Larry McKlintic appeals from the district court’s1 dismissal of his suit against his employer, the 36th Judicial Circuit Court of the State of Missouri, seeking relief under the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (known as the *877FMLA) granting a right to leave on account of the employee’s own illness (known as the self-care provisions of the Act). The district court held that McKlintic’s suit against the State was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which the court held, was not abrogated by the FMLA’s self-care provisions. McKlintic v. 36th Judicial Circuit Court, 464 F.Supp.2d 871, 875 (E.D.Mo.2006).
In Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir.2000), we held that the FMLA did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Townsel was overruled in part when the Supreme Court held in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003), that the family-care provisions of the FMLA did abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. McKlintic argued that Hibbs should extend to the self-care provisions of the FMLA as well, but after McKlintic filed this appeal, we decided Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation Center, 481 F.3d 1106, 1107 (8th Cir.2007) (per curiam), in which we held that the self-care provisions of the FMLA did not abrogate the states’ immunity.2 We are bound by the earlier decision of a panel of our Court. South Dakota v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 487 F.3d 548, 551 (8th Cir.2007). Accordingly, we may not reconsider the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against a state for violation of the self-care provisions of the FMLA.
McKlintic further argues that the State waived its immunity to suit by offering FMLA leave in its employee handbook. Specifically, he alleges in his complaint, “Mr. McKlintic’s request was in fact covered under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act as stated in the Missouri Circuit Courts Handbook.” A state may voluntarily waive its sovereign immunity from federal-court jurisdiction, but the federal courts will only conclude that it has done so if the alleged waiver passes a stringent test. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999). “Generally, we will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction or else if the State makes a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction.” Id. at 675-76, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (citations omitted). A state does not waive its immunity from federal suit by consenting to suit in state courts, by stating its intention to sue and be sued, or by authorizing suits against it in “any court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. at 676, 119 S.Ct. 2219. Thus, a state’s grant to an employee of a substantive right with no mention of whether that right can be enforced against the state in federal court does not effect a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.