for the Court:
This is a capital murder case arising from the shooting death of James Albert Brewer outside his home in Union. The defendant, Calvin Hunter, was convicted of murdering the victim during the commission of a robbery, and was sentenced by the Neshoba County Circuit Court to death by lethal injection. The dispositive issue in this case is the failure to instruct the jury on the elements of the underlying crime of robbery; this failure requires reversal. The other issues raised by Hunter are without merit. However, in order to provide guidance on remand, this opinion will also address: the trial court’s denial of Hunter’s motion to recuse; the shuffling of venire members during jury selection; the admission of Hunter’s statement; the trial judge’s appointment of the jury foreman; and the comments made by the prosecutor throughout the trial. The following is a complete list of the issues raised by Hunter on appeal:
PRE-TRIAL ISSUES
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Hunter’s motion to re-cuse?
GUILT PHASE ISSUES
II. Whether the prosecutor’s comments during voir dire violated Hunter’s rights?
III. Whether the trial judge’s moving venire members to the end of the jury list without cause or explanation violated Hunter’s rights?
IV. Whether the State exercised peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans from the jury in violation Hunter’s rights?
V. Whether the admission of Hunter’s statement violated his rights?
VI. Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the crime of robbery?
A. Whether the instruction offered by Hunter was properly denied?
B. Whether the trial court failed to instruct on robbery?
C. Whether the district attorney or the trial judge was obligated to offer an instruction on the elements of the underlying crime?
VII. Whether the trial court failed to fully instruct the jury on manslaughter?
VIII. Whether jury instruction S-8 at the guilt phase relieved the State of the burden of proving intent to commit the underlying felony, thereby violating Hunter’s rights?
*629IX. Whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury on the manner of its deliberations was unduly coercive in that it forbade any consideration of the lesser included offense until and unless the jury had unanimously agreed to acquit the defendant of the greater charge?
X. Whether the trial court denied Hunter a fair and impartial juiy by appointing the jury foreman?
XI. Whether the prosecutors’ comments in closing argument violated Hunter’s rights?
XII. Whether the evidence before the jury on the underlying felony of robbery was legally insufficient to support a verdict of capital murder?
SENTENCING PHASE ISSUES
XIII. Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the robbery-murder aggravating circumstances?
XIV. Whether the failure to define one of two aggravating circumstances found by this jury requires that the death sentence be vacated?
XV. Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the aggravating circumstance that Hunter had been convicted of another capital offense?
XVI. Whether the trial court’s anti-sympathy instruction coupled with denial of a mercy instruction violated Hunter’s rights?
XVII. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury at sentencing that it could consider “the detailed circumstances of the offense?”
XVIII. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that, in order to return a sentence of life imprisonment, it had to find that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances?
XIX. Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury in the sentencing phase of the trial the form of the verdict as contained in sentencing instruction S-l?
XX. Whether the prosecutors’ comments in closing argument violated Hunter’s rights?
XXI. Whether the aggregate error in this case requires reversal of the conviction and death sentence?
XXII. Whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment given the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant?
LEGAL ANALYSIS
PRE-TRIAL ISSUES
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Hunter’s motion to recuse?
On the Friday before this case was set to go to trial on Monday, Hunter presented his motion to recuse Judge Marcus D. Gordon. Hunter’s basic argument was that the trial judge’s law firm had represented the victim (Jimmy) in his divorce from his wife (Lucille). Specifically, the trial judge’s nephew, Rex Gordon, Jr., had represented Jimmy in the divorce, in which Hunter was Lucille’s “named paramour.” A no-fault divorce was eventually entered. Furthermore, the parties stipulated that (after the trial judge left the firm) Rex Gordon, Jr., represented Jimmy’s estate and his daughter. This same daughter was a witness against Hunter at trial.
The trial judge denied Hunter’s motion to recuse, and made the following statement:
I practiced law until January of 1991 in the firm in Union known as the Gordon Law Firm, of which Rex Gordon, Jr. was a member. It appears that [Rex Gordon, Jr.] filed a complaint for divorce for James Albert Brewer in June of 1990. That there was the wife of James Albert Brewer, who was the Defendant in the ease, was represented by the Honorable Jerry Bus-tin of Forest, Mississippi. That later, through negotiations among the parties, *630the matter was resolved by á no-fault divorce that was entered in September of 1990.
Now, the question [the defense attorney] raises is that the Trial Judge should recuse himself in the trial of the case of State of Mississippi vs. Calvin Hunter, with Calvin Hunter being named as the paramour of Lucille Brewer.
Now, I do not recall the law firm representing this ease, nor any witnesses, nor was the case ever discussed between myself and Rex Gordon, Jr.
I fail to see how a case involving a victim of an offense, a domestic case involving a victim of an offense, and another person, raises the appearance of impropriety in the case where a paramour is being tried for the murder of his friend’s husband.
On appeal, Hunter argues that Judge Gordon should have recused himself, because “the combination of Judge Gordon’s familial and firm relationship to counsel for the victim and the State’s witnesses against Calvin Hunter provides the appearance of and the potential for partiality.”
Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides as follows:
C. Disqualification.
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it.
Miss.Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1). “[T]he Canon enjoys the status of law such that we enforce it rigorously ...” Green v. State, 631 So.2d 167, 177 (Miss. 1994).
Mississippi has an objective test in determining when a judge should recuse himself. Jenkins v. State, 570 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss.1990). “A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality.” Rut-land v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986).
The presumption is “that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a ‘reasonable doubt’ (about the validity of the presumption)!.]” Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss.1990). When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions1, “the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892 (Miss.1991); Turner, 573 So.2d at 677; Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312 at'317 (1985) (quoting McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So. 821, 823 (1939)).
Banana v. State, 635 So.2d 851, 853 (Miss.1994) (quoting Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898, 901 (Miss.1992)); Green v. State, 631 So.2d 167,177 (Miss.1994).
“While an attorney may rightfully, in cases where he thinks the judge’s relations would result to the injury of the defendant, move for a recusation of the judge; this Court, in such a case, will look to the whole trial and pass upon questions on appeal in *631the light of the completed trial. Every act and movement had during the entire trial will be considered, and if we are unable to find that rulings have been prejudicial to the defendant, we will not reverse.”
Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 817, 72 So.2d 211, 213-14 (Miss.1954) (trial judge need not recuse himself where he had previously presided over civil ease involving same defendant and same transaction) (quoting Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 455, 193 So. 452, 456 (Miss.1940)). There is nothing in the manner in which Judge Gordon presided over Hunter’s trial and exercised his discretionary powers that would indicate prejudice to Hunter. Furthermore, there was nothing in the record regarding any financial arrangements of the trial judge with his former law firm. Indeed, Hunter does not allege that he was actually prejudiced, he only argues that the trial judge’s relations gave the appearance of impartiality.
Hunter has not overcome the presumption that the trial judge was qualified and unbiased. Furthermore, Judge Gordon did not abuse his discretion by overruling Hunter’s motion to recuse. See Cantrell v. State 507 So.2d 325, 327-28 (Miss.1987); Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 953-54 (Miss.1986). On this record, there was no evidence of prejudice or impropriety that would require the trial judge’s recusal. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit, and the trial judge’s denial of the motion to recuse is affirmed.
GUILT PHASE ISSUES
III. Whether the trial judge’s moving ve-nire members to the end of the jury list without cause or explanation violated Hunter’s rights?
At voir dire, there were seven prospective jury panels. The trial judge moved some veniremen to different jury panels, so that more prospective jurors would be considered prior to them. He also moved some of the prospective jury panels to the end of the list for consideration. The record clearly demonstrates that the trial judge rearranged the veniremen to accommodate the personal problems of certain jurors. For example, he moved a woman who had a problem with, swollen feet and two school bus drivers who were scheduled for recertification training “way down on the list for selection.”
Defense counsel made no objection to the judge’s shuffling of the veniremen. For this reason, the issue is procedurally barred on appeal. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263,1270 (Miss.1994) (quoting Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 369 (Miss.1987)) (“If no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. This rule’s applicability is not diminished in a capital case.”). Furthermore, “[tjhis Court has often held that a party waives any and all claims regarding the composition of his jury if he fails to raise an objection before the jury is sworn.” Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1264 (Miss.1993); Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554, 557 (Miss. 1990).
Moreover, the judge’s actions should stand, unless Hunter can demonstrate prejudice, bias, or fraud. Pulliam v. State, 515 So.2d 945, 948 (Miss.1987); Harris v. State, 406 So.2d 823, 824 (Miss.1981). Hunter has made no such demonstration. Of note, however, is the fact that one black venireman was moved further down the list for consideration without explanation. This could be prejudicial — particularly in cases such as this — where the defendant is black, a Batson challenge is raised during jury selection, and the jury that is eventually empaneled is composed of twelve white members. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).2
Generally, the direction in jury selection is within the discretion of the trial judge. Harris, 406 So.2d at 823. However, trial judges should avoid any actions that might suggest that the juror pool is being manipulated for racial or other improper reasons. Therefore, if a trial judge employs this practice of rearranging the veniremen to accommodate the personal problems of prospective jurors (thereby maintaining a larger juror pool), he should be certain to give explicit reasons for moving each venireman to the end of the list.
*632Y. Whether the admission of Hunter’s statement violated his rights?
At trial, a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of Hunter’s statement to the police. The record reflects that, on the evening of April 8,1993, Hunter and the victim’s ex-wife (Lucille) were apprehended by the Mississippi Highway Patrol (MHP) near Jackson. They were detained in Jackson until the Neshoba County authorities arrived.
Officer Greg George (an investigator for the Neshoba County Sheriff’s office) and Chief Deputy Pheris Saveli arrived in Jackson and spoke with Hunter at approximately 11:05 that night. Hunter refused to give a statement. Hunter testified that he requested an attorney, but both officers denied that such a request was made.
Hunter was taken to the Neshoba County jail. The next day, April 9, 1993, the jailer informed Officer George that Hunter wanted to speak with him. At approximately 12:45 p.m., and in the presence of Officer Tommy Waddell (an investigator for the Philadelphia Police Department), Officer George advised Hunter of his Miranda rights. Hunter acknowledged that he understood his rights, and signed a waiver-of-rights form. Hunter testified that he understood the waiver-of-rights form.
Hunter was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Both' officers testified that no threats or promises were made to him. Hunter was not represented by an attorney; he did not ask for a lawyer or for the questioning to cease. Hunter gave a statement regarding Jimmy Brewer’s death. Officer George read the statement to Hunter, and Hunter signed it without making any changes.
Hunter testified that, on April 9, 1993, Lucille (the victim’s ex-wife and Hunter’s alleged paramour) had cancer and was bleeding. He told the officers that he would make a statement if they would arrange medical treatment for Lucille. According to Hunter, Officer George told him that Lucille would be released for treatment if he gave a statement. Hunter said that he relied on Officer George’s assurances when he gave his statement. However, both officers denied that Hunter agreed to give the statement in exchange for medical treatment for Lucille.
The trial judge ruled that Hunter was advised of his constitutional rights, that he understood those rights, and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them. The statement, with some editions, was admitted.3
On appeal, Hunter argues that the statement should not have been admitted because: (a) he had previously requested an attorney, and the statement was taken in violation of his right to counsel and (b) his statement was not voluntary, because it was given in exchange for medical treatment for Lucille.
First, this Court addresses Hunter’s alleged request for an attorney in Jackson on the night he was arrested. Hunter testified that he requested an attorney; Officers George and Saveli denied that he made such a request. Regardless of whether he actually requested an attorney, Hunter admits that he sent for Officer George the next day. The law is well-established that an accused person can waive his right to counsel by initiating conversation with law enforcement:
An accused, after expressing a desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to farther interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Once the right to counsel has attached, and the accused asserts the right, he is protected from further police-initiated interrogation. Even if an accused has procured an attorney, the accused may still waive the right to have the lawyer present during any police questioning. Nothing in the Sixth Amendment prevents a suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel from voluntarily choosing, on his *633own, to speak with police in the absence of an attorney. Although a defendant may sometimes later regret his decision to speak with police, the Sixth Amendment does not disable a criminal defendant from exercising his free will. This Court has found that a defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he waives his Miranda rights.
Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted). This Court finds that the appellant “knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to assistance of counsel during the statement to the police.” See Mette-tal, 602 So.2d at 869.
The next issue raised by Hunter is whether his confession was voluntary. The standard of review in such eases is well-settled. “Once the trial judge has determined at a preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal.” Sills v. State, 634 So.2d 124, 126 (Miss.1994) (quoting Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345, 1350 (Miss.1986)). “Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. As long as the trial judge applied the correct legal standards, his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1281 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). “Where, on conflicting evidence, the court makes such findings, this Court generally must affirm.” Lesley v. State, 606 So.2d 1084, 1091 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted).
The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily, and not as the result of any promises, threats or other inducements. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. The “burden is met and a prima facie case made out by testimony of an officer, or other persons having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward.”
Chase v. State 645 So.2d 829, 838 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted).
In the case at hand, both officers who witnessed Hunter’s statement testified that it was voluntarily given. They specifically denied promising Hunter that Lucille would receive medical treatment in exchange for his statement. Therefore, the State made a pri-ma facie showing that Hunter’s statement was voluntary. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion or commit manifest error when he ruled that Hunter’s statement was admissible. See Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171, 1175 (Miss.1992); Lutes v. State, 517 So.2d 541, 548-49 (Miss.1987). Thus, Hunter’s arguments on this point are without merit, and his statement is admissible.
VI. Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of the crime of robbery?
Hunter’s next argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the elements of the underlying crime of robbery. The record reflects that no instruction regarding the elements of robbery was given.
Hunter’s argument raises three questions: (A) whether the trial judge erred in denying Hunter’s proposed jury instruction, (B) whether the elements of robbery were included in the instructions that were given, and (C) whether it was incumbent on the district attorney to offer such an instruction.
Based on the following analysis, the trial judge correctly denied Hunter’s proposed instruction as confusing. However, it also seems that reversible error was committed when the jury was not instructed on the elements of the underlying crime of robbery, and that the district attorney should have offered such an instruction.
A. Whether the instruction offered by Hunter was properly denied?
Hunter argues that the trial judge failed to give his proposed instruction D-19 regarding the elements of the crime of robbery. The record reflects that, after the parties rested and the jury was excused, the trial judge began to rule on proposed instructions. The judge deemed several of the instructions confusing, including D-19. He re*634cessed overnight, in order to give the defense attorney an opportunity to re-draft his proposed instructions.4
The next morning, the judge went back through the instructions.5 The trial judge again refused to give instruction D-19 “because of being repetitious and rambling and confusing.” There is no evidence that the defense attorney attempted to amend D-19, which read as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that in this case, the defendant, Calvin Hunter, is accused of having committed a capital crime; that is, he the said Calvin Hunter took the life of Jimmy Brewer, with the then present intent to rob the said Jimmy Brewer. If you, the jury, find that the State has failed to prove from the evidence, or lack of evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, any one of the elements of the crime of robbery which are at the time and place testified about, the said Calvin Hunter alone or in concert with another unlawfully assaulted Jimmy Brewer, which is to say, unlawfully put Jimmy Brewer, in fear of some immediate injury to his person; and that the assault, if any was made by Calvin Hunter with the specific intent to then steal the personal property belonging to Jimmy Brewer in his presence or from his person and against his will; that further, by virtue of the assault, if any, Calvin Hunter did take, steal, and carry away personal property belonging to Jimmy Brewer, from the presence or person of Jimmy Brewer and against his will, then there has been no robbery of Jimmy Brewer by Calvin Hunter and it is your sworn duty to find Calvin Hunter not Guilty of Capital Murder.
Further, if from the evidence or lack of evidence, you find that Calvin Hunter did kill Jimmy Brewer; but, did not at the time of the alleged homicide have the present intent to rob Jimmy Brewer; but that said intent to rob the said Jimmy Brewer, if any was formed after the alleged homicide, then in that event also, you must find Calvin Hunter not guilty of Capital Murder.
In the event you so find, either one or both of the before mentioned conditions you may proceed with your deliberations in order to determine whether the State has proven from said evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s guilt of the lesser crime of non-capital murder.
The Court further instructs you that in order to find the defendant, Calvin Hunter, guilty of the crime of non-capital murder you must find that the State has proved from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the date and at the place testified about, the defendant, Calvin Hunter did feloniously and with the deliberate design to cause the death of Jimmy Brewer in fact kill the said Jimmy Brewer without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense. If the state’s evidence has failed to prove any one or more of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you shall find the defendant not guilty of murder.
The proposed instruction is long, confusing, and contains several different concepts. It cannot be said that the trial judge erred by refusing to grant instruction D-19. See Sudduth v. State, 562 So.2d 67, 72 (Miss.1990) (“This Court has repeatedly condemned confusing and misleading instructions.”).
*635B. Whether the trial court failed to instruct on the elements of robbery?
Hunter also argues that the failure to instruct the jury with regard to the elements of the underlying crime of robbery constitutes reversible error. The State points out that the following instruction was given as instruction S-8:
The Court instructs the Jury that in a case of capital murder, wherein the alleged underlying offense is robbery, the fact that the murder, if any occurred prior to the taking, if any, does not lessen the crime of robbery. The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the chain of events of the fatal injury of James Brewer and the taking of his property formed a continuous chain of events, then the fact that James Brewer was dead at the time the Defendant took his property does not absolve the Defendant from the crime of robbery.
The State argues that Hunter should have objected to the giving of instruction S-8 in order to preserve this issue on appeal. The State seems to be arguing that S-8 is an instruction on the elements of robbery, and that, therefore, the jury was instructed with regard to the underlying offense. Indeed, “an instructional error will not warrant reversal if the jury was fully and fairly instructed by other instructions.” Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29, 85 (Miss.1992); Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss.1991).
Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1990), provides:
The killing of a human being without authority of law by any means in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases: :.. when done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of ... robbery, ... or any attempt to commit such felonies....
Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-73 (1972) provides that “every person who shall feloniously take the personal property of another in his presence or from his person and against his will, by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of some immediate injury to his person, shall be guilty of robbery.”
Instruction S-8 did not mention any of these elements. Rather, it instructed the jury regarding the sequence of the robbery and the murder. The State’s argument to the contrary is without merit. Furthermore, none of the other instructions that were given defined the underlying offense of robbery.
C. Whether the district attorney was obligated to offer an instruction on the elements of the underlying crime of robbery?
Indeed, no instruction on the elements of the underlying offense was given. The defendant offered a confusing instruction, which was properly refused. The State did not offer an instruction on the elements of the underlying offense of robbery. This Court holds that the State had a duty to ensure that the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the underlying crime.
It is hornbook criminal law that before a conviction may stand the State must prove each element of the offense. Not only is this a requirement of the law of this State, due process requires that the State prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757 (Miss.1984). A logical corollary of this principle is that, because the State has to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then the State also hás to ensure that the jury is properly instructed with regard to the elements of the crime. See also Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789, 792 (Miss.1988) (quoting Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 75, 30 So.2d 593 (Miss.1947) (“In conducting a criminal case, the prosecuting attorney must be fair and impartial, and see that defendant is not deprived of any constitutional or statutory right.”) (emphasis in original).
However, the State argues that it is incumbent on the defendant to offer such an instruction, and cites several cases, all of which can be distinguished. See Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1252 (Miss.1995); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1254 (Miss.1993); Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 416 (Miss.1985) *636(reversed on other grounds, 481 U.S. 648,107 5.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987)).
Ballenger is factually similar to the case sub judice, in that the defendant/appellant was convicted of capital murder during the commission of a robbery and sentenced to death. Ballenger claimed that the trial judge erred by failing to grant two of her instructions, which discussed the elements of robbery. One of the instructions was not marked given, refused, or withdrawn, and was not discussed in the transcript. This Court held that Ballenger’s argument with regard to that instruction was not properly preserved for appeal. The second instruction was on the lesser included offense of robbery. This Court ruled that the trial judge properly refused to give the instruction because it would have allowed the jury to find Ballenger guilty of robbery, but not guilty of capital murder. Id. at 1252. In the case sub judice, the proposed instruction containing the elements of the underlying crime was marked “refused”. Furthermore, Hunter did receive a proper lesser included offense instruction on simple murder. Therefore, Ballenger is factually distinguishable and does not apply.6
The other cases cited by the State dealt with lesser included offense instructions. See Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1254 (Miss.1993); Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 416 (Miss.1985). These cases can be distinguished from the case at hand, which deals with an instruction on the underlying crime — that is, the alleged crime which elevated this to a capital case. See also Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1023 (Miss.1985).
“Just as the State must prove each element of the offense, the jury must be correctly and fully instructed regarding each element of the offense charged.” Neal, 451 So.2d at 757 n. 9. Failure to submit to the jury the essential elements of the crime is “fundamental” error. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). In capital murder cases, the trial court is “required to instruct just as fully regarding the definition of [the underlying crime] as it [is] on murder.” Id. Indeed,
“[i]t is axiomatic that a jury’s verdict may not stand upon uneontradicted fact alone. The fact must be found via jury instructions correctly identifying the elements of the offense under the proper standards.” “Where the jury had incorrect or incomplete instructions regarding the law, our review task is nigh unto impossible and reversal is generally required.”
Henderson v. State, 660 So.2d 220, 222 (Miss. 1995) (citations omitted).
It is rudimentary that the jury must be instructed regarding the elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Therefore, even though the defendant did not present an acceptable instruction, the State was obligated to do so. Reversal on this issue is warranted. See Henderson v. State, 660 So.2d 220, 222 (Miss.1995); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757 n. 9 (Miss.1984); see also Watson v. State, 465 So.2d 1025, 1031 (Miss. 1985).
X. Whether the trial court denied Hunter a fair and impartial jury by appointing the jury foreman?
Prior to the jury’s retiring, the trial judge appointed the jury foreman. Hunter made no objection, and he did not raise the issue in his post-trail motion. Therefore, he is precluded from raising this issue on appeal. See Robinson v. State, 662 So.2d 1100, 1104 (Miss.1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d at 1270.
Furthermore, this issue was recently addressed in the ease of Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1258-59 (Miss.1995). This Court held that Ballenger was procedurally barred from raising the argument on appeal. The court went on to rule that, “In the future, trial judges are advised not to appoint jury *637foremen. Who is to be the foreman is a decision which should be made by fellow jurors.” Id.
Hunter was tried approximately two years' before the ruling in Ballenger; therefore, the court’s prospective advice in Ballenger does not apply to this appeal. On remand, however, the jurors should select the jury foreman.
SENTENCING PHASE ISSUES
XX. Whether the prosecutors’ comments in closing argument violated Hunter’s rights?
Hunter argues that several prosecutorial comments made during closing arguments violated his right to a fair trial. Specifically, Hunter contends that: (A) the prosecutor improperly interjected personal opinion at closing arguments in both the guilt and sentencing phases, and (B) the prosecutor improperly asked the jury at the sentencing phase to “send a message” with the verdict.
Hunter’s first argument, which deals with the prosecutor’s alleged statement of personal opinion, is procedurally barred. See Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1288-89 (Miss.1994) (“A prosecutor is forbidden from interjecting his personal beliefs regarding the veracity of witnesses during closing argument. By the same token, it is incumbent on defense counsel to raise a proper objection when the offensive language is uttered or waive appellate review of the issue.”).
Furthermore, “wide latitude” is granted to attorneys during closing arguments. See Jimpson v. State, 532 So.2d 985, 991 (Miss.1988). Moreover, a prosecutor “may comment upon any facts introduced in evidence” and “may draw whatever deductions seem to him proper from these facts.” Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 900 (Miss.1989). However, this Court has warned prosecutors to “refrain from interjecting personal beliefs into presentation of their cases.” Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 854-55 (Miss.1994) (quoting Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078,1100 (Miss.1987)). On remand, that warning should be heeded.
Hunter also asserts that the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to “send a message” during the closing arguments at the penalty phase. This Court has repeatedly cautioned prosecutors not to use this argument. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 854 (Miss.1994); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988); Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss.1983). Indeed, “[t]he function of the jury is to weigh the evidence and determine the facts Mississippi jurors are not messenger boys.” Williams, 522 So.2d at 209. For this reason, the use of the “send a message” argument should be avoided on remand.
CONCLUSION
The failure to instruct the jury on the elements of the underlying crime of robbery constitutes reversible error. This ease is reversed and remanded for a new trial and proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. SENTENCE IS VACATED.
PITTMAN and MILLS, JJ., concur.
McRAE, J., concurs in part.
BANKS, J., concurs with separate written opinion.
SULLIVAN, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by McRAE, J.
SMITH, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., J.
DAN LEE, C.J., not participating.