ORDER CONCERNING PENDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
First, they destroyed the Carolina parakeet, and I did not speak out because I was not a Carolina parakeet.
Next, the Florida red wolf was made extinct, and I said nothing because I am homo sapien, not Cams rufas floridanus.
Then they took the habitat of the silver trout, the Santa Barbara song sparrow, and the Wisconsin cougar, but I inhabited elsewhere and had no concern and did not get involved.
Then my environment began to deteriorate and decay— and there were no other species to whom I could look for protection.1
This dispute presents technical environmental legal issues. In a larger sense, the case compels us to think about our responsibility as stewards of the earth which bore and sustains us. For those of Western religious beliefs, the author of the creation story teaches that we “have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that mov-eth upon the earth.”2 But “dominion” does not mean “destruction,” and our elected representatives have passed the Endangered Species Act standing for that proposition. At about the time our political ancestors were writing the Magna Car-ta, St. Francis of Assisi implicitly foresaw *597the need for protective legislation when he wrote:
By our own fault we have lost the beautiful relationship which we once had with all ... creation.... Give us the grace to see all animals as gifts from [God] and to treat them with respect for they are [God’s] creation.3
In a perfect world, the lion would lie down with the lamb; and we would live in peace with each other and in harmony with the land. It is not; lions still eat lambs; and we do not. Instead of a community of neighborhoods, we are becoming a segregated collection of consuming Haves served by minimum wage Have-nots whose festering envy will someday manifest itself. While ancient Rome had its bread and circuses, we have our air conditioned malls and arenas to satisfy the appetites of American materialism and entertainment. The reaping and reckoning in public health and quality of life which will come to our children and grandchildren will echo from what we incrementally sow into their environment and whether we come to an epiphany of the interdependence and interrelatedness played out in the mystery of the dance called life.
Apparently invoking the principle that matter is neither created nor destroyed but merely changes forms, defendant-in-tervenor La Cantera Development Co. wishes to profit from suburban consumerism by transforming Nature’s beauty into upscale shopping venues accompanied no doubt by lovely, non-porous asphalt parking lots over a part of our water supply. Despite my personal lamentation about failing to nurture nature, my oath and the judicial process require decisions to be made within the parameters of the law, notwithstanding my own view that we have quite enough of the sterility of steel and concrete stores, several now standing vacant. See Perkins v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., No. SA-02-CA-313-FB, 2002 WL 1160583 (W.D.Tex. Apr. 9, 2002) (order concerning jurisdiction and preliminary injunction) (to be published) (“[w]hile I might have made a distinction and different decision.. .my personal opinion is secondary to the law”); Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F.Supp. 587, 589 (W.D.Tex.1996) (notwithstanding personal opposition, Court does not sit in loco par-entis to decide whether terms limits make better or worse government).
A preview of the legal analysis is that plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity would' prefer pristine wilderness. Defendant-intervenor La Cantera would rather develop the land with no responsibility for its actions on living things. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service is the regulatory referee charged with keeping the ball somewhere around the 50-yard line as between encroaching human activity and endangered species. The law requires the judicial branch of government to give deference to administrative agency decisions so long as they are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary and capricious. See Newell Recycling Co., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 231 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir.2000) (decision by Environmental Protection Agency’s Appeal Board must be affirmed by court unless “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”); Meadows v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n, 119 F.3d 1219, 1224 (5th Cir.1997) (court to uphold decision by agency unless “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”; factual findings by the Commission to be upheld “if supported by substantial evidence”); Louisiana v. Mathews, 427 F.Supp. 174, 175 (E.D.La.1977) (judicial review of action by *598Food & Drug Administration banning sale and distribution of small turtles limited to whether defendants acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, in abuse of their discretion or-otherwise unlawfully”); see also Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Top of the Strip, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.App.—San Antonio, 1999, pet. denied) (court’s review of TABC order based on substantial- evidence rule; court may reverse or remand case if substantial rights of appellant have been prejudiced because administrative findings, conclusions, inferences, or decisions are “arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion”; reviewing court evaluates reasonableness not correctness of the order). For the reasons stated below, this Court finds United States Fish and Wildlife Service negotiated and regulated vigorously and at arms length to- discharge its duty under the Endangered Species Act with the result that La Cantera Development Co. purchased, and has set aside and will maintain 181 on-site and off-site acres of protected land for the subject species and their cave habitats. Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 27) is DENIED. The motions for summary judgment by defendants La Cantera Development Co. (docket # 29) and United States Fish and Wildlife Service (docket #30) are GRANTED.
Procedural Parameters
On October 22, 2001, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter referred to as FWS or Service) issued an Incidental Take Permit to La Cantera Development Company related to the development of approximately 750 acres of land in northern Bexar County, Texas. The permit was issued pursuant to section 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a), and authorized the permittee, La Cantera Development Company, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as La Cantera or defendant-intervenor) to “take” three species of karst invertebrates, Rhadine exilis, a troglobitic ground beetle, Rhadine internals, also a troglobitic ground beetle, and Circurina madia, a meshweaver spider,4 *599incidental to the construction, operation and management of the development of the property.5 “Threats to the[ese] species and their habitat include destruction and/or deterioration of habitat by construction; filling of caves and karst features and loss of permeable cover; contamination from septic effluent, sewer *600leaks, run-off, pesticides, and other sources; predation by and competition with nonnative fire ants; and vandalism.” 65 Fed.Reg. 81419. Like the warning to humans by a dying canary in the coal mine, some of these dangers adversely affect homo sapiens.
FWS contends that before making its decision to issue the incidental take permit, it completed a comprehensive analysis and documentation process pursuant to section 10 of the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The analysis and documentation process featured a Habitat Conservation Plan, Biological Opinion, an environmental assessment, a finding of no significant impact, and extensive public participation.
On December 12, 2001, plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (hereinafter referred to as Center), filed suit in this Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff alleges the FWS violated both the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act by improperly issuing a Habitat Conservation Plan, incidental take permit, and a finding of no significant impact and allowing the development of the La Cantera property in northern Bexar County, Texas. Plaintiff argues the development will cause an improper take of three endangered invertebrate species and cause undue, environmental harm to the property which contains significant environmental values and which is in the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone.
On January 16, 2002, Center filed its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction asking the Court to “enjoin the defendant United States Fish and Wildlife Service ... to suspend its ‘incidental take [of endangered species] permit’ ... issued to La Cantera Development Company for the development of ‘La Cantera’ property in northern San Antonio, Texas.” La Cantera filed its motion for leave to appear as an amicus curiae in the case and filed its brief in opposition to Center’s motion for TRO and preliminary injunction. The Court held a hearing on the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on January 17, 2002, and orally denied plaintiffs request. Thereafter, on February 7, the Court granted La Cantera’s unopposed motion to intervene as a party-defendant and entered a Scheduling Order to control the disposition of the case. Because the parties advised the Court they agreed the case should be decided on cross motions for summary judgment, the Scheduling Order set forth the deadlines for submitting the motions, responses, and replies. All briefing has been submitted, and this case is now ripe for disposition.
Parameters of the Dispute
Plaintiff believes a quotation taken from an e-mail sent by Christina Longacre of the FWS to Glen Sain Mitts, Vice President, Senior Finance Officer with USAA Real Estate Company, shows why this case is “particularly important.” Ms. Lon-gacre wrote, “This will be the basis for those to come in Bexar” County.6 Plaintiff believes that because the standards and procedures used for the Habitat Conservation Plan and Environmental Assessment in this case were the first to be used for the cave invertebrates in Bexar County, it is important for the FWS to know what is expected for compliance with the Endangered Species Act and the National Envi*601ronmental Policy Act. Therefore, what is at stake here is not simply the La Cantera tract of land, but the remaining undeveloped lands of central Texas as well. Plaintiff maintains that not only do legal flaws exist which are fatal to the integrity of the entire process and the result, but these legal flaws are further exacerbated by irregularities such as undue influence and pressure exerted by La Cantera during the process.
In its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff claims: (1) the FWS failed to ensure that the “applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of [] taking”; (2) the FWS arbitrarily found the development would “not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild,” and (3) the FWS incorrectly found there is “no significant impact” and thereby avoided the preparation of an environmental impact statement to fully assess the development. In response, FWS contends plaintiff has failed to establish its actions in issuing the incidental take permit were arbitrary and capricious because (1) the La Cantera project and the Habitat Conservation Plan satisfied the requirements of the Endangered Species Act for issuing the incidental take permit; (2) the failure to adopt the comments by George Yeni does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious, and (3) FWS complied with its obligations under the National Environment Policy Act and properly arrived at a finding of no significant impact. La Cantera also believes (1) its permit complies with the Endangered Species Act; (2) FWS adequately analyzed the minimization and mitigation requirements, and (3) an environment impact statement was unnecessary because the FWS correctly found the La Cantera project did not “significantly” affect the qualify of the human environment.7 The Lone Star Chapter and the Alamo Regional Group of the Sierra Club filed an amicus brief fully supporting the Center’s claims and position in this case.
Legal Parameters — Motions for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute concerning a material fact is considered “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is not the Court’s function to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court must determine if there are “any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. Of course, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all inferences drawn from the factual record are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
*602If the party moving for summary judgment carries its burden of producing evidence which tends to show there is “no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmov-ant must then direct the court’s attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996). The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere conclusory allegations to defeat a motion because allegations of that type are not competent summary judgment evidence and are insufficient to defeat a proper motion. Id In fact, if the “nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation,” a motion for summary judgment may be granted even in cases “where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue.” Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994).
The party opposing the motion also may not rest on the allegations contained in the pleadings but “must set forth and support by summary judgment evidence specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998). In meeting this requirement, the party must “identify specific evidence in the record” and “articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.” Id. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does riot impose upon this Court the “duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992)). A summary judgment will only be, precluded by disputed facts which are material, i.e. “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Factual disputes which are irrelevant or unnecessary to the issue will not preclude summary judgment. Id.
Because cross motions for summary judgment have been filed in this case, each party’s motion must be considered separately, and each movant must present evidence to support its respective motion. Ghoman v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 159 F.Supp.2d 928, 931 (N.D.Tex.2001); Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F.Supp. 587, 589-90 (W.D.Tex.1996). Summary judgment is often appropriate in cases involving a review of an administrative record. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1289 (E.D.Cal.2000) (summary judgment frequently appropriate in cases involving judicial review of voluminous and complete administrative record); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 120 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1011-12 (M.D.Fla.2000) (because court is to determine issues based on agency’s administrative record, “trial is generally unnecessary and summary judgment is often appropriate”).
The Parameters of Agency Review
In determining whether the action by the FWS in this case should be set aside, the parties agree the standard established by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, applies. See North Carolina Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 151 F.Supp.2d 661, 678 (M.D.N.C.2001) (National Environmental Policy Act contains “no independent private right of action”; “Administrative Procedure Act...expressly provides a right to judicial review of all final agency actions, including NEPA decisions”); Bennett v. Spear, 5 F.Supp.2d 882, 885 (D.Or.1998) (“[j]udicial review of agency action under the Endangered Spe*603cies Act is controlled by section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706”). The application of this standard of review has been explained as follows:
Under this “very narrow” standard of review, we may not “weigh the evidence in the record pro and con.” Instead, “our role is to review the agency action to determine whether the decision “was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear error of judgment.’” “Thus, if the agency considers the factors and articulates a rational relationship between the facts found and the choice made, its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.” “Indeed, the agency’s decision need not be ideal, so long as it is not arbitrary or capricious, and so long as the agency gave at least minimal consideration to relevant facts contained in the record.”
Harris v. United States, 19 F.3d 1090, 1096 (5th Cir.1994) (citations omitted.); see Lodge Tower Condo. Ass’n v. Lodge Props., Inc., 85 F.3d 476, 477 (10th Cir.1996) (review under § 706 narrow; agency need only “demonstrate that it considered relevant factors and alternatives after a full ventilation of issues and that the choice it made was reasonable based on that consideration”) (quoting Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 (10th Cir.1994)). The Court, in deciding whether to uphold an agency’s decision, may not consider evidence outside of the administrative record. Harris, 19 F.3d at 1096 n. 7. It is only where the action is not supportable on any rational basis that the administrative decision is considered to be arbitrary and capricious. Kaplan v. Johnson, 409 F.Supp. 190, 196 (N.D.Ill.1976), rev’d on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.1976). The action will not be considered arbitrary and capricious even if the reviewing court could have reached a contrary decision based on the same evidence. Id.; see Green v. United States Coast Guard, 642 F.Supp. 638, 642 (N.D.Ill.1986) (citing to Kaplan and recognizing that the “ ‘reviewing court is not barred from setting aside an agency decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial,’ it may not ‘displace the [agency’s] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo’”).
In addition, when an agency is acting within its “own sphere of expertise,” this Court’s review “must be very deferential.” Center for Marine Conservation v. Brown, 917 F.Supp. 1128, 1143 (S.D.Tex.1996); see Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 120 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1013 (M.D.Fla.2000) (in case involving Endangered Species Act, court noted that because an agency’s “special scientific expertise [was] involved, the Court must be ‘most deferential.’ ”). “An agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, the court might find contrary views more persuasive.” Center for Marine Conservation, 917 F.Supp. at 1143 (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)); see Bennett v. Spear, 5 F.Supp.2d 882, 885 (D.Or.1998) (when specialists express contrary views, agency given discretion to rely on “the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive”) (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)). The choices by the Secretary, are entitled to a “presumption of regularity.” Loggerhead, 120 F.Supp.2d at 1013. An agency violates the Administrative Procedure Act where it:
*604relies on factors Congress did not intend for it to consider, fails to examine an important aspect of the problem, offers an explanation for its decision that contradicts the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it cannot be attributed to a product of agency expertise.
North Carolina Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 151 F.Supp.2d 661, 679 (M.D.N.C.2001).
Parameter of the Arguments
1. Did FWS Fail to Ensure La Cantera Will to the Maximum Extent Possible, Minimize and Mitigate the Impacts of the Taking of Rhadine exil-is, Rhadine infemalis, and Cicurina madia?
Plaintiff argues the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter ESA) is explicit in requiring that an incidental take permit not issue unless the FWS ensures the applicant will to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of the taking, and the record in this case shows that requirement was not met. Plaintiff contends the FWS failed to adequately analyze and provide an explanation for the rejection of the “Reduced Development” Alternative8 which would have, for pur*605poses of argument here, completely avoided a “take” of the ground beetles and spider. Instead, the FWS offered a single, conclusory statement concerning the reduced economic value which would result from implementation of the Reduced Development alternative (i.e. loss óf 100 acres for development) but failed to provide any analysis in support of its conclusion, for example, how much profit La Cantera claims it might forego under this alternative and/or whether a different confíguration of the development, but which avoids the 100 acres, might still provide an adequate return.9 Plaintiff believes La Cant-era expressed its desire to develop the entire property, and the FWS simply acquiesced.
Plaintiff also contends the “Proposed Alternative”10 adopted does not fulfill the *608statutory requirement to minimize and mitigate the impacts of the taking to the “maximum extent practicable,”11 and the FWS failed to announce what standard *609would be applied in determining “the maximum extent practicable.” Plaintiff believes the maximum extent practicable standard imposes a clear duty on the FWS to fulfill the statutory command to the extent it is feasible or possible. The fact one alternative is more expensive or less profitable is insufficient to show the alternative financially infeasible. Relying on a California state court case, plaintiff claims what is required is “evidence that the additional costs or lost profitability are sufficiently severe as to render it impractical.” Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Cal.App.3d 1167, 243 Cal.Rptr. 339 (1988). Under these standards, plaintiff argues that the manner in which the FWS proceeded is arbitrary and capricious because it allowed La Cantera to “take” the species as it desired.
FWS agrees that before an incidental take permit could be issued to La Cantera in this case, the FWS had to find that La Cantera would to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of the incidental taking. As set out in the Service’s Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook, the “maximum extent practicable” standard has been interpreted as follows:
This finding typically requires consideration of two factors: adequacy of the minimization and mitigation program, and whether it is the maximum that can practically be implemented by the applicant. To the extent that the minimization and mitigation program can be demonstrated to provide substantial benefits to the species, less emphasis can be placed on the second factor.
The Handbook also explains that it is only “where the adequacy of the mitigation is a close call the record must contain some basis to conclude that the proposed project is the maximum that can be reasonably required by that applicant.” FWS contends the mitigation and minimization measures proposed by La Cantera were carefully considered by it in its Findings and Recommendations on Issuance of an Incidental Take Permit,12 and in its Biolog*610ical Opinion for La Cantera Development Company.13 FWS contends that in order *611to minimize the take of the affected spe-eies, La Cantera provided two one-acre set-backs from caves inhabited by the endangered species and has purchased and insured the perpetual preservation of eight caves on five off-site karst preserves totaling 179 acres with the preservation measures for both on-site and off-site preserves to include: routine inspections,14 vegetation and habitat management,15 red-*612imported fire ant control,16 fencing, sign*613age,17 cave-gating,18 control of mammals,19 *615surface and subsurface monitoring,20 and *616other measures.21 In addition to the on-the-ground preservation measures, La Cantera is also funding outreach and research programs.22
*617FWS disagrees with plaintiffs proposition that it was required to impose on La Cantera the “Reduced Development” alternative because section 10 of the ESA does not authorize the FWS to impose any alternative on any applicant,23 and the FWS has made this position clear in its Handbook.24 Instead, FWS maintains its duty is to analyze the applicant’s proposal to ensure that the impacts of the chosen alternative are minimized and mitigated to the maximum extent practicable.25 Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that the minimization and mitigation measures proposed by La Cantera fail to meet the requirements of section 10. Therefore, *618plaintiffs argument that FWS’s actions were arbitrary and capricious because they failed to explain why the Reduced Development Alternative was rejected is without merit.
Moreover, even if FWS had a duty to consider the alternatives, a consideration of the alternatives was made. The La Cantera caves were found to be in close proximity to existing roadways and did not provide ideal conditions for the long-term protection of the species as would the off-site preserves to be acquired by La Cant-era in mitigation of their incidental taking.26 Therefore, FWS states it accepted *619the one-acre setbacks around the La Cant-era caves # 1 and # 2 with implementation in perpetuity of measures to protect the species there and required La Cantera to acquire and maintain off-site mitigation based on the impact on the number and quality of the caves on the La Cantera property.27 In fact, Dr. Veni, upon whom plaintiff relies in support of its motion, stated that “[t]he rectangular shape of the proposed 100-acre La Cantera preserve will result in considerable adverse edge effects on the three La Cantera caves, which are especially susceptible since they are near the edges of the property, Therefore, this proposed preserve would help but will not be adequate to fully protect these species.” AR 1, A69, 0641. Dr. *620Veni recommended to FWS that the Reduced Development Alternative with additions from the Proposed Alternative be accepted because it was the only alternative that protected Mixojapyx (which is a species not at issue in this case).28 In contrast, SWCA Environmental Consultants opined there was no quantitative data to indicate that the two listed species found within La Cantera Caves # 1 and #2 would perish within the 1 acre setbacks.29 In addition to this difference of opinion, the FWS was also provided with information that even if the 100-acres would provide significant, long-term protection for the species, the cost to La Cantera would “make the project infeasible because the 100 acres was extremely valuable land.”30 Based on this record, FWS contends the mitigation and mini*621mization measures imposed are of signifi-eant benefit to the endangered species,
In response to plaintiffs contention that the FWS simply acquiesced to La Cant-era’s demands, the FWS points to the fact that originally, La Cantera argued that the one-acre setbacks would provide adequate mitigation. The FWS not only rejected this proposal as inadequate but also La Cantera’s proposal for three small preserves containing a total of 34 acres and 4 caves,31 and its proposal of four preserves containing 109 acres and 7 caves.32 FWS states it also rejected La Cantera’s propos-a[ a(j¿ a 70 acre preserve which included the Hills and Dales Pit but drop the Madia cave. La Cantera then amended its proposal to include the Madia Cave, and the FWS found this proposal satisfactory.33 *622The cost to La Cantera to acquire the 179 off-site preserves for this proposal is approximately $4 million. Thus, FWS believes the record fully supports that their finding, that the HCP contains measures that, to the maximum extent practicable, avoids, minimizes, and mitigates the impacts of La Cantera’s take of the affected species, was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court agrees.
As set forth in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1279 (S.D.Ala.1998), this Court, in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, may not:
set aside an agency action that is rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors and within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the statute, “ ... the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found the choice made.’ ”
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). Here as in Sierra Club, the FWS issued an incidental take permit and the dispute there, as is the case here, focused on whether the developer adequately minimized and mitigated the taking impacts to the “maximum extent practicable.” Id. The plaintiffs argued the levels of off site mitigation funding contained in the HCPs incorporated into the ITPs were inadequate and could not be supported by any rational basis in the Administrative Record.34 Id. In making their argument, the plaintiffs maintained the agency’s determination of the mitigation funding amounts was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted the “lack of any analysis in the Administrative Record concerning whether the amount or level of offsite mitigation funding is to the maximum extent practicable supports the plaintiffs contention.” Id. at 1280-81. The court also noted that the field office had expressed concerns over the inadequacy of the level of funding for offsite mitigation in one of the HCPs and ITPs and even though the field office failed to voice similar concerns with respect to the second HCP and ITP, the record nevertheless showed “that the FWS failed to support the level or amount of offsite mitigation funding with a clearly articulated analysis demonstrating whether the amount or level of funding is rationally based on the relevant facts.” Id. at 1281. In response, the defendants asserted that the field office’s concerns had been previously addressed prior to the final draft of the Biological Opinion, when it was told that the “ITP would state our use of these additional funds” for offsite mitigation in addition to the $150,000, but the court found that “such a eonelusory statement [did] little to ameliorate the lack of a sufficient basis upon which the FWS can demonstrate that the mitigation measures are to the maximum extent practicable.” Id. The court found the statement did not *623increase the mitigation measures nor did it provide the “necessary analysis to demonstrate that the existing level of mitigation is sufficient.” The court noted that FWS:
simply ignored the clearly expressed concerns of the experts Congress intended the agency to rely upon in making such discretionary decisions. This is further illustrated by the complete lack of subsequent consideration or explanation of the amount of mitigation funding in the final BO, HCP, and ITP. As the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis in the Administrative Record to support the amount of offsite mitigation funding, the issuance of the ITPs was arbitrary and capricious.
Id. Here, however, the Court has found no evidence nor has plaintiff pointed to any, of a field service office expressing concern over the inadequacy of the minimization and mitigation measures set forth by La Cantera in their HCP. The Court is aware of Dr. Veni’s35 concerns but under his complete analysis, even the 100 acres was insufficient. The FWS also had before it opinions/responses contrary to those of Dr. Veni. Moreover, plaintiffs argument concerns an alternative in the plan which La Cantera did not seek to implement instead of an actual portion of the plan at issue in Sierra Club. Although plaintiff contends FWS did not consider this alternative, there is no language in the Sierra Club opinion requiring FWS to consider all alternatives set forth in a HCP. The court instead took issue with FWS’s failure to explain or provide any analysis of “whether the amount of offsite mitigation required is ‘to the maximum extent practicable.’ ” Id. at 1282. The court noted that “the Administrative Record must contain some analysis of why the level or amount selected is appropriate for the particular project at issue.” Id. Even though the plaintiff does not agree with its analysis, FWS did provide an explanation and analysis of why the selected alternative was appropriate for the La Cantera project. Moreover, the record also shows FWS found the plaintiffs chosen alternative not practicable due in large part to the financial impact it would have on the development of the property and concerns as to the long-term preservation of the species due to the proximity of this area to major highways. Plaintiff, here, as in Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 120 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1021-22 (M.D.Fla.2000), must:
bear in mind that an “agency’s decision need not be ideal, so long as it is not arbitrary or capricious, and so long as the agency gave at least minimal consideration to relevant facts contained in the record.”
The Service is not required to select all available measures or even the best measures. Rather, it must select measures that minimize and mitigate impacts to the maximum extent practicable.
The record supports the decision in this case even though it might not be plaintiffs “ideal” or even “the best” measure.
In another case in which the court found the FWS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the plaintiffs challenged, as plaintiff does in this case, the failure by FWS to consider “any alternatives involving greater mitigation measures.” National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1291 (E.D.Cal.2000). In fact, none of the three alterna*624tive HCP strategies involved additional mitigation. Relying on Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F.Supp.2d 1274 (S.D.Ala.1998) (discussed above), the court noted that the phrase “maximum extent practicable” required the FWS to consider an alternative involving greater mitigation. In this context, the court stated the “record should provide some basis for concluding, not just that the chosen mitigation fee and land preservation ratio are practicable, but that a higher fee and ratio would be impracticable.” Id. at 1292. The court found the record “nearly non-existent” on whether the HCP provided the maximum practicable mitigation fee and reserve land ratio and explained:
There are conclusory statements in the record to the effect that “the common and local wisdom is that a fee in the range from $2000 to $2500 per acre is practicable,” but the record is devoid of evidence that the Service subjected this assumption to any examination or attempted to determine if a higher base fee would also be practicable. There is no economic analysis, discussion of mitigation fees in similar plans and circumstances, or even representation from particular landowners. ... The plain language of the statutory provision requiring that the Plan minimize and mitigate its effect “to the maximum extent practicable” is not satisfied by a fee set, as here, at the minimum amount necessary to meet the minimum biological necessities of the covered species. The record lacks adequate evidence and analysis of whether .a fee higher than that initially proposed by the working group would be economically practicable.
Id. at 1292-93 (citations to record omitted). Here, however, the record reflects that the reduced development alternative would in fact have an economic impact. As set forth in FWS Findings, some commentors requested the FWS to choose the environmentally preferred/Reduced Development Alternative 2 over the Preferred Alternative, but FWS stated it had a non-discretionary duty to issue the incidental take permit where the applicant adequately addresses the permit issuance criteria. As set forth in the EA/HCP, Alternative 2 did not include the issuance of a permit under section 10 of the ESA and did not provide for the removal or realignment of existing roadways, which could cause a potential long-term preservation problem, because that would be cost prohibitive.36 In addition, this alternative would not provide off-site mitigation, and the off-site caves sought to be protected under the Preferred Alternative would not receive active long-term management for the listed species.37 Again, as previously set forth, *625FWS specifically noted this alternative would “provide greatly reduced economic value for the current landowners by virtue of the loss of approximately 100 acres of otherwise developable land” and La Cant-era chose not to pursue this option. Given that FWS cannot require an applicant to choose a particular alternative, the record as set forth herein supports the finding that La Cantera met the issuance criteria for an incidental take permit, and the FWS did provide some basis for not choosing the Reduced Development Alternative, the Court cannot find FWS’s actions arbitrary and capricious.
2. Did the FWS Arbitrarily Find the Development by La Cantera Would Not Appreciably Reduce the Likelihood of Survival and Recovery of Rhadine exilis, Rhadine infernalis, and Cicurina madia?
Plaintiff contends the HCP violates the mandate of section 1539(á)(2)(B)(iv) of the Endangered Species Act. This section provides the Secretary shall issue the permit if “after opportunity for public comment, with respect to a permit application and the related conservation plan” the Secretary finds, among other listed factors, that “the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). Plaintiff states it is not arguing that the HCP must enhance recovery but merely that it must not “appreciably reduce” recovery. Because under plaintiffs analysis the HCP does not appreciably reduce recovery, the HCP must be set aside and remanded to the FWS.
In support of its argument, plaintiff states the term “conservation” as defined in the ESA means “the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to [the ESA] are no longer necessary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). According to a recent 5th Circuit decision, “ ‘conservation’ speaks to the recovery of a threatened or endangered species.” Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 442 (5th Cir.2001). Relying on the comments of Dr. Veni, plaintiff argues the HCP here will reduce the likelihood of recovery of the species.
In a letter to Christina Longacre of the FWS dated August 12, 2001, Dr. Veni opines that the proposed HCP did not meet recovery plan standards. Dr. Veni wrote:
A recovery plan does not yet exist for the Bexar County karst invertebrates: However, my discussions with USFWS staff indicate that until a plan is established the USFWS would follow the methodology of the recovery plan for the related endangered Austin karst invertebrates (O’Donnell, Elliott, and Stanford 1994). The key element to that plan is that at least “three karst fauna areas [KFAs] within each karst fauna region [KFR] in each species range should be protected in perpetuity.” The three La Cantera caves are located in the UTSA KFR (per Veni and Associates, 1994), but only two of the five proposed preserves are within that area. In my dealings with USFWS on behalf of my clients who have looked for mitigation properties for their impacts, USFWS has insisted on finding caves within the same KFR. The Service should be consistent and do the same here.38
*626Dr. Veni also wrote about the chosen alternative wherein he stated:
1) Alternative 1, the “Proposed Alternative” should be rejected. It does not come close to meeting the standards of the Austin karst invertebrate recovery-plan. Further, it does not protect the caves’ ecosystem, including Mixojapyx, and thus does not preserve the biological integrity of the UTSA KFR.
Plaintiff explains the only response by FWS to Dr. Veni’s comments was that normally priority should be given to acquiring mitigation in the same karst region but here, La Cantera was limited by what land was practicably available for sale during the preparation of the HCP and therefore had to look outside the region for other high priority locations for the species.39 Plaintiff contends the fact that La *627Cantera is the only place in the region where the cave species could be protected, FWS should have protected this area, not written it off. Plaintiff claims Dr. Veni specifically made this point, but FWS did not respond.40 Because FWS chose to allow the destruction of the La Cantera caves despite their own standards which provide that recovery requires their protection, FWS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1282 (S.D.Ala.1998) (despite explicit directive in FWS Handbook “not to apply inconsistent mitigation policies and to provide good reasons for or to explain clearly any inconsistent applications, the agency never provided ‘good reasons’ for or ‘clearly explained’ why the FWS applied inconsistent mitigation policies ... in the same geographic area”). Plaintiff believes this point is made stronger by the fact that not only were the recovery standards relaxed for this HCP, but the normal permit requirements that applicants stop working pending investigation of new found sites (as is found in the Buttercup permit) were omitted due to pressure by La Cantera to avoid making that information part of the record and being shut down.
Again returning to Dr. Veni’s comments, plaintiff contends that not only do the locations of the off-site preserve sites fail to meet the recovery standards but the quality of these sites do as well. In his August 12 comment letter, Dr. Veni wrote:
In recent meetings I’ve had with USFWS staff, they have presented a mitigation matrix where the quality of a cave’s habitat is compared to the proposed impact to determine the number of eaves needed for adequate mitigation. The proposed HCP will result in major impacts to La Cantera Cave No. 1 and La Cantera Cave No. 2 and total impact to La Cantera Cave No. 8, which are probably moderate quality habitats due to the nearby roads. My understanding of the mitigation matrix was that caves of moderate quality that would be subjected to major or total impact would require 2-3 caves in the same KFR in exchange for mitigation. This standard is not met by the number of caves offered in the UTSA KFR nor in their quality. In fact, not even a 1:1 mitigation of caves exists for the UTSA KFR.41
*628Plaintiff states FWS merely responded to these comments with the conclusory statement contained in the HCP that the off-sites cave preserves are considered to be of equal or greater quality than the La Cantera caves, but FWS failed to say who considered this to be true. Because FWS has relied on Dr. Veni’s opinion for listing determinations and for this HCP, plaintiff believes the “who” of this contrary opinion is relevant. Plaintiff also finds telling the fact the FWS did not consider smaller 4 and 5 acre preserves to be adequate.42
Even more telling is the fact that FWS did not respond to Dr. Veni’s comment that the EA/HCP is based on data that is simply wrong.43 Based on this assertion, plaintiff claims the decision of the FWS must be set aside because it was based on inaccurate information and/or fails to comply with the ESA’s mandate that decisions must be based on the best scientific and commercial data available. Plaintiff also takes issue and finds “even more disturbing than lack of response to this [simply wrong] issue” that the Service was aware of features that could contain endangered *629species but failed to require necessary follow-up because of pressure from La Cant-era. In addition to the failure to require “normal survey/report/stop-work conditions” in the permit, plaintiff claims the parties were aware of Cave 184 yet never included or mentioned this cave in the EA/HCP.44 Thus, because as set forth above, the HCP contains major flaws in terms of technical data, procedures employed, and conclusions reached, plaintiff contends it violates the ESA’s mandate that the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.
As set forth by the FWS, section 10(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the ESA requires a finding by the FWS, before it may issue an incidental take permit, that the incidental take will not “appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species in the wild.” The FWS made that finding here.45 FWS argues that in the Biological Opinion, it made the determination, as required by section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, that the issuance of the ITP is “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of the endangered species covered by the permit. This so-called “jeopardy” standard has been explained to mean “to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected ... to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. Thus, FWS argues, the jeopardy-standard for a § 7(a)(2) finding is essentially the same as the standard for issuing an incidental take permit pursuant to § 10(a)(2)(B)(iv). In fact, this is exactly what Congress intended.46 Despite this clear Congressional expression, plaintiff appears to argue, based oh a recent 5th *630Circuit opinion, that merely avoiding jeopardy is not the same as ensuring the recovery/conservation of the species as required by the ESA. As pointed out by Dr. Veni in his August 12 comments, the HCP at issue here will not “reduce the likelihood of recovery of the species.”
At issue in Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir.2001), was the refusal of the FWS to designate critical habitat for the Gulf sturgeon. The court held: “(1) Regulation defining circumstances under which jeopardy consultation is required was invalid as conflicting with Endangered Species Act (ESA); and (2) agencies’ reliance on availability of jeopardy consultation when deciding that it would not be prudent to designate critical habitat for threatened Gulf sturgeon was error where made in reliance upon invalid regulation.” Id. Before finding the regulation invalid, the court provided a background into the ESA as follows:
In 1973, Congress enacted the ESA as a “means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,” and “to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.” The ESA defines “conservation” as “the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided [by the ESA] are no longer necessary.” As the district court observed, the objective of the ESA is to enable listed species not merely to survive, but to recover from their endangered or threatened status.
To achieve this objective, Congress required the Secretary of the Interior to designate a “critical habitat” for all listed species. The ESA defined occupied critical habitat as “the specific areas within the geographic area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed ... on which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special management considerations or protection.”
Critical habitat designation primarily benefits listed species through the ESA’s consultation mechanism. Section 7(a)(2) of the statute requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification” of that species’s critical habitat. Thus, regardless of whether critical habitat is designated, an agency must consult with the Secretary where an action will “jeopardize the continued existence” of a species. If critical habitat has been designated [which has not been done with respect to the beetles and spider at issue here], the statute imposes an additional consultation requirement where an action will result in the “destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat. Although the ESA does not elaborate on the two consultation scenarios discussed above, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 defines each in terms of the effects of agency action on both the survival and recovery of the species. Thus, to “jeopardize the continued existence of’ a species is “to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild.” This “jeopardy standard” is similar to the regulation’s description of “destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat. The regulation defines “destruction or adverse modification” as a “direct or indi*631rect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species.”
Id. at 438-39. Before rejecting as unpersuasive Sierra Club’s first argument that the “regulation defines the jeopardy and destruction/adverse modification standards in terms of both survival and recovery” and the regulation “consequently equates these two consultation standards,” the court noted that because it was revievdng a facial challenge to a regulation, its review was not under the Administrative Procedure Act (as is the case here) but rather pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Id. at 440. Therefore, the court had to first determine whether Congress had directly spoken to the “precise question at issue,” with reversal in that instance warranted “only where an agency interpretation is contrary to ‘clear congressional intent.’ ” Id. at 440-41. If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court then determines if the agency’s interpretation is “a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 441. An agency’s construction is reversed only if it is “arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. This review differs however from the review this Court must apply here in that review under the APA focuses on the “reasonableness of the agency’s decision-making process” as compared with the “reasonableness of [the agency’s] interpretation.” Id. at n. 37 (citing Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 410 (5th Cir.1999)).
In its second argument, and the argument found by the 5th Circuit to have merit, the Sierra Club argued that the regulation “sets the bar too high” for the destruction/adverse modification standard. Id. Sierra Club argued that the requirement that the action must affect both survival and recovery conflicted with the ESA which requires “consultation where an action affects recovery alone; it is not necessary for an action to affect the survival of a species.” Id. The court agreed and explained:
The ESA defines “critical habitat” as areas which are “essential to the conservation” of listed species. “Conservation” is a much broader concept than mere survival. The ESA’s definition of “conservation” speaks to the recovery of a threatened or endangered species. Indeed in a different section of the ESA, the statute distinguishes between “conservation” and “survival.” Requiring consultation only where an action affects the value of critical habitat to both the recovery and survival of a species imposes a higher threshold than the statutory language permits.
Id. at 441-42 (footnotes/citations omitted). The legislative history also supports the court’s analysis because critical habitat had been defined in a 1978 regulation in terms of a loss of air, land or water area, that would “appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed species,” and being aware of this regulatory approach, Congress in amending the ESA in 1978 chose to define critical habitat as it reads today in terms of conservation. Id. at 442. The court concluded the “Services’ definition of the destruction/adverse modification standard in terms of survival and recovery is consequently an attempt to revive an interpretation that was rejected by Congress.” Id. at 443. Based on the “manifest inconsistency between [the regulation] and Congress’s ‘unambiguously expressed intent’ in the ESA, [the court found] the regulation’s definition of the destruction/adverse modification standard to be facially invalid.” Id. at 443. Having so found, the court made the following comment:
*632We emphasize that our holding applies only to the definition of “destruction or adverse modification.” The remainder of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02—including the regulation’s definition of “jeopardize the continued existence of’—is unaffected by our ruling.
Id. at n. 61. Thus, because plaintiff has not made a facial challenge to the regulation and because the 5th Circuit has not affected the regulation at issue herein concerning jeopardy to the continued existence of the ground beetles and spider, the Court will not impose upon the Service a higher “conservation” standard but will review the agency’s decision under the traditional jeopardy standard. See National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1286 (E.D.Cal.2000) (when Service considers issuance of ITP, it must “engage in internal consultation under § 7, and may issue the permit only upon a finding that it ‘is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a protected species”). As set forth by the court in National Wildlife:
Formal consultation typically culminates in the issuance of a biological opinion by the Service, which addresses whether jeopardy is likely to occur for any protected species, and if so, whether “reasonable and prudent alternatives” exist to avoid jeopardy. The Service must use “the best scientific and commercial data available” in making the required “no jeopardy” finding. In every respect except for this “best scientific and commercial data” requirement, the no jeopardy finding required by-ESA § 7(a)(2) is identical to the survival finding required under § 10(a)(2)(B)(iv). Where the “available data” is imperfect, the Service is not obligated to supplement it or to defer issuance of its biological opinion until better information is available. Rather, “the Service must develop its biological opinion based upon the best scientific and commercial data available regardless of the ‘sufficiency’ of that data.”
Id. at 1286-87.
Plaintiffs argument with respect to the inadequacy of the HCP is based on the comments of Dr. Veni. Plaintiff contends that in Dr. Veni’s August 12 comments, he pointed out the HCP will “reduce the likelihood of recovery of the species” and the proposed HCP does not meet the recovery plan standards established for related endangered Austin karst invertebrates. However, as pointed out by FWS, a section 10(a)(2)(B)(iv) permit does not require the HCP to meet any recovery plan goal. Support for this proposition comes from the FWS Handbook which provides:
Issuance of a section 10 permit must not “appreciably reduce” the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild. Note that this does not explicitly require an HCP to recover listed species, or contribute to their recovery objectives outlined in a recovery plan. .This reflects the fact that HCPs were designed by Congress to authorize incidental take, not to be mandatory recovery tools.
Handbook at 3-20 (emphasis in original). Based on this language, it does not appear to the Court that FWS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not requiring the HCP in this case to meet the recovery plan standards, assuming as plaintiff asserts that it does not, set forth for other species of listed karst invertebrates in Travis and Williamson counties. However, in order to provide a complete review, the Court will consider plaintiffs arguments.
As pointed out by FWS, Dr. Veni’s comments, upon which plaintiff relies, were made on August 12, 2001, which was over 2 months before the Service issued its Biological Opinion on October 22, 2001. In addition, as previously set forth, *633this Court’s review of an agency acting within its own sphere of expertise must be very deferential. Even if this Court were to find Dr. Veni’s contrary views more persuasive, an agency is given discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts. This Court has not been presented with any evidence that Dr. Veni was for the purposes of the HCP at issue here one of FWS’s experts.
In response to plaintiffs contention that the only response by FWS to Dr. Veni’s assertion that the proposed HCP does not meet recovery plan standards because it does not follow the standard of three karst fauna areas within each karst fauna region being protected in perpetuity, was that normally priority should be given to acquiring mitigation in the same karst region where the impact occurs but the applicant was limited here by what land was practicably available for sale during the preparation of the HCP, FWS asserts that assuming that goal is appropriate, the La Cantera project would not interfere with the achievement of this goal because three karst fauna areas within the UTSA region will exist after the development. FWS states this point was made in the Biological Opinion as follows:
In evaluating the effects of the proposed action which are further described under Section 5.1 of the EA/HCP, we assessed the impact in relation to the conservation strategy outlined for similar species in the Endangered Karst Invertebrates Recovery Plan for Travis and Williamson counties, Texas (1994). Recovery criteria in that plan call for the preservation, in perpetuity, of three karst fauna areas (areas separated from each other hydrologically and geologically), if three exist, for each species within each karst region. In reviewing the status of the affected species, we determined that three karst fauna areas within the UTSA karst region will exist after the ;proposed development. These areas are summarized in Section IILa. of this BO.
AR 1, A4, 0025 (emphasis by FWS). In reply, plaintiff asserts the record shows the Biological Opinion is wrong because the Service admitted in its Findings and Recommendations on the issuance of the ITP the previous statement that the applicant was limited by the land practicably available, and therefore, the applicant had to look outside of the region for other high priority locations for the species. Additionally, the BO contains a table purporting to contain three sites for each species, but plaintiff contends a closer look reveals only 2 positive sites for C. madia are shown and although 3 sites are listed for R. infemalis, plaintiff contends one site does not fit the minimum 69-99 acre recovery standard because it only consists of 4 acres. Therefore, plaintiff contends it is the Findings and Recommendations that are correct not the Biological Opinion.
In support of its Biological Opinion, FWS explains that the positive identification of C. madia requires the finding of an adult female and without such a finding, the only identification that can be made with certainty is at the genus level.47 FWS contends that based on the known *634distribution of the Cicurina listed species in Bexar County and the best scientific information available, FWS determined the spiders were likely to belong to C. madla.48 As a result, La Cantera agreed to mitigate for this species. In evaluating *635La Cantera’s mitigation proposal at issue here, FWS claims they identified two karst areas in the UTSA karst region where a positive identification of C. madia had occurred and based on information received from an expert in invertebrate taxonomy, Dr. James Cokendolpher, confirmed that the species identified in the John Wagner Ranch Cave # 3 was more likely to be C. madia than any of the other three listed species of Cicurina.49 Although plaintiff continues to argue that only two positive *636sites were listed for C. madia, the record also reflects that there was just as much uncertainty as to whether C. madia actually existed in the La Cantera caves as existed in the cave chosen for mitigation. This site, the John Wagner Ranch Cave # 3 lies within the UTSA karst region and contains the same possibility for C. madia as the La Cantera caves. Therefore, it appears that even if the Austin recovery standard was applicable to the FWS in this instance, the decision by the FWS in finding that three karst fauna areas within the UTSA karst region will exist for the C. madia species was not arbitrary or capricious.50 Alternatively, even if FWS violated their Austin standard as plaintiff alleges, the citations to the record clearly set forth the reasons for any alleged inconsistency with respect to the C. madia mitigation.
With respect to the species R. infemalis, plaintiff agrees that FWS showed three positive sites in the UTSA karst area, but takes issue with the fact that one of the preserves is only 4 acres in area instead of the minimum 69-99 acres it contends is the minimum recovery standard based on the language contained in the EA/HCP at AR1, A9, 0084.51 As *637pointed out by the highlighted language of the section and by the FWS in its brief, these are recommendations, not recovery standards. As explained by FWS in its Biological Opinion and EA/HCP respectively:
Not all of the off-site preserves are of ideal size for providing the highest probabilities for long-term survival of the karst invertebrates because the majority of surrounding land was not available to the Applicant at the time of HOP development. However, additional acreage does exist around the preserves and is currently contributing to conservation of these species; and thus, this land around those caves may become available for preservation in the future. The Applicant has agreed to contribute money toward development of outreach materials and to provide updated maps three times a year for three years from permit issuance... .This information will enhance the Service’s ability to work with suiTOunding landowners and encourage more proactive protection and conservation efforts.
Three of the off-site preserves (Madia, John Wagner Ranch, and Helotes Hilltop/Blowhole) are of insufficient size by themselves to provide a high probability for long-term conservation of the species. However, the size and shape of these preserves is based in part on the land surrounding the features that was practicably available for sale during preparation of the HCP (Robert Kuhn, sworn affidavit). These three preserve sites are the type localities for four of the nine listed karst invertebrates. Additionally, all three preserves are adjacent to or surrounded by undeveloped lands that are currently contributing to the long-term conservation of these sites. Therefore, the merits of these sites and the lack of availability for sale of additional lands around them, makes them of conservation benefit to this Preferred Alternative.
The proposed approximately 4-acre John Wagner Ranch Cave # 3 preserve lies within a small residential neighborhood in the Grey Forest area of northwestern Bexar County. Land to the east, west, and south of the proposed preserve area contains low-density (1-5 acres) occupied residential lots. Land to the north consists of undeveloped scrubby ranch land and woodland. A relatively high diversity of troglobitic species coupled with presence of low-density residential areas immediately to the east, west, and south and a large tract of undeveloped land to the north made acquisition and management of the preserve area high desirable. This cave is the type locality for Rhadine exilis.
Therefore, even if this were a recovery standard as plaintiff suggests, FWS clearly explained the reasons for choosing this land despite of the acreage amount. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1282 (S.D.Ala.1998) (“Administrative Record must contain some analysis of why the level or amount selected is appropriate for the particular project at issue, and the FWS should not apply inconsistent mitigation policies for the same species in the same geographic area, unless differences *638are based on biological or other good reasons and are clearly explained”). Moreover, plaintiff has not presented the Court with any evidence that the 69-99 acre recommendation is part of the Austin recovery standard it seeks to impose in this case. Again, based on the record presented, the Court does not find the FWS acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner in allowing the John Wagner Ranch Cave # 3 to serve as an off-site preserve for R. infemalis.
In its next argument, the Center alleges that not only were the recovery standards for La Cantera’s HCP relaxed, but the permit standards were relaxed as well. In support of this proposition, plaintiff refers to the Buttercup Permit which it claims contains stop-work provisions that are not contained in La Cantera’s permit. The Center specifically points to sections AA, HH, MM, and SS of the Buttercup permit to support its assertion.52 The Center contends La Cantera applied pressure on the *639FWS to avoid making “that info part of the record so that someone comes along and shuts us down.”53
*640In response, FWS contends that as argued by La Cantera, the so-called “stop work” provision of the Buttercup permit does nothing more than provide for one-week delays in construction after which the caves were to be sealed without regard to what was found in the surveys and does not provide for a halt to construction to allow FWS to make changes to the permit to protect the species. The Court does not find any provision allowing the FWS to change the Buttercup permit to protect the species and agrees with defendants’ analysis that the caves found pursuant to the Buttercup permit will be sealed regardless of the findings. Therefore the Court is unclear as to what benefit the species at issue herein would have gained from the addition of this provision. Although plaintiff argues this provision shows FWS was relaxed in the issuance of the La Cantera permit, plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that this provision is standard in other ITPs which have been issued, for example in a closer geographic region such as Austin, or why the failure to include this one provision was arbitrary or capricious. With respect to the other Buttercup permit provisions plaintiff cites, i.e. AA, MM, and SS, FWS contends similar provisions are found in La Cantera’s HCP and are incorporated into their permit via paragraphs I and R.54 Upon a *642review of these provisions, the Court agrees.
Plaintiffs remaining arguments in this section focus on the fact the Service did not agree with Dr. Veni’s assessment of the quality of the off-site preserves55 and his statement that the EA/HCP is based on data that is simply wrong.56 *643Plaintiff also points to a statement made in a telephone conversation concerning the size of the preserves.57 FWS contends it was not arbitrary or capricious to rely on their own experts who reviewed the reports and studies, visited the property (unlike Dr. Veni), and visited the mitigation sites. FWS notes that Dr. Veni reviewed the draft EA/HCP without all of the reports and underlying data and made complaints in his August 12 letter concerning access to the mitigation properties which had been addressed in the draft HCP, i.e. issues concerning fencing and gating the preserves. FWS also maintains they received comments from La Cantera and its consultant addressing Dr. Veni’s comments and had information from three different consultants who surveyed the karst formations and studied the La Cantera property as well as several consultants who had extensively studied the mitigation property.58 The EA/HCP explains how the property was evaluated:
*645Over 400 potential karst features have been evaluated on the Property. Three primary geological assessments have been performed in the past, and their combined scope has included the entire Property (Raba Kistner 1993a and 1993b; SWCA 2000a; Horizon Environmental Services, Inc. 2000). The area surveyed by each company, as well as the scope of investigation, was different for each survey. Section I of the supporting documentation of the Habitat Conservation Plan (page 75 ff section 6.0, the HCP), which is available upon request, provides a summary of the karst invertebrate survey history and results, where appropriate, for each of the over 400 potential karst features identified on the Property. Where possible, correlations between the features have been made and shown in Section I. The results of all the surveys are given in Table 1-15 in Section I. All but three of the features (La Cantera caves # 1, # 2, and # 3) identified during the course of the karst surveys are considered insignificant with regard to endangered karst invertebrate habitat.
Karst surveys began in 1993 when Raba-Kistner was contracted to conduct a Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC) geologic assessment of a portion of the Property bounded by La Cantera Parkway to the west, Fiesta Texas to the north, Loop 1604 to the south, and Old Fredericks-burg Road to the east (Raba Kistner 1993 a and b). During this survey, 200 potential karst features were identified, including a sinkhole that was later excavated by SWCA to reveal La Cantera Cave #3. A total of 89 of the karst features identified during the survey were described as fractured rock outcrops or faults and not likely to contain potential habitat for karst invertebrates. SWCA was contracted in 1994 to conduct a karst feature survey to search for features on the entire Property with potential to provide habitat for the now endangered species. During this survey, 207 karst features were identified, including several features that had previously been identified in the Raba-Kist-ner geologic assessment. After the survey, SWCA excavated 41 karst features that were identified as meriting further evaluation with regard to potential karst invertebrate habitat. It was during these excavations that La Cantera Cave # 3 was discovered and opened.
In 2000, Horizon was contracted by a potential developer to conduct a karst survey of 200 acres of the Property to the southwest of Fiesta Texas, east of La Cantera Parkway, and north of Loop 1604. The scope of the Horizon investigation was to conduct a detailed study of both aquifer recharge features and potential karst invertebrate habitat. Horizon identified approximately 28 insignificant karst features that had not been identified by Raba-Kistner or SWCA. No additional caves or subsurface voids were identified during the Horizon investigation.
The FWS also addressed why it was accepting off-sites preserves of insufficient size as follows:
Three of the off-site preserves (Madia, John Wagner Ranch, and Helotes Hill*646top/Blowhole) are of insufficient size by themselves to provide a high probability for long-term conservation of the species. However, the size and shape of these preserves is based in part on the land surrounding the features that was practicably available for sale during preparation of the HOP (Robert Kuhn, sworn affidavit). These three preserve sites are the type localities for four of the nine listed karst invertebrates. Additionally, all three preserves are adjacent to or surrounded by undeveloped lands that are currently contributing to the long-term conservation of these sites. Therefore, the merits of these sites and lack of availability for sale of additional lands around them, makes them of conservation benefit to this Preferred Alternative.
Although plaintiff takes issue with the size of these preserves and the fact that the Service did not defend them “scientifically,” plaintiff has not provided the Court with any authority which requires the FWS to respond to every statement or comment made in order for its actions not to be arbitrary or capricious. The record presented supports a finding that FWS considered Dr. Veni’s comments but chose instead to rely on their own and other experts to which this Court must give great deference. Center for Marine Conservation v. Brown, 917 F.Supp. 1128, 1143 (S.D.Tex.1996). The record does not support plaintiffs contention the HCP contained major flaws in terms of technical data relied upon, procedures employed, and conclusions reached. As a result, the Court finds the FWS was not arbitrary or capricious in finding that the development of the La Cantera property would not “appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species.”
3. Did the FWS Violate the National Environmental Policy Act By Its “Findiny of No Siynificant Impact?”
Plaintiff alleges that FWS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by finding in its “Finding of No Significant Impact” (FONSI) that the La Cantera development would have “no significant impact” thereby avoiding the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to fully assess the impacts of the development.59 Plaintiff contends a *647challenge to an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS, should be upheld and the filing of an EIS ordered if the court finds “the project may cause a significant degradation of some human environmental factor.” Plaintiff argues that although the Fifth Circuit subsequently has held the standard of review is under the arbitrary and capricious standard rather than the reasonableness standard previously esT poused, that change was not of great pragmatic consequence and did not affect the “may be significant” standard set forth in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir.1973).
FWS and La Cantera in response state this Court must apply the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing FWS’s decision not to prepare an EIS. As previously set forth, under this standard great deference to the decision not to prepare an EIS must be given, and this Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of FWS. Defendants maintain the former requirement that a court should require the filing of an EIS if it finds the project “may” have caused a significant degradation of some human environmental factor is no longer good law. Sabine River Auth. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.1992). Not only did Sabine overrule the “reasonableness” standard relied on in Kreger, but it also, according to defendants’ analysis, requires this Court to defer to FWS’s non-arbitrary conclusion that the permit at issue here lacks the type of significant impacts which warrant an EIS even though Dr. Veni may be of the opinion that “significant effects ‘may’ occur.”
For an overview of the NEPA, its EIS requirement, and the standard of review, the Court found instructive the following:
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” An EIS is a “detailed statement” examining in depth the environmental impact of the proposed action and alternatives to the proposed action. NEPA sets forth “action-forcing” procedures designed to fully inform agency decisionmakers of the environmental impact of their decisions. The reason for the EIS requirement is that “decisions that are based on understanding of the environmental consequences” will “protect, restore and enhance the environment.” “NEPA exists to ensure a process, not a result.” Thus NEPA does not forbid harm to the environment but requires government decisionmakers to evaluate that harm and explain why the action is justified despite the harm:
NEPA is not designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment; it foresees that decisionmakers may choose to inflict such harm, for perfectly good reasons. Rather, NEPA is designed to influence the decision-making process; its aim is to make government officials notice environmental considerations and take them into account.
By regulation, an agency considering whether an action would require preparation of an EIS must prepare a brief, preliminary evaluation, called an environmental assessment (“EA”). As are intended to be concise documents that “briefly provide sufficient evidence and *648analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS or a ‘finding of no significant impact’ (“FONSI”).” NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared before taking action that may significantly affect the quality of the human environment. An EIS must be prepared if “substantial questions are raised as to whether a project ... may cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor.” “The plaintiff need not show that significant effects will in fact occur, but if the plaintiff raises substantial questions whether a project may have a significant effect, an EIS must be prepared.”
In assessing the significance of a project’s impact, NEPA regulations require the agency to consider a variety of factors, which are set out in two categories, labeled “context” and “intensity.” The regulations enumerate a number of relevant considerations, including the scope of the affected area and region, the severity of the impact, whether public health may be affected, whether unique resources may be affected, the degree to which the effects are likely to be controversial or uncertain, the precedential nature of the action, the impact of other related actions, the degree to which the action may affect an endangered or threatened species or critical habitat, and whether the action threatens a violation of federal, state or local law.
After conducting a preliminary environmental assessment, if the agency makes a Finding of No Significant Impact, then no EIS is required. An agency’s decision to issue a FONSI, and not to prepare an EIS is renewable under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1287-88 (E.D.Cal.2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS, courts must “ensure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences” of its action. While a review of agency action is narrow and presumes the agency action valid, an agency action shall be set aside as arbitrary and capricious where the agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” There are four criteria to be considered in determining whether an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS is arbitrary and capricious:
First, the agency must have accurately identified the relevant environmental concern. Second, once the agency has identified the problem it must have taken a “hard look” at the problem in preparing the EA. Third, if a finding of no significant impact is made, the agency must be able to make a convincing case for its finding. Last, if the agency does find an impact of true significance, preparation of an EIS can be avoided only if the agency finds that changes or safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.
Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1283 (S.D.Ala.1998) (citations omitted); see Tillamook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 01-35922, 2002 WL 745577, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2002, designated for publication in F.3d 288 F.3d 1140, 1143) (an agency’s decision not to prepare EIS is reviewed under arbitrary and capricious standard; court must determine if agency has taken “the requisite hard look at the environmental consequences of its proposed action” and “conducted a ‘reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors’ ”; agency’s decision rejected only if clear error of judgment; EIS not required if after hard look proposed action will not have significant impact; agency’s *649decision to forego EIS preparation may be justified even in presence of environmental impacts if agency adopts “mitigation measures in response to identified impacts”); Utah Shared Access Alliance v. United States Forest Serv., No. 00-4146, 2002 WL 725419, at *1, *7 (10th Cir. Apr. 25, 2002, designated for publication in F.3d 288 F.3d 1205) (NEPA does not require “agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations”; NEPA requires the agency take a “ ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences before taking a major action”; role of courts in reviewing NEPA compliance “is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious”; agency’s decision not to prepare EIS is “a factual determination which implicates agency expertise and accordingly, is reviewed under the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review”; court to consider whether decision “ ‘based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment’ ”); Sabine River Auth. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 677-78 (5th Cir.1992) (recognizing previous standard of review of decision not to prepare EIS based on “reasonableness” no longer applicable; arbitrary and capricious standard to be applied; “[u]nder this highly deferential standard of review, a reviewing court has the ‘least latitude in finding grounds for reversal’”; court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but must studiously review the record to ensure that the agency has arrived at a reasoned judgment based on a consideration and application of the relevant factors”; where agency presented with conflicting evidence, it is the agency not the reviewing court that is given the discretion to “accept or reject from the several sources of evidence. The agency may even rely on the opinions of its own experts, so long as the experts are qualified and express a reasonable opinion. The reviewing court may be inclined to raise an eyebrow under such circumstances, but it must show the proper respect for an agency’s reasoned conclusion even if the reviewing court finds the opinions of other experts equally or more persuasive.”); Save Our Wetlands v. Julich, No. Civ.A.01-3472, 2002 WL 59401, at *3 (E.D.La. Jan.15, 2002) (review of agency’s FONSI conducted under arbitrary and capricious standard; because NEPA a purely procedural statute, “courts are not permitted to critique an agency’s substantive decisions or to second guess the extent or quality of its decisionmaking process”; FONSI may only be set aside if “(1) evidence before the court demonstrates that, contrary to the FONSI, the project may have a significant impact on the human environment or (2) the agency’s review process was flawed in such a manner that it cannot yet be said whether the project may have a significant impact”); Gerber v. Babbitt, 146 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2001) (court’s review of decision by Service on necessity of EIS involves “evaluating only whether it has taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental impact and documented ‘its determination of “no significant impact” ’ ”); Stewart v. Potts, 126 F.Supp.2d 428, 434 (S.D.Tex.2000), aff'd, 2002 WL 496389 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2002, Table No. 01-40156) (arbitrary and capricious standard very narrow and mandates “judicial deference to conclusions and actions of the agency”; decision by agency need not be ideal so long as not arbitrary and capricious and minimal consideration to the facts in the record must be -given; court’s review of agency’s scientific factfindings “especially deferential”;' “ ‘We must look at the decision not as the chemist, biologist, or statistician that we are qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies *650to certain minimal standards of rationality.’ ”); Brenham Cmty. Protective Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 893 F.Supp. 652, 658-59 (W.D.Tex.1995) (plaintiff bears burden of providing decision to forego producing EIS was arbitrary and capricious; plaintiff carries burden of showing “[defendants had little or no evidence to support their decision to grant assistance without an EIS or Defendants ignored or disregarded a relevant factor in making their decision”). Based on these instructions and parameters, the Court finds the decision not to issue an EIS in this case was not arbitrary and capricious.
In its attempt to show to the contrary, plaintiff contends the record reveals that even the Service did not believe there were not significant impacts from this development. Plaintiff contends the following email supports this assertion:
Leslie [apparently FWS employee Michelle Shaughnessy e-mailed this response to FWS employee Leslie Dierauf, who forwarded same to FWS employee Christina Longacre], here are some responses in the findings document I put together for specific comments on AD 161, this might help your thoughts on the jeopardy issue and recovery issue in the letter. I am still searching for responses on the EIS issue. In a nutshell, you should talk about how these particular caves fit into the conservation strategy for the region. I assume that they are relatively unimportant to the larger scheme and therefore not significant.
AR 1, A44, 493. Handwritten off to the side of the e-mail are notes apparently made by Christina Longacre in which she notes “not ‘not significant,’ just not jeopardy.” The record is not clear to the Court that Christina was referring to significance in terms of the project as a whole thus necessitating an EIS or was jotting down the correct terminology to use in support of FWS’s no jeopardy finding. As set forth in the introduction, the e-mail concerned “comments ... [that] might help your thoughts on the jeopardy issue and recovery issue in the letter.” The writer indicated she was “still searching for responses on the EIS issue.”
Plaintiff next turns its attention to the “applicable factors” discussed by the Fifth Circuit to be used in determining “significance.” The Center argues that FWS’s decision not to prepare an EIS does not comport with six of the ten factors found in the NEPA regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).60 These factors are: ecologically critical area, controversial impacts and unknown risks, precedential nature of action, *651cumulative impacts, destruction of significant scientific resources, and adverse effect on endangered species.
Ecologically Critical Area
Plaintiff contends, that as discussed in the ESA section of its motion, the record plainly shows the karst area at issue is an ecologically critical area and the development may have an adverse impact upon it. Not only is it critical to the endangered invertebrates but also to the Edwards Aquifer.61 In response, defendant points out that plaintiff has failed to substantiate *652this assertion, and moreover, the factors which plaintiff lists in support of its assertion, the threats to the karst invertebrate species, the impact to these species as well as the impact to the water resources and quality, including the Edwards Aquifer, were all considered by the FWS in preparing the EA.62 Although FWS concluded *653these caves were ecologically important, the FWS also concluded the HCP folly mitigated for any significance of impact on the La Cantera property because a greater number of off-site caves of greater or equal value will exist and species in addition to the ones at issue here will be protected at these off-site preserves. Moreover, because three other areas containing these species will exist in the UTSA karst region after development at La Cantera, the significance of the three La Cantera caves is likewise diminished. FWS maintains this finding is consistent with their Handbook which provides:
[A]n HCP that might otherwise require an EIS can be analyzed with an EA, if mitigation measures that would ensure that environmental impacts do not reach the significant level are part of the original project proposal (in this case, part of the HCP) and are enforceable. This type of EA can be used when an HCP would otherwise be expected to have significant environmental impacts but, with mitigation, those impacts can be reduced to less than significant levels. The basis for this type of EA is found at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(b), 1501.4(e)(2), and 1508.9(a)(2).
The Court finds that not only does the Handbook support FWS’s decision but case law does as well. See Tillamook County v. United States Corps of Engineers, No. 01-35922, 2002 WL 745577 at *654*2 (9th Cir. April 29, 2002, to be reported in F.3d 288 F.3d 1140, 1144) (“an agency’s decision to forego preparation of an EIS may be justified, even in the presence of adverse environmental impacts, if the agency adopts mitigation measures in response to identified impacts”). Moreover, plaintiff has failed to meet its burden on this issue. Plaintiff has pointed out that this is an ecologically critical area due to the species and the Edwards Aquifer, but has failed to show that the FWS’s decision to issue the ITP may significantly affect the quality of the human environment or even raised a “substantial” question on this issue. See Indiana Forest Alliance Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., No. NA99-214-C H/G, 2001 WL 912751 at *13 (S.D.Ind. July 5, 2001) (although plaintiff identified certain unique characteristics of the property such as its karst features, plaintiffs did not show Forest Service “unreasonably concluded that the forest openings maintenance project will not significantly affect any of them”; “mere presence of unique features does not require' ... preparation of] an EIS”); Foundation for Global Sustainability Incorporated’s Forest Protection v. McConnell, 839 F.Supp. 147, 154 (W.D.N.C.1993) (although plaintiffs asserted the project would affect the biological corridor, plaintiffs did not offer evidence of what the possible impact would be; plaintiffs admitted they had to raise a substantial question about whether the proposed action would have significant effects on the environment and court found they failed to do so).
Controversial Impacts and Unknown Risks
Plaintiffs next argument focuses on two factors: “[t]he degree to which the effects on -the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial” and “the degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4), (5). Plaintiff argues the objections in the record demonstrate the controversial nature of the proposed action, its impacts, and proposed mitigation, and it is clear there is a controversy over what the effects of this HCP will be.
Again, plaintiff focuses on the comments of Dr. Veni as presenting the “clearest evidence that there is a serious scientific dispute about the effect the development will have on the cave invertebrates and the environment, including groundwater resources.” 63 Plaintiff contends Dr. Veni is the “one person who may be the most *655expert in this field, and that his objections to the facts found in the EA were so strong” an EIS is “needed to come to a sound factual and scientific underpinning for the project.” Plaintiff points to the Administrative Record at AR 1, A45 through A65 for the assertion that “nearly ever [sic] other comment in the record supported the thrust of Dr. Veni’s comments or pointed out other unknowns.” Plaintiff also contends that even FWS shared Dr. Veni’s uncertainties. This contention is based on Cave 184, (which plaintiff latter admitted was resolved according to protocol and therefore withdrew its arguments concerning this Cave in its arguments concerning the ESA, and the Court assumes that withdrawal applies to this issue as well), and uncertainty of species contained in the now capped Cave 3.64 *656Thus, plaintiff argues an EIS is needed not only to resolve the status of these particular sites but also as to the rest of the property based on Dr. Yeni’s comments the property is far more likely to contain more endangered species than indicated. Plaintiff argues the facts of this case are similar to those found in Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir.1982), where the agency “received numerous responses from conservationists, biologists, and other knowledgeable individuals” critical of the EA and its conclusions, and Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1988), where there was “testimony of conservationists, biologists and other experts who were highly critical of the EAs and disputed the Forest Service’s conclusion that there would be no significant effects from logging.” Because the courts in these cases found an EIS must be prepared, plaintiff likewise believes their holdings applicable here.
In response, FWS contends that none of the comments are sufficient to raise a “substantial dispute” because they do not constitute evidence sufficient to “cast[] serious doubt upon the reasonableness of [FWS’s] conclusions.” National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 739 (9th Cir.2001) (quoted by the plaintiff in support of its motion for summary judgment). Although FWS recognizes that controversy is one factor to consider in determining whether an EIS needs to be prepared, the NEPA, however, does not demand scientific unanimity in order to support a FONSI. Here, FWS states it extensively examined the karst features in the development area and relied on three primary geological assessments, whose combined scope covered the entire property.65 Based on the extensive karst surveys of the property, FWS concluded in its assessment of the take that the “likelihood of discovering previously undetected habitat is considered low.” AR 1, A9 at 0105. With respect to Dr. Veni’s August 12 comments, FWS con*657tends it properly declined to find these comments/criticisms sufficient to raise a substantial dispute amounting to a controversy requiring preparation of an EIS. Moreover, Dr. Veni does not indicate in his comments that he actually reviewed the geological assessments on which FWS relied nor are his comments based on a. direct examination or assessment of the La Cantera property. His criticisms flow from his work on a nearby property (Camp Bullís) as compared to FWS’s reb-anee on surveys prepared according to FWS protocol and a thorough examination of the La Cantera property. See AR1, A50 at 0511-14 (Letter dated 30 August 2001 to FWS from SWCA Environmental Consultants addressing Dr. Veni’s comments concerning validity of technical data supporting HCP); AR1, A17 at 0355-64 (Appendix I — Assessment of La Cantera Cave Biota and HCP Preserve Descriptions and Appendix II — Assessment of La Cantera Cave Biota and HCP Preserve Descriptions); AR4, C18 at 2145-76 (Results of Karst Terrain Features Investigations of the La Cantera Property Northern Bexar County, Texas, prepared by SWCA Inc. Environmental Consultants, 4 December 2000).
For purposes of analyzing the highly controversial factor, “controversial” has been defined to mean “a substantial dispute [about] the size, nature, or effect of the major Federal action rather than the existence of opposition to a use.” Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir.1992); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 2337, 144 L.Ed.2d 235 (1999). In cases where courts have required the preparation of an EIS,-the substantial dispute was shown through the number and strength of the opposition. For example, in Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d 1172, 1175 & n. 10 (9th Cir.1982), to which plaintiff cites, “numerous environmentalists responded with vigorous protests” and “[i]n addition to responses from environmentalists and biologists, the Service also received highly critical responses from the California State Department of Natural Resources and the Cabfornia State Department of Fish and Game.” Likewise in Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1988), the Sierra Club “introduced affidavits and testimony of conservationists, biologists, and other experts who were highly critical of the EAs and disputed the Forest Service’s conclusion that there would be no significant effects from logging because the sequoias could be protected and their regeneration enhanced.” Based on this sort of evidence, the court concluded “[t]his is precisely the type of ‘controversial’ action for which an EIS must be prepared.”66 Id.; see National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 736 (9th Cir.2001) (after publication of initial EA and before publication of EA and FONSI, Parks Service received 450 comments on the VMP, approximately 85% were in opposition to one alternative in favor of another; court noted the volume of “negative comment is more than sufficient to meet the ‘outpouring of pubbe protest’ discussed in Greenpeace Action ”), cert. denied, — *658U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 903, 151 L.Ed.2d 872 (2002). Here, the opposition does not rise to the same level.
As set forth in the Public Comment section of FWS’s Findings and Recommendation
The Service published a Notice of Availability of the EA/HCP and Receipt of the Application for an Incidental Take Permit for three karst invertebrates from a Residential and Commercial Development on approximately 1,000 acres in Bexar County, Texas in the Federal Register on July 2, 2001. Publication of the notice initiated a 60-day comment period, which closed on August 31, 2001. Eighteen requests for copies and 12 comment letters were received.
The Findings and Recommendations also reveal, only two commentators stated an EIS should have been, and needs to be, produced for the project. AR1, A3 at 008. Moreover, plaintiff can only point to one expert who disagreed/criticized the findings by FWS, and FWS responded to those comments and provided information supporting its contentions to the contrary.67 Given that this Court is bound by the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, it cannot find FWS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in determining the comments to the EA/HCP did not create a controversy or show unknown risks necessitating the preparation of an EIS. See Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir.1992) (recognizing previous decision upholding FWS’s decision not to prepare EIS with issuance of ITP because “NEPA does not require that we decide whether an [environmental assessment] is based on the best scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve disagreements among various scientists as to methodology”); Surfrider Found. v. Dalton, 989 F.Supp. 1309, 1322-23 (S.D.Cal.1998) (eleven comments to draft EA received, only 4 objections; agency not required to prepare EIS because it answered the comments, made changes and satisfied many of the concerns; court noted previous case suggested an “EIS is not required when an agency makes a good faith effort to satisfy the concerns of commentators, and, to at least some extent, succeeds”); see also Indiana Forest Alliance Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., Inc., No. NA 99-214-C H/G, 2001 WL 912751 at *11 (S.D.Ind. July 5, 2001) (requirements of NEPA found fulfilled where agency considered in the EA the issues raised but rejected same; agency given substantial discretion “in choosing how to analyze possible environmental effects”).
Precedential Nature of Action
Section 1508.27(b) also provides for consideration of the “degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions with significant effects or represents a decision in principle about a future consideration.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(6). Based on a comment contained in an email that this HCP is the basis for those to come in Bexar County, plaintiff contends this HCP satisfies the criteria for this factor.68 In response, FWS states this comment could just as easily be construed *659as meaning FWS personnel on similar projects would be able to avoid “starting from scratch.” Plaintiff maintains that an EIS in this ease would “go a long way to determine what this HCP of first impression should contain and what its effects will be, as it will be modeled in the future.”
The purpose of section 1508.27(b)(6) is “to avoid the thoughtless setting in motion of a ‘chain of bureaucratic commitment’ that will become progressively harder to undo the longer it continues.” Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1162-63 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 879 (1st Cir.1985)). As stated by the FWS in its Findings and Recommendations, it did not believe the La Cantera project warranted an EIS based on the precedent factor because even though the permit was “setting a precedent for future permits in Bexar County regarding the nine endangered Bexar County invertebrates, it is not dissimilar from permits issued in Travis and Williamson counties for endangered karst invertebrates.” Thus, this Court is unwilling, based on one comment, to find FWS was required to prepare an EIS based on precedent. Presidio Golf Club, 155 F.3d at 1163 (although Club theorized that because clubhouse was first new construction in the Presidio it would establish a precedent for what constitutes a sufficient EA, the project was a unique and independent project and did not serve to establish precedent; court found Club failed to show similar or related projects being contemplated); Surfrider Found. v. Dalton, 989 F.Supp. 1309, 1325 (S.D.Cal.1998) (not only did plaintiff fail to develop an argument on this factor, EA in that case site-specific, and there was no indication that judicial refusal “to force the agency to complete an EIS in this project [would] enable the USMC to ratify future projects without complete adherence to NEPA”; thus no cause for preparation of EIS).
Cumulative Impacts
As set forth by the court in Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir.1998):
A cumulative impact on the environment “results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions_” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. Cumulative impacts may result from “individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” In determining whether a project will have a “significant” impact on the environment, an agency must consider “[w]hether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). If several actions have a cumulative environmental effect, “this consequence must be considered in an EIS.”
Plaintiff believes an EIS must be prepared in this case for two reasons: (1) statements in the EA/HCP recognize that the property lies within a portion of the City of San Antonio that is being increasingly developed by commercial and residential growth which will add to water demand and an increased burden on the Edwards Aquifer Authority and SAWS to meet this demand without jeopardizing the endangered Edwards Aquifer-dependent species;69 and (2) the cumulative effects *660section contained in the EA/HCP is made-quate.70 Plaintiff contends the EPA com-*661merited on the cumulative effects analysis regarding water resources71 and even FWS appeared to believe there may be significant cumulative impacts.72
In response, FWS contends plaintiff failed to substantiate its claim by failing to offer evidence of allegedly significant cumulative impacts that were overlooked or any deficiency in the analysis that was provided. The mere fact that FWS recognized the development would add to the overall demand for water resources and increase the burden on SAWS to provide water without jeopardizing the endangered Edwards Aquifer-dependent species does not amount to a finding of significance which would require an EIS. FWS maintains it provided a sufficiently thorough analysis of cumulative impacts and found the issuance of the ITP in conjunction with other actions would not have a significant impact. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff had the burden to show this Court “exactly how the [FWS’s] decision-making was flawed.” Hoosier Envtl. Council v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 105 F.Supp.2d 953, 981 (S.D.Ind.2000). Although the EA did not make elaborate findings, the Court has not been pointed to anything in the record to suggest a need for a more extensive analysis. Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir.1995). Although plaintiff questions the extent of the cumulative impacts considered by the FWS, plaintiff has not pointed to any facts in the record which demonstrate an abuse of discretion or an arbitrary and capricious decision. Hoosier Envt’l, 105 F.Supp.2d at 981 (instead of meeting burden of showing how agency’s decision flawed, plaintiffs merely questioned extent of cumulative impacts considered and failed to show agency abused its discretion).
*662 Destruction of Significant Scientific Resources
Plaintiff next asserts pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7), an EIS is required for projects that cause the “destruction of significant scientific ... resources.” It appears plaintiff meant to refer to § 1508.27(b)(8) for this proposition because that section requires consideration of “the degree to which the action may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific ... resources.” Again relying on Dr. Veni’s expertise, plaintiff supports this argument with the following administrative record reference in which Dr. Veni, in his August 12 comments, states the proposed HOP does not meet recovery plan standards:
This standard [the recovery plan for the related Austin species requiring all karst fauna areas within a region to be protected if fewer than three exist] was established for the endangered cave ecosystems and not just the individually listed species. In doing so, it prevents the need to list other species that may be even rarer than those listed. An excellent example of this occurs at La Cantera Cave No. 1 and La Cantera Cave No. 2. Both caves contain the rare troglobitic earwig-like Mixojapyx species. It is known from only four other caves in Bexar County, only one cave each from Comal, Kimble, Menard, and Travis counties, and is probably a complex of related but separate species (Veni and Reddell, 1999). The occurrence of Mixojapyx in the La Cantera caves is their only known-occurrence in the UTSA KFR and none of the KFAs proposed in the HCP are known to contain that rare species of concern.
AR1, A69 at 639-40. Plaintiff maintains, without authority however, that although these species may not receive, protection under the ESA, an EIS is required to study the effect the La Cantera development would have on the development of that species because “such a large percentage of its existing population would be destroyed by the development.”
FWS in response asks this Court to show deference to its judgment that through the conservation preserves, the project is expected to provide conservation benefits to the Bexar County endangered karst invertebrates. Plaintiffs conclusory statement that the earwig-like Mixojapyx species is a significant scientific resource that will be destroyed does not show FWS was arbitrary and capricious in its determination. Because of the standard of review the Court must apply in this case and because plaintiff has failed to provide any authority for its argument, the Court will give deference to the FWS’s decision on this factor as well.
Adverse Effect on Endangered Species
In its final argument, plaintiff states, relying on its previous discussion in the motion and without reference to authority or the record, that “it is indisputable that the action ‘may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species’ ” thus requiring the preparation of an EIS even if the development would not “jeopardize” the species for purposes of the ESA. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(9). FWS believes it properly evaluated the degree to which the issuance of the ITP would adversely affect an endangered or threatened species and determined that the project is expected to provide conservation benefits to the Bexar County endangered karst invertebrates citing AR 1, A9 at 0110. Because its exercise of judgment was rational, FWS claims its determination that there no are significant impacts requiring the preparation of an EIS was not arbitrary or capricious.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(9) requires the assessment of the “degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered *663or threatened species.” The record supports FWS’s assertion that it assessed the degree to which the ground beetles and spider would be adversely affected and determined there would be “no significant impact” because of the on and off-site mitigation areas/preserves. Although plaintiff disagrees with this analysis, the Center has not brought forth evidence that this decision was arbitrary or capricious.
Accordingly, in reviewing FWS’s decision under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, this Court finds FWS has in fact taken a “hard look” at the effects of the proposed development and the record supports the finding that FWS has discharged its obligation in performing a thorough environmental analysis before concluding “no significant impact” exists pursuant to the NEPA. In addition, the record also supports a finding that impact, if any, was reduced to a minimum by the mitigation procedures implemented in the EA/HCP. Therefore, FWS was not required to prepare an EIS. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1283 (S.D.Ala.1998) (listing criteria for consideration of decision not to issue EIS was arbitrary or capricious).
Orders of the Court
The disposition of the pending motions is as follows:
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (docket #27) is DENIED.
2. La Cantera Development Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 29) is GRANTED.
3. Defendant United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 30) is GRANTED.
4. Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction still remain as pending on the Court’s docket but were orally DENIED at the hearing held on January 17, 2002.
It is further ORDERED that defendant-intervenor La Cantera and its successors shall prepare and submit an annual report to this Court and FWS setting forth what La Cantera and its successors have done to fulfill its responsibility to maintain the habitat set aside pursuant to the Incidental Take Permit. The report shall be filed on or about April 22 each year. FWS shall exercise due diligence in follow through inspection of the set aside properties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Final Parameter: Be Careful For What Is Asked
The dedicated employees of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service did their best to strike a reasonable balance between the mammon worshipers and the least of those among the species, notwithstanding the penurious resources we give Fish and Wildlife Service to safeguard us from ourselves. To the extent the Center for Biological Diversity would prefer more protection, the law and standard of review which the Court is bound to apply are on the side of the developers and shoppers. Counsel for La Cantera hit a stand-up triple and the real estate magnates are winning thus far. But
Mother Nature bats last.
She is a jealous manager of her players.
It is the top of the eighth.