OPINION
A jury found appellant, Jerry Earl White, guilty of delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of premises owned by a school, and assessed his punishment at 10 years in prison and a fine of $5,000. He appeals, claiming legal and factual insufficiency and error in the jury charge. We affirm.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first point of error, appellant argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that he delivered a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of Saint John’s school. In reviewing legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and ask whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In reviewing factual sufficiency, we examine all the evidence neutrally and ask whether proof of guilt is so obviously weak or greatly outweighed by contrary proof as to indicate that a manifest injustice has occurred. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
An individual convicted of selling drugs in, on, or within 1,000 feet of any real property that is owned, rented, or leased to a school is subject to an enhancement penalty. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.134(d)(1) (Vernon 1998). The State presented evidence that appellant sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer near 40th and Broadway in Galveston. The spot where appellant sold the cocaine was approximately 616.8 feet from the property owned by Saint John’s Lutheran Church (which operates St. John’s school on the same premises), according to the officer’s measurement using a measuring wheel.
*370The State also called the Reverend Morris Alan Taylor, whose entire testimony at trial was as follows:
QUESTIONS BY MS. TAYLOR [Prosecutor for the State]:
Prosecutor: Could you please state your name?
Witness: Morris Alan Taylor.
Prosecutor: What is your occupation?
Witness: I’m a pastor.
Prosecutor: Where are you a pastor?
Witness: St. John’s Lutheran Church.
Prosecutor: What is the address there?
Witness: 1121 39th Street.
Prosecutor: Is that the premises, 1121 39th Street, is that owned by St. John’s?
Witness: Yes, it is.
Prosecutor: Is that building operated as a school?
Witness: The building in the same block on the other corner is a school, yes, ma’am.
Prosecutor: So St. John’s is operated as a school?
Witness: Yes.
MS. TAYLOR: I pass the witness.
QUESTIONS BY MR. JEWETT [Defense counsel]:
Defense: Excuse me. May I get your name again?
Witness: Morris Alan Taylor.
Defense: So, Reverend Taylor?
Witness: Yes.
Defense: Is it is correct to say that the school is located on a different block than where the church building is?
Witness: No, sir. I misstated. We own the entire block. The church building is situated at 39th and L. The school is situated at 40th and L. But we own the entire block.
Defense: But it’s a block away from the church? The school sits a block away from there?
Witness: Its on the other corner of the same block.
Defense: Do you have any knowledge if this school is within a thousand feet of 40th and Broadway, do you?
Witness: I wouldn’t be able to say. I don’t know the measurements.
Defense: You have testified there is a school in that area; correct?
Witness: Oh, yes. Certainly.
Appellant points out that this testimony does not draw a clear distinction between St. John’s school and St. John’s Lutheran Church. Indeed, it is not clear whether the two are distinct entities, or whether the former is merely a part of the latter. We agree with appellant that this testimony establishes that St. John’s Lutheran Church owns the property on which the school is operated. The question presented is whether property owned by a church and operated as a school is protected.
Section 481 defines “school” as “a private or public elementary or secondary school or a day-care center.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.134(a)(5) (Vernon 1998). There is no restriction on the type of ownership or organizational structure. There is nothing that excludes churches from the definition, or prohibits the owner from also owning and operating a church nearby.
Similarly, there is no general definition in Texas law that limits a school to any particular organizational form. Indeed, a private home can constitute a “school” if children are taught there in a bona fide manner. Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 443 (Tex.1994). We do not see why the same does not apply to churches. By adopting only a general (not to say circular) definition, we *371believe the Legislature intended to adopt an operational definition, thereby protecting all school property even if the operating entity is a church.
In this case, it is true that the State could have been more meticulous in its proof. But, in seeking to establish drug-free zones around schools, we believe the statute focuses on reality rather than realty titles. Testimony that a location appears to be operating as a school or contains the word “school” in its name is sufficient to support conviction. Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 754 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Appellant never asserted at trial or on appeal that it was unclear whether the property concerned was a school. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support his conviction.
Jury Charge
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the jury charge is inconsistent with the indictment.1 The record reflects a brief jury charge conference, at which the trial court made a correction and then asked the following:
THE COURT: Within 1,000 feet of a premises owned by. Any other corrections or objections by the State?
PROSECUTOR: The state has no objections.
THE COURT: Any by the Defendant?
DEFENSE: No, your Honor. Defense has no objection.
An appellant should not be allowed to affirmatively approve a jury charge, perhaps for sound strategic reasons, and then attack the charge on appeal. Ly v. State, 943 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. refd). Appellant waived any error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Justice TAFT concurring and dissenting.