Manuel Plaisance, Louisiana prisoner # 196480, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), filed a complaint in the district court arguing that 23 prison offi*567cials retaliated against him for filing an administrative grievance. The district court dismissed Plaisance’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Plaisance now moves, pursuant to Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197 (5th Cir.1997), for leave to proceed IFP following the district court’s order denying IFP and certifying that his appeal is not taken in good faith.
Louisiana provides a two-step administrative remedy procedure for inmates, which they must use before filing suit in district court. La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. 1, § 325(A). Plaisance does not dispute that he failed to file a second-step grievance, but he argues that he did not do so because he was unaware that he was required to complete both steps of the process before filing suit. Plaisance’s ignorance of the law, however, does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with procedural requirements. See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.1999) (“[I]gnorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.” (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the exhaustion required under § 1997e is “proper exhaustion” and that this standard is not met “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“We hold that the proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.”).
Plaisance also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice. This issue “involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Plaisance’s appeal is not entirely frivolous, Plaisance is entitled to proceed IFP on appeal, and his motion for IFP is granted. We may, however, address the merits of Plaisance’s claims at the same time as resolving the IFP issue if it is expedient to do so. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 201-02 (“We are mindful that occasionally we have blurred the distinction between motions to proceed IFP and appeals on the merits.... Legitimate values, such as concerns for judicial economy and prudence, justified the melding of the decisions.” (footnote omitted)).
Plaisance argues that the district court should have dismissed his complaint without prejudice to allow him to exhaust his administrative remedies. We agree. See Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 359 (5th Cir.2001). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed as modified to reflect a dismissal without prejudice of Plaisance’s complaint.
IFP GRANTED; AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.