Opinion
Evelyn M. Bruegl appeals from that portion of an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage which characterizes the pension rights of Herbert J. Bruegl as-his separate property.
*203Evelyn and Herbert Bruegl were married on June 25, 1945. A carpenter by profession, Herbert belongs to a union with a noncontributoiy pension fund. He started earning credits in this plan on January 1, 1959,1 and stipulated at trial he then had 14 years, 3 months of pension credit. The couple separated on February 13, 1973; an interlocutory judgment of dissolution was entered December 5, 1973, when Herbert was 51 years old.
The trial court found Herbert was not eligible to retire and if he stopped working he could not withdraw any funds from the pension fund; it concluded there was no community property interest in the fund. In so ruling the trial court was concerned with the proper interpretation of one instrument, the pension plan.
“[Wjhere no extrinsic evidence has been introduced in connection with the instrument, the court on appeal can and should apply its own interpretation . . .” (Estate of Shannon, 231 Cal.App.2d 886, 889 [42 Cal.Rptr. 278].)
Pension benefits, to the extent, they have vested, are community property subject to equal division between the spouses in the event the marriage is dissolved (Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal.App.2d 8, 11 [21 Cal.Rptr. 164]). Have Herbert’s rights in this plan vested? Under the plan’s terms vesting occurs when “[a]n Employee . . . has earned at least 25 years of Pension Credit. . . or . . . has attained age 45 and has accumulated at least 10 years of Pension Credit. . . .” (Art. IV, § 8(a).)
Herbert is over 45 years of age and has accumulated more than 10 years of pension credit. There is no way for his pension rights to be reduced or withdrawn. Herbert has an irrevocable interest in the fund; his rights have vested (In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal.App.3d 642, 649 [115 Cal.Rptr. 184]).
Repeating the findings of the trial court, Herbert argues he is not eligible for retirement, he cannot receive any benefits until age 55 at the earliest2 and his interest is a mere expectancy, citing Williamson v. *204Williamson, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d 8 and French v. French, 17 Cal.2d 775 [112 P.2d 235, 134 A.L.R. 366]. However, in Williamson the pension plan required 20 years of service and the defendant had only been there for 13; in French the plan required 14 years of service which defendant had not completed; in either case if the respondent quit his job tomorrow he would lose all of his rights to a pension in the future. Here, if Herbert were to quit his job tomorrow it could be considered a break but would not cancel his pension rights.3 The fact Herbert must wait until he is 55 years old to collect his pension is a condition precedent to the payment of benefits and relates to whether his benefits have “matured,” not whether they have vested. (In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal.3d 592, 596, fn. 2 [111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449].) The fact Herbert cannot receive *205any benefits until age 55 at the earliest does not affect the character of the pension rights which are unmatured but fully vested (see Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.3d 349, 355, fn. 4 [118 Cal.Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589]; In re Marriage of Peterson, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 642, 649).4
Herbert’s pension plan includes among its benefits a series of payments to be made at his death. As to benefits applicable to Herbert the plan provides:
“Art. V Section 2. Death Benefits.
“(a) Death Before Retirement.
(i) ..................
(ii) If an Employee who . . . has attained age 45 and has accumulated 10 years of Pension Credit dies, his designated beneficiary or the person or persons selected . . . shall, upon application, be entitled to 36 monthly payments in an amount equal to the monthly pension which the deceased Employee would have received had he retired at age 62, based on his years of Pension Credit at the time of his death. The total value of any Pension payments, if any, received by the deceased Employee during a previous period of retirement shall be deducted from the total value of the 36 monthly payments otherwise due the deceased Employee’s beneficiary. The monthly payments described herein will begin with the first month following the death of the Employee....
“(b) Death After Retirement.
(i) If a Retired Employee dies within the 36-month period beginning with the effective date of such payments, his monthly pension payments shall be continued, until a total of 36 such payments have been made to such Retired Employee, to his designated beneficiaiy,. . . and shall thereupon cease.”
*206Evelyn asks us to consider this part of the pension plan as a life insurance policy in order to avoid “the rule that the wife’s vested rights in the husband’s pension plan are limited to amounts payable to him while he is living.” (In re Marriage of Peterson, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 642, 654; see Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.2d 355, 361 [33 Cal.Rptr. 257, 384 P.2d 649]). However, if Herbert receives 36 or more installments and then dies, no further payments will be made. The plan is not for life insurance; rather, it guarantees a minimum number of pension payments to Herbert or his beneficiary. In Benson the ex-wife was denied an interest in a widow’s pension. Her interest was deemed contingent since no one knew who the widow would be or whether she would survive until the pensioner died. Likewise, here Evelyn’s interest in the guaranteed payment is contingent since the identity of the beneficiary and whether that person survives will not be known until Herbert’s death.
Because the pension plan has vested, it is community property subject to division between the spouses. However, Evelyn has no community interest in the guaranteed payment feature of the plan insofar as it relates to payments due after Herbert’s death. Since the pension plan comprises the bulk of the community assets, the trial court may wish also to review its earlier determinations on spousal and child support.
Judgment reversed.
Coughlin, J.,* and Whelan, J.,* concurred.