We are asked to decide a question of first impression in interpreting the Anti-Kickback Act (the “AKA” or the “Act”), 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-58.1 At issue is whether, and if so under what conditions, 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(l)’s civil suit provision extends vicarious liability to an employer for the acts of its employees. Employees of Defendant-Appellee Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (“KBR”) allegedly accepted kickbacks from two companies angling to win subcontracts on KBR’s prime contract to service American armed forces in military theaters across the globe. Intervenor-Appellant, the United States, wishes to hold KBR liable for the kickbacks.
For the reasons outlined below, we conclude the district court erred in finding that § 55(a)(1) does not allow the government to allege vicarious liability. We REVERSE its ruling granting KBR’s motion to dismiss the government’s AKA claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and REMAND for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS2
In 2001, KBR secured a contract to provide global logistical services to the United *345States Army; an agreement known as Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III (“LOGCAP III”). LOGCAP III was structured as an “indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract,” -under which the Army issues KBR discrete task orders that KBR may fulfill on its own or by retaining subcontractors. KBR periodically bills the Army for the costs of performing the task orders, including costs incurred by its subcontractors, and is also permitted to charge the Army mark ups of one percent as profit and an award fee of up to two percent. KBR engaged two subcontractors, EGL, Inc. (“EGL”) and Panalpina, Inc. (“Panalpina”) to assist in carrying out LOGCAP III task orders to transport military equipment and supplies to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait between 2002 and 2006.
As the government alleges, employees in KBR’s transportation department accepted kickbacks from counterparts in EGL and Panalpina calculated to “obtain favorable treatment on ... subcontracts with KBR, such as overlooking service failures and continuing to award new subcontracts ... despite such failures.” The allegations center on KBR’s Corporate Traffic Supervisor for LOGCAP III, Robert Bennett. Bennett was responsible for overseeing EGL’s and Panalpina’s performances on LOGCAP III subcontracts and for reviewing the invoices those subcontractors billed KBR for their services. From 2002 to 2006, Bennett and four colleagues in the KBR transportation department accepted kickbacks from Kevin Smoot, managing director of EGL’s freight forwarding station, as well as other EGL employees acting on Smoot’s instructions, on at least ninety-three occasions. The benefits ranged from “meals, drinks, golf outings, tickets to rodeo events, baseball games, football games, and other gifts and entertainment.” Between 2003 and 2006, Panalpina’s account- representative for the LOGCAP III subcontracts, Grant Watt-man, and other Panalpina employees acting at Wattman’s behest, provided Bennett and KBR colleagues kickbacks on fifty-five occasions in the form of “meals, drinks, golf outings, and other gifts and entertainment.” 3
This civil action commenced when two private individuals brought a qui tarn suit against KBR, Bennett, and others for the kickback scheme. The government intervened in the case against KBR and filed its own complaint. KBR moved to dismiss the government’s complaint.' As relevant to the present appeal, KBR argued the government failed to state a claim for civil liability under the AKA, because 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) does not permit vicarious liability. In the alternative, it contended the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to attribute Bennett’s and his transportation department colleagues’ conduct to KBR. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the AKA count for failure to state a claim, finding that “the plain language of § 55(a) indicates that corporate vicarious liability” does not extend to violations of § 55(a)(1). It further noted that “[b]ecause the United States has not sufficiently alleged that KBR employees were acting for the corporation’s benefit, imputation [of vicarious liability] is not appropriate in this case.”
To obtain final judgment, the government voluntarily dismissed all of its remaining claims and filed the present ap*346peal. The government solely challenges the district court’s ruling on the AKA count.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo. United States ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Cont'l Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869, 872 (5th Cir.2008). We “accept. ‘all well pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ ” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 553 (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007)). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
We begin with a brief description of the relevant provisions of the AKA, before reaching the two merits issues raised on appeal: whether § 55(a)(1) provides for vicarious liability, and, if it does, whether the government sufficiently imputes liability to KBR in its complaint.
A. The Anti-Kickback Act’s, Civil Lia; bility Provisions
“In the idiom of economic crime, a ‘kickback’ is a kind of commercial bribe.” United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 242 (2d Cir.1998). Congress enacted the AKA in 1946, responding to reports revealing that World War II defense subcontractors paid fees to prime contractors to gain valuable military subcontracts. Id. at 242-43; see S.Rep. No. 99-435, at 3 (1986). The taxpayer typically bore the cost of the fees, as prime contractors charged the government subcontract -costs inflated by the amount of such “kickbacks.” See United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 143, 87 S.Ct. 350, 17 L.Ed.2d 249 (1966); Purdy, 144 F.3d at 242-43.
The AKA presently defines a “kickback” as:
any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or compensation of any kind that is provided to a prime contractor, prime contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee to improperly obtain or reward favorable treatment in connection with a prime contract4 or a subcontract5 relating to a prime contract.
41 U.S.C. § 52(2). It states that:
A person may not—
(1) provide, attempt to provide, or offer to provide a kickback;
(2) solicit, accept, or attempt to accept a kickback; or
(3) include the amount of a kickback prohibited by paragraph (1) or (2) in the contract price—
(A) a subcontractor charges a prime contractor or a higher tier subcontractor; or
(B) a prime contractor charges the Federal Government.
§ 53. The AKA defines “person” to include both an “individual” and “a corporation, partnership, business association of any *347kind, trust, [or] joint-stock company.” § 52(3). As the district court found, the parties do not dispute, at least for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that the benefits provided to Bennett and other KBR employees were kickbacks given to prime contractor employees by subcontractor employees.
The case turns on interpreting the civil liability provisions of the AKA, codified at 41 U.S.C. § 55(a). Section 55(a), “Civil Actions,” provides:
(a) Amount. — The Federal Government in a civil action may recover from a person—
(1) that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section [53] of this title a civil penalty equal to—
(A) twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and
(B) not more than $[11,000]6 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and
(2) whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates section [53] of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.
41 U.S.C. § 55(a). Section 55(a)’s present civil liability provisions are the product of the Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986, a series of amendments intended “to strengthen the prohibition of kickbacks relating to subcontracts] under Federal Government contracts.” Pub.L. No. 99-634, 100 Stat. 3523. Previously, the government could recover only the value of a kickback and could obtain relief only from the kickback’s recipient or the subcontractor who provided it. See 41 U:S.C. § 51 (1982). The 1986 amendments reshaped the civil damages remedies by permitting, in § 55(a)(1), recovery of double damages and per-occurrenee penalties from knowing violators of the Act. See Pub.L. No. 99-634, § 5, 100 Stat. 3523; H.R.Rep. No. 99-964, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5967.7 In § 55(a)(2), the 1986 amendments added recovery of the cost of the kickback from prime contractors and higher tier subcontractors for kickback activity on the part of their employees or subcontractors. See Pub.L. No. 99-634, § 5, 100 Stat. 3523; H.R.Rep. No. 99-964, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5967. The government, in this case, only alleges a violation of § 55(a)(1).
B. Whether § 55(a)(1) Permits Holding Employers Vicariously Liable
We turn to whether the government may ever bring a suit under § 55(a)(1) alleging an employer is vicariously liable for the kickback-related conduct of its employees.8 When interpreting a statute, our analysis begins with its text. See In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 759-60 (5th *348Cir.2012) (en banc). The district court reasoned primarily from the text and structure of § 55(a), arguing that to provide for vicarious liability under § 55(a)(1) “would render Congress’s reference to fraud committed by an ‘employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee,’ which appears only in § 55(a)(2), superfluous.” It stated that if the government -could pursue employers under § 55(a)(1), with its double damages and per-occurrence penalty provisions, § 55(a)(2) would lose its relevance because it provides for recovery of the value of the kickback only. Under the district court’s approach, Congress contemplated that persons would be held liable for their employees and subcontractors under subsection (a)(2) but not under (a)(1).
The district court’s reading gives individual expression to both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), but it insufficiently accounts for the fact that both of § 55(a)’s subsections allow the government to “recover from a person.” See § 55(a) (emphasis added). Congress defined “person” broadly in the AKA, to include corporations and other business entities. 41 U.S.C. § 52(3); see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 782, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (“the presumption with regard to corporations is ... they are presumptively covered by the term ‘person’ ”) (citing the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1). By § 55(a)’s plain terms, a corporate person, and not solely its individual employees, can be held liable under both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States (KBR I), 99 Fed.Cl. 488, 504 (2011). Furthermore, when Congress creates causes of action in tort, we must assume “it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.” Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003). It is well-established that “[a] corporation is only a legal entity and strictly speaking it cannot act or have a mental state by itself. Nevertheless, the acts and mental states of its agents and employees will be imputed to the corporation where such natural persons acted on behalf of the corporation.” 10 William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 4877 (2012 ed.) (internal citations omitted). Since Section 55(a)(1) makes corporations liable for kickback activity, it requires attributing liability to corporate entities for that activity under a rule of vicarious liability.
Congress’s decision to provide for vicarious liability under both subsections does not render § 55(a)(2) superfluous. Under § -55(a)(1), the government must prove a “knowing! ]” violation before it may obtain double damages and per-occurrence recoveries. See § 55(a)(1). Section 55(a)(2) requires no proof of “knowing” misconduct before allowing recovery of “a civil penalty equal to the amount of th[e] kickback.” See § 55(a)(2). Like the Court of Federal Claims, we find “[i]t is entirely consistent for the statute to punish knowing violations more severely than those of which the corporation was unaware.” See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States (KBR II), 103 Fed.Cl. 714, 773 (2012). We conclude that § 55(a)(1) permits the government to attribute liability to corporate defendants vicariously.9
We add that we appreciate Judge Jolly’s separate effort, in concurrence, to explore the distinction between the “knowing!]” *349violations contemplated in § 55(a)(1) and those acts encompassed by § 55(a)(2). We are mindful, however, that this issue of statutory interpretation was neither squarely presented to us by the parties on appeal, nor relied upon by the district court. We respectfully decline to reach the question, unnecessary as it is to our holding, on our own initiative. Even consistent with Judge Jolly’s approach to the text, as he admits, defining what “knowingly” entails in the context of the AKA is a nuanced, fact-reliant question .unsuited for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. See In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 & n. 20 (5th Cir.2001); see also United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir.1977) (holding, in the False Claims Act context, that “liability of a corporation ... may arise from the conduct of employees other than those with ‘substantial authority and broad responsibility.’”). Lacking development of the record, we emphasize that we make no determination as to the knowledge requirement of this statute, pleaded by the government in its complaint.
C. Whether the Complaint Sufficiently Alleges Vicarious Liability
We next reach KBR’s challenge to whether the government pleaded facts sufficient to hold KBR liable for the conduct of its employees. When grappling with the standard for imposing vicarious liability in civil liability provisions, we look to the common law principles distilled in the Restatement (Second) of Agency for guidance. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 542; 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME), 456 U.S. 556, 565-66 & n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 72 L.Ed.2d 330 (1982); United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 498-500 (5th Cir.1966). Under the default, common law rule of vicarious liability, “[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment,”10 dr, if the act is committed outside the scope of employment, if “the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958) (emphasis added); accord ASME, 456 U.S. at 565-67, 102 S.Ct. 1935; see also In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d at 395. The government, for its part, neither avers in its complaint nor advances on appeal that the KBR officials accepting bribes: did so within the scope of their employment. The government instead argues the KBR officials acted within their apparent authority. “ ‘Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other’s manifestations to such third persons.’ ” ASME, 456 U.S. at 566 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 1935 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8 (1958)). *350As the Supreme Court has further explained, “one who appears to have authority to make statements for the [principal] gives to his statements the weight of the [principal’s] reputation.” Id. at 567, 102 S.Ct. 1935 (internal quotation marks omitted).
KBR’s challenge is that the AKA’s language and structure indicate congressional intent to deviate from the default rule and require the government to plead, and later to prove, a narrower theory of vicarious liability than apparent authority. KBR urges principally that the government must allege KBR employees acted with an intent to benefit KBR and were of managerial level acting within the scope of their employment, before the government may state a claim imputing liability to KBR. We disagree, not being persuaded judicially to interpret this statute to apply restrictive notions of vicarious liability.
Specifically, and starting with the intent-to-benefit requirement, the district court buttressed its decision to grant the motion to dismiss by noting that the government could not, in any event, impute vicarious liability to KBR for “knowingly” violating § 55(a)(1) because, it had “not sufficiently alleged that KBR employees were acting for the corporation’s benefit.” The district court relied on our decision in Ridglea, 357 F.2d 495, for the act-to-benefit standard, and KBR does the same on appeal.
In Ridglea, the government sought to hold two banks liable under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) for the conduct of a former employee who knowingly approved false and fraudulent Federal Housing Authority loan applications while working at the banks. 357 F.2d at 496. The version of the FCA in effect at the time gave the government the right to recover, for knowing violations of the law, double damages and a forfeiture of $2000 for each false claim. See id. at 499. In deciding whether the banks could be held liable, we noted the government’s reliance on case law establishing “that in most civil cases the employer is held liable for the fraudulent misrepresentations of his agent, even though the agent acted without any intent to benefit his employer, so long as the third person reasonably believed that the agent was acting within the scope of his employment.” Id. at 499. We distinguished the case before us, however, reasoning: “All of these authorities concern civil actions to recover actual loss caused by the misrepresentations of an employee; not, as here, actions to recover forfeitures ánd double damages far in excess of actual loss.” Id.
We focused particularly on the FCA’s $2000 forfeiture provision, which “ha[d] been held to be mandatory and beyond the power of the courts to modify no matter how disproportionate the forfeiture may seem in relation to the actual damage suffered by the Government.” Id. at 499. Consequently, the government would have received “a recovery wholly out of proportion to actual loss” and we observed further that the bank employee was additionally liable for criminal penalties. Id. at 500. In light of the disproportionate civil sanctions at issue, we sought guidance in the vicarious liability principles that govern criminal law. See id. at 498-500 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 217D cmt. d, 235 (1958)). We incorporated the criminal standard into the civil FCA in part, holding “that the knowledge or guilty intent of an agent not acting with a purpose to benefit his employer, will not be imputed to the employer, when the latter is sought to be held liable under a statute requiring knowledge or guilty intent.” Id. at 499-500.
We have elaborated little on the holding in Ridglea nor have we applied it to any *351other civil statute.11 In Ridglea itself, we acknowledged the outcome was in tension with precedent generally construing FCA double damages and forfeiture provisions. Id. at 500 (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (upholding the FCA against Double Jeopardy Clause challenge as a penal sanction, concluding that “[w]e cannot say that the remedy now before us requiring payment of a lump sum and double damages will do more than afford the government complete indemnity for the injuries done it”)); see also United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 315 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 523, 46 L.Ed.2d 514 (1976); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (assessing the Double Jeopardy Clause implications of FCA civil awards, describing “that the' Government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages.”), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997).
Moreover, since Ridglea, the Supreme Court has provided additional guidance in evaluating the elements required to assert vicarious liability under federal civil suit provisions. In ASME, 456 U.S. at 558-59, 102 S.Ct. 1935, the Court addressed whether ASME, a non-profit engineering standard-setting body, could be held liable under the Sherman Antitrust Act for the fraudulent activity of members of one of its subcommittees, “performed with apparent authority.” The Court reiterated “that under general rules of agency law, principals are liable when their agents act with apparent authority and commit torts analogous to the antitrust violation presented by this case,” including when “the agent acts solely to benefit himself.” Id. at 565-66, 102 S.Ct. 1935; see also id. at 567, 102 S.Ct. 1935 (“The apparent authority theory has long been the settled rule in the federal system.”). Turning to the antitrust law’s statutory purpose, the Court found that “the apparent authority theory is consistent with the congressional intent to encourage competition.” Id. at 570, 102 S.Ct. 1935. It also noted that requiring an employee act to benefit the employer before imputing liability would stymie the law’s purpose. Id. at 573-74, 102 S.Ct. 1935. The Court further rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Ridglea to argue the antitrust statute’s treble damages remedy was punitive such that it triggered more restrictive vicarious liability rules. Id. at 574-76 & n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1935. The Court acknowledged that the treble damages provision was “designed in part to punish past violations,” but stated that it functioned “primarily as a remedy for the victims” and also as a deterrent. Id. at 575, 102 S.Ct. 1935. It concluded: “Since treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of compensating victims, it is in accord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and principles of agency law to hold ASME liable for the acts of agents committed with apparent authority.” Id. at 575-76, 102 S.Ct. 1935. Under ASME, we must construe federal civil remedies statutes in harmony with the common law apparent authority rule for *352attributing vicarious liability, unless Congress signals its intent to adopt a different approach. See id. at 568-70 & n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1935.
Applying those principles, we first find § 55(a)(1) is meaningfully distinct from the provisions we analyzed in Ridglea. The per-occurrence penalty in the AEA, unlike the mandatory $2000 forfeiture at issue in Ridglea, is not obligatory upon finding the defendant liable. The Act provides that the government “may recover ... not more than $[11,000] for each occurrence of prohibited conduct,” § 55(a)(1) (emphasis added). Courts retain the discretion to tailor the size of the per-occurrence penalty they award under § 55(a)(1) to fit the facts of the case. See United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir.1998) (observing, in conducting an Excessive Fines Clause analysis of an award under § 55(a)(1), that the district court declined to permit recovery beyond double damages); Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed.Cl. 116, 122-23 (2007) (finding that imposing the per-occurrence penalty “is warranted in this case”). It is true, as KBR emphasizes, that the double damages and per-oeeurrence penalties may result in recoveries in excess of the proven value of the kickback exchanged. Nonetheless, in construing a prior version of the AKA, the Supreme Court emphasized the insufficiency of recovering the simple, estimated dollar value of a kickback to fully compensate the government for its kickback-related losses:
The second false assumption underlying Acme’s argument is that the increased cost of the Government is necessarily equal to the amount of the kickback which is recoverable. Of course, a subcontractor who must pay a kickback is likely to include the amount of the kickback in his contract price. But this is not all. A subcontractor who anticipates obtaining a subcontract by virtue of a kickback has little incentive to stint on his cost estimates. Since he plans to obtain the subcontract without regard to the economic merits of his proposal, he will be tempted to inflate that proposal by more than the amount of the kickback. And even if the Government could isolate and recover the inflation attributable to the kickback, it would still be saddled with a subcontractor who, having obtained the job other than on merit, is perhaps entirely unreliable in other ways. This unreliability in turn undermines the security of the prime contractor’s performance — a result which the public cannot tolerate, especially where, as here, important defense contracts are involved.
Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. at 144-45, 87 S.Ct. 350;. see also ASME, 456 U.S. at 575, 102 S.Ct. 1935 (noting the treble damages provision at issue helped compensate for the costs in bringing a private suit). We discern no persuasive evidence of congressional intent in § 55(a) to vary from the common law norm of permitting vicarious liability for employee actions taken under apparent authority.12
*353KBR also argues we should apply “heightened proof’ requirements hewn by the law of vicarious liability applicable to punitive damages statutes, including that offending employees,must have acted within their scope of employment and have been of managerial rank. In Kolstad, the Supreme Court made clear that “[t]he common law has long recognized that agency principles limit vicarious liability for punitive awards,” a rule “this Court historically has endorsed.” 527 U.S. at 541, 119 S.Ct. 2118; see also id. at 542-43, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (quoting and applying Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217C (1958), which separately enumerates rules for vicarious liability for punitive damages). KBR reasons that- § 55(a)(1) is a statute with a punitive purpose. Nonetheless, KBR cites no case in which a court has applied punitive damages vicarious liability principles to a statute that, by its terms, does not expressly provide for punitive damages.13 Rather, the Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in ASME, finding the deterrence and compensatory rationales of the antitrust laws required applying an apparent authority' rule, in spite of those laws also bearing punitive characteristics. 456 U.S. at 575-76, 102 S.Ct. 1935. We see no cause in the AKA to stretch Kolstad’s holding expansively, as KBR’s position requires. See United States ex rel. Bryant v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 158 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1006, 1008 (D.S.D.2001) (rejecting the argument that Kolstad should apply to the FCA because of the FCA’s punitive purposes).
Nor does § 55(a)(1), with its caps on the damages the government may recover, bear the hallmarks of a punitive damages provision. See Restatement (First) of Torts § 908 (1939) (providing that punitive damages are “awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct,” and “their allowance and amount are within the discretion of the trier of fact”). That dissimilarity is significant because the Restatement (Second) of Agency cautions that the punitive damages rule “stated in this Section does not apply to the interpretation of special statutes such as those giving triple damages, as to which no statement is made.” Restatement (Second) of Agency ' § 217C cmt. c (1958). Likewise, the Supreme Court has observed that while the treble damages and civil forfeitures provisions in the FCA may be punitive in some respects, “[tjreble damages certainly do not equate with classic punitive damages, which leave the jury with open-ended discretion over the amount.” Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 131-32, 123 S.Ct. 1239, 155 L.Ed.2d 247 (2003). We decline to apply law crafted in the context of punitive damages provisions to alter the generally applicable common law rules for a non-punitive-damages law like the AKA. We conclude that neither the aet-to-benefit pleading standard we adopted in -Ridglea, nor standards fitted to punitive damages statutes, govern when alleging a violation of § 55(a)(1). We find the government at this threshold point has adequately stated an AKA claim.14
*354CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s ruling granting KBR’s motion to dismiss for failure to state an AKA claim under § 55(a)(1), and we REMAND for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.