Tyrone v. State 180 S.W. 125

HARPER, J.

Appellant was convicted at the January, 1915, term of the district court of Eastland county of manslaughter, and his punishment was assessed by the jury at confinement in the state penitentiary for a period of five years.

Our able Assistant Attorney General has so ably discussed and disposed of every question raised in the motion for a new trial, we adopt the brief as the opinion of the court:

[I] “Bill No. 1 complains that the court erred in giving verbal instructions to the panel of jurors for the week before this case was called for trial and before it was set for trial. A special venire was afterwards ordered, and two men, Dane and Gillette, who were on the panel for the second week, were accepted as jurors. At the time appellant made no objection to either juror, and the record does not disclose that appellant had exhausted his peremptory challenges when either of said jurors was accepted. This complaint is wholly without merit. Reed v. State, 168 S. W. 541; McGaughey v. State, 169 S. W. 287. But not only is this hill wholly without merit, but the entire instruction copied in this bill and delivered to the jury for the week on the part of the trial court was so able and so proper and so commendable that I ask this court, if they agree with me in this view, to copy said instruction in the opinion that it may be preserved in the jurisprudence of our state as an able appeal to the loftiest sentiments of citizenship.

[2, 3] “In the next two bills appellant complains that the court erred in permitting counsel for the state to read from a memorandum testimony which was given by the witness Alvin Tyrone before the grand jury, for the purpose of impeaching said witness and for the further purpose of placing him in a bad attitude before the jury; it being alleged that said witness was not an unwilling witness and state’s counsel was not surprised at his testimony. The bill further complains that the court, in the presence and hearing of the jury, said to counsel, ‘Gentlemen, I don’t want any more of the time of the court wasted with frivolous controversies,’ it being alleged that said remark was calculated to prejudice the rights of appellant. These hills as qualified and as accepted by appellant show that the only objection or exception taken by appellant was with reference to the district attorney’s questioning the witness while looking at a piece of paper which he had in his hand. Judge Morris, for appellant, stated he objected to counsel reading from the testimony before the grand jury, and the district attorney replied that he was not reading from the grand jury testimony, but was referring to private notes in order to know how to frame questions to the witness. The court thereupon said that if it was the private notes of counsel he had a right to refresh his memory with them. Counsel for appellant then said it was either the grand jury testimony or testimony taken at the examining trial. The court ruled that, if the district attorney was using either grand jury testimony or examining trial testimony, the defendant could see it, but he had no right to see private notes of counsel for the state used purely as a memorandum to refresh his memory. These bills as qualified and accepted by appellant are wholly without merit, because appellant’s counsel offered no testimony to show that the paper in the hands of the district attorney was testimony adduced at any former trial or hearing. And it was certainly proper for the court, in order to stop further colloquy between. counsel in the courtroom and in order to preserve order and decorum, to state to counsel to be seated; that he did not want any more time wasted with frivolous controversies, such as this one was.

[4] “In the next bill appellant complains that the court erred in permitting the state to ask the witness Mrs. W. I. Tyrone, on. cross-examination, over appellant’s objection: ‘Is it not a fact that your husband, W. I. Tyrone, had you to place one hand on the Bible and one hand on your heart and say that there had never been anything wrong between you and Dr. Evers?’ The bill nowhere discloses what answer was given to said question. But reference to the statement of facts discloses that the witness answered that he had not. In the first place, this was certainly legitimate and proper cross-examination. The defendant himself placed his wife on the stand and elicited from her the remarkable story that deceased had exerted hypnotic influence over her to such an extent that she was- powerless to resist him, and that, being absolutely devoid of will power, yet conscious of the doctor’s acts, and while under Ms influence, she yielded to deceased and permitted him to have carnal intercourse with her; and further that she had communicated the story of her debauchery to her husband, and on account of the cMldren they had agreed to keep it quiet; that before she would tell Mm she exacted a promise from him that he would not kill deceased, etc. Certainly, therefore, the state had the right to ask her on cross-examination, not only what her husband said when such information was first communicated to him, hut how he was affected, and any other matter proper and material to the main testimony given, and further for the purpose of laying a predicate for her impeachment on any of such matters. See Dee Stacy Case, recently decided.

[5] “In the second place, since no answer is set out in the bill, the same is insufficient, as this court cannot determine whether or not appellant was injuriously affected. And if reference be bad to the statement of facts, it will be *128observed that a negative answer was returned to said question, and hence appellant cannot claim that he was prejudiced thereby.

[6] “Appellant also complains that the court erred in permitting the district attorney in his closing argument to read from a written memorandum made by himself which he referred to as testimony of some of the witnesses. Counsel for appellant thereupon requested the following instruction: ‘You are instructed that the statement of the district attorney that a certain written instrument was the evidence of a witness in this case is not evidence, and you will not consider the statement so made by the district attorney whatever, hut you will disregard such statement, and you cannot consider the same against this defendant for any purpose.’ It appears that when objection was made the court immediately orally instructed the jury that they could not consider the argument of the district attorney or of any other attorney as evidence in the case, and that the written memorandum from which the district attorney read to them a moment before while making his argument was not evidence and they should disregard the same. He further instructed them, in this connection, that unless they found that arguments of counsel were supported by the record evidence in the case they should disregard any portion of the same not supported by such evidence. However, after delivering such oral instruction, counsel for appellant wrote out a written charge to the same effect and asked the court to again interrupt state’s counsel in order to road their written charge, which the court marked ‘given,’ and the court declined further to interrupt the speech of state’s counsel. Said special charge was, however, handed to the jury with the court’s main charge. As T view the matter, this bill is absolutely without the semblance of merit, and I believe it would be had the court refused to give either the written charge or the oral instruction. The writer of this brief has scarcely addressed a jury in’ a murder case in which he did not take notes during the trial of tlie cause on important testimony from leading witnesses and copied it in his memoi-andum hoik, and while addressing the jury, in order to be absolutely correct in quoting the witnesses, would read from the memorandum the exact words by the witnesses, and has left it to the jury to say whether or not he was correct in quoting said witnesses’ testimony. But in this case appellant certainly cannot complain because he had the benefit of both oral and written instructions; and, since the court had orally instructed them, certainly he was not called upon to again read to the jury the special charge which he had given.

[7, 8] “Appellant contends the court erred in sending for the jury after they had been deliberating on their verdict about 24 hours, and telling them he had to go to his homo in Abilene, and urging them to continue their deliberation conscientiously in an effort to arrive at a verdict. Tlie remarks are set out in full in the bill to which the court is respectfully referred. I submit that said instructions were altogether proper and commendable, and were but an appeal to tlie jury to do their duty as good citizens. His entire statement to them is absolutely devoid of a single improper reference or remark as I view it. Iio distinctly told them to take plenty of time, do good work, and stay in a good humor; all of which instructions were devoid of prejudices conducive to a well-considered, impartial, unbiased verdict. Muckleroy v. State, 42 S. W. 383; Dow v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 278, 20 S. W. 583; Jordan v. State, 30 S. W. 445; Wilkerson v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 170, 91 S. W. 228; Brady v. State, 74 S. W. 771; Carlisle v. State, 56 S. W. 365. I also submit that the necessity of the judge’s going to his home in Abilene did not ipso facto adjourn said court, and that part of this complaint is without merit. White v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 498, 135 S. W. 562; Scott v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 568, 85 S. W. 1060, 122 Am. St. Rep. 717. He returned on the next day and remained in attendance on court.

[9] “Appellant contends that the court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, in this, that the state, over objection of appellant, proved by the witness Dr. Sheppard that it was impossible for any person to wield a hypnotic influence over another person to the extent that such person would submit to the sexual embrace of such other person, or that the person under such influence would lose all will power to resist such act of intercourse, etc. Appellant alleges that for the first time, after the trial of this cause, he ascertained that the witness Dr. Johnson, a resident of Eastland county, would testify to the contrary. In connection with this bill, I ask the court to refer to appellant’s motion for new trial wherein appellant alleges that Peterson & Haynes’ Legal Medicine and Toxicology, vol. 2, p. 138, states that there is no doubt that the hypnotic state may be induced and used for sexual purposes, etc., and further states that said book is a standard medical authority. I attribute appellant’s complaint as to newly discovered testimony to the untiring zeal on the part of his attorneys to find some pretext on which to hand at least a faint hope for a reversal of his cause, rather than to a desire to submit any real substantial matter to the court in this bill. It would be a reflection on the ability of appellant’s counsel as criminal attorneys to say that they could not foresee that, when they introduced appellant’s wife and elicited from her her wierd and unreasonable story, her testimony would be attacked by the state for every legitimate angle. And appellant’s counsel must have known that the reasonableness of the story would depend on the reasonableness of hypnotic power. That very fact must have charged them with the duty to search the medical authorities on that -subject; and, when Dr. Sheppard had concluded his testimony, they had but to refer to the standard medical work upon which they rely for a new trial, the index of which would have immediately directed them to the paragraph which they now claim1 as newly discovered evidence, and, when they had found it, their necessity in the case would have immediately prompted them' to consult Dr. Johnson and all other able physicians to find testimony further to support their contention. But they did not even ask the time of the court to look up the medical authority or to consult with a physician; and certainly they cannot be heard to complain at this late date. The testimony of Dr. Sheppard adduced by the state and complained of herein was material on the part of the state because, if appellant’s wife’s story was unreasonable and probably untrue, then it would certainly be considered by the jury as tending to throw light on the fact as to whether or not she ever communicated such a story to her husband prior to the homicide.

“Appellant also insists that the court erred in overruling his motion for new trial because the evidence was wholly insufficient to sustain the conviction for manslaughter. And in apparent sincerity appellant’s counsel contend that this is true because appellant himself says that he killed deceased in self-defense, and therefore, if he did, he should of necessity have been acquitted. Appellant’s counsel at the moment must have forgotten that there were other witnesses who testified in this case, among them .being appellant’s own children, his daughter-in-law, his aged mother, and others, and it must have for the moment escaped the attention of appellant’s counsel that these witnesses had contradicted appellant on almost every material point in his entire testimony. The bill needs no further comment.

“The indictment in this case is valid, and the *129state’s witnesses, if they are to be believed— and the jury evidently did believe them — furnished ample testimony on which to base the conviction. The charge of the court presents in a most favorable light to appellant every defense even remotely raised by the evidence of appellant’s witnesses. Indeed, the charge is so perfect that not a single exception is taken to it by appellant’s counsel. And not a single requested charge was asked and refused. An extended statement of the facts would be useless. As I view the record, it is absolutely clear of error on the part of the trial court, and the judgment should be affirmed.”

And as requested by Mr. McDonald, the reporter, in connection with this case, will publish the court’s remarks to the jury when it was impaneled for the week.

The judgment is affirmed.

DAYIDSON, J.

(dissenting). Before the adjournment of the last term of this court, the judgment herein was affirmed. Motion for rehearing was filed and disposed of during the present term. I did not then believe, and in the light of further investigation am more fully persuaded the opinion is not correct, and that the judgment ought to have been reversed.

Appellant was allotted five years in the penitentiary under a conviction for manslaughter. As evidenced by the statute this is the maximum punishment. This is mentioned for the reason that, if there were any circumstances on the trial which led erroneously to conviction or to enhanced punishment, conceding appellant’s guilt, then the verdict was wrong and the judgment erroneous. This record discloses that it was the custom of the trial judge to deliver on each recurring Monday morning during his term of court a charge or lecture, to the jury for that week, in which he instructed them, substantially, there should be no hung juries in the trial of causes; that one set of twelve jurymen ought to dispose of a case as easily and as readily as any other twelve jurors; that hung juries were detrimental to the state, were expensive, and cost the state money; that causes should be tried without regard to the “standing” of the parties to the litigation, and the jurors should disregard such standing; that they should lay aside all their “contrariness,” and should agree to a verdict. Defendant was not present when this charge was given and had no opportunity then to enter his protest. Many exceptions, however, have been urged and were urged when this matter was called to his attention. This charge was not given on the trial of the case. Had it been, this judgment would have been promptly reversed. I believe even the majority of this court and the Assistant Attorney General would so concede. Two of the jurors thus charged sat upon the trial of the case and convicted appellant. It is a matter of judicial knowledge to this court that it is and has been the habit and custom of that trial judge to so charge the jury. Reed v. State, 168 S. W. 641. The Reed Case was tried in the same county by the same judge as was this case, but at a previous term of the court. The Assistant Attorney General recommended a decided approval of this charge by this court. A majority of this court adopted that request as evidenced by their opinion. Partisanship is commendable on the part of attorneys. An attorney’s view usually is that his side is right, but the court does not primarily so hold. The case must so present itself from careful revision. Such request, if indulged, should be of a character that the court, from every standpoint, could say the request should be endorsed as correct and as the law of that case. Zeal is commendable, but this belongs to attorneys, not the court. He may be commended for his success, but I cannot agree with the court in adopting his zealous views.

The accused is accorded and entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury. At least, the Constitution and our law so guarantees. This is time honored, it is the growth of our jurisprudence, and guaranteed by section 10 of the Bill of Rights. This means twelve impartial jurors in the district court. Article 1, § 10, of the Bill of Rights. Also, article -6, § 13. This remains inviolate. Constitution, art. 1, §§ 15 and 29. Each of the twelve jurors shall be fair. It does not mean a part of the jury ofjwelve, but it means all and each juror. The verdict must be from twelve unbiased jurors. It does not mean a fraction of the jury. The verdict is the independent vote and verdict of each juror. This is guaranteed by the Constitution, and it is provided by the Constitution and the statute that the accused cannot be deprived of such trial. The verdict is not that of a majority of the jury; it must speak the truth as to the conscience and judgment of each juror. There is no warrant of law for the proposition thav less than a full jury of twelve men can under any circumstances in a felony case render a verdict, or that the verdict shall be rendered by a majority of the jury. It is not the law that the majority shall control the minority or dictate their verdict. Nor am I aware as to which part of the jury — -the majority or the minority — constitute the “contrary jurors,” where the jury does not agree. The trial court, however, from Ms charge, seems to have thought it was the minority. This may be or it may not be, but it is not the province of the judge to decide that question. The law takes this from the court and places it exclusively in the hands of the jury. There is no rule of law that fixes infallibility in a majority of the jury. Each juror must decide for himself upon his judgment and conscience, and to test this the statute authorizes that the jury may be polled to ascertain if the verdict is that of each juror unbiasly given. If not, the verdict is not to be received. The forcing of a majority verdict upon the minority for any reason is violative of every principle of law, and is *130subversive of all ideas of a fair trial, and overturns tbe constitutional and statutory guaranties. Tbe jury could not be fair under sueb circumstances, nor could it be impartial. If tbe charge mentioned bad been given on tbe trial of the ease, no citizen of Texas, be he layman, attorney, or court, would have sanctioned it. It subversively struck; at the very basis of a fair trial by an impartial jury, and invaded tbe province of tbe jury. No appellate court- would have sustained a conviction thus obtained.

Nor do our Constitution, statutes, or jurisprudence proceed on tbe idea that tbe life, liberty, or property of a citizen shall be taken because it may be costly to tbe state for tbe jury to disagree as to their verdict, or that a conviction should be upheld obtained for that reason. This idea is more than a criticism and reflection upon our people and their ordained government. Tbe life, liberty, and property of our citizenship are not held on or by such sordid consideration. Life, liberty, and property are placed on higher lines and grander planes. We have not placed nor rested these great principles on financial consideration. Life, liberty, and property are not the subject of cost bills. Innocence is not to be weighed by such methods or means, and it is to be hoped will never be. The Bill of Rights fixes it definitely and provides that no man’s life, liberty, or property shall be taken except by due process of law. It excludes the idea that either shall be taken to prevent cost or expense. Every criminal trial involves cost and expense, but this lias not heretofore been urged as a reason for verdicts or convictions. If this is to be the law, or regarded as such, our lives, liberty, and property will become the subject not only of financial consideration, but to be decided to save expense accounts. I protest against such propositions either as law or policy. Law, and not money, is the legal criterion in the trial of cases.

Again, the “standing of parties” in criminal cases has heretofore been considered of most material consideration. One of the basic principles of this and other right-minded governments is the “standing” and character of the citizenship. Such “standing” and character has at all times been considered of inestimable value in governmental and social relations. In criminal cases this has been the subject of express legislation. In murder cases, as in other cases, the standing and character of the citizen when tried for his life or liberty has been thought heretofore to be of the most material consideration. It is deemed unnecessary to collate the statutes and ‘ decisions manifesting this great truth and principle. The books teem with such jurisprudence, and beyond dispute even by the most strenuous seeker for the imnishment of the citizen. It aids and is in accord with the great underlying principles of innocence and its overruling presumption. This belongs only to the jury to be weighed by them. It is expressly so provided by statute. The court is debarred from passing on such facts. He instructs as to the law; he may not and cannot invade the jury box. Sanctity against the judge guards the jury box and protects the citizenship against his expression of opinion on the evidence.

“Character” is but a synonym of the high “standing” of the womanhood and manhood of our country, and its citizenship for integrity. It is the product, or intended so to be, of our civilization, political and religious, and has been in our history and social life. Purity of life has been indorsed among all right-thinking people in all times of history. On the plains and among the Judean hills Christ denounced the Pharisee and pronounced benedictions upon purity in life. To this end and for the establishment of character, the clergy, Protestant and Catholic, have preached the teachings of the Savior, and beginning at Jerusalem have heralded the principles of the Sermon on the Mount to all nations for over 1900 years. The churches or denominations have established and supported colleges and universities so that character lofty and pure might form the basis of society, and from their viewpoint inculcate the great doctrines of Christianity. To the end that our people be taught high standards of life and character, our secular school systems have been created, fostered, supported, and cherished. Our system of public education, common schools, normal colleges, A. & M., and State University crystallizes the thought in which is involved, and about which revolves, the great central idea of upbuilding character in our youth and as the basis and hope of the future of our civilization. In that great system inheres the welfare, development, and character building of the youth, future manhood and womanhood, and the higher destiny of our great commonwealth. The past and present furnish the greatest and most perplexing problems which have involved and do involve the destiny of our people and the great issues' of the future. To meet that and build character of student bodies, those institutions are endowed and upheld as the central thought of our civilization and polity, and this whether the school system be sectarian or nonsectarian, religious or secular. Higher civilization based on nobility of character is in the last analysis the central thought of our advanced and advancing humanity, civilization, and jurisprudence. It involves the higher destiny of our country and people.

The trial judge who delivered the derelict charge set out in this record, but for the fact of his high character, could not have entered the legal profession through which he is permitted to qualify for the distinguished judicial position he occupies and which enabled him to deliver that charge to the jury. That judge selected the jury commissioners by whom the jury he addressed was *131drawn because of their high “standing” as citizens. The jury he was addressing were chosen on the theory of their character and standing, probity and integrity, and fitness to decide the great questions of life, liberty, and property submitted to them. The very basic reason for their selection as jurors they were instructed to disregard in deciding upon the lives and liberty of their fellow men. Presumption of innocence is based on the natural as is the legal idea that the citizenship are not criminals, at least to the extent that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accused guilty of a legal violation. Standing and character is the underlying thought of this fundamental principle of law and government. This charge of the trial judge strikes essentially at the very life of that great principle, and means, if carried out, its destruction.

Character is worth something in all phases and departments of life. It is a priceless asset not only to the individual, but to society, civilization, and humanity. It is on this principle that humanity moves, works, builds, and this from the mother’s touch in infancy at the home fireside till the close of eventful life.

Under our supposedly advancing civilization towards higher planes, loftier thoughts, and purer character, I am persuaded we have not yet reached the point where character shall be ignored or be leveled with viciousness; or where the .good and the noble are to be classed on equality with the impure, or the manhood and womanhood of “standing” and character with those who have neither.

Our Constitution, statutes, jurisprudence, history, polity, civilization, institutions, state and church, in all things and from every standpoint have been based upon the “standing” and character of the womanhood and manhood of our age and country, past and present, and upon these we are building the expectancies of the future of humanity. These all stand as enlarging monuments of protest to the submarine sentiment expressed in the unfortunate charge.

To this end the suspended sentence law was enacted. That law left that matter exclusively to the decision of the jury. The court is powerless to interfere with it. The very basis of the suspended sentence law is the standing and character of the accused, and yet the court said to the jury they must not consider his standing, in face of the fact that appellant filed his plea for suspended sentence in this very case, but the jury failed to recommend it. What effect did the judge’s speech or charge have upon this feature of the ease? That is one of the questions. Can we tell? We know that the jury refused to suspend the sentence, and we further know that appellant was awarded the highest punishment allowed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. It may be this charge from the “Lord’s annotated” turned the scale against the defendant, and doubtless did, and caused the jury to resolve all issues against him.

The wife of appellant was placed upon the stand, and testified for her husband, to the insulting conduct on the part of the deceased toward her, and further that deceased had had carnal intercourse with her, and that he had accomplished this by hypnotizing her, and that she communicated these facts to the defendant prior to the homicide. After she had so testified, the state, upon cross-examination, asked the following question:

“Isn’t it a fact that your husband, the defendant, W. I. Tyrone, had you to place your hand, one hand on the Bible and one hand on your heart, and say that there had never been anything wrong between yourself and Dr. Evers?”

Evers was the deceased. Various objections were urged to this; that she was the wife of defendant, and could not be cross-examined on any matter about which she did not testify in her direct examination, and because it was an effort on the part of the state to introduce a privileged communication or conversation between husband and wife. Appellant also asked the court to instruct the jury not to consider this for any purpose. The court qualifies this bill by stating such question was proper examination of the matters elicited by the defendant. The writer agrees with the appellant in this contention. This was privileged matter which is held sacred by the statute.

It does seem to me that this record manifests the fact that the appellant has not had a fair trial such as the law guarantees to the citizen when tried for his life and liberty. If the rule of substantial justice is to be invoked for the state and made the criterion of decision against the citizens, why would a failure of substantial justice be equally invoked in behalf of the citizen as to his right for fair and just trial? The rule ought to be made to work both ways, if used in criminal trials, and not used to deprive the citizen of a fair trial.

For the reasons indicated, the judgment ought to be reversed, and the cause remanded.