MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., C.J., DAUGHTREY, COLE, CLAY, and GILMAN, JJ„ joined. BOGGS, J. (pp. 416-420), delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which KRUPANSKY and BATCHELDER, JJ„ joined.
OPINION
Petitioners Mario Rosales-Garcia and Reynero Arteaga Carballo appeal the denials of their petitions for the writ of habeas corpus in the district courts. Both Petitioners, Cuban nationals who have been ordered removed from the United States, are currently in the indefinite and potentially permanent custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) because Cuba refuses to allow them to return. In its recent decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) that authorizes the post-removal-period detention of removed aliens must be construed to contain an “implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation” because the indefinite detention of aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability “would raise serious constitutional concerns.”
We first conclude that Rosales’s and Carballo’s detention by the INS is governed by IIRIRA. We then conclude that although Rosales and Carballo are removable on grounds of inadmissibility, as opposed to deportability, the Supreme Court’s limiting construction of IIRIRA’s post-removal-detention provision applies to their detention. Finally, we conclude that even if the Supreme Court’s construction of IIRIRA does not apply to Rosales and Carballo, their indefinite detention independently raises constitutional concerns, and we construe IIRIRA’s post-removal-period detention provision as it applies to Rosales and Carballo to contain an implicit reasonable-time limitation. Because there is no significant likelihood of the petitioners’ removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the continued detention of the petitioners by the INS is not authorized by the applicable statute, and we REVERSE the district courts’ denials of their habeas petitions and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioners-Appellants Mario Rosales-Garcia (“Rosales”) and Reynero Arteaga Carballo (“Carballo”) arrived in this country as part of the Mariel boatlift in 1980, during which over 120,000 Cubans crossed by boat from the Mariel harbor in Cuba to the United States. Rosales and Carballo, *391like most of the Mariel Cubans, arrived in this country without documentation permitting them legal entry; therefore, because they were not authorized to enter the country and because immigration officials stopped them at the border, they were deemed “excludable” under the immigration law in effect at the time.1 Although excludable aliens have not “entered” the country for the purposes of immigration law, Rosales and Carballo were permitted physical entry into the United States pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982) to grant immigration parole.2 As of 1986, this parole has been governed by regulations specifically promulgated by the INS for Mariel Cubans. 8 C.F.R. § 212.12 (2002) (the “Cuban Review Plan”).
Following their independent criminal convictions, the Attorney General, acting through the INS, revoked Rosales’s and Carballo’s parole and initiated exclusion proceedings against them. Both petitioners were excluded and, pursuant to the immigration law in effect at the time, they should have been immediately deported. Cuba, however, has refused to repatriate most of the Mariel Cubans whom the United States has excluded, and the U.S. government does not contend 'in this appeal that a repatriation by Cuba of either Rosales or Carballo is reasonably foreseeable.3 Because Cuba refused to accept the *392deportation of either Rosales or Carballo, the INS has detained them in prisons in the United States.
A. Rosales
Rosales was twenty-three when he arrived in the United States, and he was soon thereafter paroled into the custody of his aunt. Beginning in 1980, Rosales was arrested for a number of offenses, including aggravated battery, possession of marijuana, burglary, and loitering. Rosales was convicted of the following offenses: possession of marijuana and resisting arrest in October 1981; grand theft in September 1981, for which he received two years of probation in March 1983; burglary and grand larceny in October 1983, for which he received two six-month sentences, to be served consecutively; escape from a penal institution in February 1984, for which he received a 366-day sentence; and one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine in March 1993, for which he received a sixty-three month federal prison sentence and five years of supervised release.
On July 10, 1986, Rosales’s immigration parole was revoked by the INS on the basis of the escape and grand larceny convictions, pursuant to INS authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d)(2) (1986). In a separate proceeding before an immigration judge, Rosales was denied asylum and ordered excluded on June 26, 1987, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982), for improper documentation. Rosales was in INS detention between July 1986 and May 1988, when he was again released on parole. After he pleaded guilty to the cocaine conspiracy charge in 1993, the INS revoked Rosales’s parole, this time pursuant to the Cuban Review Plan. When Rosales was released from federal prison in May 1997, the INS detained him, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (1994). Rosales remained in INS detention for four years, during which time he was denied parole twice, in November 1997 and March 1999, under the Cuban Review Plan. In April 2001, Rosales was granted parole and released into a halfway house program. Rosales completed the program in May 2001, and he was subsequently released into the community under conditions of supervision.
Rosales filed his pro se habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on July 9, 1998. In the petition, he alleged that his “continued incarceration is illegal, it violates Due Process, statu[t]es, and case law....” Rosales Joint Appendix (“Rosales J.A.”) at 9. The district court initially denied Rosales’s habeas petition sua sponte in October of 1998; however, Rosales filed a motion to amend, and the district court vacated its initial denial. On May 3, 1999, the district court denied with prejudice Rosales’s amended habeas petition. The court concluded that under the IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp.V.1999), the Attorney General was authorized to detain Rosales indefinitely, and the court further concluded that such detention did not violate Rosales’s constitutional substantive or procedural due process rights. In regard to Rosales’s substantive due process claim, the court held that Rosales “ha[d] no fundamental right to be free to roam the United States.” Rosales J.A. at 91. With respect to Rosales’s procedural due process claim, the court held that “[wjhatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” Rosales J.A. at 91 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950)).
*393On August 4, 2000, a panel of this court heard the case on appeal, and on January 31, 2001, the panel reversed the district court’s denial of Rosales’s petition. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the government petitioned the Court for certiorari, asking that the panel’s decision be vacated and remanded in light of Zadvydas. On December 10, 2001, the Supreme Court granted the government’s request. Thoms v. Rosales-Garcia, 534 U.S. 1063, 122 S.Ct. 662, 151 L.Ed.2d 577 (2001). Following our sua sponte decision to hear Carballo v. Luttrell en banc, Rosales requested that his case be heard en banc together with Carballo; we granted his request.
B. Carballo
Carballo was twenty-five when he arrived in the United States, and he too was soon thereafter released on parole. By 1983, Carballo had been arrested sixteen times, for offenses including aggravated assault, burglary, grand larceny, battery, carrying a concealed weapon and an unlicensed firearm, trespassing, and possession of marijuana.4 In April 1983, Carbal-lo was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and robbery, for which he received a sentence of eight years for the murder, eight years for the robbery, and five years for the aggravated assault. During his incarceration, the INS initiated exclusion proceedings, and in September 1994, an immigration judge ordered Car-ballo excluded, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crimes of moral turpitude), (a)(2)(B) (multiple criminal convictions), and (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (improper documentation) (1994). Upon the completion of his sentence, in June of 1988, Carballo was taken into custody by the INS.5 He has been detained since then, although his status has been reviewed annually, pursuant to the Cuban Review Plan. While this case was pending, on December 17, 2002, Car-ballo was placed by the INS in a nine-month residential substance-abuse program at the Union Rescue Mission in Los Angeles.
On September 6, 1990, Carballo filed a pro se habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Carballo claimed that the Attorney General did not have the authority to detain him beyond a reasonable time to effect his exclusion and that his continued detention violated his constitutional substantive and procedural due process rights. A magistrate judge recommended that Carballo’s petition be denied, and on November 26, 1991, the district court denied Carballo’s petition. The district court concluded that the Attorney General had implied statutory authority to detain Carballo under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1988). Addressing Carballo’s constitutional claims, the court held that because Carballo’s detention did not constitute punishment, it did not violate substantive due process. The court further held that Carballo was entitled to only as much procedural due process as Congress granted him. Carballo did not appeal this denial.
On December 11, 1998, Carballo filed a successive habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The district court denied Carballo’s successive petition on May 10, 1999. After finding that Carballo *394raised the same claims in his successive habeas petition as he had raised in his original habeas petition, the court stated that the “law of the case doctrine prevents this court from reconsidering petitioner’s entirely repetitive claim.” Carballo Joint Appendix (“Carballo J.A.”) at 20. Carballo appealed this denial, and a panel of this court heard the case on March 9, 2001. On October 11, 2001, the panel affirmed the decision of the district court. On November 3, 2001, we sua sponte granted Carballo a rehearing en banc, vacating the decision of the panel. Carballo requested that his case be heard together with Rosales’s, and we granted his request.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
1. Availability of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Both Rosales and Carballo filed petitions for habeas corpus relief in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Recently in INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court definitively concluded that aliens detained by the INS can petition for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241— whether they are detained pursuant to the pre-1996 statutory regime, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), or IIRIRA. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-314, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). The Court held that “[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Id. at 301, 121 S.Ct. 2271. “[U]nder the pre1996 statutory scheme — and consistent with its common-law antecedents — it is clear that St. Cyr could have brought his challenge to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ legal determination in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Id. at 308, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Although the government argued that certain provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA barred habeas petitions under those statutes, the Court determined that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA or IIRIRA. Id. at 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (“§ 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.”). Therefore, the district courts properly had jurisdiction over Rosales’s and Carballo’s habeas petitions, and we have jurisdiction to review the district courts’ denials of those petitions.
2. Mootness — Rosales
Rosales was released from INS detention and paroled into the United States in May of 2001; the government contends that Rosales’s appeal is therefore moot. “Under Article III of the Constitution, our jurisdiction extends only to actual cases and controversies. We have no power to adjudicate disputes which are moot.” McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.1997) (quotation omitted). Even if a case was not moot in the district court, if it becomes moot on appeal, we must dismiss the case unless “the relief sought would, if granted, make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” Id. Because Rosales is still “in custody” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and because the relief he seeks, if granted, would make a difference to his legal interests, we conclude that his appeal is not moot.
The government argues that “if a prisoner is released from custody during the pendency of his case, his habeas petition becomes moot.” Gov’t Supp. Br. re Rosales at 19. In Jones v. Cunningham, *395371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963), however, the Supreme Court held that a paroled prisoner was in the custody of his state parole board for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. “While petitioner’s parole releases him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this is enough to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the members of the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute.... ” Jones, 371 U.S. at 243, 83 S.Ct. 373; see also DePompei v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 999 F.2d 138, 140 (6th Cir.1993). Although Rosales’s parole was not based on a criminal conviction, it imposes similarly restrictive conditions. See Rosales Supp. J.A. at 4-5 (Conditions of Parole). Therefore, we conclude that even though he has been paroled into the United States, Rosales is still in the custody of the INS for the purposes of his habeas petition.6
Our inquiry into whether Rosales’s claim is moot cannot end, however, with a determination of custody. In Spencer v. Kemna, the Supreme Court determined that a petitioner’s release did not by itself moot his habeas petition, but the Court then explained that “[t]he more substantial question ... is whether petitioner’s subsequent release caused the petition to be moot because it no longer presented a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Rosales petitioned the district court for habeas relief, alleging that his continued detention by the INS was impermissible on both statutory and constitutional grounds. We thus must ask whether Rosales’s claim is moot because he is no longer being detained by the INS. “The parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit. This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Although Rosales is not currently being detained, his immigration parole can be revoked by the INS at any time for almost any reason.7 Unlike parole granted following incarceration for a criminal convic*396tion, Rosales need not do anything for the INS to revoke his parole; for instance, the INS can revoke Rosales’s parole if it deems such revocation to be “in the public interest.” See 8 C.F.R. § 212.12(h) (2002). Thus, Rosales’s “release” into the United States does not constitute a termination of detention; it simply constitutes a reprieve from detention.8 Under these circumstances, we believe that Rosales is threatened with an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. We therefore conclude that Rosales’s appeal is not moot.
Two other strands of the Supreme Court’s mootness jurisprudence support this conclusion. First, the Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is well settled that ‘a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.’ ... ‘[I]f it did, the courts would be compelled to leave [t]he defendant ... free to return to his old ways.’” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 & n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982)). Second, the Court has long recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” This exception applies where “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated pri- or to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17, 118 S.Ct. 978 (quotation omitted); see also Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1114, 119 S.Ct. 890, 142 L.Ed.2d 788 (1999).
To determine whether a case has been mooted by the defendant’s voluntary conduct, the Supreme Court has articulated the following standard: “A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693. As discussed above, the INS can revoke Rosales’s parole at any time. We have noted that “cessation of the allegedly illegal conduct by government officials has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than similar action by private parties.” Mosley v. Hairston, 920 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.7 (2d ed.1984)). The Ninth Circuit has even held that a Mariel Cuban’s parole did moot his habeas petition because, on the basis of government declarations, the court concluded that “the alleged wrong will not recur.” Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir.1991). In Picrin-Peron, the government stated in its dismissal motion that “[a]bsent Picrin’s reinvolvement with the criminal justice *397system, a change in the Cuban government enabling him to return to Cuba, or the willingness of a third country to accept him, he will be paroled for another year,” and an INS official reiterated the statement in a declaration made under oath. Id. The government in Rosales’s case, however, has made no such promise, nor has the government made it “absolutely clear” in any other way that potentially indefinite detention of Rosales by the INS cannot reasonably be expected to recur.
We also believe that the indefinite detention of Rosales by the INS is a case “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Because the INS can revoke Rosales’s parole at any time and has in fact revoked Rosales’s parole twice in the past fifteen years, there is a reasonable expectation that Rosales will again be subject to indefinite INS detention.9 Moreover, because the INS can grant Rosales parole at any time, such detention can always evade review. The government argues that “there is no basis for concluding that when a Mariel Cuban’s parole is revoked, the alien will always be rereleased in a time that is so short that the legality of his detention will evade review.” Gov’t Supp. Br. re Rosales at. 22-23. It is true that the Cuban Review Plan requires the INS to follow certain procedures before releasing a Mariel Cuban into the United States. However, the INS granted Rosales parole in the two years between the denial of his habeas petition by the district court and our review, and we have every reason to believe both that the INS could again accomplish a release in the same amount of time and that another habeas petition filed by Rosales would take at least as long as the instant case in arriving in this court. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320-22, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988).10
3. Successive Habeas Petition — Car-ballo
The government argues on appeal that “Carballo’s petition is an abuse of the writ [of habeas corpus] because it is a second, successive petition that raises the same claims that were denied on the merits in his first petition, and he cannot point to any exception to overcome the bar on *398successive petitions.” Gov’t Supp. Br. re Carballo at 57.11 “A ‘successive petition’ raises grounds identical to those raised and rejected on the merits on a prior petition.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 n. 34, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)).12 Carballo indeed presented the same claims for relief in the petition that gave rise to this appeal as he presented in his habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in 1990. However, applying the traditional successive-petition doctrine, we conclude that we should reach the merits of Carballo’s petition because there has been an intervening change in the law.
Carballo petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As discussed above, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that § 2241 is the appropriate means for an alien to challenge his detention by the INS. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-314, 121 S.Ct. 2271.13 Under AEDPA, there are strict “gatekeeping” provisions restricting the ability of federal courts to hear successive habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a) & (b) (2000); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662-63, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996). By their own terms, however, these provisions do not apply to petitioners like Carballo who are not in custody pursuant to a conviction in state or federal court. See Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir.2000). *399In Barapind, the Ninth Circuit explained that “§ 2244(a) cannot apply to a § 2241 petition filed by an INS detainee such as Barapind because § 2244(a) bars successive petitions seeking review of the propriety of a detention ‘pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States’ ” Id. (emphasis in original). “Because § 2244(b) makes no reference to habeas petitions filed under § 2241, but rather, applies only to petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the prior-appellate-review provisions of § 2244(b) do not apply to habeas petitions filed under § 2241.” Id.; see also Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir.1998).14
Therefore, we apply the preAEDPA law governing successive habeas petitions to determine whether we should hear Carballo’s petition. The Supreme Court held in Sanders v. United States that, “[c]ontrolling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (footnote omitted); see also Lonberger v. Marshall, 808 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1055, 107 S.Ct. 2195, 95 L.Ed.2d 850 (1987).15
*400Because Carballo made the same claims in the Northern District of Texas as he made in the district court below, and because the Northern District of Texas denied these claims on the merits, the first two prongs of the Sanders test for successive habeas petitions clearly apply. In regard to the third prong, the Sanders Court stated that “[e]ven if the same ground was rejected on the merits on a prior application, it is open to the applicant to show that the ends of justice would be served by permitting the redetermination of the ground.” Sanders, 373 U.S. at 16, 83 S.Ct. 1068. “If purely legal questions are involved, the applicant may be entitled to a new hearing upon showing an intervening change in the law.” Id. at 17, 83 S.Ct. 1068; see also Lonberger, 808 F.2d at 1174. Applying Sanders, Carballo argues that IIRIRA and the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas constitute an intervening change in the law and thus that the ends of justice would be served by considering the claims in his successive habeas petition. See Carballo’s Supp. Br. at 13-14. The government, however, also applying Sanders, contends that Zadvydas does not constitute a change in the law and that IIRIRA does not apply to Carballo. See Gov’t Supp. Br. re Carballo at 57-62.
In our analysis below, we conclude that IIRIRA is the appropriate statute to apply to Rosales and Carballo. We also agree with Carballo that IIRIRA, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of its post-removal-period detention provision in Zad-vydas, constitute an intervening change in the law sufficient to warrant our review of his petition. Although the post-removal-period detention provision of IIRIRA is in itself not substantially different from the detention provision in pre-IIRIRA law, the Supreme Court’s construction of IIRIRA’s post-removal-period detention provision in Zadvydas is different from the construction of the detention provision in pre-IIRI-RA law that prevailed in most circuits at the time Carballo filed his original habeas petition. Therefore, Carballo is able in this habeas petition to raise legal arguments that he was unable to raise in his habeas petition in the Northern District of Texas. See Collins v. Zant, 892 F.2d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 180 (1990) (“In analyzing ‘the ends of justice,’ a court may consider new arguments (based, for example, on intervening changes in the law) that a petitioner raises in support of an old claim.”) (emphasis in original). Because, moreover, such arguments go to the constitutionality of and statutory authorization for Carballo’s indefinite detention, it serves the ends of justice for us to reach the merits of Carballo’s successive habeas petition.16
B. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a petition for the writ of *401habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Asad v. Reno, 242 F.3d 702, 704 (6th Cir.2001).
C. Applicable Statute
There are two versions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., that could potentially apply to the petitioners in the present appeals: (1) the version of the INA in effect between 1990 and 199517; and (2) the INA as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).18 Rosales and Carballo argue that we should apply IIRIRA in assessing whether their detention by the INS is a violation of statutory and constitutional law; the government contends that we should instead apply the law in effect between 1990 and 1995.19
According to the petitioners, we should apply IIRIRA because, in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court applied IIRIRA “to a petitioner who had been placed in deportation proceedings and ordered deported prior to the statute’s April 1, 1997 effective date.” Rosales’s Supp. Br. at 9 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court in Zadvydas did apply IIRIRA to such a petitioner, Zadvy-das, but it did not explain its reason for so doing. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Moreover, the government and the petitioner in Zadvydas agreed on what statute to apply. See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 286-87 (5th Cir.1999), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). According to the government, § 309(c)(1) of IIRIRA precludes us from applying IIRIRA to an alien excluded prior to the statute’s effective date. Section 309(c)(1), entitled “General rule that new rules do not apply,” provides that:
Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings before the title III-A effective date [April 1, 1997] — (A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and (B) the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000), note regarding “Effective Dates” (reprinting IIRIRA § 309(c)(1)). Inasmuch as the Supreme Court in Zadvydas did not discuss the application of IIRIRA to Zadvydas, we cannot simply assume that such application is appropriate for all aliens deported or excluded before April 1, 1997. We are persuaded for other reasons, however, that IIRIRA is the appropriate statute to assess in our review of the merits of Rosales’s and Carballo’s habeas petitions.
The government contends that IIRIRA does not apply to Rosales and Carballo because, pursuant to § 309(c), IIRIRA does not apply to aliens who were in exclusion or deportation proceedings prior to April 1, 1997. It is not clear from the government’s brief whether it believes this *402interpretation to be of the statute’s retro-activity (i.e., that IIRIRA does not apply retroactively to aliens ordered deported or excluded prior to its effective date) or of the statute’s general applicability (i.e., that IIRIRA generally does not apply to aliens ordered deported or excluded prior to its effective date). To the extent that the argument is one of IIRIRA’s retroactivity, we do not believe that retroactivity is at issue in these appeals. In Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, the Ninth Circuit considered the legality of an excludable alien’s detention under the statute in effect at the time of the decision. Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 842, 113 S.Ct. 127, 121 L.Ed.2d 82 (1992). “Although the new section 1226(e) does not retroactively authorize any of the Attorney General’s acts accomplished prior to the amendment, we are concerned here only with the legality of Alvarez-Mendez’s present detention. Because this case involves a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, and not a claim for damages for illegal detention, the only issue before us is whether Alvarez-Mendez’s detention is illegal today.” Id. (emphasis added). We agree with this reasoning. Rosales and Carballo are not challenging the legality of their original detention — they are challenging the INS’s authority to detain them now. Therefore, whether IIRIRA retroactively authorizes Rosales’s and Carballo’s detention is irrelevant; we need only assess whether IIRI-RA currently authorizes their detention.20
To the extent that the government’s argument is one of IIRIRA’s general applicability, the Supreme Court has stated that “[s]ection 309(c)(1) is best read as merely setting out the procedural rules to be applied to removal proceedings pending on the effective date of the statute.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 318, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (emphasis in original). The St. Cyr Court also noted that “the Conference Report expressly explained, ‘[Section 309(c)] provides for the transition to new procedures in the case of an alien already in exclusion or deportation proceedings on the effective date.’ ” Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, p. 222 (1996)) (emphasis in original). In other words, according to the Supreme Court, § 309(c) provides only that IIRIRA does not apply to removal proceedings that were pending on April 1, 1997. See also Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 286-87 & n. 7 (“[T]he natural reading of the clause would thus seem to be that it applies only to proceedings that are pending as of the effective date.”); cf. Carrera-Valdez v. Perryman, 211 F.3d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir.2000) (applying pre-IIRIRA law to an alien “subject to an order of exclusion” on April 1, 1997); Duy Dac Ho, 204 F.3d at 1050 (same).21
*403As neither Carballo’s nor Rosales’s exclusion proceeding was pending on April 1, 1997, and as neither petitioner is challenging his exclusion proceeding, we conclude that IIRIRA § 309(c) does not limit the applicability of IIRIRA to Rosales or Carballo.22 IIRIRA governs the current detention of removed aliens beyond the removal period; therefore, we apply IIRIRA in assessing the legality of Rosales’s and Carballo’s current detention by the INS.
D. Statutory Authority to Detain Indefinitely
1. Statutory Construction in Zadvy-das
Under IIRIRA, Rosales’s and Carballo’s detention by the INS is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000), the post-removal-period detention provision. Normally, after a final order of removal has been entered against an alien, the government must remove the alien from the United States within a 90-day statutory removal period, during which the alien is held in custody. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“Except as otherwise provided in the section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).”) & (2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 121 S.Ct. 2491. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000) provides, however, that:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
*4048 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000).23 In Zadvy-das, the Supreme Court addressed the detention of two aliens who had been removed on grounds of deportability.24 Concluding that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem,” the Zad-vydas Court read the provision to limit “an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court then recognized six months as a presumptively reasonable period of post-removal-period detention. Id. at 699-702, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Because we are assessing the same provision of IIRIRA that the Supreme Court considered in Zadvydas, the petitioners ask us simply to apply to them the reasonableness limitation the Supreme Court read into the provision in Zadvydas. The government contends, however, that the Zad-vydas Court’s construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000) does not apply to Rosales and Carballo because the detention of aliens who are removable on grounds of inadmissibility does not raise the same constitutional concerns as the detention of aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability.
On the basis of the plain language of the provision, we find it difficult to believe that the Supreme Court in Zadvydas could interpret § 1231(a)(6) as containing a reasonableness limitation for aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability but not for aliens who are removable on grounds of inadmissibility. Section 1231(a)(6) itself does not draw any distinction between the categories of removable aliens; nor would there be any statutory reason to interpret “detained beyond the removal period” differently for aliens who are removable on grounds of inadmissibili*405ty and aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (discussing presumption that a statutory term retains the same meaning throughout a statute and in particular throughout a provision). The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue, and it concluded that the Supreme Court’s construction of § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas applied to an inadmissible, formerly excludable, alien. See Lin Guo Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir.2002). (“We are now presented with the question of whether [8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)] bears the same meaning for an individual deemed inadmissible to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. The answer is yes.”). The court in Lin Guo Xi explained that “[s]eetion 1231(a)(6) ... does not draw any distinction between individuals who are removable on grounds of inadmissibility and those removable on grounds of deportability.” Id. at 835.25
We also do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to construe § 1231(a)(6) differently for aliens who are removable on grounds of inadmissibility and aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability. The government focuses on the Zadvydas Court’s statement at the outset of its opinion that “[w]e deal here with aliens who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed. Aliens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 121 S.Ct. 2491. In addition, the government looks to the portion of Zadvydas in which the Court distinguished its decision in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953). See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-95, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court stated that “[although Mezei, like the present cases, involves indefinite detention, it differs from the present cases in a critical respect.... [Mezei’s] presence on Ellis Island did not count as entry into the United States.” Id. at 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court then further explained:
The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.... It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders .... [0]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.
Id. According to the government, “[i]t is unreasonable to assume the Zadvydas Court went to such great lengths to distinguish the Government’s authority to detain inadmissible aliens from its authority to detain aliens who have entered the country only to mandate that the courts treat both groups of aliens identically under § 1231(a)(6).” Gov’t Supp. Br. re Rosales at 38-39.
We agree with the government that the Zadvydas Court addressed only the constitutional concerns raised by the indefinite detention of aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability, but we also agree *406with the Ninth Circuit in Lin Guo Xi that the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas was “unqualified,” Lin Guo Xi, 298 F.3d at 836. “Although Zadvydas concerned the second prong of the statute — relating to deportable aliens — the Court’s ultimate holding addresses the statute as a whole: “we construe the statute to contain an implicit “reasonable time” limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court review.’ ” Lin Guo Xi, 298 F.3d at 835 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 121 S.Ct. 2491). The Zadvydas Court also noted that the statute “applies to certain categories of aliens who have been ordered removed, namely inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who have violated their nonimmigrant status conditions, and aliens removable for certain national security or foreign relations reasons.... ” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Furthermore, in stating that the statute does not permit indefinite detention, the Court referred generally to aliens as opposed to aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability: “[i]n our view, the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Id. at 689, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (emphasis added).
As in Lin Guo Xi, the government in the instant cases “has offered no authority suggesting that a litigant may not take advantage of a statutory interpretation that was guided by the principle of constitutional avoidance when that litigant’s case does not present the constitutional problem that prompted the statutory interpretation.” Lin Guo Xi, 298 F.3d at 839. In a case addressing a remarkably similar issue of statutory construction, the Third Circuit recently stated that “[i]t simply cannot be that the meaning will change depending on the background- or pedigree of the petitioner. Were we to so hold, we would render the meaning of any statute as changeable as the currents of the sea, and potentially as cruel and capricious.” Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210, 215 (3rd Cir.2001). We fully agree with this reasoning.
In Chmakov, the court addressed the applicability of the Supreme Court’s construction of certain provisions of IIRIRA and AEDPA to individuals who did not raise the same constitutional concerns as the individuals in the case in which the Court construed the statute. The Supreme Court in St. Cyr held that, notwithstanding certain provisions of IIRIRA and AEDPA, aliens who had been ordered deported on the basis of criminal convictions could petition the federal courts for habeas relief from their deportation decisions. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-314, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Court in St. Cyr interpreted IIRIRA and AEDPA not to preclude federal habe-as jurisdiction both because such preclusion raised serious constitutional concerns under the Suspension Clause and because there was no clear and unambiguous statement of congressional intent to preclude habeas. In Chmakov, the government argued that although the St. Cyr Court had interpreted IIRIRA and AEDPA not to repeal federal habeas jurisdiction over criminal deportees, the Court’s interpretation of those statutes did not apply to the Chmakovs because, as non-criminal deportees, the Suspension Clause could not be a cause for constitutional concern. Chmakov, 266 F.3d at 215. The Third Circuit responded to this argument by first stating that “[t]hat argument borders on the nonsensical,” and the court then held that “Congress has preserved the right to habeas review for both criminal and noncriminal aliens.” Id.
Finally, we note that Zadvydas Court did not actually distinguish between aliens who are removable on grounds of inadmis*407sibility and aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability in its analysis of the constitutional concerns raised by the indefinite detention of aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability. The Court only refers to “admission” at the outset of the opinion; in its discussion of the constitutional concern raised by the statute, the Court distinguishes between aliens who have “entered” the United States and those who have not. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 692, 121 S.Ct. 2491. As we explained above, see supra note 1, “admission” is a defining principle in IIRIRA, whereas “entry” was a defining principle in pre-IIRIRA immigration law. In its briefs in the instant appeal, as in Lin Guo Xi, the government implies that “the central operating terms of the two statutes are functionally the same — namely ... that ‘entry’ and ‘admission’ are interchangeable and that ‘excludable’ and inadmissible’ are interchangeable.” Lin Guo Xi, 298 F.3d at 838. As we also explained above in note 1, however, these terms are not interchangeable. See also id. Admission is defined as “the lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2000) (emphasis added); aliens who enter this country illegally and who were formerly classified as “deportable” are now classified as “inadmissible.” Therefore, to the extent that the Zadvydas Court distinguished between categories of aliens in its analysis of the constitutional concerns raised by the statute, it distinguished only between excludable and deportable aliens.26
We explained above that, on the basis of the plain language of the statute, we do not believe that the Zadvydas Court could construe the statute differently for aliens who are removable on grounds of inadmissibility and aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability. It is even less conceivable, therefore, that the Court construed the statute differently for excluda-ble and deportable aliens. In enacting IIRIRA, Congress not only abolished the use of the term “excludable,” but it also abolished that category of alien. “The INA is no longer denominated in terms of ‘entry’ and ‘exclusion.’ IIRIRA replaced these terms with the broader concept of ‘admission.’” Lin Guo Xi, 298 F.3d at 838; see also id. (“We simply cannot ignore that ‘excludable’ is no longer a term that has any statutory import under the INA.”). To accept the government’s argument that the Zadvydas Court’s construction of § 1231(a)(6) does not apply to Rosales and Carballo, therefore, we would have to conclude that the Zadvydas Court interpreted a statute currently in force to apply differently to a category of alien that no longer exists in immigration law. Without explicit instruction by the Court, we will not reach such a conclusion.
As the court in Lin Guo Xi concluded, “[t]he clear text of the statute, coupled with the Supreme Court’s categorical interpretation, leaves us little choice but to conclude that Zadvydas applies to inadmissible individuals like Lin Guo Xi. The statute, on its face, makes no exceptions for inadmissible aliens. The Supreme Court’s unqualified holding provides that the statute ‘does not permit indefinite detention.’ ” Lin Guo Xi, 298 F.3d at 836 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 121 *408S.Ct. 2491); see also Borrero v. Aljets, 178 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1042 (D.Minn.2001) (“[W]e can find no sound reason to interpret and apply the statute one way for one category of aliens, but a different way for others. We therefore must conclude that § 1231(a)(6), as construed in Zadvydas, does not authorize the INS to detain Petitioner[, an excludable alien,] indefinitely.”).27 We thus agree with the petitioners that we should apply 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000) to them with the reasonableness limitation that the Court read into that provision in Zadvydas. However, because it is not completely clear from the Court’s opinion in Zadvydas how the Court intended its statutory construction to be applied, we also explain why constitutional concerns would independently compel us to construe IIRIRA’s post-removal-period detention provision to contain a reasonableness limitation for excludable aliens.
2. Constitutional Concern Raised with Regard to Excludable Aliens
a. Applicability of Fifth Amendment Due Process to Excludable Aliens
Describing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Zadvydas Court stated “when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932)). The Court then held that “the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” Id. at 689, 121 S.Ct. 2491. “A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to depriv[e] any person ... of liberty ... without due process of law.” Id. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court concluded that while indefinite civil detention may be permissible in some few cases, an alien’s status as removable is alone insufficient to outweigh his constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 690-92, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
Neither the Court’s holding nor the Court’s discussion of the due process problems with indefinite detention distinguish between excludable and other aliens. Following its conclusion that an alien’s status as removable alone does not outweigh his constitutionally protected liberty interest, however, the Court noted: “The Government argues that, from a constitutional perspective, alien status itself can justify indefinite detention, and points to Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953), as support.” Id. at 692, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court explained that Mezei involved an excludable alien, and, as we describe above, it then distinguished Mezei from *409the cases before it by invoking the entry fiction. Id. at 693-94, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (“Although Mezei, like the present cases, involves indefinite detention, it differs from the present cases in a critical respect.... His presence on Ellis Island did not count as entry into this country once again.”).
The government first contends in these appeals that this portion of the Court’s opinion in Zadvydas demonstrates that the detention of excludable aliens cannot raise constitutional concerns because such detention “does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.” Gov’t Supp. Br. re Rosales at 50 (emphasis added). We could not more vehemently disagree. Excluda-ble aliens—like all aliens—are clearly protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:
The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: “Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). While we respect the historical tradition of the “entry fiction,” we do not believe it applies to deprive aliens living in the United States of their status as “persons” for the purposes of constitutional due process. In fact, in Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court held in regard to Cuban aliens who were in the United States on immigration parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), that “[e]ven one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection [of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments].” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75 n. 7, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”).
As we understand the entry fiction, and the Supreme Court’s discussion of it in Zadvydas, excludable aliens are treated differently for due process purposes than deportable aliens: they are entitled to less process.28 In Landon v. Plasencia, the Court explained that “once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly. Our cases have frequently suggested that a continuously present resident alien is entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation.” Landon, 459 U.S. at 32, 103 S.Ct. 321 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). And in Mezei, the Court held that:
*410It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 73 S.Ct. 625 (citations omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950)) (emphasis added). The fact that excluda-ble aliens are entitled to less process, however, does not mean that they are not at all protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If excludable aliens were not protected by even the substantive component of constitutional due process, as the government appears to argue, we do not see why the United States government could not torture or summarily execute them. Because we do not believe that our Constitution could permit persons living in the United States — whether they can be admitted for permanent residence or not — to be subjected to any government action without limit, we conclude that government treatment of excludable aliens must implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.29
b. Indefinite Detention of Excluda-ble Aliens under the Fifth Amendment
Although we believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas fully supports our conclusion that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to excludable aliens, we recognize that the Zadvydas Court left open the question whether the indefinite detention of excludable aliens raises the same constitutional concerns under those clauses as the indefinite detention of aliens who have entered the United States. We now conclude that it does.
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court explained that “the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two types of government action. So-called ‘substantive due process’ prevents the gov*411ernment from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. This requirement has traditionally been referred to as ‘procedural’ due process.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (citations omitted). The Zadvydas Court reiterated that “[flreedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992)).
Therefore, government detention violates a person’s substantive due process rights unless such detention is “ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections” or “in certain special and ‘narrow’ non-punitive ‘circumstances,’ where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, and quoting Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997)) (emphasis in original). In Zadvydas, the Court determined that the detention of removable aliens by the INS is “civil, not criminal, and we assume that [it is] nonpunitive in purpose and effect.” Id. The Court then looked to the regulatory goals of the statute to determine whether they constituted sufficient “special justification” to outweigh the aliens’ interest in avoiding detention. According to the government’s brief in Zadvydas, the regulatory goals of IIRIRA’s post-removal-period detention provision are “ ‘ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings’ and ‘[preventing danger to the community.’ ” Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, p. 24). The Court concluded that the flight prevention justification was “weak or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best,” and the dangerousness justification could not be supported by alien status alone. Id. at 690-91, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Explaining that “[i]n cases in which preventive detention is of potentially indefinite duration, we have also demanded that the dangerousness rationale be accompanied by some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to create the danger,” the Court held that an alien’s status as removable did not constitute such a special circumstance because it “bears no relation to a detainee’s dangerousness.” Id. at 691-92, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (emphasis in original).
Rosales’s and Carballo’s status as ex-cludable aliens does not alter the above analysis. An excludable alien who cannot be removed to his country of origin presents no greater risk of flight than the aliens who could not be removed to their countries of origin in Zadvydas; nor does an excludable alien’s status relate any more to his dangerousness than the removable status of the aliens in Zadvydas related to their dangerousness.30 Howev*412er, the government contends that because Rosales and Carballo are excludable aliens, them detention should not be subject to the same analysis as the detention .of the aliens in Zadvydas. According to the government, because excludable aliens do not have a constitutional right to enter the United States, the INS must be permitted to detain them indefinitely if they cannot be removed.
We recognize that excludable aliens do not have a constitutional right to enter or be admitted to the United States; indeed, no alien has a constitutional right to enter or be admitted to the United States. We also recognize that the INS is faced with an extremely difficult situation in the case of aliens who legally cannot enter or be admitted to the United States, yet who, by virtue of the fact that their country of origin will not repatriate them, are in the United States. However, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas confronted much the same situation. Aliens who are removed on grounds of deportability do not have a constitutional right to stay in the United States, and, as the Court recognized, Congress has plenary power to create immigration law. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96, 121 S.Ct. 2491. “But that power is subject to important constitutional limitations.” Id. at 695, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Like the Supreme Court, we do not question “the right of Congress to remove aliens, to subject them to supervision with conditions when released from detention, or to incarcerate them where appropriate for violations of those conditions.” Id. “Rather, the issue we address is whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United States.” Id.
The Supreme Court in Zadvydas concluded that “for the reasons we have set forth, we believe that an alien’s liberty interest is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696, 121 S.Ct. 2491. We draw the same conclusion with regard to excludable aliens. If the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to Rosales and Carballo, as we believe that it must, we do not see how we could conclude that the indefinite and potentially permanent detention of Rosales and Carballo raises any less serious constitutional concerns than the indefinite and potentially permanent detention of the aliens in Zad-vydas. We emphasize that we understand that this situation, involving criminal aliens whose removal cannot be effected, is a difficult one: we, too, find it unpalatable that inadmissible aliens who have previously abused the privilege of immigration parole should be permitted additional opportunities to live in this country simply because their country of origin will not have them back. As the Zadvydas Court explained, though, “[t]he choice ... is not between imprisonment and the alien ‘living at large.’ It is between imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be violated.” Id.31 Moreover, we *413find it not only unpalatable but also untenable to conclude that under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment persons living in the United States — whether by our choice or not — could be subjected to a life sentence in prison simply because their country of origin will not have them back. A life sentence in prison, in fact, seems to us no less impermissible than the government’s torture or summary execution of these aliens.
The government also argues that in Mezei, the Supreme Court held that the indefinite detention of an excludable alien was permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the government further argues that the Zadvydas Court reaffirmed Mezei. We note at the outset that the Zadvydas Court explicitly refused to address the continuing validity of Mezei: “we need not consider the aliens’ claim that subsequent developments have undermined Mezei’s legal authority.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Inasmuch as the Court in Mezei permitted the potentially indefinite detention of an excludable alien, however, we agree with the government that we must address Mezei’s ramifications for Rosales and Carballo.32 We believe that Mezei does not govern the outcome of the instant cases for two reasons. First, the Mezei Court explicitly grounded its decision in the special circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney General that Mezei presented *414a threat to national security.33 The Court, in fact, located the Attorney General’s authority to exclude and detain Mezei in the Passport Act of 1918. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210-11, 73 S.Ct. 625 (“Congress expressly authorized the President to impose additional restrictions on aliens entering or leaving the United States during periods of international tension and strife. That authorization, originally enacted in the Passport Act of 1918, continues in effect during the present emergency.”). Moreover, in regard to the proposition that Mezei be released on immigration parole, the Court stated: “An exclusion proceeding grounded on danger to the national security ... presents different considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority for such release exists.” Id. at 216, 73 S.Ct. 625. Particularly in a post-September 11 world, we recognize that in special circumstances prolonged post-removal-period detention may be warranted. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (“Neither do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.”). There are, however, no special circumstances involving national security in the instant cases.
Second, we believe that the Court’s implicit conclusion in Mezei is eclipsed by the conclusion drawn from the Salerno line of cases that the indefinite detention of excludable aliens does raise constitutional concerns. All of the cases that the Zadvydas Court relied on in assessing the constitutional due process concerns implicated by the indefinite detention of aliens who are removable on grounds of deportability were decided after Mezei. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). In these cases, the contours of constitutionally permissible civil detention are rigorously delineated — a substantial jurisprudential development from the time that Mezei was decided. As we explained above, the Zadvydas Court held on the basis of these cases that civil detention is constitutionally permissible only “in certain special and narrow non-punitive circumstances where a special justification ... outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491. As we also explained above, we do not believe that any such special circumstances outweigh Rosales’s and Carballo’s interest in avoiding indefinite and potentially permanent INS detention. Although we must — as a lower federal court — apply all pertinent Supreme Court precedent, it is not our role to reconcile cases whose application leads to opposite conclusions.34 Therefore, *415to the extent that we could conclude, in reliance on the Court’s holding in Mezei, that the indefinite detention of excludable aliens is constitutionally permissible, we believe such a conclusion to be fatally undermined by the Court’s later decisions in the Salerno line of cases.
3. Statutory Construction of § 1231(a)(6) as Applied to Excludable Aliens
“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.” United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494, 121 S.Ct. 1711, 149 L.Ed.2d 722 (2001). Therefore, prior to construing § 1231(a)(6) (2000) to contain a reasonable time limitation, the Zadvydas Court addressed whether Congress had clearly indicated an intent in the statute to authorize indefinite post-removal-period detention of aliens whose removal cannot be effected. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696-99, 121 S.Ct. 2491. After reviewing the history of the statute, the Court concluded that “[w]e have found nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention. Consequently, interpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat, we conclude that, once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699, 121 S.Ct. 2491. We again see no reason to interpret the statute any differently for excludable aliens.35
Like the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, then, we recognize six months as a presumptively reasonable period for the post-removal detention of excludable aliens. “After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. In the instant cases, we conclude that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Although the government presented evidence of our continuing negotiations with Cuba over the return of Cuban nationals excluded from the United States, neither Rosales nor Carballo is currently on a list of persons to be returned.
III. CONCLUSION
Under either the Supreme Court’s construction in Zadvydas or our construction in regard to excludable aliens, we read 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000) to contain an implicit reasonable time limitation. Because there is no significant likelihood that Rosales and Carballo will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future and because the INS has detained them longer than six months, we conclude that the INS’s detention of Rosales and Carballo is no longer reasonable and is therefore not authorized by IIRIRA’s post-removal-period detention provision. We REVERSE the district courts’ denials of Rosales’s and Carballo’s habeas petitions, and we RE*416MAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.