SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner A.B.M. Saifur Rahman, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks re*644view of the May 7, 2009 order of the BIA affirming the October 24, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Steven R. Abrams pretermitting his application for asylum and denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re A.B.M. Saifur Rahman, No. A 095 956 702 (B.I.A. May 7, 2009), aff'g No. A 095 956 702 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 24, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
When the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements the IJ’s decision, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008). We review de novo questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008).
Rahman does not challenge the IJ’s determination that he was ineligible for asylum because he failed to file his application within the prescribed statutory period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). In addition, because Rahman does not challenge the agency’s adverse credibility determination in his brief, he has waived any challenge to that determination. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal in the absence of manifest injustice). As either of these grounds is sufficient to sustain the agency’s denial of Rah-man’s application for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Wang v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006); Chen v. I.N.S., 344 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam), there is no need to address his argument that the IJ erred in concluding that he did not establish a nexus to a protected ground, which, in any event, is foreclosed because he did not present it to the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir.2007). Moreover, Rahman has abandoned any challenge to the IJ’s denial of his applications for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Gui Yin Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d 716, 723 n. 6 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam).
In any event, we find no merit in Rahman’s contention that the IJ improperly denied his motion for a continuance. We review the BIA’s affirmance of an IJ’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 449, 453 (2d Cir.2008). As we have noted, IJs have “broad discretion” and “are accorded wide latitude in calendar management.” Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir.2006). An IJ would abuse his discretion in denying a continuance only “if (1) his decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) his decision — though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding — cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. at 551-52 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Here, the IJ found that even if Rahman could obtain the order sheet proving that the case against him in Bangladesh was active, it would not establish his eligibility for relief, as the IJ found that the case was “a criminal matter that can be handled by *645the government of Bangladesh,” and this finding was not clearly erroneous. In addition, the BIA noted that Rahman did not know what the order sheet would show, and could not articulate how it would be helpful to his claim. The BIA also observed that, 18 months after the IJ’s decision, Rahman had not submitted the order sheet. Based on this reasoning, we cannot say that the agency committed an error of law, made a clearly erroneous factual finding, or departed from the range of permissible decisions, in denying the continuance. Furthermore, because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination remains unchallenged, Rahman fails to establish that he suffered actual prejudice. See Rajah, 544 F.3d at 453.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance Procedure 34(a)(2), with Federal Rule of Appellate and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).