*106OPINION
Appellant, Carol Musi, was tried before a jury for the shooting death of her husband, a Philadelphia police officer, and was found guilty of murder of the third degree.1 In this direct appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed upon the verdict, appellant cites three alleged instances of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and one assertion of trial error.2 After consideration of these claims we are satisfied that they are without merit and affirm the judgment of sentence.
On July 28, 1976, appellant was serving at the bar where she was employed. At approximately 3:00 p. m., she began drinking and continued until 6:00 p. ,m. At 6:15 p. m., the deceased arrived and joined appellant and they drank together until 8:00 p. m. After leaving appellant’s place of employment, the couple proceeded to another bar and stayed until 11:00 p. m. Upon leaving for home, an argument erupted between the two which required the intervention of the police. When they arrived home, the deceased removed some of his clothing and personal effects and entered a pickup truck which was parked nearby. Later, appellant emerged from the house and proceeded to the truck in which her husband was seated, and the argument resumed. Appellant then left the truck and re-entered the house, only to return within a short period of time carrying a rifle. She approached the truck, raised the rifle to her shoulder and shot her husband through the open window of the truck. There was also testimony that appellant had threatened the deceased on the night in question and on previous occasions.
*107Appellant testified that she believed the gun was not loaded, and that she was merely attempting to frighten her husband into returning to their house when she placed the rifle through the open truck window. She maintained that the rifle discharged only because her husband grabbed it while she was holding it.
It is by now axiomatic that the test for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether the record supports a conclusion that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interest. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). In making this assessment we are not to employ a hindsight evaluation to determine whether other alternatives may have been more reasonable, Washington v. Maroney, supra, but whether there was a reasonable basis for the course of action actually selected. Commonwealth v. Hosack, 485 Pa. 128, 401 A.2d 327 (1979); Commonwealth v. O’Neal Weathers El, 485 Pa. 28, 400 A.2d 1295 (1979); Commonwealth v. Treftz, 485 Pa. 297, 401 A.2d 1325 (1979); Commonwealth v. Williams, 485 Pa. 137, 401 A.2d 331 (1979); Commonwealth v. Tome, 484 Pa. 261, 398 A.2d 1369, 1371-72 (1979); Commonwealth v. Betrand, 484 Pa. 511, 399 A.2d 682 (1979); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 484 Pa. 188, 398 A.2d 1007 (1979); Commonwealth v. Ray, 483 Pa. 377, 396 A.2d 1218 (1979); Commonwealth v. Yocham, 483 Pa. 478, 397 A.2d 766 (1979); Commonwealth v. Chumley, 482 Pa. 625, 394 A.2d 497 (1978); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 482 Pa. 581, 394 A.2d 474 (1978); Commonwealth v. Sisco, 482 Pa. 459, 393 A.2d 1197 (1978). If a reasonable basis for counsel’s trial strategy decision exists, that decision is imputed to the client. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 450 Pa. 273, 299 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923, 93 S.Ct. 2745, 37 L.Ed.2d 150 (1973). Moreover, the fact that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is entertained in a direct appeal, rather than in a collateral attack upon a judgment of sentence,3 does not relieve the *108party asserting the claim of providing a record which will support the contention.4
Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to request that the jury be instructed as to homicide by misadventure. If there was evidence in the record that would support a jury finding of an accidental excusable killing, the defense would certainly be entitled to such a charge, Commonwealth v. Beach, 438 Pa. 37, 264 A.2d 712 (1970), and the failure to make such a request would cast serious question upon the quality of representation given by counsel. The difficulty with appellant’s argument in this case is that accepting the version of the facts most favorable to her position they would not constitute a homicide of misadventure.
In Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 156-157, 200 A. 632, 637-638 (1938), we defined an accidental killing which would relieve the actor of the criminal responsibility for the death as being:
the accidental killing of another, where the slayer is doing a lawful act, unaccompanied by any criminally careless or reckless conduct. “Three elements enter into the defense of excusable homicide by misadventure: (1) The act resulting in death must be a lawful one; (2) It must be done with reasonable care and due regard for the lives and persons of others; and (3) The killing must be accidental and not intentional, or without unlawful intent, *109or without evil design or intention on the part of the slayer. All these elements must concur and the absence of any one of them will involve in guilt. Even though the homicide is unintentional, it is not excusable where it is the result or incident of an unlawful act, such as pointing or presenting a gun, pistol or other firearm at another person in such a manner as to constitute an offense under the laws of the state, or unlawfully striking another with an intent to hurt, although not with an intent to kill, or driving an automobile at an unlawful rate of speed”, (citations omitted).
The defense’s version at trial was that appellant raised the rifle to her shoulder and pointed it at the decedent in order to “scare the hell out of him”. Claiming that she thought the rifle was unloaded, she aimed it at the decedent and said, “Now get the f___in the house before you wreck our lives” and that the decedent struck the weapon causing it to discharge. Thus appellant concedes that the killing occurred while she was committing the act of pointing the rifle at the victim. The law of this jurisdiction is clear that it is unlawful to point a firearm at another, whether loaded or unloaded. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 464 Pa. 292, 346 A.2d 746 (1975). Commonwealth v. Chruscial, 447 Pa. 17, 288 A.2d 521 (1972) (pointing a firearm at another human being, even to scare, is not a lawful act in Pennsylvania).5 Appellant stresses the fact that she was under the impression that the weapon was unloaded. While this fact, if believed, would support the premise that the killing was unintentional, that alone does not satisfy a finding that it was an excusable homicide. As noted in Commonwealth v. Flax, supra, “even though the homicide is unintentional, it is not excusable where it is the result or incident of an unlawful act . . . ” Id. 331 Pa. at 157, 200 A.2d at 638.
*110Therefore, since the testimony did not warrant a charge as to homicide by misadventure, defense counsel’s failure to request such a charge is obviously not a basis for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 482 Pa. 350, 393 A.2d 1141 (1978); Commonwealth v. Gray, 473 Pa. 424, 374 A.2d 1285 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). Where a claim is not meritorious it is not ineffective assistance not to pursue it.
Appellant also challenges trial counsel’s failure to seek a charge to the jury on involuntary manslaughter. A review of the testimony offered in the case would suggest there did exist rational basis for a verdict of involuntary manslaughter. Thus either under the theory of Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 378 A.2d 1189 (1977) or Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977), a trial judge would have been required to give the requested charge in this case, if he had been requested to do so. We therefore must look to see if there was any trial strategy, designed to effectuate the best interest of the client, that might move a trial counsel in the instant situation not to make such a request.6
We have already noted, accepting the version of the facts most favorable to the defense, the appellant was at least guilty of reckless or grossly negligent conduct which was the legal cause of the death. In the charge given by the court, the jury’s alternatives were confined to either finding a malicious killing (i. e., murder), an intentional killing resulting from provocation and passion or an acquittal. Thus if the jury had accepted the version of the defense, it could properly have returned a verdict of not guilty. If, however, trial counsel had sought and obtained a charge as to involuntary manslaughter, the option of an outright ac*111quittal on this record would have been eliminated.7 In view of the presence of this legitimate reason for electing not to request a charge that would virtually end all hope of an acquittal, we cannot conclude as urged by appellant that counsel’s decision was without a reasonable basis to effectuate his client’s best interests. Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 449 Pa. 584, 297 A.2d 456 (1972).8
The final claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is based upon his failure to raise in post-verdict motions the legality of the search of appellant’s premises and the subsequent seizure of a .22 calibre rifle. This issue must be considered in two steps, whether there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and then it must be determined whether the execution of the search warrant was proper. Addressing first the adequacy of the affidavit supporting the warrant, appellant argues that the search was premised upon “double hearsay” and thus invalid. The affidavit set forth that an eyewitness to the shooting told one of the investigating detectives at the scene that appellant re-entered the house with the rifle. That officer, rather than leaving the scene, called this information to a fellow officer who completed the paper work and secured the warrant. Appellant argues that we condemned this type of double hearsay in Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972) and should hold that the rifle obtained pursuant to a search authorized in this manner must be suppressed.
It is apparent that appellant has misconstrued the language of our opinion in Garvin. In Garvin, we stated:
*112The pertinent testimony in the instant case revealed that Officer Covotta of the Philadelphia Police Department received a telephone call at approximately 2:40 P.M. on September 4, 1969. The call was from an informant who was known to the officer and who had supplied him with information during the past five years leading to six arrests and six convictions. However, with regard to this particular call, the record is contradictory and inadequate as to what portion of the information had been obtained by the informant’s personal observation, if any, and what portion had been received by the informant from a third person who sought anonymity to avoid retaliation. The requirement of a determination of the trustworthiness of the source of the information cannot be met solely because it is channelled through an informant known to be reliable. While it may properly be assumed that the informant passed upon the reliability of the third person supplying the information to him, the law makes it most clear that it is not his judgment to make. As the Supreme Court in Aguilar, supra, did not permit the officers to make the determination for the issuing authority we cannot permit the officer in a warrantless arrest to delegate his responsibility to the informant. To accept without question the messages of alleged eyewitnesses relayed through informants would be to totally disregard the Supreme Court’s mandates. From the information received in the phone conversation, the officer was only aware that an unknown third person, who allegedly witnessed some portion of the robbery, identified one of the two participants as a man who was then walking on a particular street two blocks from the district at the time of the call. When the officer arrived at the specified location there was nothing about the behavior of the appellant which would have furnished a basis for taking him into custody, and even though the record indicated the officer had been furnished with an identification by the victims, there is no testimony to suggest that he considered this information when he approached the appellant. On this record we find that the *113arrest of the appellant was illegal. Id., 448 Pa. at 263-64, 293 A.2d at 36 (italics added).
Appellant extracts only the italicized portion of the quote and ignores the context in which these comments were made. In Garvin, we were confronted with information based upon double hearsay when it reached police officials. We expressly pointed to the fact that the evil in such a case was that there was no basis for the police to assess the reliability of the initial source of the information. Here a police officer received the information directly from an eyewitness to the event. Therefore, there is no question as to how the information was obtained by the witness nor can there be any serious challenge here to that witness’s reliability.9 Thus, to reach appellant’s position we would be required to find that police officials could not rely upon information relayed to them by other members of the department during the performance of their duties. Such a rule would not only unduly hamper police administration but would serve no useful purpose in assuring the reliability of the information acted upon.
The concept of evaluating the police operation as a collective function as opposed to an individual one is not new. For instance, we have held that it is unnecessary for an arresting officer to have knowledge of the information which supported the probable cause of a warrantless arrest, provided that the officer issuing the order to arrest had sufficient information to act. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 566-567, 297 A.2d 794, 796 (1972). See also Commonwealth v. Whitson, 461 Pa. 101, 334 A.2d 653 (1975). Here, the officer supplying the information for the affidavit possessed the requisite information to satisfy the probable cause requirements. The fact that he delegated the responsibility of placing this information in affidavit form and the securing of the warrant from the issuing authority is of no consequence, where the affidavit accurately reflects the *114information possessed by the officer and that information satisfies the probable cause requirement.
Having concluded that the affidavit did set forth probable cause for the search and did provide sufficient information upon which an issuing authority could find the reliability of the source of that information, it cannot be successfully maintained that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the issue. A finding of ineffectiveness cannot be premised upon counsells failure to pursue and preserve an obviously meritless issue. Commonwealth v. Martin, 479 Pa. 63, 68, 387 A.2d 835 (1979); Commonwealth v. Smith, 478 Pa. 76, 80, 385 A.2d 1320 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, supra, and cases cited therein.
The second aspect of this argument, relates to the manner in which the warrant was executed. A copy of the warrant and affidavit was not served upon either appellant, the alleged possessor of the item seized, or the persons upon the premises at the time of the search.10 The suppression court initially found that Pa.R.Crim.P. 2008(a)11 had been violated and entered an order suppressing the introduction of the rifle at trial. After a petition by the Commonwealth to reconsider the suppression court reversed its original order and held that although there had been a rule 2008(a) violation, this fact did not require that the fruits of the search to .be suppressed.
*115Thus, framed in an ineffective assistance claim perspective the issue presented is whether counsel should have pursued the question on post-verdict motions. Normally, a resolution of the issue so framed would be dependent upon a determination as to whether the question constituted an arguable issue and whether there existed strategy that would justify abandoning it, rather than a determination as to the ultimate validity of the proposition. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, supra. However, since the question presented is of importance and has yet to be considered by this Court, see Commonwealth v. Walls, 255 Pa.Super. 1, 386 A.2d 105 (1978), and the record before us is one which is sufficient for us to make a decision upon the merits of the contention, we are satisfied that it is appropriate that we do so. If we were to limit the inquiry as to whether counsel was ineffective in abandoning this argument and determined that he was, the remedy in the first instance would not be the award of a new trial but rather the allowance of an opportunity for the question to be decided upon its merits. Restated, if appellant prevailed in her ineffective assistance claim, that fact would merely provide her with a basis for avoiding a waiver of the issue; the ultimate relief she seeks — a retrial and a suppression of the rifle — would be dependent upon a final determination on the merits of the claim. We are satisfied that in such a posture it is jurisprudentially sound to reach the merits of the question as to whether the rule 2008(a) violation required the suppression of the fruits of the search in this case.
A rule of exclusion is properly employed where the objection goes to the question of the reliability of the challenged evidence, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Commonwealth v. Sexton, 485 Pa. 17, 400 A.2d 1289 (1979), or reflects intolerable government conduct which is widespread and cannot otherwise be controlled. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (decided June 5, 1979); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 *116L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).12 Experience does not suggest there has been such a widespread and flagrant abuse of rule 2008(a) that would require the fashioning of a per se exclusionary rule for its violation. See e. g. Mapp v. Ohio, supra. Therefore, the imposition of a sanction requiring the exclusion of evidence that results from a search where there has not been compliance with the rule must depend upon the relationship of the violation to the reliability of the evidence seized. Here, there was probable cause for the entry and search and there is no dispute that the rifle was in fact found on the premises described in the warrant and seized pursuant to that search. Thus, appellant’s rights were not prejudiced by the officer’s failure to fully comply with the mandates of the rule.
Federal cases interpreting a comparable rule of criminal procedure, see Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, have concluded that although important, the procedures required for execution and return of the warrant are ministerial and that irregularities should not void an otherwise valid search absent a showing of prejudice. See e. g. U. S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); U. S. v. McKenzie, 446 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971); U. S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956) cert. denied 351 U.S. 924, 76 S.Ct. 781, 100 L.Ed. 1454. We accept the wisdom of this approach and hold that where, as here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced from the violation of this rule a request to suppress the fruits of the search is not justified. See also State v. Stachler, 570 P.2d 1323 (Hawaii 1977); see generally State v. Cymerman, 135 N.J.Super. 591, 343 A.2d 825 (1975).
*117The last issue, which we will treat as properly preserved for review,13 is the trial court’s failure in admitting testimony regarding the violent character of the decedent. This argument is based upon our decisions in Commonwealth v. Scott, 480 Pa. 50, 389 A.2d 79 (1979) and Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 336 A.2d 282 (1975). The theory of the Scott and Stewart cases was that where an accused is attempting to negate an inference of malice by asserting a motivation of fear or panic, this type of evidence is relevant to establish the basis for the fear or panic. In this case, by her version of the occurrence, apellant was not in fear of an assault by the deceased, but rather emerged from the safety of her home, with the rifle, for the purpose of scaring the deceased and forcing him to return to their home. Even at the moment of the firing appellant does not charge that she fired in fear or panic but rather asserted that it was accidental. It is therefore apparent that Scott-Stewart rationale was inapplicable and the trial court was correct in ruling that the proffered testimony was irrelevant.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
O’BRIEN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
LARSEN, J., agrees with the opinion and joins therein except that he would find that the final issue was also waived.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.