On July 18, 1963, the plaintiff, then a lieutenant in the City of Cranston permanent police department, was seriously injured in the line of duty as a result *193of which he became and still remains unable to perform his regular duties. Notwithstanding his disability, he continued to receive his full salary for almost three years. His pay status changed when the Cranston city council, acting upon the recommendation of the mayor, voted that effective April 1, 1966, he be retired from active service in the department and placed on the pension list. The authority relied upon for that action was section 24-24 of the Cranston code,1 the enabling legislation for which was P. L. 1937, chapter 2549.2
Thereafter plaintiff brought this civil action in the Superior Court. He seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Cranston City Treasurer to pay him the difference between the pension he has been receiving since, his involuntary retirement and the salary to which he would have been entitled if his status as a lieutenant in the permanent police department had not been terminated.3 His position *194is that the vote retiring and pensioning him was invalid and a nullity because under the Cranston Home Rule Charter4 all of the powers and duties relating to police department pensions were transferred from the mayor and the city council to the employee retirement board, that the employee retirement board has never acted on his case and indeed' does not even exist, and that until legally retired and pensioned pursuant to the charter provision he is entitled to receive his full salary. The case was heard by a justice of the Superior Court on an agreed statement of facts. ‘ It was decided adversely to the plaintiff who now appeals from a judgment dismissing the action on its merits.
The basic question is whether by a provision of a charter adopted’ pursuant to article XXVIIÍ of amendments to 'the state constitution, the home rule amendment, the people of Craiiston could transfer' to an employee retirement board the powers and duties with respect to the retirement and pensioning of police officers then vested in the. mayor and city council under a prior legislative grant of-authority (P. L. 1937, chap. 2549, supra, n.2).
Unless the home rule amendment conferred that right, the answer to that question would be “No” because historically under our system a municipal corporation, in the *195absence of a special constitutional provision, was a creature of the state having no inherent right of self-government and deriving all of its authorities and powers from its creator. City of Providence v. Moulton, 52 R. I. 236, 160 A. 75; Opinion of Justices in re Metropolitan Park Loan, 34 R. I. 191, 83 A. 3.
Municipalities by adopting home rule charters may, however, escape some of the strictures on self-government imposed by the historical relationship between the state and its cities and towns, but only in a narrowly limited sense. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 79 R. I. 277, 87 A.2d 693. Thus, they may govern themselves with respect to local affairs and may enact or amend such laws relating to their property, affairs and government as are not inconsistent with either the state constitution or the laws enacted by the General Assembly in conformity Avith its reserved powers. Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R. I. 51, 166 A.2d 216. They may not, however, legislate on matters of state-wide concern for there the power of the General Assembly remains exclusive and undiminished. State v. Krzak, 97 R. I. 156, 196 A.2d 417. And even as to those local affairs where they may govern without prior state authorization, their power, of home rule is subordinate to the General Assembly’s overriding fight to legislate on the same subject matter either (1) by a general act applicable to all cities and towns alike, and not affecting the form of government.of any city or town;, or (2) by a special act directed to a particular, city or town and approved by a majority of-its qualified electors. Opinion to the House of Representatives, supra.
The question' narrows then, to whether providing a municipally appointed police officer, with a disability'pension is a matter for state or local action; The home rule amendment make? 'the" character and the, scope of- tliat action the ultimate determinant, but it does not assist by fur*196nishing any guidelines. Instead it leaves to the courts the responsibility of resolving the conflicts where the state and a municipality have each legislated on the same subject matter.5
In this case both a state statute and a provision of the Cranston charter purport to regulate the right of a disabled police officer to receive a pension. In resolving the conflict between the two we cannot ignore a long line of decisions which tell us that it is the state’s duty to preserve the public peace and good order, to enforce the laws, to suppress crime and to protect liberty and property; that the police officers who discharge the state’s responsibility in these respects, even though they may have been appointed by municipalities under a delegation of power, act for all of the inhabitants of the state and not merely for those of a particular community; that they are officers who perform a state duty and are subject to full control by the state; and that as a necessary incident of that full control the state may regulate the appointment and ten-' ure of the members of a local police department, and may also provide for the payment of their expenses and salaries out of local funds. State v. Wax, 83 R. I. 319, 116 A.2d 468; Eaton v. Town Council, 52 R. I. 449, 161 A. 225; City of Providence v. Moulton, supra; Horton v. City of Newport, 27 R. I. 283, 61 A. 759; Opinion to the Governor, 22 R. I. 654, 49 A. 36; City of Newport v. Horton, 22 R. I. 196, 47 A. 312; Kelley v. Cook, 21 R. I. 29, 41 A. 571.
It would appear on general principle that the broad sweep of the control which under our cases the General *197Assembly has over police affairs certainly includes within its scope the right to provide for the pensioning of a police officer who becomes incapacitated by reason of an injury sustained in the line of discharging his duties as a state officer. It is upon this rationale that other courts have held that constitutional provisions such as ours do not permit a home rule municipality to impinge upon the state’s sovereign power to control police affairs which include the right to provide for and regulate pensions. Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 52 Ariz. 438, 83 P.2d 283; Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N. W. 2d 613.
We are not persuaded by the statement in 40 Am.Jur. Pensions §19, 976 at 977 and 105 A.L.R. 259 at 263, relied upon by plaintiff, that the general rule is that the pensioning of a member of a police department of a municipality operating under a home rule charter is within the exclusive rule of that municipality. The only authorities relied upon in those works for the verification of that statement are one Oregon and four California cases.6 Those cases, however, are clearly distinguishable because article NI, sec. 8% of the California constitution permits a home rule municipality to exercise full plenary authority over its police officers; and the cited Oregon case notes that “* * * no other state has constitutional provisions similar to ours as to the powers of cities and towns.” Branch v. Albee, 71 Ore. 188, 200, 142 P. 598, 601.
We decide this case under our own constitutional provisions, in accordance with our own long-settled principles and in partial reliance upon decisions of other courts where, unlike the situation in California and in Oregon, *198the home rule constitutional provisions are similar to our own.
Francis Castrovillari, for plaintiff.
Peter Palombo, Jr., City Solicitor, for defendant.
The plaintiff’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.