Plaintiff Virginia Cooper is the mortgagee in a chattel mortgage, executed by Frank J.' LaBuda as mortgagor on November 4, 1938. This mortgage was given to secure the payment of a promissory note in the sum of $500, with 6 per cent, interest thereon. The mortgage was duly recorded and covers personal property located in a beer tavern then owned and operated by LaBuda.
Subsequently one Fred Teichman, Jr., became LaBuda ’s partner, the venture was unsuccessful, LaBuda filed a bill in chancery for the dissolution of the partnership, and a receiver was appointed. The partnership had a number of creditors, some of whom had liens on the partnership property superior to that of plaintiff. In addition, the State, county and city also had liens for unpaid taxes. On April 28, 1939, the court, after notice to creditors, authorized the receiver to sell the physical assets at private sale at a price of not less than $2,300, and to execute and deliver an assignment of the State liquor license to the purchaser. The defendant, Fred Teichman, Sr., who owns the building in which the tavern is located, was the purchaser at the sale.
Sometime after the judicial sale of the partnership assets, plaintiff sought foreclosure of her chattel mortgage in equity. A decree was entered on May 15, 1941, in which it was determined that plaintiff had a valid mortgage on the personalty enumerated therein in the amount of $575. This decree further *739provided that defendant Fred Teichman, Sr., was “subrogated to the rights of various prior lien-holders to the extent of the amount advanced” by him in payment of these liens. The decree also contained an order of reference of the matter to a circuit court commissioner for the sole “purpose of determining the exact amount due Fred Teichman, Sr.”
No appeahwas taken by plaintiff from this decree. The matter was referred, objections were filed to the findings and recommendation of the commissioner; on motion of the defendant the findings were stricken, and the commissioner’s report vacated. After the filing of a written stipulation of the parties as to the exact amounts of the several liens, a second decree was entered on November 12, 1942, in which the recitals and determinations of the decree of May 15, 1941, were repeated and the exact amount of defendant’s subrogation fixed. The decree of November 12, 1942, differs from the decree of May 15,1941, only in that the 1942 decree establishes the amount plaintiff shall pay defendant for the prior liens to which defendant was subrogated by the 1941 decree.
Plaintiff did not appeal from the 1941 decree, but has appealed from the 1942 decree, asserting that defendant as a purchaser at a judicial sale is not entitled to be subrogated to prior liens, and that his action was in effect a fraudulent attempt to wipe out mortgage liens. Defendant asks that plaintiff’s appeal be dismissed because the decree of May 15,1941, was a final and appealable one in which the only question left for future determination was the amount of the prior liens, and that plaintiff, by her appeal filed November 17, 1942, can only question (which she does not) the correctness of the amounts of the several liens in question.
*740For the sake of clarity the two decrees are printed in the margin hereof.*
Decision turns on whether the decree entered May 15,1941, was a final and appealable one.
Prior to Webber v. Randall, 89 Mich. 531, “there appears to be some little confusion in the cases as to what is a final decree.” '.In that case the court held that a decree which settled the rights of both parties and left nothing further to be done than to determine the amount due complainant upon an accounting made upon a basis fixed by such decree was final and appealable. See, also, Perrin v. Lepper, 72 Mich. 454, 541.
In Hake v. Coach, 105 Mich. 425, involving a partnership accounting, a decree was made adjudging the rights of the parties and ordering a reference to a special commissioner to state an account. Coach *741appealed and Hake moved to dismiss the appeal. The court, in holding the decree appealable and denying Hake’s motion, said:
“In the decree in the present case the defendant is deprived of a substantial right if his claim is supported by the evidence taken. Under his answer and cross bill, he claims that he is entitled to all the profits made upon a certain transaction, and that he is also entitled to all the interest in certain lands or the timber on certain lands which he purchased individually, and- for his individual use. The order or decree of the circuit court makes final disposition of these questions, and directs an accounting thereon,”
In Commissioner of Insurance v. Lloyds Insurance Co. of America, Inc., 287 Mich. 599, the problem was *742again discussed and the rule repeated that “the right to appeal is determined not by the form of the order or decree but by its effect.”
The first decree in the instant case made a final disposition of the questions of defendant’s subrogation and plaintiff’s right of foreclosure. It also fixed the basis for determining the exact amount of subrogation. The second decree only added thereto a determination of the amount due defendant. Therefore, the decree entered May 15,1941, was a final and appealable one.
Can the present appeal, filed November 17, 1942, be considered as an application for delayed appeal from the decree of May 15, 1941 ?
*743Court Rule No. 57, § 3 (1933), provides that this court — “may in its discretion, within such further time as may be permitted by law, grant leave to appeal, upon showing, supported by affidavit, that there is merit in the claim for appeal and that the delay was not due to appellant’s culpable negligence.” (Italics ours).
See, also, Court Rule No. 72, § 1 (g) (1933).
The time permitted by law is fixed by 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15510 (Stat. Ann. 1943 Rev. § 27.2610), and provides that the time for perfecting an appeal shall not be extended for more than one year from the entry of the order or decree appealed from, and *744“may be extended, not exceeding six months from the expiration” of one year, by this court. Obviously more than one year and six months had elapsed between the date of entry of the first decree and the date of filing the instant appeal. A delayed appeal cannot therefore be allowed.
The motion to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal is granted, with costs to appellee.
North, C. J., and Starr, Wiest, Butzel, Sharpe, Boyles, and Reid, JJ., concurred.