We have three certified questions from the Circuit Court of Marion County about whether West Virginia’s Wage and Hour Law, W.Va.Code, 21-5C-1, et seq., provides coverage and protection to deputy sheriffs, and if so, who is their employer.1
Michael Amoroso and several other Marion County deputy sheriffs brought this suit, as individuals and as members of the Marion County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association, against the Marion County Commission and Charles H. Dodd, the sheriff of Marion County, for a declaration that the commission and sheriff are joint “employers” and that deputy sheriffs are “employees” affected by the act. The deputies also sought an order directing the commission and sheriff to pay them overtime compensation for all overtime work thereafter performed, a judgment of thirty thousand dollars for unpaid overtime compensation, and a writ of mandamus directing the commission and sheriff to make appropriate provi*344sions for the payment of overtime compensation.2
After the commission answered the complaint, the deputy sheriffs moved for summary judgment. The circuit court denied the motion and certified the following questions: 3
1. Is the County Commission of Marion County, a corporation, the employer of the plaintiffs as Deputy Sheriffs of Marion County, West Virginia within the meaning of Article 5C, Chapter 21 of the West Virginia Code?
2. Is the Sheriff of Marion County the employer of the plaintiffs as Deputy Sheriffs of Marion County, West Virginia, within the meaning of Article 5C, Chapter 21, of the West Virginia Code?
3. Are Deputy Sheriffs of Marion County employees within the meaning of Chapter 21, Article 5C of the West Virginia Code and as such entitled to receive overtime pay?
We will answer the third certified question first. “Employee” is broadly defined to include “any individual employed by an employer,” in W.Va.Code, 21-5C-l(f). “Employ” is expansively defined as meaning “to hire or permit to work.” W.Va. Code, 21-5C-l(d). The deputy sheriffs, having been hired and permitted to work, are therefore employees entitled to the benefit of the act, unless they fall within any of the specific occupational categories expressly excluded from the definition of “employee”. W.Va.Code, 21-5C-l(f) states:
As used in this article:
(f) “Employee” includes any individual employed by an employer but shall not include: (1) Any individual employed by the United States; (2) any individual engaged in the activities of an educational, charitable, religious, fraternal or nonprofit organization where the employer-employee relationship does not in fact exist, or where the services rendered to such organizations are on a voluntary basis; (3) newsboys, shoeshine boys, golf caddies, pinboys and pinchasers in bowling lanes; (4) traveling salesmen and outside salesmen; (5) services performed by an individual in the employ of his parent, son, daughter or spouse; (6) any individual employed in a bona fide professional, executive or administrative capacity; (7) any person whose employment is for the purpose of on-the-job training; (8) any person having a physical or mental handicap so severe as to prevent his employment or employment training in any training or employment facility other than a nonprofit sheltered workshop; (9) any individual employed in a boys or girls summer camp; (10) any person sixty-two years of age or over who receives old-age or survivors benefits from the social security administration; (11) any individual employed in agriculture as the word agriculture is defined in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended; (12) any individual employed as a fire fighter by the state or agency thereof; (13) ushers in theaters; (14) any individual employed on a part-time basis who is a student in any recognized school or college; (15) any individual employed by a local or interurban mo-torbus carrier; (16) so far as the maximum hours and overtime compensation provisions of this article are concerned, any salesman, partsman or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trailers, trucks, farm implements, aircraft if employed by a nonman-*345ufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles to ultimate purchasers; (17) any employee with respect to whom the United States department of transportation has statutory authority to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service; or (18) any person employed on a per diem basis by the senate, the house of delegates, or the joint committee on government and finance of the legislature of West Virginia, other employees of the senate or house of delegates designated by the presiding officer thereof, and additional employees of the joint committee on government and finance designated by such joint committee. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is apparent that deputy sheriffs are not expressly excluded from employee status. Neither the sheriff nor the commission direct us to any exclusionary language eliminating them from coverage, and the only exclusionary language conceivably applicable to the deputy sheriffs is “any individual employed in a bona fide professional, executive or administrative capacity.”
We considered the scope of this exclusionary language in State ex rel. Crosier v. Callaghan, 160 W.Va. 353, 236 S.E.2d 321 (1977), finding that state conservation officers employed by the Department of Natural Resources are not professional employees excluded from the act, because their positions had no educational or experience requirements. We also found that conservation officers are not executive or administrative employees.
More recently in Rohrbaugh v. Crabtree, 164 W.Va. 791, 266 S.E.2d 914 (1980), we concluded that a Probation Officer I is a professional employee excluded from coverage because the Department of Labor’s regulation defining professional employees fit the job requirements and desired educational background of probation officers.
On the present record, we cannot say that deputy sheriffs are professional, executive, or administrative employees excluded from coverage. Consequently, we find that they are entitled to the benefits of the act.
Are they employed by the commission, the sheriff, or both? The commission, positing the unassailable legal premise that it can lawfully perform only those acts authorized by law, says that it has no authority to employ deputy sheriffs, that its only statutory authority to hire, pay and discharge employees pertains to its own staff. W.Va.Code, 7-l-3m.4 The commission argues that in counties having more than twenty-five thousand population, such as Marion County, all full-time deputy sheriffs are appointed by the sheriff according to the deputy sheriffs’ civil service law. W.Va.Code, 7-14-1, et seq. [1971].5 It *346therefore contends that it is not now, if it ever was, an employer of deputy sheriffs subject to liability for failure to pay overtime wages.6
The sheriff also wants to avoid liability and says that the commission is the employer for purposes of the act because it controls funding for his office. Unless the commission provides money to pay overtime compensation, he cannot compensate deputy sheriffs for hours worked in excess of the statutory maximum.
The deputies argue that the sheriff and commission are joint employers within the meaning of W.Va.Code, 21-5C-l(e). If a sheriff does not include in his budget request funding for overtime hours, and a county commission does not provide such funds, no overtime benefits can be paid.
We agree with the deputy sheriffs that the commission and sheriff are joint employers. The commission’s argument ignores controlling statutory language and focuses too narrowly on who hires deputies. Section 1 of the act defines the following pertinent terms:
(e) “Employer” includes the State of West Virginia, its agencies, departments and all its political subdivisions, any individual, partnership, association, public or private corporation, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer in relation to an employee_ (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1(e) defines “employer” to include all political subdivisions of the State of West Virginia. A county commission, like a municipality, see, e.g., Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 531, 170 S.E.2d 217 (1969), is the governing body of a political subdivision. County commissions have constitutional and legislative authority to supervise and administer “the internal police and fiscal affairs of their counties.” W.Va. Const, art. IX, § 11; W.Va.Code, 7-1-3. See, e.g., State ex rel. County Court v. Arthur, 150 W.Va. 293, 145 S.E.2d 34 (1965).7 In Kucera, we noted that:
“The attributes which are generally regarded as distinctive of a political subdivision are that it exists for the purpose of discharging some function of local government, that it has a prescribed area, and that it possesses authority for subordinate self-government through officers selected by it.” Dugas v. Beauregard, 155 Conn. 573, 236 A.2d 87. Id. 153 W.Va. at 536, 170 S.E.2d at 220.
Although it is true that a sheriff can hire and fire individual deputy sheriffs without the commission’s consent, and as such acts as an employer by the explicit language of the act, the sheriff “does not have the complete or the exclusive control of the internal police affairs of the county”. Hockman v. County Court of Tucker, 138 W.Va. 132, 75 S.E.2d 82 (1953). A county commission in exercising its general control of the fiscal affairs of the county, determines the overall amount of money to be allowed to the sheriff’s office, including an amount for compensation of deputy sheriffs. W.Va.Code, 7-7-7. The term “employ”, as noted earlier, is expansively defined to include not just the act of hiring, but also the act of permitting a person to *347work. The act, then, by its terms, includes a county commission within the definition of an employer, even when the commission need not consent to hiring.
County commissions also set the budgets for offices of other county officials. W.Va. Code, 7-7-7 [1982].8 If the commission’s arguments were accepted, many county employees employed by other officials would be deprived of the benefits of the act, against the clear intent of the legislature.
In State ex rel. Cabell County v. Dunfee, 163 W.Va. 539, 258 S.E.2d 117 (1979), we held that a sheriff is prohibited by the provisions of W.Va.Code, 7-7-7, from giving deputy sheriffs a raise in salary, if the increase would cause expenditures to exceed his budget as set by the county commission.
Several statutory provisions buttress our conclusion, tending to make the commission a joint employer. A county commission is responsible for financing training programs that deputy sheriffs’ civil service commissions must establish or prescribe. W.Va.Code, 7-l-3b. W.Va.Code, 7-14-17a, provides, as pertinent here, that the “county commission of each county shall allow the sheriff’s deputies in its employ vacation time accrued in the following manner -” (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, W.Va.Code, 7-14-17b, provides that the “county commission of each county shall allow the sheriff’s deputies sick leave with pay .... ” County commissions are also vested with authority to purchase, install and maintain radio mobile communication equipment and appliances for the use of the sheriff and his deputies. W.Va.Code, 7-l-3b.
*348Although the commission and sheriff are joint employers, this does not necessarily mean that both are liable under the act. The facts of each case must be considered. If, for example, a commission provides funds for overtime compensation, but a sheriff for an invalid reason refuses to pay overtime compensation, then only the sheriff would be the responsible employer.
Accordingly, we answer each of the certified questions in the affirmative, and reverse the rulings of the circuit court.
Reversed and remanded.