On November 6, 1946, a criminal information was filed in the District Court of Burleigh County, charging that the defendant “. . . did commit the crime of selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, committed in the manner following, to-wit: That at the said time and place the said defendant did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell intoxicating liquor to a minor (to-wit: to Robert Godfrey, who was then of the age of eighteen years or thereabouts).” On the same day the defendant was arraigned and appearing in person and by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. On November 30, 1946, the defendant appeared in person and by counsel and withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of selling intoxicating liquor to a minor. On January 6, 1947, the defendant *389again being present in court and being represented by counsel, tbe State’s Attorney moved pronouncement of sentence. Tbe Clerk’s minutes show tbat at tbat time defendant’s attorney . . objects to tbe passing of any sentence on tbe Defendant because, be says, there is no penalty on tbe matter in. tbe statute as amended, and for tbat reason says no sentence be pronounced.” On January 11,1947, tbe court sentenced tbe defendant to thirty days in tbe county jail and a fine of $50 and costs taxed at $10. In default of tbe payment of fine and costs tbe defendant was ordered committed to jail for an additional thirty days. This appeal is taken from tbe judgment and sentence thus pronounced.
Tbe defendant specifies tbe following errors:
“I. Tbe Court erred in pronouncing judgment and sentence on tbe Defendant in tbe crime of selling intoxicating liquor to a minor for tbe reason tbat tbe same offense is not a crime and was not a crime at tbe time of tbe entry of judgment.
“II. Tbe Court erred in entering judgment and imposing sentence on tbe Defendant for a term of thirty (30) days in jail and payment of a fine of Fifty Dollars ($50) and costs for tbe reason tbat tbe Court was without authority and jurisdiction to impose said sentence for the reason that there was no penalty provided by law at the time of entry of said judgment.”
The first question is whether the information states and tbe defendant pleaded guilty to a criminal offense under tbe statutes of North Dakota. At the time of tbe commission of tbe alleged offense and tbe imposition of sentence therefor, Cb 52 Sess Laws ND 1945 provided: “No person shall sell or deliver any beer, alcohol or alcoholic beverages to any person under tbe age of 21 years, incompetent person, Indian as defined by federal law, or a person who is an inebriate, or habitual drunkard.” Tbe statute also repealed §§ 5-0210 and 5-0318, Rev Code ND 1943. *
*390The latter section read as follows: “No person shall sell any liquor to a minor, incompetent person, Indian as defined by federal law, or a person who is an inebriate, or habitual drunkard.” The important change made by the new statute was the substitution of “any person under the age of 21 years” in place of “a minor.”
Section 14r-1001, Eev Code ND 1943, defines minors as: “1. Males under twenty-one years of age; and 2. Females under eighteen years of age.” The change thus wrought by the statute added to the list of those to whom the sale of alcoholic beverages was forbidden, females between the age of eighteen and twenty-one years.
Under Par 2 of § 29-1110, Eev Code ND 1943, an information is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense in terms of the statute or . . in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice of the offense which is intended to he charged.” The sufficiency of the information was not challenged by a motion to set aside, a motion to quash or a motion in arrest of judgment. The only objection to passing sentence was made orally and upon the ground that no penalty was provided by the statute.
The information in question charges that the defendant sold intoxicating liquor to a minor', that his name was Eobert GrocL-*391frey, and that he was of the age of eighteen years or thereabouts. The sufficiency of this language is challenged for the first time on this appeal. Under these circumstances the wording of the information will he viewed less strictly than if it had been challenged in the court below. See State v. Johnson, 17 ND 554, 118 NW 230; State v. Rhoades, 17 ND 579, 118 NW 233; State v. Anderson, 66 ND 522, 267 NW 121.
When these proceedings are viewed as a whole there can be no question but that the defendant was not misled and that he voluntarily pleaded guilty to the commission of an act forbidden by statute, namely, the sale of alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age.
The second specification of- error challenges the right of the court to impose the sentence. It is argued that since Ch 52, Sess Laws ND 1945, contains no penalty, none can be imposed by the court. The absence of a penalty provision in the statute in question does not mean that no punishment may be inflicted for its violation.
Section 12-1727, Rev Code ND 1943, provides that: “When the performance of an act is prohibited by any statute and no penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed in any statute, the doing of such act is a misdemeanor.”
Section 12-0614, Rev Code ND 1943, provides a general penalty for misdemeanors in the following language: “Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by law, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
The situation here presented falls squarely within the provisions of these statutes. Ch 52, Sess Laws ND 1945, forbids the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons under twenty-one years of age. It provides no penalty. Section 12-1727, Rev Code ND 1943, declares that the doing of such an act is a misdemeanor. The court sentenced the defendant to thirty days in jail and a fine of $50, which falls within the punishment prescribed by § 12-0614, Rev Code ND 1943. Thus it appears that *392the contention of the defendant that no punishment could he imposed by the court is without merit.
The identical question under similar statutes was presented to the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. York, 131 Iowa 635, 109 NW 122. It was there decided that the general statutory punishment for misdemeanors applied for the violation of an act containing prohibitive language but providing no penalty for the violation thereof. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
ChkistiaNSON, Ch. J., and Burke, Nuessle and Burr, JJ., concur.