MEMORANDUM ***
Raymond G. Schreiber and his brother, Robert Schreiber, appeal from the district court’s judgment denying their claims related to alleged intellectual property rights in the performances, autobiography, and artwork of motorcycle daredevil Robert “Evel” Knievel.1 The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
The Court reviews the district court’s findings of fact following a bench trial for clear error. Lentini v. Cal Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir.2004). The clear error standard “is significantly deferential, and we will accept ' the lower court’s findings of fact unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo. Id.
The Schreibers seek to enforce three purported agreements with Knievel that were drafted in 1982. The parties agrée with the district court that Ohio contract law governs the agreements. Under Ohio law, as elsewhere, a contract exists only *480when the parties “consent to its terms,” there is a “meeting of the minds,” and the contract is “definite and certain.” Episcopal Ret. Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 61 Ohio St.3d 366, 575 N.E.2d 134, 137 (1991). To show the requisite meeting of the minds when “more than two (2) persons are intended to be parties to a proposed contract,” Ohio law requires that each person manifest an intention to be bound to its essential terms. Wilson v. Brown, No. 07CA13, 2008 WL 1062183, at *4 (Ohio Ct.App. Apr. 9, 2008) (quoting Living Waters Fellowship v. Ross, No. 00CA2714, 2000 WL 1617945, at *5 (Ohio Ct.App. Oct. 23, 2000)).
Each of the 1982 agreements lists Knievel, Raymond G. Schreiber, and Robert Schreiber as parties. Only Knievel signed the documents. At trial, Robert Schreiber testified, against his interest, that he never agreed to any of the terms, and the Schreibers concede that including Robert Schreiber in the agreements was a mistake. In that light, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in its factual finding that there was no meeting of the minds and that the agreements were therefore unenforceable under Ohio law. See Garrison v. Daytonian Hotel, 105 Ohio App.3d 322, 663 N.E.2d 1316, 1317 (1995) (observing that the question of whether a meeting of the minds occurred is a- “question of fact to be determined from all the relevant facts and circumstances”).
As to the film rights agreement specifically, we also agree with the district court that the terms were fatally uncertain because they failed to specify which “certain performances” of Knievel’s are included. See Mr. Mark Corp. v. Rush, Inc., 11 Ohio App.3d 167, 464 N.E.2d 586, 589-90 (1983) (noting that the essential terms of a contract must be sufficiently certain such that “they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given the uncertainty of terms and the unenforceability of the film rights agreement, the district court also did not err in its determination of ownership of the various film footage and documentary compilations at issue. Nor did the district court err in concluding that two copyrights for Knievel footage held exclusively by Schreiber were invalid. See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556-57 (9th Cir.1990) (noting that the transfer of a copyright requires a clear, written transfer of ownership).
As to the autobiography and art work agreements, the Schreibers have failed to challenge the district court’s alternative reasons as to why those agreements were unenforceable. The Schreibers have therefore waived any challenge, and we affirm the district court’s judgment on these alternative bases as well. See Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1019 n. 1 (9th Cir.2010).
AFFIRMED.