Petitioner seeks review of a Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) decision remanding to the Crook County Court its decision approving a conditional use permit application for a nonfarm dwelling on a 25-acre tract of land that is zoned for exclusive farm use. Petitioner does not challenge the merits of LUBA’s decision; instead, he asserts that LUBA erred in rejecting his argument that the county violated ORS 215.422(l)(c) and section 18.172.050 of the Crook County Code (CCC) by charging an excessive filing fee for the appeal of the conditional use approval.1 Petitioner contends that the assessment of the appeal fee violated both the ordinance and the statute and that LUBA erroneously shifted the burden of producing evidence concerning the reasonableness of the fee from the county to petitioner. We affirm, because we conclude that petitioner failed to meet his burden to establish a prima facie case that the appeal fee violated either the ordinance or the statute.
In 2007, the county issued Order 2007-56, which set the fee formula for appeals from county planning commission *4decisions. In accordance with that order, the county charged petitioner a fee of $2,030 for processing an appeal to the county court of the county planning commission’s decision to approve the nonfarm conditional use at issue in this case. As a ground of appeal, petitioner made an as-applied challenge to the fee assessment. Petitioner asserted:
“The excessive Crook County appeal fee to challenge this decision of $1850 + 20% of the initial application fee effectively prohibits meaningful citizen participation in the land use planning process in violation of Goal 1 of the Statewide Planning goals. This fee substantially exceeds any reasonable estimate of the cost of processing the appeal in violation of CCC 18.172.050.”
In addition, 1000 Friends of Oregon submitted a letter regarding the fee to the county court. 1000 Friends asserted that, “[a]s applied, the [order establishing the fee schedule] results in an unreasonable fee for this appeal in violation of state law (ORS 215.422(l)(c)). The challenged order establishes a very wide range of possible fees for appeals from the planning commission; these fees could impermissibly exceed average or actual costs.” In the letter, 1000 Friends also asserted that several other counties charged much lower fees for appeals from planning commission decisions.
Crook County court appeals are decided on the record, CCC 18.172.110(12)(a), but appellants may seek to admit new evidence on appeal. CCC 18.172.110(12)(a)(vi).2 Petitioner did not seek to admit new evidence pertaining to the reasonableness of the appeal fee before the county court. Nor did the county itself adduce evidence regarding the fee formula determination process or whether the fee formula *5was consistent with the “actual” or “average” cost for such services within the county. In its decision on petitioner’s appeal, the county court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the reasonableness of the appeal fee.
Petitioner renewed his objection to the county’s appeal fee in his ensuing appeal before LUBA. Petitioner asserted that “[t]he county erred in assessing a $2030 local appeals fee which was not reasonable and which exceeded the average or actual cost of such appeal in violation of ORS 215.422(l)(c).” The county argued before LUBA that petitioner’s challenge was untimely, because he had failed to challenge the county’s appeal fee ordinance when it was adopted. LUBA did not address that defense, “because [it] agree[d] with the county that, even if such an as-applied challenge is permissible, petitioner has not demonstrated that the appeal fee charged in this case is unreasonable or exceeded the average cost of such appeals or the actual cost of the appeal.” Young v. Crook County, 56 Or LUBA 704, 717 (2008). LUBA explained that petitioner had made no effort to substantiate with evidence his argument that the appeal fee was unreasonable, “and we cannot say that as a matter of law it is unreasonable.” Id. at 15.
Petitioner renews his as-applied challenge to the appeal fee assessment before this court. The question for decision is whether LUBA’s decision is unlawful in substance. ORS 197.850(9)(a). In a nutshell, the difficulty for petitioner is that, although in previous appeals he complained that the appeal fee was excessive, he never made an evidentiary showing to support that argument. Petitioner had opportunities to make such a showing while the evidentiary record remained open, for example, by filing a motion to submit additional evidence before the county court, CCC 18.172.110(12)(a)(vi), or even, perhaps, by making a motion before LUBA for an evidentiary hearing or the taking of depositions. OAR 661-010-0045 (taking evidence not in the record).3 Petitioner also could have made a public records *6request to inspect the documents that formed the basis of the order that set the appeal fee. See ORS 192.420. However, petitioner failed to avail himself of those or any other opportunities to buttress his assertions with supporting evidence.
In its decision, LUBA mentioned the letter that 1000 Friends of Oregon submitted to the county court but did not treat that letter as part of the evidentiary record.4 As pertinent here, the letter stated:
*7“Whether the amount of any appeal fee will be impermissible because it is unreasonable and exceeds the appeal’s ‘average or actual’ cost is not ascertainable from the challenged order’s face, because the amount of the fee will vary depending on the maps that may be required, the number of dwelling requested, and whether the applicant requests expedited review — none of which can be determined from the face of the challenged order.”
However, the letter did not supply any of the purportedly missing information. Accordingly, it did not constitute evidence in any pertinent sense.
Nor does the record disclose that petitioner made any effort to obtain evidence about the reasonableness of the fee from county officials. Rather, petitioner took the position, as he does on review, that the burden of producing such evidence fell on the county. Indicative of that view, petitioner made the following request before the county court:
“Appellant requests the County Court to revise the challenged order so that no appeal fees are charged that exceed the documented average cost or documented actual cost of the appeal. Appellant also requests a refund of all fees in excess of either the documented average cost of processing appeals such as this or the documented cost of this appeal, whichever is less.”
In short, petitioner’s argument reduces to an assertion that LUBA erred in allocating to petitioner the burden of producing evidence concerning the reasonableness of the fee. We conclude that LUBA did not so err. Petitioner has the burden before this court to show that LUBA’s order was unlawful in substance. In order to do so, petitioner must demonstrate a source of law that required the county to prove, in response to an as-applied challenge to its appeal fee formula determination order under ORS 215.422(l)(c), that the *8assessed fee was reasonable. Petitioner has not made such a showing.5
Affirmed.