Plaintiff-Appellant Long Island Trust Company (“Long Island”) brings this appeal from an adverse judgment in the court below in its suit against Defendant-Appellee Edward T. Dicker.1 Long Island seeks to enforce Dicker’s obligations under the terms of a guaranty agreement (the “Guaranty”) dated September 10, 1971, in which Dicker guaranteed all liabilities owed to Long Island by Gemstone Miners, Ltd. (“Gemstone”). Long Island’s claim2 is *643premised in part upon Gemstone’s default on one promissory note in the amount of $114,000, due May 14, 1973, and another promissory note in the amount of $10,000, due July 30, 1973. Long Island obtained judgment against Gemstone in the amount of $157,000 in a New York state court on June 29, 1976, but that judgment has never been satisfied; Long Island’s claim against Dicker is also predicated in part upon this judgment. Dicker was named as a defendant in the New York litigation, but was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction.
Dicker defended on grounds that the Guaranty was obtained through fraud, and that the statute of limitations had run. The court below submitted the fraud issue to the jury, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict and was dismissed. The court then denied Long Island’s motion for a directed verdict, but granted Long Island’s motion for a new trial with respect to Dicker’s liability on the $10,000 note. However, the court further held that the four-year statute of limitations contained in Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958) barred Long Island’s claim with respect to the $114,000 note; in so doing, the court specifically refused to apply the Texas saving statute, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958). The court entered final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) on that portion of Long Island’s suit which was premised on the $114,000 note, and Long Island appeals.
Finding that the district court, 480 F.Supp. 656, erred in its interpretation of the Texas saving statute, and that the court erred in denying Long Island’s motion for a directed verdict, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Long Island.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THIS APPEAL
Gemstone, a New York corporation, was in the business of mining for precious gems in Africa. In need of additional capital, Gemstone planned in 1971 to conduct a public offering of its common stock in March 1972. To facilitate interim financing from Long Island, Gemstone sought Dicker as an outside guarantor. Dicker, a Texas investor, was a close friend of Gemstone’s president, Aaron Knopf. In return for Dicker’s signature on the continuous, unlimited Guaranty, Gemstone permitted Dicker to purchase 30,000 shares of its common stock at one cent per share; the anticipated price of the stock in the planned public offering was $3 per share.
In reliance on the Guaranty, Long Island made substantial loans to Gemstone. But because the Securities and Exchange Commission refused to permit Gemstone’s registration statement to become effective, the proposed public offering fell through. By August of 1973, Gemstone had defaulted on its obligations to Long Island under the two notes totalling $124,000.
Long Island sued both Gemstone and Dicker in New York State court, and obtained judgment against Gemstone in the amount of $157,000. Dicker, however, was dismissed from the suit for want of personal jurisdiction. Long Island appealed, but the dismissal of Dicker was affirmed on May 16, 1977. Long Island Trust Co. v. Gemstone Miners, Ltd., 57 A.D.2d 889, 394 N.Y.S.2d 407 (2d Dep’t 1977). The judgment against Gemstone was never satisfied.
Accordingly, Long Island filed this suit against Dicker in the court below on June 23, 1977 — well within sixty days after the dismissal of Dicker from the New York suit became final. Long Island purported to base its claim against Dicker upon Gemstone’s liability under the 1976 New York judgment, rather than upon Gemstone’s liability under the underlying notes themselves.3
*644Testimony at trial principally concerned Dicker’s claim that his signature on the Guaranty was fraudulently induced by representations allegedly made by John Demato, a loan officer for Long Island. According to Dicker’s testimony, Demato told him that the Guaranty, which was continuous and unlimited on its face, was in fact limited to $100,000 and for a period of 180 days. Dicker also testified that Demato represented to him that Long Island would fill in certain blanks in the Guaranty limiting it to $100,000 and 180 days, and that he only signed the Guaranty in reliance on these representations. It is undisputed that Dicker was a sophisticated businessman who had had extensive dealings with lending institutions prior to signing the Guaranty, and that he read and understood the Guaranty — including the provisions therein making it continuous and unlimited — prior to signing it. Demato denied having made any false statements to Dicker.
After several days of deliberation, the jury was unable to reach a verdict.4 The court discharged the jury and requested renewed motions for a directed verdict pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).5 After both parties had done so, the court entered an interlocutory order on November 9, 1979, in which it concluded that Long Island’s claim based on the 1976 New York judgment was, in fact, two claims — one for each of the two notes upon which Gemstone had defaulted. The court determined that Dicker’s liability under the Guaranty accrued with respect to the $100,000 note on May 14,1973, when the $100,000 note came due, and that Dicker’s claim under that note was barred by the four-year statute of limitations contained in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958).6 The court granted a new trial with *645respect to the $10,000 note, since four years had not passed between the date it came due (July 30, 1973) and the date Long Island filed this action (June 23, 1977). In response to the parties’ joint motion, the court entered final judgment on the November 9 order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).7
II. THE PROPER OPERATION OF THE TEXAS SAVING STATUTE
In the court below and on appeal, Long Island has advanced a number of alternative arguments as to why its suit is not barred in whole or in part by the four-year statute of limitations contained in article 5527. Its chief argument has been that since Dicker agreed in the Guaranty to pay “all liabilities” of Gemstone, it could properly base its claim on the New York judgment rather than the underlying notes — in which ease its cause of action would have accrued in 1976 rather than when the notes came due in 1973. Long Island has also argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by the operation of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5537 (Vernon 1958), which tolls the running of the statute for periods during which Texas residents are absent from the state; Long Island contends that it must be granted a new trial because the court below impermissibly limited its ability to prove that Dicker was indeed absent from the state.
We reach neither of these arguments, however, for we hold that the court below erred in its conclusion that the Texas saving statute, article 5539a, did not toll the operation of article 5527’s limitations period. Accordingly, we accept for purposes of this appeal the district court’s characterization of Long Island’s suit as stating multiple, independent claims.
The Texas saving statute reads in full as follows;
When an action shall be dismissed in any way, or a judgment therein shall be set aside or annulled in a direct proceeding, because of a want of jurisdiction of the Trial Court in which such action shall have been filed, and within sixty (60) days after such dismissal or other disposition becomes final, such action shall be commenced in a Court of Proper Jurisdiction, the period between the date of the first filing and that of commencement in the second Court shall not be counted as part of the period of limitation unless the opposite party shall in abatement show the first filing to have been in intentional disregard of jurisdiction.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958). Dicker contends, in essence, that the proper operation of this statute is limited to cases that have been dismissed from either another Texas state court or a federal dis*646trict court sitting in Texas. The parties concede that this is a question of first impression, in that it has never been addressed by either the Texas courts or the federal courts interpreting Texas law.8 We believe, however, that the Texas courts would not agree with Dicker’s argument.
First, and most important, the statute is not so limited by its terms. The statute does not refer to dismissal from “a Trial Court of this jurisdiction”; it simply says “Trial Court.” The term “Trial Court” is nowhere defined by the Texas statutes;9 accordingly, given its ordinary and most natural meaning, it must be taken to refer to any trial court.10
Second, we note that while no Texas appellate court has ever been called upon to answer the question of whether article 5539a applies when the court from which the action has been dismissed is one of a sister state, the Texas courts have repeatedly applied article 5539a to toll the statute of limitations in cases that have been dismissed from the federal courts. E. g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ.App.—Austin 1944, writ ref’d).11 The federal courts are just as certainly courts of a jurisdiction other than Texas as are the courts of New York.
Third, we note that the Texas courts have consistently indicated that article 5539a should be given a liberal interpretation. In discussing the statute’s legislative history, the Burford court made these remarks:
It is manifest that the Act is remedial in every essence. It should therefore be given a liberal construction with a view of effectuating its manifest objective— relief from a penalty of limitation bar to one who has mistakenly brought his action “in the wrong court.” ... So construed it is clear that the Act was intended to cover every case where .the effect of the final judgment or order of the first court was tantamount to a dismissal because the action was mistakenly but in good faith brought in the wrong court. In other words, the effect of the court judgment or order and not its form or the name by which it is called is the controlling factor.
Id. at 310. This language clearly cuts against Dicker’s suggestion that the Texas courts would take a restrictive view toward the meaning of the phrase “Trial Court.”
Fourth, we note that courts from other jurisdictions are split in their interpretations of analogous statutes.12 Thus, given *647that article 5539a is to be interpreted broadly and remedially, we presume that the Texas courts would be disinclined to follow another jurisdiction’s restrictive view and would instead favor the more liberal interpretations that many other jurisdictions have accorded analogous statutes.
Finally, we note that Dicker’s suggested rule would not further the policies that ordinarily provide justification for the results otherwise created by statutes of limitations:
Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. Such statutes “promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitations and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail <)ver the right to prosecute them.”
Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1054, 13 L.Ed.2d 931 (1965). It will virtually always be the case, as here, that a defendant who seeks a dismissal based on want of jurisdiction will have actual notice that the plaintiff intends to pursue a claim against him; given the extremely high probability that the plaintiff will refile in a proper court if the defendant is successful in obtaining the dismissal in the forum of the plaintiff’s choice, the defendant has no one but himself to blame if evidence is lost, memories fade, and witnesses disappear.
For these reasons, we believe that the Texas courts would apply article 5539a to a suit which, as here, was dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the court of a sister state and has been refiled, within sixty days thereafter in a court of proper jurisdiction.
Dicker suggests that the phrase “want of jurisdiction” should be limited to subject-matter jurisdiction. This claim, however, is rebutted by both the language and the facts of Burford, in which the “dismissal” from federal court was not for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but on abstention grounds. Again, we see no reason to read into the statute limitations that are not contained in the words therein. We believe that the Texas courts would extend article 5539a to cases involving dismissals for want of personal jurisdiction.
As counsel for Dicker conceded at oral argument, Dicker has never contended that Long Island’s suit against him in the New York court was filed “in intentional disregard of jurisdiction,” as that term is used in the final phrase of the statute. Neither has he contended that Long Island’s resistance to his jurisdictional challenge in the New York courts was in anything other than complete good faith. See Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1115 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981). Further, this contention would have had to have been raised affirmatively by Dicker in his pleadings in the district court, since the statute requires that it be raised through a plea in abatement. See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blum, 649 F.2d 342, 344-45 (5th Cir. 1981).
Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that that portion of Long Island’s claim that is premised on the $114,000 note was barred by the four-year statute of limitations contained in article 5527; that statute was tolled by the operation of the Texas saving statute, article 5539a.13
*648III. THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
Subsequent to the failure of the jury to return a verdict in the court below, Long Island moved for, and the court denied, a directed verdict on the question of Dicker’s liability on the Guaranty. Long Island argues that the denial of the directed verdict was erroneous in that the only defense to liability (other than the statute of limitations) — fraudulent inducement of Dicker’s signature — was improperly submitted to the jury. The trial court allowed Dicker to testify as to alleged oral misrepresentations made by John Demato, an officer of Long Island Trust, to Dicker, that the guarantee was limited to $100,000 for a period of 180 days, at the time Dicker signed the guarantee. Long Island maintains that Dicker should have been estopped from asserting this defense, /. e., that testimony of the oral representations should not have been admitted, and that, without any testimony relative to fraud, Dicker had no defense to the liability claim, and a directed verdict would have been proper.
According to the well established principle governing the granting or denial of a directed verdict, our review is limited to whether there was substantial evidence upon which reasonable men might reach different conclusions as to Dicker’s liability on the Guaranty to warrant submission of the case to the jury. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969). If the defense of fraud was improperly submitted to the jury, no substantial evidence would have existed and a directed verdict in favor of Long Island would have been proper. The only question necessary to determine whether Dicker’s liability should have even gone to the jury is whether the defense of fraud was available to him.
To determine if this defense of fraud by oral misrepresentations was available we must make a preliminary finding of which state’s law governs as to the availability of the defense of fraud. In this diversity case, it is incumbent upon this court to apply the law of the jurisdiction in which we sit, including that state’s conflict of laws principles. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Baum, 617 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1980). We thus look to the conflict of laws principles of Texas to determine whose law will govern this question whether Dicker could assert a defense of fraud to this guarantee.
Here Dicker and Long Island agreed in the Guaranty that New York law would govern. Texas law provides that the contracting parties’ choice of law will be honored unless there is no reasonable relationship to the state of choice. Austin Building Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex.1968). Here, the choice by Dicker and Long Island, having a reasonable relationship to the contract, would be honored by a Texas court and will be by this court. New York law governs the question whether fraud is a defense to this guaranty.14
Generally, New York allows an allegation of fraud to be asserted and shown by *649parol evidence, even in the face of a written agreement. Centronics Financial Corp. v. El Conquistador, 573 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1978). However, New York seems to have abrogated this general rule when the claims of oral misrepresentations are made as a defense to a guaranty given to a bank. In such cases, even a claim of fraud in the inducement based on oral misrepresentations may not be asserted as a defense. Franklin National Bank v. Skeist, 49 A.D.2d 215, 373 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App.Div.1975). In Skeist, remarkably similar to the case here, the defendant claimed that a bank official orally promised that the maximum loan would not exceed a specified amount — similar to Dicker’s claim that his liability was limited to $100,000. The court in Skeist, in holding that the defendant could not assert this claim of fraud, stated:
[T]he instant case involves public policy affecting obligations due a bank.
Briefly stated, such policy precludes a party from asserting that an asset of a bank is something less than it appears on its face to be.
Id. 373 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (citations omitted).
Skeist governs here, whether New York law is framed in terms of fraud being unavailable as a defense or in terms of the inadmissibility of parol evidence of fraud where a guaranty to a bank is involved. The trial court erred in allowing this defense of fraud to be presented to the jury.15 Because Dicker had no other viable defense to liability on the Guaranty, there was not sufficient evidence to submit the question of liability to the jury. The directed verdict should have been granted.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Long Island.