranteeing "the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" in all criminal prosecutions); Inp. Constr. art. I, § 18 (guaranteeing the right to "a public trial, by an impartial jury," in all eriminal prosecutions)."7 "The right to *205trial by jury applies to habitual offender proceedings." Dixie v. State, 726 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Ind.2000) (citing Inp.Cope § 35-50-2-8). "A person charged with a felony has an automatic right to a jury trial; the defendant is presumed not to waive this right unless he affirmatively acts to do so." Poore, 681 N.E.2d at 207.8 "It is fundamental error to deny a defendant a jury trial unless there is evidence of the defendant's knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right." Reynolds v. State, 703 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). "The defendant must express his personal desire to waive a jury trial and such a personal desire must be apparent from the court's record," Poore, 681 N.E.2d at 206, whether in the form of a written waiver or a colloquy in open court. See Good v. State, 267 Ind. 29, 32, 366 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (1977).
Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution provides that "the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts" in all criminal cases9 In Seay v. State, 698 N.E.2d 732 (Ind.1998), our supreme court definitively stated that Article I, Section 19 applies to habitual offender proceedings and that "a defendant is entitled to an instruction similar to that given during the guilt phase of a trial, i.e., the jury has the right to determine the law and the facts." Id. at 7386 and n. 8.10 The court further explained that "at issue was the jury's ability to find Seay to be a habitual offender (or not to be a habitual offender) irrespective of the uncontrovert-ed proof of prior felonies." Id. at 736.11 Gonzalez contends that his waiver of his constitutional right to jury trial was unknowing 12 because the trial court failed to *206advise him of the jury's ability to find him not to be a habitual offender.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[wlaivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (addressing claim that petitioner's guilty plea was not voluntary) (emphasis added). In the years following Brady, our courts followed this standard to the letter in reviewing guilty pleas. Seq, e.g., Brimhall v. State, 258 Ind. 153, 162, 279 N.E.2d 557, 563 (1972) (waivers must be "'intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant cireumstances and likely consequences'") (quoting Brady) (emphasis added); Henry v. State, 175 Ind.App. 212, 216, 370 N.E.2d 972, 975 (1977) (same).
The first Indiana decision to rely on Brady with respect to jury trial waivers, however, employed the following language: "The waiver of any constitutionally protected right at the time of trial must be voluntary, knowing and intelligently made with sufficient awareness of the relevant cireumstances surrounding its entry and its consequences." Williams v. State, 159 Ind.App. 470, 474, 307 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1974), trans. denied. Subsequent decisions of this court and our supreme court addressing jury trial waivers followed Williams' lead in omitting "likely" before the word "consequences." See, eg., Kindle v. State, 161 Ind.App. 14, 21, 313 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1974) ("To be effective, such waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made with sufficient awareness of the relevant cireumstances surrounding its entry and consequences."), trams. denied (citing, inter alia, Brady and Williams); Perry v. State, 401 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) ("It has also been said that such waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made with sufficient awareness of the relevant cireum-stances surrounding its entry and its consequences.") (citing, inter alia, Kindle); Doughty v. State, 470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind.1984) ("A waiver of this right must be made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner, with sufficient awareness of the surrounding cireumstances and consequences.") (citing Perry); Brown v. State, 495 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind.1986) ("However, trial by jury is subject to knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant, provided the record demonstrates such waiver was made in a voluntary manner with sufficient awareness of the surrounding circumstances and the consequences.") (citing, inter alia, Doughty).
Given that the rights forfeited in guilty pleas and jury trial waivers are all constitutionally derived,13 and that our supreme court has not specifically enunciated a more stringent standard for reviewing the waiver of rights derived from our state constitution, we conclude that a defendant who considers waiving his right to jury trial need only be informed of the likely consequences of his decision. Our conclusion is supported not only by the specific language of Brady, but also by practical considerations; if courts were required to *207inform defendants of every conceivable consequence of waiving the right to jury trial, the wheels of justice would grind to a proverbial halt. See Reynolds, 703 N.E.2d at 704 ("Reynolds' counsel did not have to explain each and every possible detail concerning a jury trial in order for the defendant to be sufficiently informed about the nature of a jury trial and the consequences of waiving his right to a jury trial."); see also Kennedy v. State, 271 Ind. 382, 387, 393 N.E.2d 139, 142 (1979) (noting that there is no "statutory or constitutional requirement that the trial judge explain to Defendant the difference between a trial by court and by jury; nor is there any requirement that the trial record demonstrate that Defendant understood the difference."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047, 100 S.Ct. 737, 62 L.Ed.2d 734 (1980); but see ABA Stanparps For Criminat Justice 15-1.2(b) (8d ed. 1996) ("The court should not accept a waiver [of trial by jury] unless the defendant, after being advised by the court of his or her right to trial by jury and the consequences of waiver of jury trial, personally waives the right to trial by jury in writing or in open court on the record.").
Gonzalez argues that since he was not informed of the possibility of jury nullification, he was not "fully informed as to the consequences of electing not to have a Jury make [the habitual offender] determination." With respect to Article I, Section 19, our supreme court has stated that the jury's power to "sit along with the court as judges to honestly, justly, and impartially interpret and apply existing law ... does not include the right to create law or to reject law." Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 857 (Ind.1996) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 849, 118 S.Ct. 137, 139 L.Ed.2d 85 (1997); see also Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind.1994) ("[A] jury is not bound to convict even in the face of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, it is improper for a court to instruct a jury that they have a right to disregard the law. Notwithstanding Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution, a jury has no more right to ignore the law than it has to ignore the facts in a case.") (citations and footnote omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996).14 Although a defendant who waives his right to jury trial *208in a habitual offender proceeding would consequently forgo the possibility of jury nullification, in light of the above pronouncements we cannot conclude that nullification is so likely to occur that a defendant must be informed of this consequence before he can knowingly waive his right to jury trial.
There are no cases or statutes specifically enumerating the "likely consequences" of which a defendant must be informed before waiving his right to jury trial, and we are not called upon to do so here. In Kelley v. State, 543 N.E.2d 638, 639 (Ind.1989), our supreme court concelud-ed that the trial court "was very thorough in its interrogation of appellant and in fully informing him of his rights and the consequences of the waiver of those rights":
[The court] explained to appellant that if they proceeded with the jury trial a panel of impartial jurors would listen to the evidence and determine his guilt or innocence. He pointed out to appellant that even i#f one member of the jury believed he was not guilty, he would not be found guilty. He apprised appellant that if he waived a trial by jury, the judge, sitting alone, would listen to the evidence and determine his innocence or guilt. He also informed him that his trial on the theft charge and the question of his status as an habitual offender would be tried separately.
Although the trial court's "interrogation" in the instant case was not as extensive as that described in Kelley, Gonzalez does not claim that his waiver was unknowing with respect to the aforementioned consequences, including that "even if one member of the jury [found him not to be a habitual offender], he would not be found [to be a habitual offender]." See id. Whether one or all of the jury members might have found him not to be a habitual offender because of insufficient evidence or via exercise of their nullification power is ultimately irrelevant for purposes of our discussion.15
In summary, we conclude that the trial court was not required to advise Gonzalez of the possibility of jury nullification and that he knowingly waived his right to jury trial on the habitual offender charge.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH and BAILEY, JJ., concur.