Michael Emordi Ogwude, a native and citizen of Nigeria, has filed a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order affirming the denial of his second motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The BIA denied the motion because it was time and number barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A)(i) and (c)(7)(C)(i).
Ogwude contends that the BIA should have equitably tolled the 90-day time limitation set forth in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), from the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal in October 2005 until he filed his second motion to reopen in July 2014, because he was diligent in pursuing his ineffective assistance claims.
Motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored, and the moving party must satisfy a heavy burden. Altamirano-Lopez v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In reviewing the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen, we generally apply a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.
It is undisputed that the motion to reopen at issue was Ogwude’s second such motion and that it was filed more than nine years after the BIA dismissed his appeal. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ogwude’s second motion to reopen as time and number barred under § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)©.
To the extent the BIA determined that Ogwude was not entitled to equitable tolling of the time and number limitations, assuming equitable tolling is indeed available in the immigration context, the BIA’s determination in this regard was also not an abuse of discretion. In other contexts, we have recognized that equitable tolling should apply in “rare and exceptional circumstances,” United States v. English, 400 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2005), and a party seeking to toll a filing deadline must demonstrate diligence, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). Ogwude has failed to establish that he diligently pursued and presented his ineffective assistance claims.
The petition for review is DENIED.