OPINION OF THE COURT
This appeal arises because of the discharge of two employees of petitioner, the Hugh H. Wilson Corporation, a manufacturer of hair curlers and bobby pins in Sunbury, Pennsylvania, after they had engaged in certain activities in response to the employer’s announcement that instead of making contributions to the corporation’s profit-sharing plan for the prior year 1966, the profits would be used for the purchase of new machinery and equipment. The -employees, claiming they were discharged for engaging in protected concerted activities in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
Following several days of hearings, the trial examiner, in a well-reasoned *1347and well-documented decision,1 approved by the Board,2 upheld the unfair labor practice charges and ordered
(a) the reinstatement of one of the employees, Moll,
(b) certain payments to the estate of the other employee, Gibson,3 and
(c) other affirmative action by the employer.
The petitioner-corporation seeks to set aside the Board order approving the decision of the trial examiner, contending, inter alia, that the employees were properly fired for cause and that they had not been engaged in concerted activities but rather had “acted individually and independently * * * reflecting solely their own views.” (Petitioner’s brief, p. 6). The Board has countered with a request for enforcement of its order.
It does not appear to be disputed that the subject matter of the discharged employees’ protest, the company’s profit-sharing plan, concerns a term or condition of employment. Nor is it contended that the activities of the employees, if concerted, were unlawful.
The trial examiner’s decision adopted by the Board held that the petitioner was guilty of an unfair labor practice for interfering with employee conduct found to be concerted activity under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act which provides, in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right * * * to engage in * * * concerted activities * * * for the purpose of * * * mutual aid and protection. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157.4
The lines defining this right have of necessity been painted with broad strokes. To protect concerted activities in full bloom, protection must necessarily be extended to “intended, contemplated or even referred to” group action, Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir.1964), discussed further infra, lest employer retaliation destroy the bud of employee initiative aimed at bettering terms of employment and working conditions.
The mantle of protection of concerted activities, the various circuit courts have held,5 extends to both union and nonunion employees.6
Section 7 of the Act is designed to guarantee to employees the fundamental right to present grievances to their employer to secure better terms and conditions of employment, even if *1348the presentation of a grievance requires a work stoppage: NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 8 L.Ed.2d 298 (1962); NLRB v. Serv-Air, Inc., 401 F.2d 363 (10th Cir.1968).
Although a single employees’s encouragement of individual fellow workers to present grievances has not been protected, Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.1967); Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, supra; Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir.1959); Union Carbide Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 69 LRRM 1086 (1968), a single employee attempting to induce fellow workers to join in a petition regarding a common grievance is protected, Salt River Valley Users’ Ass’n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, supra, as is the right of an individual employee presenting grievances on behalf of others, NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.1960). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, applying the Third Circuit test set out in Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, supra, held that a single nonunion employee’s verbal support of a threatened strike by the union was protected and that the employee’s discharge by the employer was an interference with his § 7 rights. Signal Oil and Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1968). In Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir.1969), the court said:
* * * The activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much “concerted activity” as is ordinary group activity. The one seldom exists without the other.
“Mere griping” about a condition of employment is not protected, but when the “griping” coalesces with expression inclined to produce group or representative action, the statute protects the activity: Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, supra. The stimulus which caused the coalescence of a grievance and concert of action may, of course, be initiated by the employee, but the coalescence may also be triggered by an action of or a failure to act by management.
In NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., supra, several employees had complained individually to management about the lack of heat in the plant. Management failed to remedy the situation. On an especially cold morning, several employees thought it was too cold to work. After a brief discussion among themselves, and without notifying any member of management who might be able to effect a remedy, the employees, in unison, walked out of the plant. Those who walked out were discharged. The walkout, the only concerted activity, was in response to a situation which management had failed to remedy; it was held by the Supreme Court to be protected under the Act.
In Modern Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 925 (8th Cir.1952), the protected activity was a refusal to go back to work. Indeed, the suggestion that the employees leave the premises came from the employer:7
The concerted activities involved were prompted by the employer’s fail*1349ure at Christmas-time in 1949 to pay an employees’ bonus, as had been done during a number of preceding years. On the morning following the Christmas holiday, eleven of the employees in the employer’s shop insisted upon an opportunity to discuss the matter with the president of the Company. Two of their number acted as spokesmen for the group. The president declared that the Company could not afford to pay a bonus that year and directed all of them either to go back to work or leave the premises. The two spokesmen replied that they felt that they were entitled to seek legal advice. They left the shop and went downtown to find and consult with a lawyer. They suggested to the other nine that they not go back to work until their return. When the president came out into the shop a few minutes later and learned that the two spokesmen had left the premises, he announced that they were fired and ordered the rest to “go to work or get your tools and leave the building.” All of the nine, except one, returned to their jobs. * * * When the two spokesmen came back * * * [an three were fired. The Board’s order, including reinstatement and back pay for the three discharged employees, was enforced.] 198 F.2d 925-926.
The cohesiveness of the concerted activity need not be more than the suggestion of group action. In fact, the existence of a “group” need not be communicated to management, as asserted by petitioner in its brief (p. 39).8 The Sixth Circuit has stated that, “the mere fact that the * * * [employees] did not formally choose a spokesman or that they did not go together to see * * * [management’s representative] does not negative concert of action. It is sufficient to constitute concert of action if from all of the facts and circumstances in the case a reasonable inference can be drawn that the men involved considered that they had a grievance * * *." NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., supra at 12.9
The grievance in Guernsey involved the appointment of Larry Miller, a son-in-law of a company executive, as foreman. His father-in-law announced the appointment to some of the employees as follows: “Now, Larry don’t know a damn thing about it, but he is going to be your foreman.” The other employees, who felt that one of their own number would be more qualified for the supervisory post, discussed the problem among themselves, and at various times each man in the crew went individually to complain to a management representative. The company’s general manager *1350was “damned unhappy” about the complaints of the employees so he fired one of them for “cause.” This was held to be an unfair labor practice. Even though the employees had not communicated that a “group” had existed, and management may have inferred that it was dealing with individual gripes, the consensus of the affected, unhappy employees was sufficient to support a finding that the activity was in concert and, therefore, protected.
In short, the law recognizes that employees have a legitimate interest in “acting concertedly to make their views known to management without being discharged for that interest.” NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845, 69 S.Ct. 68, 93 L.Ed. 395 (1948); NLRB v. City Yellow Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575, 582 (6th Cir.1965).
As stated briefly in the opening part of the opinion, the events in this appeal began when the petitioner informed its employees that it was going to retool and invest in equipment and supplies so there would be little, if any, money payable as a contribution to the profit-sharing plan for the year 1966. This news was conveyed to the employees who are the subject of the unfair labor practice charge, as well as to others, by Bruce Minnier, tool room foreman. He had been instructed by management that when he distributed the profit sharing statements he was to make sure to get “across to the employees why there wasn’t a contribution made.” (App. 116.)
When Minnier spoke to tool room employees Moll and Gibson individually, they both complained (App. 66-67, 147-148, 164). In the presence of some other employees, Gibson loudly announced his dissatisfaction10 to maintenance supervisor James Howard as the latter walked through the machine shop (App. 147-148, 152). Howard tried to explain to Gibson the reason for the company’s action (Id.) Howard later reported the incident to Gibson’s direct supervisor, Minnier (App. 181).
When some of the employees complained individually to Minnier about the profit-sharing plan, he told them there would be a meeting later in the afternoon to discuss “the whys and wherefores of the contribution this year.” (App. 164). There is some disagreement between the parties as to whether Minnier decided to hold the meeting because of the complaints, or whether he had been initially instructed even before handing out the profit-sharing statements to hold a meeting, or whether his instructions were to have a meeting if it became necessary to do so in order to explain the company’s action. (See NLRB brief, p. 3; petitioner’s brief, p. 3 n. 1.) We do not believe this factual issue is crucial. Even if management had decided to call the meeting in the first place, the protests about the profit-sharing plan which preceded and followed it, and the questions raised and suggestions made at the meeting, are sufficient in our view to fit in the mold of “group action,” which is considered to be an element of concerted activities under § 7: Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 685.
At the meeting Minnier again explained why there was to be little or no contribution to the profit-sharing plan. After Minnier made his remarks, he solicited comments from those present. One employee, William Yoxheimer, expressed suspicion at the petitioner’s failure to provide the employees with a copy of the profit-sharing plan and suggested that the company do so (App. 71, 165). *1351Gibson concurred in this suggestion (App. 72-73). Another employee, Russell Haas, urged that the company make some contribution to the profit-sharing plan even if most of the profits were invested back into the company (App. 71, 165). Gibson and Moll expressed concurrence in this suggestion (App. 72, 208). Minnier’s response to these points was “to have faith in the company.” (App. 72).
Minnier then reported the events of the meeting to his superiors who, in turn, informed the president of petitioner-company, Miss Mary Pich (App. 116-118). When she was told that Gibson and Moll, while complaining about the profit-sharing plan, had made derogatory remarks about the company, President Pich asked to see their personnel files. In examining the files she discovered some adverse information about both employees.11 Miss Pich then talked to counsel for the company and, after describing the situation, she was advised to dismiss Moll and Gibson (App. 134-135).12
The following morning, June 19, 1967, before the men were fired, employee Yoxheimer brought to the plant a clip-ping from the help wanted column of the local newspaper. It was an advertisement for a secretary which told about the company’s “excellent benefits including an outstanding profit-sharing plan.” Yoxheimer handed the clipping to Moll, who, in turn, handed it to Minnier, stating, “I’m going to put this with my profit-sharing statement so when I get in the office again and they bring up the profit-sharing plan up, why, I’ll have it to show to Miss Lane [the personnel director].” (App. 91, 170.)13 After reading the clipping, Minnier went directly to the personnel office (App. 77), As he did, Gibson came over to Moll and said, “Isn’t that something.” (App. 76-78).
At the end of the day, on June 19, 1967, Moll was fired. In a meeting held in the personnel office Minnier said to him, “Bill * * * since you are no longer satisfied here we are going to let you go.” (App. 80, 171.)
Gibson was next. When he came to the personnel office, Minnier said, “Ed, we’ve been reviewing your feelings and since you aren’t happy with the company we decided to leave you go.” (App. 182.)14
*1352Prior to their discharge on June 19, 1967, Moll had worked for the company for over 7 years and Gibson for 3½ years. Each had received periodic raises and had on occasion been complimented for his work (App. 82-83, 100, 125, 131-133, 196-200).
The day following the discharge of Moll and Gibson, the company called a special meeting of the other employees and informed them that the dismissals were due to the poor attitude and work performance of Moll and Gibson, and had nothing to do with their complaints about the profit-sharing plan. (App. 119-120.)
We conclude upon an examination of the record that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the trial examiner that Moll and Gibson were discharged because of their activities in response to the profit-sharing announcement.15 It may be that neither was an ideal16 or even acceptable employee, but the policy and protection provided by the National Labor Relations Act does not allow the employer to substitute “good” reasons for “real” reasons when the purpose of the discharge is to retaliate for an employee’s concerted activities. It is clear that the “real” stimulus for the discharges here was each employee’s conduct in response to the lack of a contribution by the petitioner to the profit-sharing plan.
In NLRB v. Electric City Dyeing Co., 178 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1950), this court had occasion to rule on a comparable situation where the employer alleged that certain employees were discharged for unsatisfactory work whereas the Board made a finding, in which we concurred, that the dismissals were for union activity. Judge Goodrich, speaking for the court, said, 178 F.2d at 983:
Bernard Czankner seems to be the weakest of the helpers discharged. He was probably guilty of sloppy packing, and Heilig testified that he should have been discharged five months earlier. But for some time prior to the discharges, respondents had a list of over forty persons seeking employment, and we cannot say that the Board gave undue weight to the timing of the discharge, which closely followed Czankner’s presence at the union meeting. Czankner’s work apparently became intolerable only after he had joined the union. Cf. Agwilines, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 5 Cir., 1936, 87 F.2d 146, 154. Moreover, it matters not that for reasons apart from the union [concerted1] activity an employee deserves summary discharge if as a fact the reason was union [concerted] activity. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 3 Cir., 1942, 138 F.2d 86, 90, certiorari denied, 1944, 321 U.S. 778, 64 S.Ct. 619, 88 L.Ed. 1071. (Emphasis added.)
We have reiterated this same principle in subsequent cases.
In NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 298 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1962), we said:
We observe preliminarily that where, as here, contradictory reasons for the discharge of an employee are advanced, it is the responsibility of the Board to weigh the evidence and resolve the factual conflict. * * * There is clearly no obligation on the Board to accept at face value the reason advanced by the employer. The *1353concurrent existence of an otherwise valid reason for the discharge of an employee does not preclude a factual determination that his discharge was discriminatory if it appears from the preponderance of evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the discharge was in fact motivated by the employer’s opposition to the employee’s union activities. * * *17
It should be noted that in Buitoni, there was alleged to be a “concurrent reason” for discharging the . employee, viz., violence on the picket line, which the examiner and the Board did not entirely accept. In our case the claimed unsatisfactory work record was not even concurrent but had occurred well before the activities involved in this appeal.18
In its brief, petitioner contends that in order to constitute concerted activity *1354in violation of § 7 of the Act, this court has said that the employees’ conduct must contemplate some sort of “group action,” Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, supra, otherwise their protests are mere griping. In support of its claim that there was no group action here, petitioner has constructed a chart listing each statement by Moll and Gibson which could in any way be related to their “concerted activity” and has characterized each such statement as being an “individual gripe, comment or suggestion” and not “group action intended, contemplated or referred to.” (Brief, pp. 30-32.)
We believe petitioner takes too narrow a view of each statement or act of the employees in isolation. It is the totality of their conduct, their complaints to Minnier and others prior to the meeting, their participation in the June 16 meeting in which certain suggestions' and ideas were generated, the consternation which their remarks and behavior caused the petitioner’s top management, and the post-discharge meeting with the other employees to explain what had happened, which supports the Board’s conclusion that Moll and Gibson reflected a general dissatisfaction which manifested itself, however inartfully, in the desire to do something about the disappointing profit-sharing contribution which could adversely affect the employees’ ultimate retirement benefits.
As previously indicated, at the meeting called by Minnier, the discharged employees, Moll and Gibson, not only continued their prior protest against the employer’s decision with respect to the profit-sharing plan but also concurred in suggested remedies put forward by other employees. Although the meeting was called by management, it was no doubt called because of the general dissatisfaction anticipated from or expressed by the employees under Min-nier’s supervision. The vocalization of this dissatisfaction on behalf of the employees by Moll and Gibson and others constituted sufficient “group action” to come within the protected concerted activities under the statute.
In substance, the employees had a gripe. They assembled. They presented their grievance to management, represented at the meeting by Minnier. Standing alone, we believe this was concerted activity sufficient to shield Moll and Gibson from discharge as a result of their protests. Moreover, Moll’s indication the day following the meeting that he wanted to show management the “want ad” given to him by Yoxheimer, and Minnier’s immediate response by going to the personnel office, further reflects Moll’s desire to act for himself arid for the group of employees adversely affected with respect to the profit-sharing plan and reveals that the discharges were directly related to the concerted activity in which the employees were engaged.
Both parties in this appeal rely on Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, supra, where we said:
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees.19 330 F.2d at 685.
*1355We believe that the facts here meet and surpass the threshold of concerted activity test which Mushroom established.
It should be pointed out that a violation of the Act was not found in Mushroom. In that case, a part-time or “extra” nonunion employee, during work hours, advised other employees of their various “rights” under the existing collective bargaining contract which had been negotiated by the union for the full-time employees. There was no evidence in the case that any of the “grievances” involved a group of employees or that the discharged employee, Keeler, had any intention of forming any such group. In refusing to enforce the order of the Board, this court said:
We look in vain for evidence that would support a finding that Keeler’s talks with his fellow employees involved any effort on his or their part to initiate or promote any concerted action to do anything about the various matters as to which Keeler advised the men or to do anything about any complaints and grievances which they may have discussed with him. * * * 330 F.2d at 684-685.
In other words, we held that mere conversations between employees do not come “within the ambit of activities protected by the Act * * How different the Mushroom case is, then, from the facts at bar where the two discharged employees and others complained about the profit-sharing plan arrangement, and the employer found it necessary to hold two meetings to deal with the problem, in the first of which the discharged employees participated and helped to generate suggestions for dealing with their grievance. Certainly, as the Board suggests, this conduct comes at least within that part of the Mushroom test holding that “a conversation may constitute a concerted activity” if it appears “that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees.”
Two more points should be covered briefly on the prime issue of concerted activity. Petitioner contends that there must be a spokesman for the employees leading the call for group action, and that the employer must have knowledge that the employees are engaged in concerted action.
With respect to the “spokesman” question, NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., supra, expressly held that there is no need for a formal selection of a spokesman. “It is sufficient to constitute concert of action if from all the facts and circumstances in the case a reasonable inference can be drawn that the men involved considered that they had a grievance. and decided, among themselves, that they would take it up with management.” 285 F.2d at 12.
Furthermore, a spokesman may be a voluntary one or a chosen representative. Here, it might be said that Moll and Gibson were volunteers in speaking and protesting for themselves and on behalf of other employees of petitioner.
With respect to knowledge of the concerted activity, it is difficult to believe that at the time the officers of the petitioner decided to effect' the discharges they were unaware of the dissatisfaction pulsating in the plant, at least in the tool room, which the trial examiner properly held to constitute protected concerted activity.
Finally, petitioner has laid great stress on the fact that both Moll and Gibson indulged in considerable profanity in the course of their protests. The Supreme Court has held, and we apply the principle here, that in balancing the rights of the employer and the employees, as long as the activities engaged in are lawful and the character of the conduct is not indefensible in the context of the grievance involved, the employees *1356are protected under § 7 of the act: NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., supra at 17 of 370 U.S., 82 S.Ct. 1099, 8 L.Ed.2d 298. See generally, Falcon Plastics Division of B-D Laboratories, Inc. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1968).
We cannot agree that the measure of profanity in which the discharged employees indulged here was completely unusual and totally indefensible in the context of their claimed grievance.20
We have considered the other points raised by petitioner in the able and comprehensive brief of counsel and find them not to warrant any different result.21
From a review of the record as a whole we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial examiner and the action of the Board in the relief which it has ordered.22
Petitioner’s request to set aside the Board’s order will be denied. The request of the Board for enforcement of its order will be granted.