We granted oral argument to consider whether evidence that a child was present in a home in which defendant was in possession of drugs and firearms is, by itself, legally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction under MCL 750.145 for doing an act that “tended to cause a minor child to become neglected or delinquent so as to tend to come under the jurisdiction of” the family division of the circuit court. We hold on the facts of this case — where there is no evidence that the child was aware of such drugs or firearms— that there is insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction under this statute. To decide otherwise would render a conviction under MCL 750.145 an increasingly routine appendage to a broad array of other criminal charges in instances in which a child is merely present in a home where evidence of a crime has been uncovered. Moreover, to decide otherwise would *733have considerable implications for the process by which parental rights are terminated in this state, for, as the facts of this case demonstrate, a conviction under MCL 750.145 would almost certainly constitute a trigger at least for the initiation of the termination process by the Department of Human Services. Because this result has never before been reached by courts of this state, and because we believe that such result was never intended by the Legislature, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate defendant’s conviction under MCL 750.145, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Defendant’s drug and firearms convictions, which the Court of Appeals has affirmed, are not affected by this decision.
I. PACTS AND HISTORY
On August 16, 2006, Detroit police executed a search warrant at defendant’s home. They found defendant sitting on a bed in one of the home’s two bedrooms. When one of the officers looked under the bed, he found a baggie of what he believed, based on his experience and training with narcotics, to be heroin on a plate with a razor blade and a coffee spoon. A second officer testified similarly, estimating that the amount recovered was approximately three grams, with a street value of about $700. The police also found two loaded firearms in a dresser drawer in the same bedroom. The bedroom contained both men’s and women’s clothing, while the other bedroom contained only children’s clothing.
At the time of the raid, there was a woman seated on the front porch and a 10-year-old boy on a couch in the living room. A third officer, Kathy Singleton, testified that she observed that the child, who was defendant’s stepson, was scared and crying when the officers entered. The woman, who was defendant’s wife and the child’s mother, was handcuffed and given a citation.
*734Defendant was charged with possession of less than 25 grams of heroin, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a minor, MCL 750.145. The information for the latter violation stated that defendant had contributed to the neglect or delinquency of the child by “exposing him to the use and sale of narcotics.”
With respect to the latter charge, the prosecutor argued at trial that the child “being in that house is being subject to neglect and/or delinquency.” In its instructions, the trial court stated:
To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant acted or by any word, encouraged, contributed toward, caused or tended to cause any minor child under the age of 17 years to become neglected or delinquent.
The jury convicted defendant of all charges. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 45 days in jail for the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The court also told defendant that it would contact the Department of Human Services (DHS) to request that a petition be filed to terminate his parental rights, and that same day wrote to DHS requesting that it investigate possible child neglect and abuse by defendant.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. People v Tennyson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 16, 2008 (Docket No. 278826). Regarding defendant’s conviction under MCL 750.145, the Court noted that the statute “was aimed at prevent*735ing conduct ‘which would tend to cause delinquency and neglect as well as that conduct which obviously has caused delinquency and neglect.’ ” Id. at 4, quoting People v Owens, 13 Mich App 469, 479; 164 NW2d 712 (1968) (emphasis in original).
Here, defendant’s actions, at the very least, placed [the child] directly in a home where illegal activity was occurring. It would be reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant knew [the child] was living in a house where heroin and loaded firearms were unlawfully kept. When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that defendant’s illegal activities could have subjected his son to the jurisdiction of the courts. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a minor. [Tennyson, unpub op at 4.]
This Court directed that oral argument be heard on the application for leave to appeal and specified that the parties must address whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction under MCL 750.145, People v Tennyson, 483 Mich 963 (2009), and argument was heard on November 4, 2009.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 253; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). In determining whether the prosecutor has presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, an appellate court is required to take the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor. “[T]he question on appeal is whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 421; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
*736III. ANALYSIS
A. MCL 750.145
We are called upon to construe MCL 750.145, which provides:
Any person who shall by any act, or by any word, encourage, contribute toward, cause or tend to cause any minor child under the age of 17 years to become neglected or delinquent so as to come or tend to come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court, as defined in [MCL 712A.2], whether or not such child shall in fact be adjudicated a ward of the probate court, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
This statute requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (1) by any act or word (2) “tend[ed] to cause” any minor1 (3) to “become neglected or delinquent” (4) so as to “tend to come” under what was then probate court jurisdiction, which has since been transferred to the family division of circuit court, or “family court.”2
The statute also makes clear that “neglect” and “delinquency” are specifically defined by MCL 712A.2, and that an adjudication that the child is, in fact, a ward of the court is not a prerequisite to a conviction. These conclusions are compelled by the statute and were articulated by the Court of Appeals *737over 40 years ago in People v Owens, 13 Mich App at 475-476, 479.3
Although it is clear that a prior adjudication of neglect or delinquency is not required for a conviction under MCL 750.145, the open question, which goes to the heart of this appeal, is what level of certainty is required in order for the fact-finder to determine that a defendant “tend[ed] to cause” a minor to become delinquent or neglected so as to “tend to come” under family court jurisdiction. The focal point in this inquiry is, of course, the statute’s twice-repeated use of the word “tend.” When reviewing a statute, “ ‘a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.’ ” Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 318; 645 NW2d 34 (2002) (citation omitted). This “tend” language provides an alternative ground for satisfying two of the statute’s critical elements — a person must “cause or tend to cause” a minor to “come or tend to come” under family court jurisdiction. The verbs “cause” and “come,” which immediately precede “tend” in each instance, require it to be shown that a person did in fact do something that caused a minor to fall within family court jurisdiction. However, “tend to cause” and “tend to come” require a lesser showing; each formulation lowers the threshold of proof required by “cause” and “come,” respectively, and each does not require the actual exercise of family court jurisdiction.
When reviewing a statute, all undefined “words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language[.]” *738MCL 8.3a. To determine the ordinary meaning of undefined words in the statute, a court may consult a dictionary. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 563; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). “Tend” is a non-technical word that is not defined by the statute, which according to the dictionary’s first entry for the word means “to be disposed or inclined... to do something.”4 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). As this definition indicates, “tend” is a forward-looking word that assesses possibilities and does not pertain to the absolute certainty of things that are past and completed.
However, the fact that “tend” pertains to matters that cannot be assessed with absolute certainty, unlike matters that have already occurred, does not mean that the determination that a person is “disposed or inclined” toward something can be made arbitrarily. Instead, logic suggests that “tend” is commonly understood to express some level or gradation of certainty, for if a person is “disposed or inclined” to do one thing, he is obviously not “disposed or inclined” to do its opposite. Stated another way, although “tend” conveys possibilities along a continuum, logically, a person can only “tend” toward one end of that continuum at any given time. The term thus implies a level of certainty greater than 50 percent, to wit, that it is possible to conclude from the available information and circumstances that something is “more likely than not” to occur.5
*739However, “tend” is not always used to convey gradations of certainty. The last dictionary entry for “tend” defines it as “to lead or be directed in a particular direction.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). While this definition is also consistent with the word’s forward-looking quality, in this purely directional sense, it does not compel the conclusion that a person is closer to one end of a continuum than the other. Instead, in this sense, “tend” can mean that a person has, perhaps for just an instant, been turned “toward” a “particular direction.” Thus, a determination that a person “tends” toward something in this sense could be made where there is only a 5 percent or 1 percent or 0.3 percent chance that a particular result will occur. That is, even though a person remains far closer to one end of the “good behavior-bad behavior” spectrum, if he is turned “toward” the other end even momentarily, it can be said by the purely directional understanding of the term that such person “tends” toward that direction. Because this understanding does not necessitate a comparison of possible outcomes or alternatives, a determination that a person “tends” toward something in this directional sense can be based on what is merely a snapshot of information from a single or discrete moment in time.
For several reasons, we believe that the purely directional meaning of “tend” is not what was intended by the drafters of MCL 750.145. First, the dictionary entry for “tend” emphasizes that when used in this sense, “tend” is often followed by “toward.” That is, “tend” tends to be followed by “toward.” However, the latter “companion” word is absent from MCL 750.145.
Second, the directional sense of “tend” does not accurately reflect the word’s specific placement in this statute. The statute pairs “tend to cause” and “tend to *740come” with “cause” and “come,” respectively. The difference between each of these pairings is essentially one of degree, not kind. However, an interpretation of “tend” that is based merely on direction bears no conceptual connection to actually “causing” neglect or delinquency or actually “com[ing] under” family court jurisdiction, the alternative violations with which the “tend” violations are paired. Thus, instead of establishing pairings of violations in which apples are compared with apples — in which the magnitude of the certainty or likelihood of the harm is what distinguishes the violations — the directional understanding establishes pairings of violations in which apples are compared with oranges — in which there is no coherent relationship within each pairing.
Third, construing “tend” in its directional sense in this statute would result in a highly unreasonable and unworkable, if not potentially absurd, interpretation. If all that is required by “tend” is a determination that a child had been turned in the “direction” of neglect or delinquency — “toward” the “bad behavior” rather than “toward” the “good behavior” end of the spectrum, and without regard to whether the child had been moved closer to the “bad behavior” outcome than to the “good behavior” outcome, what other than prosecutorial discretion would prevent a parent from being charged with “contributing to the neglect and delinquency of their children” whenever they tell their children a lie, exceed the speed limit while children are in the car, nick another car in a parking lot where children are present and fail to take responsibility, use coarse language in front of their children, or engage in any other such behavior into which imperfect parents sometimes lapse? Each of these forms of less-than-admirable, but hardly extraordinary, behavior on the part of the parent might well “tend” to cause harm to a child in the purely *741directional sense of the term because each such dereliction in parental behavior could hardly be expected to have a positive impact upon the child, and therefore could only be understood to have a negative impact. This reasoning would be particularly applicable with regard to a younger child. That is, rather than being pointed in a positive direction along the continuum of bad to good behavior, such parental breaches could only, however slightly or imperceptibly, point the child toward the wrong end of the behavioral continuum. Because we cannot imagine that it was within the Legislature’s contemplation that violations of MCL 750.145 be predicated on what might be momentary lapses in parental conduct rather than on an overall assessment of the child and his or her circumstances, and because we cannot imagine that the only check upon such prosecutions would be the good judgment of the prosecutor, we believe that “tend” is far more appropriately defined by its primary definition, which focuses on whether a particular result, in this case a minor coming under the jurisdiction of the family court for reasons of neglect and delinquency, is “more likely than not” to occur. “[Sjtatutes must be construed to prevent absurd results . . . .” Rafferty v Markovitz, 461 Mich 265, 270; 602 NW2d 367 (1999).6
*742By applying the more reasonable and appropriate definition of “tend” in this context as being “disposed or inclined ... to do something,” everyday lapses in parental behavior would not ordinarily suffice to lay a foundation for criminal charges that would trigger at least the initiation of the parental rights termination process, just as they have never before sufficed in this state to establish criminal charges under MCL 750.145.7 Rather, “tend” properly takes into consideration the totality of the parent’s conduct, and the overall impact of that conduct upon the child. While sociologists can *743debate the impact of countless types of parental behavior upon the child, and doubtless many such types of behavior can be characterized as either beneficial or detrimental to the child’s upbringing, those debates do not define the proper judicial inquiry under the statute. Once again, it is not whether the parent has engaged in behavior that can be described as “tending” toward the wrong end of the behavioral spectrum, but whether the parent’s overall behavior has made the harm that the statute was intended to prevent more likely than not to occur.
Accordingly, the statute’s first use of “tend” requires a determination that a defendant’s conduct has caused it to be more likely than not that a minor would “become neglected or delinquent.” Similarly, the statute’s second use of “tend” requires a determination that a defendant’s conduct caused it to be more likely than not that a minor would come under family court jurisdiction.8
*744B. MCL 712A.2
With this understanding of MCL 750.145, we next follow that statute’s directive and turn to MCL 712A.2, which sets forth the authority and jurisdiction of the family division of the circuit court. A minor may come under family court jurisdiction for either neglect or delinquency. MCL 712A.2(a) and (b).9 Because the prosecutor’s theory of this case at trial was that the child “being in [the] house [was] being subject to neglect and/or delinquency,” we must consider whether any of the definitions of “neglect” and “delinquency” set forth in MCL 712A.2 are pertinent here.
The jurisdiction of the family division of the circuit court over a minor for delinquency is discussed in MCL 712A.2(a)(l), which grants that court “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction superior to and regardless of the jurisdiction of another court in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 17 years of age who . . . has violated any municipal ordinance or law of the state or of the United States.” This is a broad grant of jurisdiction, which notably may be exercised over a juvenile who “has violated any municipal ordinance or law of the state or of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
The jurisdiction of the family court over a minor for neglect is discussed in MCL 712A.2(b). The first relevant basis for a finding of neglect is detailed in § 2(b)(1), which provides that the court has jurisdiction over a juvenile under 18
*745[w]hose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship.
This provision sets forth multiple potential grounds for a finding of neglect. The most egregious form of neglect occurs where the child has been “abandoned by his or her parents” or is “without proper custody or guardianship.” Other grounds for a finding of neglect occur where the parent “neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals,” or where a child’s “mental well-being” is subject to a “substantial risk of harm .. . .”
The other relevant basis for a finding of neglect under MCL 712A.2 is set forth in § 2(b)(2), which provides that the court has jurisdiction over a juvenile under 18
[w]hose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.
For purposes of the instant case, this provision requires a finding that the home at issue constitutes an unfit place for the juvenile to live “because of” a parent’s criminal act. Criminality per se, or even criminality in a home per se, is insufficient to support a finding of neglect under § 2(b)(2).
C. STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA
Pursuant to the express terms of MCL 750.145, it is only through the application of the definitions of “ne*746gleet” and “delinquency” found in MCL 712A.2 that it is possible to determine whether a child “tend[s] to come” under the jurisdiction of the court. As Owens recognized, MCL 750.145 and MCL 712A.2 must be construed in pari materia. Owens, 13 Mich App at 475. The foregoing analyses of these statutes allow us to do just that — to read these in tandem in order to arrive at a reasonable construction of the law.
1. “DELINQUENCY”
When MCL 712A.2(a)(1)’s definition of “delinquency” is incorporated into MCL 750.145, conviction under MCL 750.145 requires proof that (1) a person’s “words or acts” (2) “tend[ed] to cause” any minor (3) to “become [a child who] violates any municipal ordinance or any state or federal law” (4) so as to “tend to come” under family court jurisdiction for delinquency.10 Thus, conviction under MCL 750.145 for contributing to a child’s delinquency requires proof that would allow the fact-finder to determine that a person’s “words or acts” caused it to be more likely that a minor would become a child who breaks the law than that he would remain law-abiding.
These standards — and the interpretation of “tend” from which they derive — are consistent with those used by Michigan courts for almost a half-century where they have been asked to construe MCL 750.145. When Owens first addressed this statute, although it recognized that a prior adjudication is unnecessary to sustain a conviction under MCL 750.145, the Court nonetheless focused on the particular minor at issue and identified a particular act of delinquency that the defendant *747“tended to cause.” In affirming the defendant’s conviction, Owens reasoned that his actions “tended to cause” the minor at issue to commit the alleged act of delinquency, even though “she had not yet been adjudged delinquent by the probate court prior to defendant’s trial.” Owens, 13 Mich App at 479.
Since Owens, there have been few cases addressing “sufficiency of the evidence” challenges to convictions under MCL 750.145 based on grounds of delinquency — a fact that suggests that the state’s justice system has arrived at a generally accepted equilibrium for prosecuting this crime.11 However, the appellate decisions that have specifically analyzed sufficiency of the evidence challenges to convictions under MCL 750.145 employ a common approach. As with Owens, these courts identify a particular child and a particular act of delinquency as defined by MCL 712A.2(a). They then have assessed whether, because of the defendant’s actions, the child committed, or was at risk of committing, a specific act of delinquency. See, e.g., People v Antjuan Owens, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 11, 2007 (Docket No. 271064), lv den 480 Mich 1012 (2008) (sustaining the defendant’s conviction, based on finding that the “[d]efendant’s actions placed [the minor at issue] in danger of, at the least, being charged with loitering in a place of illegal business under MCL 750.167[1][j]”); *748People v Jackson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 25, 2008 (Docket No. 275908) (sustaining the defendant’s conviction, based on finding that the defendant’s actions caused the minors at issue to be charged with the crime of attending a dog fight).
These decisions reflect the existing, and proper, approach to understanding MCL 750.145 construed in pari materia with MCL 712A.2. The children at issue were at risk of committing identifiable acts of delinquency, and it was possible to conclude that they were more likely than not to become delinquent, and consequently more likely than not to come within family court jurisdiction.
2. “NEGLECT”
As noted above, MCL 712A.2(b) provides multiple definitions of “neglect,” which all must be read in conjunction with, and incorporated into, MCL 750.145. When this is done, conviction under MCL 750.145 requires proof that (1) a person’s “words or acts” (2) “tend[ed] to cause” any minor (3) to become a child: (i) who is abandoned by both parents or lacks proper custody; (ii) whose parents fail to provide the necessary care for his or her physical, educational, and moral needs; (iii) whose “mental well-being” is subject to a “substantial” risk of harm; or (iv) whose home is “unfit” “because of” a parent’s “criminality” (4) so as to “tend to come” under family court jurisdiction for neglect. Thus, a conviction based on for neglect requires proof allowing the fact-finder to conclude that, more likely than not, the child will fall under one of the definitions of “neglect” in MCL 712A.2(b), and thus, more likely than not, will fall within family court jurisdiction.
*749There are no reported Michigan cases that address a conviction under MCL 750.145 on grounds of neglect. At oral argument, the prosecutor suggested that the closest Michigan case to the case at bar was the Court of Appeals unpublished decision in Antjuan Owens. Although Antjuan Owens rested its holding sustaining the defendant’s conviction on grounds of delinquency, and in doing so followed established Michigan law, we agree that this case also affords insight into what evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction based on neglect. There, the police raided a home and found only the defendant and his 13-year-old nephew inside. When the police entered, the defendant immediately ran to the basement and tried to dispose of cocaine he had in a plastic bag, leaving a revolver in plain view on the dining room table. Although the house had electricity and heat, it had no food or furniture, and was full of trash and animal feces. These facts would clearly enable a fact-finder to find grounds for neglect, either under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), because the “criminality” of a non-parent adult rendered the home an “unfit place” for a juvenile to live, or under MCL 712A.2(b)(l), because the child was not receiving the necessary care for his health, education or morals, or because his “mental well-being” was subject to a “substantial” risk of harm.
D. APPLICATION
The essential elements derived from construing MCL 750.145 in pari materia with MCL 712A.2 require us to determine whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, a rational trier of fact could find that defendant’s actions “tended to cause” the child to become delinquent or neglected, such that the child “tended to come” under family court jurisdiction.
*7501. “DELINQUENCY”
The prosecutor contends that defendant’s conviction can be sustained on grounds of delinquency.12 Referencing statutes that prohibit the possession and use of a controlled substance, the prosecutor argues that defendant’s actions “tend[ed] to cause” the child to violate these statutes and, thus, become a delinquent so as to “tend to come” under family court jurisdiction. The prosecutor supports this argument with social science research that suggests that children of parents who abuse drugs are more likely to abuse drugs themselves.
As a threshold matter, we note this research was not part of the proofs considered by the jury. However, even if it had been, we find the prosecutor’s argument inapt under MCL 750.145. First, while this argument is purportedly focused on the child involved in this case, the research is based on the life experiences of other children.13 Second, this argument does not properly *751construe “tend.” As explained, the word is commonly understood to require a level of certainty that would allow the fact-finder to determine that defendant’s actions “tended to cause” this particular child to become delinquent. Whatever the social science research cited by the prosecutor may reveal about the children who were the studies’ subjects, or even about similarly situated children in general, it is not focused on this child and his particular life experience, such that it provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s actions “tended to cause” this child — the “such child” expressly referenced in MCL 750.145 — to violate a controlled substance statute. Defendant, as with any other criminal defendant, is entitled to have his particular circumstances assessed, not those of persons collected together to participate in a university research project.
While this Court is ill-equipped to assess the merits of the research cited by the prosecutor, as a reviewing court with the full record before us, we do possess the tools, and are charged with the duty, to ensure that the “sufficiency of the evidence” standard is met. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we are unable to conclude that a rational juror could have determined that defendant’s actions “tended to cause” the child to become delinquent. By his presence in the home, the child did not violate, nor was he in danger of violating, any “municipal ordinance or law of the state or of the United States.” Nor does the record contain any evidence whatsoever that the child was “disposed or inclined” to abuse drugs, engage in criminality, or become a delinquent for any other reason. Quite simply, the prosecutor presented no evidence regarding the child’s education, behavioral history, relationships with his peers, or any other relevant fact that could support the conclusion that defendant’s *752actions “tended to cause” this child, to become delinquent. Therefore, no matter how favorably we interpret the evidence in the prosecutor’s favor, as we are required to do, defendant’s conviction cannot be sustained under MCL 750.145 on the grounds of delinquency. There simply was no evidence of any kind to sustain such a conviction.
2. "NEGLECT”
The prosecutor also argues that defendant’s conviction can be sustained on grounds of neglect. Specifically, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the child “being in that house is being subject to neglect and/or delinquency.” Again, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to allow a rational fact-finder to make such a finding. There was simply no evidence presented that the illegal drugs or firearms at issue had any impact on the child’s “mental well-being” or his “health and morals,” as there was no evidence at all that he was even aware of these items, much less of their illegality. The child’s awareness of the illegal items is critical, if not dispositive, in this case because the overall evidence is so very sparse. To review, the evidence indicated that the child was found on the couch in the living room; he had his own bedroom; drugs were found under the bed in the parents’ bedroom; the firearms were found in a dresser drawer in the parents’ bedroom; he started crying when the police entered his home; and his mother was handcuffed and given a citation. Everything the jury knew about this child was in relation to his presence in the home at the moment of the raid; the jury knew these facts and it knew nothing more. By resting her case on a theory that the child’s presence in the home plus illegal activity in the home amounts to a violation of MCL 750.145, the prosecutor made the *753child’s awareness of the illegal activity critical to sustaining defendant’s conviction. How else could a rational juror conclude that the child’s “mental well-being” was placed at “substantial risk” unless the child was aware of the firearms and drugs? How else could a rational juror conclude that defendant “refuse[d] to provide proper. . . care necessary for [the child’s] health or morals” where no evidence was presented concerning the care defendant did, or did not, provide the child? There is nothing here beyond the child’s awareness that could even conceivably establish that he had been affected by his parent’s criminal activity, much less caused to become delinquent as a result, and there is no evidence of awareness.14
*754The other relevant ground for a finding of neglect is under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), which requires a causal connection between defendant’s “criminality” and a finding that his home “as a result” constitutes an “unfit” place for the child to live. Although two criminal acts form the basis of defendant’s convictions — the illegal possession of drugs and firearms — the charging information for the MCL 750.145 violation did not even refer to the firearms. It stated only that defendant had contributed to the neglect or delinquency of the child by “exposing him to the use and sale of narcotics.” Arguably, then, defendant’s criminal act of illegally possessing firearms is immaterial to his MCL 750.145 conviction. However, because the prosecutor argued on appeal that the presence of firearms in defendant’s home put the child at risk for neglect or delinquency, and the Court of Appeals agreed, we will consider the impact of both criminal acts on the child’s home.
Here also, the absence of evidence that the child was aware of the possession of the drugs and firearms is largely dispositive.15 On the record, no rational fact-*755finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the home was rendered “unfit” “by reason of” the presence of these illegal possessions because the record does not establish that this criminality had any impact on the child’s home.
Nor, in contrast to the home in Antjuan Owens, was there any indication that defendant’s home was a “drug-house,” subject to an influx of drug purchasers, or otherwise unsanitary or uninhabitable. Rather, the record established only that the house was a furnished two-bedroom home. There is nothing from the evidence that suggests that the physical condition of the home made it in any way “unfit” for a juvenile to live in. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not reasonably find that defendant’s home was rendered an “unfit place” for the child to live “by reason of” defendant’s criminal conduct where there was no evidence at all that the child was even aware of this criminality.
Therefore, once again, no matter how favorably we interpret the evidence in the prosecutor’s favor, defendant’s conviction cannot be sustained under MCL *756750.145 on the ground of neglect. We are not prepared to accept the dissents’ syllogism that the child’s presence in the home plus illegal activity in the home equates to a violation of MCL 750.145.
IV SLIPPERY SLOPE
In deciding this case, like all cases, we are conscious that our judicial duty is “to declare what the law is . . . .” Wilson v Arnold, 5 Mich 98, 104 (1858). In attempting to discharge this duty, we have relied on traditional tools of interpretation to determine what constitutes the most reasonable meaning of relevant statutory provisions. Accordingly, our holding rests on the conclusion that defendant’s conviction cannot be sustained in accordance with the most reasonable interpretation of MCL 750.145 construed in pari materia with MCL 712A.2.
However, we would be derelict if we did not comment further on the very steep slippery slope down which our legal system would be headed if this statute were to be . given the interpretation urged by the prosecutor and the dissents, and adopted by the lower courts. We have already commented upon the extraordinarily broad, and arguably absurd, applications of MCL 750.145 resulting from an unreasonable interpretation of “tend.” However, it is also incumbent on us to point out that another, equally steep, slippery slope would be created if we were to find that a criminal conviction, by itself, constitutes a basis for a neglect or delinquency conviction under MCL 750.145. And that is what is involved in this case: a “by itself” criminal conviction serving as a basis for a neglect or delinquency conviction. Although the dissents disagree, they do not identify any relevant evidence that was presented to the jury other than the fact of the child’s presence in a *757home where the illegal activity occurred. Indeed, the dissents cannot point to such evidence because the prosecutor presented nothing more. There is no evidence of the child’s awareness that defendant was engaged in criminal behavior; there is no evidence of the child’s awareness of any contraband in his home; there is no evidence that the physical or other conditions of the home were unfit in any way for the child; there is no evidence that the educational, moral, physical, or psychological needs of the child were being neglected; and there is no evidence that defendant’s conduct had any adverse impact on the child. There is simply the fact that defendant was convicted of crimes that occurred in a home in which a child lived.
The prosecutor and the dissents would also effectively read out of the statute language requiring a causal connection between a defendant’s “criminality” and a finding that his home is “unfit” for a juvenile. No further showing would be required in order to establish a violation of MCL 750.145 than that a crime occurred in a home and that a child was present. Such a predicate for a violation of this statute has never before been thought sufficient. Presumably, prescription drug abuse, tax fraud, unlicensed work, possession of illegal “numbers” tickets or gambling paraphernalia, computer “hacking,” check kiting, illegal possession of music downloads or “pirated” DVDs, the possession of unlawful fireworks, allowing the illegal consumption of alcohol at family gatherings, and countless other criminal offenses that occur within, or have an impact upon, the home could all serve as grounds for supplemental criminal charges of “neglect and delinquency,” if not, as occurred here, as a basis for triggering an inquiry into whether parental rights should be terminated.
*758At oral argument, the prosecutor appeared to recognize this slippeiy slope. When asked whether a hypothetical case involving a parent’s possession of an illegally scalped sporting or entertainment event ticket would fall within the statute, the prosecutor responded, “I don’t know. I don’t think I would feel comfortable arguing to a jury that going to a football game with some tickets bought from a scalper produces the substantial risk [to] mental well-being. I don’t think that does fall within the statute.” When asked if she was suggesting that this Court rely exclusively on the good judgment of the prosecutor not to bring such a case rather than on the law itself, the prosecutor answered, “Well, and if the prosecutor misuses their judgment you would deal with it in the appropriate case as well.” However, this Court does not review the discretionary charging judgments of the prosecutor, but rather the prosecutor’s compliance with the law. And despite the prosecutor’s initial assertion in this case that ticket scalping “does [not] fall within the statute,” it is clear that there is no basis whatsoever in the prosecutor’s own interpretation of the law that would allow for a ticket-scalping exception or that would distinguish between criminal offenses.16
*759Although we do not question in any way the sound judgment of Michigan prosecutors, including, and especially, the prosecutors in this case, the decisions of this Court cannot in the end rest on confidence in the judgment of prosecutors. Rather, these decisions must rely on the law. We respectfully reject the prosecutor’s reading of MCL 750.145, because we believe it is wrong and reads out of that statute the requirement that there be a causal connection between defendant’s criminal conduct and a child’s neglect or delinquency. However, to the extent that there is any concern about the slippery slope that has been identified, we are not *760assuaged by the assurance that this problem can be ameliorated by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
V RESPONSE TO DISSENTS
In their dissents, Justices CORRIGAN and YOUNG take issue with our interpretation of the relevant statutes, our application of the law, and, most insistently, with the result that we reach. While we have addressed discrete points of disagreement throughout this opinion, it is necessary to respond more generally to our differing perspectives.
First, we respectfully disagree that this case is as “simple” as the dissenters would have it.17 Rather, this case requires consideration of two statutes, each of which employs language with multiple definitions that could produce varying interpretations. Moreover, the propriety of a conviction under MCL 750.145 based on the kind of facts that exist here constitutes not only a matter of first impression but would, in our judgment, lead to the increasingly routine use of MCL 750.145 as a supplemental charge in cases in which contraband is located in a home and there is also a child present in that home. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for this Court to thoroughly consider this statute before it is applied in ways never before contemplated in the stat*761ute’s more than six-decade history. In doing so, we have used traditional tools of interpretation to discern the intent of the Legislature, an approach to statutory interpretation that we would not expect the authors of the dissents to find objectionable. In particular, we fail to see how this opinion is “disloyal to the plain text” of the relevant statutes, or that it is based on a “speculative belief about the Legislature’s intent,” whatever the latter phrase means. We find these characterizations especially ironic in view of the fact that the dissenting opinions barely engage at all in the threshold task of statutory interpretation. Thus, it is difficult to point to specific areas of disagreement concerning our respective analyses; rather, the principal difference between our approaches seems to be whether the statute is or is not so “simple” that it requires any analysis at all.
Second, unlike the dissents, we find it significant that a conviction under MCL 750.145 based on neglect — the only ground that the dissents discuss at all — is unprecedented in this state.18 The dissents cite no caselaw to support the result they reach because no such caselaw exists. Further, unlike the dissents, we find it significant that the facts of this case are substantially far afield from the case the prosecutor offered as its closest factual analogue. Yet despite the dissents’ apparent recognition that there is no evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction on grounds of delinquency, despite the fact that there is no caselaw in Michigan to support their argument based on neglect, and despite the fact that the case the prosecutor offered is factually inapposite, the dissents would apply this statute in a way that has never before been contemplated in the *762statute’s over 60-year history, without even taking notice of the absence of authority for their position. We believe that the prudent exercise of our judicial responsibilities at least requires us to consider relevant authority, or the lack thereof, before taking the law of this state into uncharted territory.
Third, we disagree with the dissents that it is we who misconstrue the “sufficiency of the evidence” standard. This standard makes clear that a reviewing court is required to take the evidence produced at trial in a light favorable to the prosecutor.19 As such, this standard does not, and never has, require the affirmance of every criminal conviction, as might be the case if a reviewing court were instead to view the prosecutor’s preferred outcome in a light favorable to the prosecutor. As already discussed, the prosecutor here produced no evidence at trial relevant to the MCL 750.145 charge, other than the fact that the child was present in the home when the contraband was found. We agree with the dissents that this statute is designed to capture behavior injurious to children, and thus find it highly significant that the record is so bereft of evidence concerning the child. The dissents have been more diligent than the prosecutor herself in seeking to sustain this charge, with the latter having barely mentioned the charge in closing argument and having chosen not even to address the elements of the crime, or define the operative statutory language, for the jury. However, it is the arguments of the prosecutor that this *763Court assesses, not those of dissenting justices.20 The prosecutor did not satisfy even her minimal burden of presenting some evidence at trial that would allow a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sustaining defendant’s conviction on this record would simply eviscerate the “sufficiency of the evidence” requirement that is “ ‘part of every criminal defendant’s due process rights.’ ” People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999) (citation omitted).21
VI. CONCLUSION
We recognize that the facts here engender no sympathy for defendant. It is easy to understand, and even applaud, the admonition delivered by the trial court to defendant at sentencing, when it stated, “I’m not going to tolerate this kind of behavior by a parent of a child in this state.” As with the trial court and the dissents, we desire more for the children of this state than a parent who keeps contraband in the home. The fact remains that the evidence presented in this case cannot sustain *764defendant’s conviction under MCL 750.145, and, if it could, we could expect to see this statute increasingly employed in ways that have not been contemplated in its long history and in situations that go far beyond what we believe was intended by the Legislature.
On the facts of this case, where the jury was presented with no evidence other than that a child was present in a home where criminal activity occurred, we hold that a rational fact-finder could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant “tend[ed] to cause” the child to become delinquent or neglected so as to “tend to come” under family court jurisdiction, as those terms are defined by MCL 712A.2. To adopt the theory that a child’s presence in the home plus illegal activity in the home amounts to a violation of MCL 750.145 is inconsistent with the language of this statute, and incompatible with past judicial practice in this state. Moreover, it would transform MCL 750.145 into an increasingly routine appendage to other criminal charges, serving thereby as an increasingly routine trigger for the initiation of proceedings by the Department of Human Services for the termination of parental rights. We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate defendant’s conviction under MCL 750.145, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Defendant’s convictions for drug and firearm possession remain intact.
Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh and Hathaway, JJ., concurred with Markman, J.