The primary question in these consolidated appeals that invokes our jurisdiction is the constitutionality of Chapter 18,965, Special Acts of Florida, 1937, and Chapter 19,211, General Laws of Florida, 1939,1 which were upheld by the trial court below.
The Appellants have filed a direct appeal from an order of the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County entitled, “Order Determining That Title to Lands Involved in This Suit is Vested in Plaintiff [Bellemead Development Corp.] and Quieting the Title Thereto and Retaining Jurisdiction for the Court to Determine Whether or not Defendants or any of Them are Entitled to Recover Attorney’s Fees and/or Costs and/or Damages from Plaintiff,” wherein the trial court upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 19,211, General Laws of 1939 and Chapter 18,965, Special Acts of 1937.
The essential facts of this cause, which arises from a complaint to quiet title to certain described property by Appellee, Bellemead Corporation, against Appellants, Paul Wernle as Executor of the Estate of Rose Dunlop and individually against Paul Wernle and nine of the beneficiaries of that estate, are not in dispute. From 1928 to 1933 numerous tax certificates were issued and sold to the State of Florida, which, when combined, described all the lands in dispute in the instant cause and a considerable amount of other lands.
The 1933 Legislature enacted Chapter 16,252 (Futch Act) which, inter alia, placed a five-year freeze on the transfer or enforcement of state-owned tax certificates, and also allowed payment of any such certificates with bonds or coupons of the original taxing district. The 1937 Legislature enacted" Chapter 18,296 (Murphy Act) which provided that as of June 9, 1939, all tax certificates which were more than two years old on the date of passage of the act — June 9, 1937 — and which remained unredeemed on June 9, 1939, would automatically be converted to a fee simple title in the State of Florida, as to the lands covered by the certificate.
In 1937, the Legislature passed Chapter 18,965, authorizing the County Commissioners of Volusia County to adjust or cancel the equity of Volusia County in tax certificates covering lands of certain owners who agreed to convey lands to the *99State of Florida having a value equal to the amount of the taxes so remitted or cancelled, any such lands so to be conveyed to be recommended and approved by the Florida Board of Forestry.
On June 2, 1938, the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County by resolution directed the Clerk of the Circuit Court to cancel the interest of the county and only the county in a number of specified tax certificates in conformity with the authority given the county under Chapter 18,965. The tax certificates covering the disputed land were only a small portion of all certificates listed. June 15, 1938, the Trustees of Pines Realty Co., a dissolved Florida corporation, conveyed a large amount of land by warranty deed dated June 15, 1938, recorded July 20, 1938, to the State of Florida, Board of Forestry. June 20, 1938, the Trustees of Pines Realty Co. conveyed a large amount of land by warranty deed (recorded June 30, 1938, Deed Book 275, p. 510, Public Records of Volusia County, Florida) to plaintiff-appel-lee (Bellemead). Included in this deed description was the land here in dispute. On June 23, 1938, Pines Realty Co. quit claimed to the plaintiff-appellee (Belle-mead) the same land previously conveyed to plaintiff by its Trustees (said deed having been recorded June 20, 1938).
In 1939 the Legislature enacted Chapter 19,211, Florida Laws, directing the Comptroller to cancel the state taxes contained in the many tax certificates upon which the County of Volusia had already can-celled its interest as a part of the purchase price of other lands acquired by the Board of Forestry for state park and right of way purposes. Subsequently on February 7, 1941 the State of Florida conveyed to Rose Wernle, by Murphy deed, the property described in several outstanding tax certificates. These certificates were never cancelled of record by the Clerk of the Circuit Court or the Comptroller although cancellation of said tax certificates was directed to have been done by legislation (Ch. 19,211, Laws of Florida, 1939). The property in question remained wild and unoccupied by either plaintiff or defendant from time of the deeds described above until filing of the instant quiet title action in Circuit Court which was commenced on November 14, 1969.
In its complaint to quiet title, Appellee urged that the Murphy deed from the State of Florida to Rose Wernle is void in view of Chapter 18,965, Special Laws of 1937, and Chapter 19,211, General Laws of 1939, which directed the cancellation of tax certificates upon land in question, sub judice, assessed in the name of Pines Realty Company, Inc., and Appellee contended, as documented by the record before us, that by resolution pursuant to Chapter 18,965, Laws of Florida, 1937, Volusia County cancelled the tax certificates in exchange for the conveyance of an equivalent amount of land to the Board of Forestry. Appellee stated in its complaint supported by official documentation that prior to the issuance of the Murphy deed the taxes on the questioned land were redeemed and paid by the deed dated June 15, 1938. The applicable statutory provision at the time of the suit, Section 192.21, F.S.1967, provides :
“No sale or conveyance of real or personal property for nonpayment of taxes shall be held invalid except upon proof that the property was not subject to taxation or that the taxes had been paid prior to the sale, or that the property had been redeemed prior to the execution and delivery of deed based upon certificate issued for nonpayment of taxes.”
The trial judge entered a lengthy order on August 23, 1973 determining that the title to the lands in question is vested in Appel-lee, Bellemead, and quieting title thereto. After expressly delineating the pertinent conveyances, the trial judge determined that the tax deed from the State of Florida by which defendants claim title was void in view of Chapter 18,965, Special Laws of 1937, which authorized the Board of Coun*100ty Commissioners of Volusia County to adjust or cancel taxes upon lands in Volusia County in consideration of conveyance to Florida Board of Forestry other lands at least equal to taxes remitted or cancelled, in view of Chapter 19,211, General Laws of 1939, directing the Comptroller to cancel all State of Florida taxes in tax certificates in all previous years upon lands assessed in the name of Pines Realty Company, Inc. upon which all county or other state taxes are cancelled, in view of the cancellation by resolution of Volusia County Commissioners of the tax certificates, and in view of the fact that prior to the issuance of the tax deed to Wernle, the taxes on the lands in dispute were redeemed and paid by the conveyance from Directors and Trustees of Pines Realty Company to the Florida Board of Forestry.
The trial court concluded that Chapter 19,211, General Laws of 1939, and Chapter 18,965, Special Acts of 1937, are both constitutional and constitute a proper exercise of the legislative function. The trial court relied, inter alia, on Section 192.21, Florida Statutes 1967, above quoted, and determined that the tax deed is void and therefore neither laches nor estoppel apply. Additionally, the trial court stated:
“5. The Defendant, ROSE M. WERNLE and subsequently her estate, have paid the taxes on said property since the issuance of said Tax Deed.
“6. The Plaintiff, BELLEMEAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, has paid into the registry of this Court the sum of One Thousand, Seven Hundred, Eighty-Seven and J2/ioo ($1,787.12) Dollars which represents the cost of the Tax Deed and taxes paid by Defendants up to the time of the filing of this suit.
“7. It is clearly established that the land which is the subject of this cause is wild and not in the possession of either the Plaintiff or the Defendants.”
Preliminarily, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in sustaining the constitutionality of Chapter 18,965, Special Laws, 1937, and Chapter 19,211, General Laws 1939, because these acts, contend Appellants, violate the prohibition of Article III, Sections 20 and 21 of the Constitution of 1885 and Article III, Section 11(a)(1) and (2), of the 1968 Constitution against the passage of any special or local laws regulating the assessment and collection of taxes or pertaining to the duties of constitutional officers.
Appellants contend that purchasers are not put on notice of special acts of the Legislature such as these, that no provision is made for recording special acts relating to tax titles, and that to uphold such special acts would creat chaos among title examiners. (Note: That the property here involved was purportedly purchased twenty-nine years before this suit was filed.) Appellee responds that even if these questioned acts are to be considered special acts or laws, they are not the type of special laws prohibited by the Florida Constitution. Appellee states that the purpose of the acts was to acquire property to benefit the public as well as return property to the tax rolls after the economic disaster of the depression. Appellee further urges that since the taxes were cancelled by operation of law prior to execution of the Murphy deed to defendants’ predecessor in title and prior to June 9, 1939, it is apparent the state had no title to convey. Appellee also points out many problems that would result if the act were held to be a nullity.
Appellants secondly urge that the trial court erred in determining that laches did not apply in this particular case and contend that Appellee should be estopped by its lack of diligence to assert that through some error the tax certificate remained outstanding. Appellee answers that the trial judge here properly considered the relative positions of the parties and cites several decisions of this Court which espouse the principle that a purchaser at a tax sale takes all the risks (McCormick v. Bounetheau (1939), 139 Fla. 461, 190 So. 882.) Appellee also strongly urges that the *101defendants were not innocent third parties within the meaning of Reed v. Fain (Fla.1962), 145 So.2d 858, but rather, in effect, are direct parties to the conveyance. Thirdly, Appellants posit that the trial court erred in refusing to find that payment of the taxes by Rose Wernle and her estate for more than twenty years constituted a bar to any action under Section 95.23, F.S. To this contention, Appellee responds citing case authority that the Circuit Court was correct in not applying the statute of limitations when the deed which is alleged to have commenced the running is void ab initio.
Appellants next argue that the lower court erred in refusing to find that the Murphy Act vested color of title in the State on June 9, 1939, as to all lands more than four years delinquent so that the Marketable Record Title Act bars any claim filed more than thirty years. Appel-lee responds that to the contrary the Murphy Act did not vest color of title in the State on June 9, 1939, within definition of Marketable Record Title Act because, inter alia, a title transaction within definition of Marketable Record Title Act had not occurred.
Finally, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the counterclaims of defendants with prejudice but reserving jurisdiction for the purpose of making a determination as to whether the defendants or any of them are entitled to attorney’s fees and/or costs and/or damages. Citing, inter alia, Wilson v. Kelley (Fla.App.1969), 226 So.2d 123, Appellee states that the trial court ruled properly in this regard.
From a careful study of the case and applicable law we conclude that the ends of justice require that we affirm the trial court.
The challenged Acts are constitutional. Their purpose was not to set up local machinery for assessing or collecting taxes contrary to Sections 20 and 21 of Article III of the 1885 Florida Constitution or Section 11(a)(1) and (2), Article III of the 1968 Florida Constitution.
Instead, the main purpose of these statutes was to provide authority for the cancellation (not collection) of delinquent taxes due upon certain privately owned lands in Volusia County in consideration of the owner or owners thereof conveying other of their lands in Volusia County to the Florida Board of Forestry for state park and right of way purposes. There was nothing in the 1885 Constitution which precluded the Legislature from enacting legislation authorizing cancellation of prior delinquent taxes for a consideration to serve some legitimate state or local purpose. This purpose was entirely apart from any local legislation purporting to authorize the general assessment or collection of local ad valorem taxes.
Turning to other contentions of Appellants, we conclude that neither laches nor the statute of limitations nor the Florida Marketable Record Title Act under the circumstances in this case has the effect of barring Appellee’s claim to the land in issue.
The trial judge found that the Ap-pellee’s predecessors in title in good faith reliance upon the local cancellation act conveyed the lands, as they agreed, to the Forestry Board. And even though there was official failure to follow through on the part of the tax officials, both county and state, and discharge their statutory duty by actually cancelling of record the outstanding tax certificates covering the delinquent taxes, they nevertheless stood equitably cancelled. In other words, the trial court applying equity principles regarded as done that which ought to have been done.
The trial court also found that even though the Appellants became possessed by purchase under the Murphy Act of the uncancelled, void, delinquent tax certificates on Appellee’s lands and have also paid for several years subsequent tax*102es on the land, the same never ripened into any tax title sufficient to divest the Appel-lee’s title. Thus the court did not find under the related circumstances that Appellants had procured valid tax deeds or prosecuted tax foreclosure or had held any tax title of sufficient status or length to ripen into any incontestable title in them by lach-es, statute of limitation, or under the Marketable Record Title Act. The court has, however, retained jurisdiction for the purpose of making a determination as to whether the Appellants or any of them are entitled to recover of and from the Appel-lee attorneys fees, costs and/or damages.
From a careful review of the record we find no good reason in law for disturbing the judgment of the trial court. Its application of legal and equitable principles presents no manifest error warranting our correction.
We note especially that the trial court, applying equitable principles, also awarded Appellants all taxes paid on the subject property and reasonable interest at eight per cent per annum on all such taxes, with credit for the amount already paid into the registry of the court.
We reiterate here we are considering initially void tax title claims which have not ripened into an incontestable title in Appellants through laches, the statute of limitations, or the Florida Marketable Record Title Act. Compare: Reed v. Fain, supra, 145 So.2d, at 864, et seq., and Wilson v. Kelley, supra.
Affirmed.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, Mc-CAIN and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with opinion.