OPINION
Before the Court are eight motions to dismiss filed by various groups of Defendants. Earlier in these proceedings, the Court heard oral argument on the motions and took the matter under advisement. For the reasons set forth below, all the motions will be GRANTED.
I.
A.
Plaintiffs are 182 Maryland residents who are insureds and family or household members of insureds under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), whose homes suffered damaged as a result of flooding during Hurricane Isabel in September 2003. They have sued various insurance companies; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and a number of its employees; private contractors who assist FEMA in the administration of the NFIP; and insurance adjusters who adjust claims under the NFIP. Plaintiffs allege violations of their due process rights, fraud in both the procurement of NFIP policies and the adjustment of claims under those policies, tortious interference with contract, and breach of contract.
B.
The NFIP is a federally-subsidized program designed to make affordable flood insurance available to the general public at or below actuarial rates. It was established under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001 et seq. In 1978, FEMA took control of the program and assumed all relevant operational responsibilities. See 15 U.S.C. § 2201 (reprinting 1978 Reorganization Plan No. 3); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a); see also Battle v. Seibels Bruce Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 596, 598-600 (4th Cir.2002) (discussing the history and operation of the NFIP). FEMA is authorized to promulgate regulations as to “the general terms and conditions of insurability which shall be applicable to properties eligible for flood insurance coverage,” and as to “the general method or methods by which proved and approved claims for losses under such policies may be adjusted and paid.” See Battle, 288 F.3d at 599 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4013, 4019). In other words, FEMA writes the policies and makes the rules as to claims made under them.
NFIP insurance is marketed to the public in one of two ways: directly by FEMA or through the ‘Write-Your-Own Program” (“WYO Program”) under which a private carrier markets the insurance in its own name. Over 90% of NFIP policies *574are written by WYO carriers. C.E.R.1988, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 386 F.3d 263, 267 (3d Cir.2004). The WYO carriers have significant administrative responsibilities under the NFIP. For the policies they issue, they are responsible for the adjustment, settlement, payment and defense of all claims. 44 C.F.R. § 62.23(d). However, the program does not utilize a traditional reimbursement mechanism; the Federal Government actually pays the claims and covers adjustment and defense costs. See C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 267. WYO carriers act as “fiscal agents” of the Government. 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1). When a WYO carrier collects a premium, it deducts fees and costs and deposits the remainder in the United States Treasury. See 42 U.S.C. § 4017(d); 44 C.F.R. Part 62, App. A, Art. IV(A). Thus, payment on a claim constitutes a direct charge on the Treasury. See 44 C.F.R. § 62.23(f); C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 267 (“It is the Government, not the companies, that pays the claims”). When WYO carriers are required to defend claims, they are reimbursed by FEMA for their defense costs. 44 C.F.R. § 62.23(i)(6); C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 268 (citations omitted). The carriers are compensated for their services by a 3.3% commission on claims paid. 44 C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. A, Art. 111(C)(1). This compensation system has been devised to minimize the risk that the carriers might be inclined to undervalue claims. See, e.g., C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 270 n. 8; Bruinsma v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 410 F.Supp.2d 628, 631 (D.Mich.2006) (“These features of the National Flood Insurance Program remove all disincentive from the insurance company to deny meritorious claims”).
The terms and conditions of coverage are fixed by FEMA regulation in the form of a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (“SFIP”) and do not vary whether the policy is marketed by FEMA or a WYO company. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 61.4(b), 61.13(d)-(e), 62.23(e)-(d); Battle, 288 F.3d at 599 (“[A]ll flood insurance policies issued by WYO Companies under the WYO Program must mirror the terms and conditions of the SFIP, which terms and conditions cannot be varied or waived other than by the express written consent of the Federal Insurance Administrator” (citations omitted)). The SFIP is published in the Code of Federal Regulations at 44 C.F.R. Part 61, App. A(l). It is a single-risk policy that limits coverage to “direct physical loss by or from flood.” Id. Art. II(B)(12). It also contains a lengthy list of losses that are not covered. Id. Arts. IV, V.
The SFIP sets forth a number of preconditions to collecting on a claim, the most important of which is the filing of a proper “proof of loss” within 60 days of the flood loss, in which the insured must give detailed written notice identifying the property damaged, how and when the damage occurred, and the property’s value. Id. Art. VII(J). Insureds have access to the services of adjusters as a “courtesy,” id. Art. VII(J)(7),(8), but the SFIP makes clear that the insured has the ultimate responsibility for complying with the policy terms to ensure payment on covered losses, see id. Art. VII(J)(5), (7), (8) (“5. In completing the proof of loss, you must use your own judgment concerning the amount of loss and justify that amount ... 7. The insurance adjuster whom we hire to investigate your claim may furnish you with a proof of loss form, and she or he may help you complete it. However, this is a matter of courtesy only, and you must still send us a proof of loss within 60 days after the loss even if the adjuster does not furnish the form or help you complete it. 8. We have not authorized the adjuster to approve or disapprove claims or to tell you whether we will approve your claim”).
*575If an insured is dissatisfied with the handling of a claim, he or she may seek recourse from the WYO company, submit to a binding appraisal process (resolving valuation disputes only, not coverage disputes), or bring an action in a federal district court. Id. Art. VII(P); 42 U.S.C. § 4072 (“In the event the program is carried out as provided in section 1340 [42 U.S.C. § 4071], the Director shall be authorized to adjust and make payment of any claims for proved and approved losses covered by flood insurance, and upon the disallowance by the Director of any such claim, or upon the refusal of the claimant to accept the amount allowed upon any such claim, the claimant, within one year after the date of mailing of notice of disal-lowance or partial disallowance by the Director, may institute an action against the Director on such claim in the United States district court for the district in which the insured property or the major part thereof shall have been situated, and original exclusive jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such court to hear and determine such action without regard to the amount in controversy”). Although the provision conferring jurisdiction on the courts speaks only in terms of “an action against the Director,” “a suit against a WYO company is the functional equivalent of a suit against FEMA” since a WYO carrier is a fiscal agent of the government. C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 268.
Several other provisions of the SFIP and NFIP regulations are relevant to the present case. First, in 2000, FEMA added an express preemption clause to the SFIP:
This policy and all disputes arising from the handling of any claim under the policy are governed exclusively by the flood insurance regulations issued by FEMA, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 ... and Federal common law.
44 C.F.R. Part 61, App. A(l) Art. IX.
Second, FEMA has promulgated a regulation that voids any representations inconsistent with the express terms of the SFIP:
The standard flood insurance policy is authorized only under terms and conditions established by Federal statute, the program’s regulations, the Administrator’s interpretations and the express terms of the policy itself. Accordingly, representations regarding the extent and scope of coverage which are not consistent vnth the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, or the Program’s regulations, are void, and the duly licensed property or casualty agent acts for the insured and does not act as agent for the Federal Government, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or the servicing agent.
44 C.F.R. § 61.5(e) (emphasis added).
C.
In the present suit, Plaintiffs have assigned Defendants to five different groups based on their respective roles in the administration of the NFIP. Although these groups are not perfectly aligned with Plaintiffs’ various claims and the various motions to dismiss, they are helpful in sketching out the relevant background. The groups are these:
1) The FEMA Group, consisting of FEMA and certain of its officials and contractors;1
*5762) The CSC Group, consisting of Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) and certain of its employees;2
3) The WYO Group, consisting of WYO carriers3 and Jerry Dubyak (a claims examiner employed by Omaha Property and Casualty);
4) The Adjusters Group, consisting of independent adjusting companies and independent adjusters who adjust NFIP losses;4
5) The Administrator/Processor Group, consisting of third-party administrators/processors and some of their employees.5
Plaintiffs have set out five causes of action in their Amended Complaint, not all of which apply to all Defendants.
Count I is a Bivens claim6 alleging that the individual CSC Defendants, FEMA officials, and Jerry Dubyak deprived Plaintiffs of a liberty interest (physical health) and a property interest (insurance proceeds they were entitled to under the SFIP) without due process of law.
Count II alleges fraud in the procurement of the policies, i.e., that certain Defendants conspired to and falsely represented the “nature and extent of benefits that would be paid ... in the event of a flood loss.”7 Plaintiffs allege that they were told that in the event of a flood loss, “benefits would be paid to them which would make them whole ... and which would be in an amount sufficient to return their property to pre-flood condition, up to the policy limits.”8 All the while, Plaintiffs contend, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs would not be made whole and that the benefits payable would be far less than necessary to return Plaintiffs’ properties to pre-flood condition. This claim is brought against all Defendants, including *577the individual FEMA Defendants, but not FEMA itself.
Count III alleges fraud in the adjustment of claimed losses. It is plead only against the adjuster and administrator Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants engaged in a systematic “low balling” scheme, whereby they induced insureds to settle claims for far less than the SFIP would allow, by misrepresenting the amounts that insureds could recover on their claims. Plaintiffs also contend that these misrepresentations were accompanied by false statements concerning the negative consequences that would result in the event that an insured failed to settle promptly. The misrepresentations were allegedly made in a manner that caused Plaintiffs to believe that the adjusters were acting pursuant to FEMA mandate.
Count IV alleges tortious interference with contract. Although it is not entirely clear from the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs appear to be saying that certain Defendants’ actions caused FEMA to breach their insurance contracts. This claim, like Count II, is brought against all Defendants including individual FEMA Defendants, but not against FEMA itself.
Count V alleges breach of contract by the WYO carriers and FEMA. These Defendants allegedly breached by depriving Plaintiffs of the benefits of their SFIP contracts, namely that the SFIP would make them whole (after satisfaction of the deductible) by providing them with an amount sufficient to return their property to its pre-flood condition, up to the policy limits.
D.
Defendants have divided themselves into groups and have filed eight motions to dismiss:
1) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint Against the CSC Defendants [Paper No. 56];
2) Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Federal Defendants [Paper No. 69];
3) Motion to Dismiss Filed by Jerry Dubyak and Twelve WYO Companies [Paper No. 73];
4) Motion to Dismiss Count I by Jerry Dubyak [Paper No. 74];
5) Certain WYO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, and For More Definite Statement [Paper No. 75];
6) Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of the First Amended Complaint Against the Independent Adjuster Defendants [Paper No. 76]; and
7) Administrator Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [Paper No. 78].
8) Defendant SafeCo Surplus Lines Insurance Company’s Joinder in Certain WYO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, and for More Definite Statement [Paper No. 83].
Defendants raise a host of arguments. They argue that the Bivens claim is barred by sovereign immunity and because Congress has created a comprehensive remedy for aggrieved NFIP insureds. As to the other non-contractual claims, they argue, inter alia, that these claims are preempted by federal law and that, in any event, Plaintiffs’ reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable as a matter of law. In the alternative, Defendants argue that the fraud claims are not properly plead under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Defendants concede that Count V, the breach of contract claim, may go forward, but argue that it should proceed in a more limited way than Plaintiffs pro*578pose. Defendants also argue that all the non-policyholder Plaintiffs must be dismissed from the action.
Because of substantial overlap among the various motions, the Court will consider Defendants’ arguments count-by-count, with a few detours where necessary.
II.
In their motions to dismiss, Defendants have invoked both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (only as to the Federal and CSC Defendants) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).9
A motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) raises the question of whether the court has the authority or competence to hear the case. Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are properly granted where a claim fails to allege facts upon which the court may base jurisdiction. Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F.Supp. 676, 679 (D.Md.1996). While the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction properly exists in the federal court, Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.1999), the court will only grant the 12(b)(1) motion “if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Richmond, Fredericks-burg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.1991).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a claim only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir.1995). The court is obliged to accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and must view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158, 1160 (4th Cir.1990). The court, however, is not obliged to accept the plaintiffs legal conclusions based on the alleged facts. District 28, United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir.1979). A complaint that fails to state a claim will be dismissed. Id.
A.
As an initial matter, the Court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction over this case. Although the Fourth Circuit has declined to decide the issue of whether 42 U.S.C. § 4072 confers jurisdiction over claims against WYO carriers, it is clear that there is federal question jurisdiction over the breach of contract claims, see Studio Frames v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir.2004), and supplemental jurisdiction over the common-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
B.
Count I is brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). “A Bivens action is a judicially created damages remedy designed to vindicate violations of constitutional rights,” by a federal official. Zimbelman v. Savage, 228 F.3d 367, 370 (4th Cir.2000). Plaintiffs allege that the individual FEMA *579and CSC Defendants, as well as Jerry Dubyak, have deprived them of liberty and property interests without due process of law.
Although Defendants make a number of arguments as to Count I, the Court finds most compelling their contention that a Bivens remedy is not appropriate because Congress has already provided a comprehensive remedy for aggrieved NFIP insureds. The Court explains.
A Bivens remedy is available only where “(1) Congress has not already provided an exclusive statutory remedy; (2) there are no ‘special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress’; and (3) there is no ‘explicit congressional declaration’ that money damages not be awarded.” Judicial Watch v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). The concept of “special factors” “includefs] an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent.” Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988). Where “the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration,” a Bivens remedy is generally not available. Id.; see also Olivares v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 934 F.Supp. 698, 707 (D.Md.1996) (“[GJenerally speaking, where Congress has acted in an area and a remedy exists which is alternative to a Bivens-type suit, no Bivens-type suit will lie”).
Schwieker militates strongly against allowing a Bivens remedy in this case. There the Supreme Court concluded that the existence of an elaborate scheme of administrative remedies in the Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984 was evidence that Congress did not intend that there be an additional remedy of money damages against federal officials. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424-28, 108 S.Ct. 2460. The Court concluded that while “a Bivens remedy would obviously offer the prospect of relief for injuries that must now go unredressed,”10 Congress had still provided “meaningful safeguards or remedies.” Id. at 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460. Similarly in the case at bar aggrieved policyholders will not be left without a remedy if it turns out federal officials have violated their rights. Bearing in mind that the crux of Plaintiffs’ claim is that they were denied the benefits they were owed under the SFIP, the existence of the judicial remedy provided by § 4072, a breach of contract action, is a sufficient reason to prompt denial of a Bivens remedy.11 But *580there is more. An aggrieved policyholder may also invoke the appraisal option whereby the policyholder and the insurer each select appraisers, who in turn select an umpire to resolve any differences in the parties’ valuations. See 44 C.F.R. Part 61, App. A(l), Art. VII(P). The valuation is thus either agreed upon or set with the assistance of an impartial third party. This represents a fair and reasonable procedure for Plaintiffs to contest FEMA’s pay-out decisions with which they may not agree.
Congress appears to have provided a meaningful remedy in these circumstances, where the need for uniformity and the establishment of limits as to possible government liability are obvious.
The Court finds a Bivens remedy inappropriate in this case. Count I will be dismissed.
C.
There is substantial overlap between Defendants’ arguments as to Count II (procurement fraud), Count III (adjustment fraud), and Count IV (tortious interference with contract). The most important of these arguments is that the claims are preempted. The Court will address Counts III and IV first, inasmuch as the preemption argument as to these claims is more straightforward, then move to Count II.
In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that the Independent Adjuster and Administrator Defendants committed common law fraud in the adjustment of NFIP claims by misrepresenting the nature and extent of Plaintiffs’ SFIP coverage in order to induce them to accept “low ball” offers. Plaintiffs further allege that these Defendants misrepresented the consequences Plaintiffs would face if they refused to accept these offers. Count IV alleges that all Defendants, except FEMA and the WYO carriers, tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs’ SFIP contracts. While it is not entirely clear what specific conduct Plaintiffs are referring to in Count IV, since they simply incorporate by reference all preceding factual allegations in this count, what is apparent is that the challenged conduct centers around “the adjustment of the insured Plaintiffs’ flood loss claims.”12 In other words, the thrust of both Counts III and IV is that they relate to the handling of claims under the SFIP. The issue, then, is whether and to what extent state common law actions related to that conduct, including fraud, are preempted by federal law.
“[Sjtate law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause in three circumstances: (1) when Congress has clearly expressed an intention to do so (‘express preemption’); (2) when Congress has clearly intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field of regulation (‘field preemption’); and (3) when a state law conflicts with federal law (‘conflict preemption’).” College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 595-96 (4th Cir.2005). Defendants’ arguments involve both express preemption and conflict preemption. Express preemption means exactly what is says; it applies where a statute or regulation explicitly bars state law regulation. Id. Conflict preemption comes in two forms: (1) “a direct conflict between state and federal law, such that compliance with both is impossible,” and (2) where “a state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Id. at 596. “A state law may pose *581an obstacle to federal purposes by interfering with the accomplishment of Congress’s actual objectives, or by interfering with the methods that Congress selected for meeting those legislative goals.” Id.
Defendants argue first that Counts III and IV are expressly preempted by Article IX of the SFIP, added by regulation in 2000.13 The provision/regulation states that:
This policy and all disputes arising from the handling of any claim under the policy are governed exclusively by the flood insurance regulations issued by FEMA, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 ... and federal common law.
44 C.F.R. Part 61, App. A(l) Art. IX (emphasis added).
“Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.” In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 109 F.3d 248, 254 (5th Cir.1997); see also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (“We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes”). Recognizing this, the Fifth Circuit, in Gallup v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., has held that Article IX expressly preempts any and all “state law tort claims arising from claims handling.” 434 F.3d 341, 345 (5th Cir.2005).
But even before Gallup, the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, in cases involving the pre-2000 SFIP which did not contain an express preemption provision, held that state law actions regarding “claims handling” were preempted as matter of conflict preemption. See C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 272; Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir.2005); Gibson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943, 949 (6th Cir.2002). Thus Defendants argue that if the Court were to conclude that Counts III and IV are not expressly preempted, it should still conclude that they are preempted because allowing them would interfere with the objectives of the NFIP. Defendants cite numerous cases to this effect.14 Of particular note is the Third Circuit’s analysis in C.E.R.15 There the *582court began by noting that “[i]ndisputably a central purpose of the [NFIP] is to reduce fiscal pressure on federal flood relief efforts.” C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 270. It then opined that allowing state tort suits would be at odds with this purpose:
State tort suits against WYO companies, which are usually expensive, undermine this goal. Allowing suits to proceed ... results in one of two consequences— both bad. If FEMA refused to reimburse WYO carriers for their defense costs, insurers would leave the Program, driving the price of insurance higher. The alternative, remuneration for losses incurred in such suits, would directly burden the federal Treasury ...
Our understanding that expensive litigation will draw on federal funds is confirmed by FEMA’s regulations and policies interpreting and implementing the NFIA. Congress statutorily authorized FEMA to enter into ‘arrangements’ with private insurance companies. FEMA, in turn, specified the terms of these Arrangements in the regulations governing the Program. Among other things, the Arrangement in effect when C.E.R. purchased its Policy provided that FEMA could reimburse a WYO company for ‘payments as a result of awards or judgments for punitive damages arising under the scope of this Arrangement and policies of flood insurance issued pursuant to this Arrangement provided that prompt notice of any claim for punitive damages [was submitted].’ The Write-Your-Own Claims Manual issued by FEMA to WYO companies also provided explicitly that the Government would reimburse a WYO company for punitive damages under appropriate circumstances. Thus it appears that FEMA ordinarily will be responsible financially for the costs of defending a lawsuit against a WYO company. The efficiency goals of the Program, on balance, would better be served by requiring claimants to resolve their disputes by means of the remedies FEMA provides.16
Id. at 270-71 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Apart from the concerns stated in C.E.R., courts have noted that allowing state law actions would jeopardize the interest in uniformity in the administration of the NFIP. As one court has put it:
[Subjecting WYO companies to fifty different bad faith statutes would undermine Congressional intent to have a uniform system. Courts consistently have recognized that the NFIP’s internal consistency and nationwide uniformity would be undermined if WYO companies are subject to each state’s bad faith laws ... Exposing WYO companies to bad faith liability in every state would create two curious results. First, [because of sovereign immunity] the holder of a FEMA-issued flood insurance policy would be entitled to less legal protection than the holder of a WYO-issued policy. Second, WYO companies might be more willing to issue[ ] flood insurance policies in some states and less willing in others. Either result would frustrate Congres*583sional intent, as it would ‘create an internal inconsistency within an otherwise balanced statutory and regulatory structure.’
Peal v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 212 F.Supp.2d 508, 516-517 (E.D.N.C.2002) (citations and footnotes omitted).
Finally, and of particular significance, application of the preemption doctrine would not work an undue hardship on aggrieved insureds since they always retain a contract remedy. If an insured can recover in contract for a shortfall in benefits, a tort remedy would add little to the enterprise.17 If an insured was in fact defrauded in the adjustment of his claims by a “low ball” offer, he remains entitled to a full recovery of direct losses by suing in contract.18
Defendants have made a convincing case for both express and conflict preemption as to Counts III and IV.19
Count II, which claims fraud in the procurement of NFIP policies, presents a slightly different case. The Court does not understand Defendants to argue that this claim is expressly preempted by Article IX of the SFIP. Rather, they argue that the claim is barred by reason of conflict preemption.20 The Court acknowl*584edges that several courts, disagreeing with Defendants, have held that procurement fraud claims are not preempted.21 These courts have made a “critical distinction between claims seeking recovery under the SFIP — which are preempted — and those arising from alleged misrepresentations made during the procurement of the policy — which are not.” Reeder v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 419 F.Supp.2d 750, 758 (D.Md.2006) (citing Houck v. State Farm, Fire and Cas. Co., 194 F.Supp.2d 452, 461 (D.S.C.2002)). At the same time, most Courts of Appeals have yet to weigh in on this issue. See Wright, 415 F.3d at 390 (“We join these circuits in holding that state law tort claims arising from claims handling by a WYO are preempted by federal law” (emphasis added)); C.E.R., 386 F.3d at 271 n. 12 (“We need not decide today whether a case alleging misrepresentation in claims procurement would also be preempted”); Gibson, 289 F.3d at 949-50 (“It is unnecessary for us to decide whether policy procurement type state law claims are preempted by NFIA”).
The cases holding that procurement claims are not preempted invariably trace back to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Spence v. Omaha Indem. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.1993), which has been read to hold that “state law claims based on claims procurement were not preempted, while state law claims based on claims adjustment were” or “that state law tort claims against WYOs, whether based on procurement or claims adjustment, are not preempted by federal law.”22 Wright, 415 F.3d at 389 (citations omitted). Spence and its progeny rest on a straightforward rationale: since Government money is not at stake when WYO carriers are sued for procurement fraud, these actions do not impede the objectives of the NFIP and therefore should not be preempted. See, e.g., Reeder, 419 F.Supp.2d at 763 (“United States Treasury funds are not at stake for judgments against WYO Companies arising out of tort claims based on misrepresentations made during the procurement of SFIPs” (citing Spence, 996 F.2d at 796 n. 17)); Houck, 194 F.Supp.2d at 463 (“[T]he court finds no substantial federal interest concerning these causes of actions because they are outside the scope of the Arrangement and not reimbursable”); Davis v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Co., 96 *585F.Supp.2d 995, 1004 (N.D.Cal.2000) (“Defendants and FEMA contend that state-law claims interfere with the statutory scheme and frustrate the intent of Congress, while depleting federal funds in a manner not contemplated by Congress. As shown, state-law claims like the ones at issue will not frustrate the goals of Congress”).
These courts cite NFIA and FEMA regulations in support of their conclusion. First, they suggest that § 4081(c) of the NFIA, which provides that “[t]he Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency may not hold harmless or indemnify an agent or broker for his or her error or omission,” “appear[s] to contemplate negligence actions against WYO Companies.” Reeder, 419 F.Supp.2d at 761. Second, they note that FEMA regulations “remove negligence-type claims from the ‘Arrangement’ between FEMA and WYO Companies,” meaning that WYO carriers are not reimbursed for such claims. Id. at 762 (citing former 44 C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. A, Art. IX (“The parties [to the Arrangement] shall not be liable to each other for damages caused by inadvertent delay, error, or omission made in connection with any transaction under this Arrangement. In the event of such actions, the responsible party must attempt to rectify that error as soon as possible after discovery of the error and act to mitigate any costs incurred due to that error”). Finally, the courts note that “FEMA regulations ... provide[ ] that FEMA can refuse to reimburse a WYO insurer if a claim is based on actions by the insurer outside the scope of the NFIP.”23 Davis, 96 F.Supp.2d at 1004 (citing former 44 C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. A, Art. 111(D)(3)(a) (“If it is determined that the claim is grounded in actions by the Company that are outside the scope of this Arrangement, the National Flood Insur-*586anee Act, and 44 C.F.R. chapter 1, sub-chapter B, and/or involve issues of insurer/agent negligence as discussed in Article IX of this Arrangement, the [Office of General Counsel] shall make a recommendation to the Administrator as to whether the claim is grounded in actions by the Company that are significantly outside the scope of this Arrangement. In the event the Administrator determines that the claim is grounded in actions by the Company that are significantly outside the scope of this Arrangement, the Company will be notified, in writing, within thirty (30) days of the Administrator’s decision if the decision is that any award or judgment for damages arising out of such actions will not be recognized under Article III of this Arrangement as a reimbursable loss cost, expense or expense reimbursement”); see also Reeder, 419 F.Supp.2d at 762 nn. 12,13.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that “if the accused activity [i.e., procurement fraud, adjustment fraud, and tortious interference] is outside the scope of the authorized arrangement between the accused party and FEMA, rather than under the policy, there [is] no express or field preemption24 of any kind.” And in this case, say Plaintiffs, Defendants conspired “to act completely outside the scope of their authority under the NFIP” by carrying out an “ ‘in-place’ comprehensive scheme” to deny them the benefits of their SFIPs, a conspiracy starting with FEMA at the top and running all the way down to the independent adjusters.25
In response, Defendants maintain that, on their face, the FEMA regulations cited by Plaintiffs do not have the meaning Plaintiffs give them nor have they ever been interpreted or applied by FEMA in the way that Plaintiffs and the case authorities suggest. In no sense, say Defendants, have the regulations been interpreted by FEMA to except from fraud from preemption, including procurement fraud. The Court finds Defendants’ arguments compelling.
First, as Defendants have noted, the regulations allowing FEMA to refuse to reimburse a WYO can unquestionably be read differently from the way in which FEMA reads them. What the “outside-the-scope” regulation does is authorize FEMA’s General Counsel and then the Federal Insurance Administrator to find that certain actions are significantly outside the scope of the NFIP arrangement and/or involve agent negligence. See 44 C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. A, Art. 111(D)(3)(a) (“If the FEMA OGC finds that the litigation is grounded in actions by the Company that are significantly outside the scope of this Arrangement, and/or involves issues of agent negligence, then the FEMA OGC shall make a recommendation to the Administrator regarding whether all or part *587of the litigation is significantly outside the scope of the Arrangement” (emphasis added)). The regulation leaves the definition of what is within and without the Arrangement to FEMA’s General Counsel. If determination of what is “significantly outside the scope of the Arrangement” or agent negligence were left to the pleader, FEMA would ostensibly be obliged to decline to reimburse any activity that the pleader might assert in a complaint was “significantly outside the scope of the Arrangement” or that arguably amounted to agent negligence. Every time an aggrieved insured might use these magic words, the WYO carrier would be left to twist in the wind. This would obviously not be in the best interest of the NFIP; WYO carriers might well leave the Program in droves. By bringing more types of WYO cases within the scope of the Arrangement and hence the preemptive fold, FEMA is able to provide important protections and incentives to WYO’s.
Second, FEMA, whose opinion on the matter is certainly entitled to deference, see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 883-84, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000); Scherz v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 112 F.Supp.2d 1000, 1009 (C.D.Cal.2000), has never agreed with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of what is meant by “significantly outside the scope of the Arrangement” or “agent negligence.” FEMA expressly disagreed with the interpretation of the regulations given by Spence, and promptly amended its regulations to make clear what its position pre-Spence had always been — that state law fraud claims based on policy procurement were not “outside the scope the Arrangement.” 26 FEMA’s position then and now is that the most that these regulations do is to “proteet[ ] FEMA from responsibility for egregious conduct totally outside the Arrangement, such as an assault by an employee of the WYO Company on an insured party.” See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 29, Gallup v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341, 345 (5th Cir.2005). They do not, however, except procurement fraud from preemption.
Finally, Defendants suggest and the Court is persuaded that federal funds may very well be at stake in connection with procurement fraud claims, however much Plaintiffs may argue that they are not. Insofar as it is for FEMA’s General Counsel in given cases “to recommend” what is outside the Arrangement, and — so as not to unduly discourage WYO’s from participating in the program — he chooses not to, federal funds are surely implicated. And while FEMA may well decline to indemnify WYO’s for certain errors, omissions, or negligence, where, as here, WYO’s are sued for both procurement fraud and claims handling fraud (or procurement fraud alone), FEMA would still presumably have a duty to defend such claims until such time as they are proven, since the claims might in fact prove to be totally groundless. This would involve federal funds. In contrast, Plaintiffs’ assertion that federal funds are not involved seems at best conclusory.27 The distinction between claims handling and procurement *588fraud that Reeder and other courts have found so significant appears to this Court to be a distinction without a difference.28 The Court finds the argument for conflict preemption as to procurement fraud claims no less persuasive than the argument for conflict preemption of claims handling fraud.
Summing up, the Court concludes that Count II is preempted as a matter of conflict preemption, and that Counts III and IV are preempted as a matter of both express and conflict preemption. Accordingly Counts II, III, and IV will be dismissed.29
*589D.
That leaves Count V, Plaintiffs’ claim against the WYO carriers and FEMA for breach of the SFIP contract. Defendants concede that this claim may go forward,30 but argue that it should only be allowed to do so in a limited fashion. In particular, they argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to certain of the damages that they claim, viz., delay damages, prejudgment interest, disgorgement of profits, and a refund of premiums. Plaintiffs have withdrawn their claims for disgorgement of profits and refund of premiums. As to the claims for delay damages and prejudgment interest, the Court agrees with Defendants.
Coverage under the SFIP is limited to “direct physical loss by or from flood.” 44 C.F.R. Part 61, App. A(l), Art. 111(A). Specifically excluded are “1. Loss of revenue or profits; 2. Loss of access to the insured property or described location; 3. Loss of use of the insured property or described location; 4. Loss from interruption of business or production; 5. Any additional living expenses incurred while the insured building is being repaired or is unable to be occupied for any reason; 6. The cost of complying with any ordinance or law requiring or regulating the construction, demolition, remodeling, renovation, or repair of property, including removal of any resulting debris ...; [and] 7. Any other economic loss you suffer.” Id. Art. V(A). These provisions establish beyond question that consequential damages such as delay damages are not recoverable. See, e.g., Atlas Pallet, Inc. v. Gallagher, 725 F.2d 131, 139 (1 st Cir.1984) (‘We believe that the type of loss insured under the SFIP does not include the kind of economic loss claimed by appellant under the rubric of ‘consequential damages’ ”).
The same is true as to prejudgment interest; it is not recoverable under the SFIP. See Newton v. Capital Assur. Co., 245 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir.2001); Sandia Oil Co. v. Beckton, 889 F.2d 258 (10th Cir.1989).
Accordingly, with the excision of these damage claims, Count V may go forward.31
E.
Finally, Defendants have moved to dismiss all non-policyholder Plaintiffs. Since all other counts have been dismissed and since the non-policyholder Plaintiffs are not included in Count V, they have no remaining claims in this suit. As a result, they will be dismissed.
*590III.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ several Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.
A separate Order will issue.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the foregoing Opinion, it is this 29th day of September, 2006 ORDERED:
1) The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint Against the CSC Defendants [Paper No. 56] is GRANTED;
2) The Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Federal Defendants [Paper No. 69] is GRANTED;
3) The Motion to Dismiss Filed by Jerry Dubyak and Twelve WYO Companies [Paper No. 73] is GRANTED;
4) The Motion to Dismiss Count I by Jerry Dubyak [Paper No. 74] is GRANTED;
5) The Certain WYO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint [Paper No. 75] is GRANTED;
6) The Certain WYO Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement [Paper No. 75] is MOOT;
7) The Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of the First Amended Complaint Against the Independent Adjuster Defendants [Paper No. 76] is GRANTED;
8) The Administrator Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and TV of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [Paper No. 78] is GRANTED;
9) Defendant Safeco Surplus Lines Insurance Company’s Joinder in Certain WYO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint [Paper No. 83] is GRANTED;
10) Defendant Safeco Surplus Lines Insurance Company’s Joinder in Certain WYO Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement [Paper No. 83] is MOOT;
11) Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Amended Complaint are DISMISSED;
12) Count V of the Amended Complaint REMAINS except that Plaintiffs’ claims for delay damages and prejudgment interest are DISMISSED; and
13) Counsel for the parties shall immediately communicate with each other and agree on at least three (3) dates for an In-Court status conference with the Court and shall promptly thereafter contact Chambers to set a status conference. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall initiate the communication with other counsel.