delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellees, individual foster parents1 and an organization of foster parents, brought this civil rights class action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for *819the Southern District of New York, on their own behalf and on behalf of children for whom they have provided homes for a year or more. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against New York State and New York City officials,2 *820alleging that the procedures governing the removal of foster children from foster homes provided in N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 383 (2) and 400 (McKinney 1976), and in 18 N. Y. C. R. R. §450.14 (1974) violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The District *821Court appointed independent counsel for the foster children to forestall any possibility of conflict between their interests and the interests asserted by the foster parents.4 A group of *822natural mothers of children in foster care 5 were granted leave to intervene6 on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.7
A divided three-judge District Court concluded that “the pre-removal procedures presently employed by the State are constitutionally defective,” holding that “before a foster child can be peremptorily transferred from the foster home in which he has been living, be it to another foster home or to the natural parents who initially placed him in foster care, he is entitled to a hearing at which all concerned parties may present any relevant information to the administrative decisionmaker charged with determining the future placement of the child,” Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 282 (1976). Four appeals to this Court were taken from the ensuing judgment declaring the challenged statutes unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their *823enforcement. The New York City officials are appellants in No. 76-180. The New York State officials are appellants in No. 76-183. Independent counsel appointed for the foster children appeals on their behalf in No. 76-5200. The intervening natural mothers are appellants in No. 76-5193. We noted probable jurisdiction of the four appeals. 429 U. S. 883 (1976). We reverse.
I
A detailed outline of the New York statutory system regulating foster care is a necessary preface to a discussion of the constitutional questions presented.
A
The expressed central policy of the New York system is that “it is generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to the natural parent because the child’s need for a normal family life will usually best be met in the natural home, and . . . parents are entitled to bring up their own children unless the best interests of the child would be thereby endangered,” Soc. Serv. Law § 38A-b (1) (a) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). But the State has opted for foster care as one response to those situations where the natural parents are unable to provide the “positive, nurturing family relationships” and “normal family life in, a permanent home” that offer “the best opportunity for children to develop and thrive.” § § 384-b (1) (b), (1) (a) (i).
Foster care has been defined as “[a] child welfare service which provides substitute family care for a planned period for a child when his own family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended period, and when adoption is neither desirable nor possible.” Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Foster Family Care Service 5 (1959).8 Thus, *824the distinctive features of foster care are, first, “that it is care in a family, it is noninstitutional substitute care,” and, second, “that it is for a planned period — either temporary or extended. This is unlike adoptive placement, which implies a permanent substitution of one home for another.” Kadushin 355.
Under the New York scheme children may be placed in foster care either by voluntary placement or by court order. Most foster-care placements are voluntary.9 They occur when physical or mental illness, economic problems, or other family crises make it impossible for natural parents, particularly single parents, to provide a stable home life for their children for some limited period.10 Resort to such placements *825is almost compelled when it is not possible in such circumstance to place the child with a relative or friend, or to pay for the services of a homemaker or boarding school.
Voluntary placement requires the signing of a written agreement by the natural parent or guardian, transferring the care and custody of the child to an authorized child welfare agency.11 N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384h-a (1) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). Although by statute the terms of such agreements are open to negotiation, § 38A-a (2) (a), it is contended that agencies require execution of standardized forms. Brief for Appellants in No. 76-5193, p. 25 n. 17. See App. 63a-64a, 65a-67a. The agreement may provide for return of the child to the natural parent at a specified date or upon occurrence of a particular event, and if it does not, the child must be returned by the agency, in the absence of a court order, within 20 days of notice from the parent. § 384-a (2) (a).12
*826The agency may maintain the child in an institutional setting, §§ 374-b, 374-c, 374-d (McKinney 1976), but more commonly acts under its authority to “place out and board out” children in foster homes. §374 (1).13 Foster parents, who are licensed by the State or an authorized foster-care agency, §§ 376, 377, provide care under a contractual arrangement with the agency, and are compensated for their services. See 18 N. Y. C. R. R. §§ 606.2, 606.6 (1977); App. 76a, 81a. The typical contract expressly reserves the right of the agency to remove the child on request. 418 F. Supp., at 281; App. 76a, 79a. See N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 383 (2) (McKinney 1976).14 Conversely, the foster parent may cancel the agreement at will.15
The New York system divides parental functions among agency, foster parents, and natural parents, and the definitions of the respective roles are often complex and often unclear.16 *827The law transfers “care and custody” to the agency, § 384-a; see also § 383 (2), but day-to-day supervision of the child and his activities, and most of the functions ordinarily associated with legal custody, are the responsibility of the foster parent.17 Nevertheless, agency supervision of the performance of the foster parents takes forms indicating that the foster parent does not have the full authority of a'legal custodian.18 Moreover, the natural parent’s placement of the child with the agency does not surrender legal guardianship;19 the parent *828retains authority to act with respect to the child in certain circumstances.20 The natural parent has not only the right but the obligation to visit the foster child and plan for his future; failure of a parent with capacity to fulfill the obligation for more than a year can result in a court order terminating the parent’s rights on the ground of neglect. § § 384-b (4), (7). See also § 384-b (5); N. Y. Dorn. Rel. Law § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); N. Y. Family Court Act § 611 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).21
Children may also enter foster care by court order. The Family Court may order that a child be placed in the custody of an authorized child-care agency after a full adversary judicial hearing under Art. 10 of the New York Family Court Act, if it is found that the child has been abused or neglected by his natural parents. §§ 1052, 1055. In addition, a minor adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, or “person in need of supervision” may be placed by the court with an agency. §§ 753, 754, 756. The consequences of foster-care placement by court order do not differ substantially from those for children voluntarily placed, except that the parent is not entitled to return of the child on demand pursuant to Soc. Serv. Law § 384-a (2) (a); termination of foster care must then be consented to by the court. § 383 (1).22
*829B
The provisions of the scheme specifically at issue in this litigation come into play when the agency having legal custody determines to remove the foster child from the foster home, either because it has determined that it would be in the child’s best interests to transfer him to some other foster home, or to return the child to his natural parents in accordance with the statute or placement agreement. Most children are removed in order to be transferred to another foster home.23 The procedures by which foster parents may challenge a removal made for that purpose differ somewhat from those where the removal is made to return the child to his natural parent.
Section 383 (2), n. 3, supra, provides that the “authorized agency placing out or boarding [a foster] child . . . may in its discretion remove such child from the home where placed or boarded.” Administrative regulations implement this provision. The agency is required, except in emergencies, to notify the foster parents in writing 10 days in advance of any removal. 18 N. Y. C. R. R. § 450.10 (a) (1976).24 The notice advises the foster parents that if they object to the child’s removal they may request a “conference” with the Social Services Department. Ibid. The department schedules requested conferences within 10 days of the receipt of the request. §450.10 (b). The foster parent may appear with counsel at the conference, where he will “be advised of the *830reasons [for the removal of the child] and be afforded an opportunity to submit reasons why the child should not be removed.” § 450.10 (a).25 The official must render a decision in writing within five days after the close of the conference, and send notice of his decision to the foster parents and the agency. § 450.10 (c). The proposed removal is stayed pending the outcome of the conference. §450.10 (d).
If the child is removed after the conference, the foster parent may appeal to the Department of Social Services for a “fair hearing,” that is, a full adversary administrative hearing, under Soc. Serv. Law § 400,26 the determination of which is subject to judicial review under N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1963); however, the removal is not automatically stayed pending the hearing and judicial review.27
This statutory and regulatory scheme applies statewide.28 *831In addition, regulations promulgated by the New York City Human Resources Administration, Department of Social Services — Special Services for Children (SSC) provide even greater procedural safeguards there. Under SSC Procedure No. 5 (Aug. 5, 1974), in place of or in addition to the conference provided by the state regulations, the foster parents may request a full trial-type hearing before the child is removed from their home. This procedure applies, however, only if the child is being transferred to another foster home, and not if the child is being returned to his natural parents.29
One further preremoval procedural safeguard is available. Under Soc. Serv. Law § 392, the Family Court has jurisdiction to review, on petition of the foster parent or the agency, the status of any child who has been in foster care for 18 months or longer.30 The foster parents, the natural parents, and all *832interested agencies are made parties to the proceeding. § 392 (4). After hearing, the court may order that foster care be continued, or that the child be returned to his natural parents, or that the agency take steps to free the child for adoption.31 § 392 (7). Moreover, § 392 (8) authorizes the court to issue an “order of protection” which “may set forth reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified time by a person or agency who is before the court.” Thus, the court may order not only that foster care be continued, but additionally, “in assistance or as a condition of” that order, that the agency leave the child with the present foster parent.32 In other words, § 392 provides a mechanism whereby a foster parent may obtain preremoval judicial review of an agency’s decision to remove a child who has been in foster care for 18 months or more.
*833c
Foster care of children is a sensitive and emotion-laden subject, and foster-care programs consequently stir strong controversy. The New York regulatory scheme is no exception. New York would have us view the scheme as described in its brief:
“Today New York premises its foster care system on the accepted principle that the placement of a child into foster care is solely a temporary, transitional action intended to lead to the future reunion of the child with his natural parent or parents, or if such a reunion is not possible, to legal adoption and the establishment of a new permanent home for the child.” Brief for Appellants in No. 76-183, p. 3.
Some of the parties and amici argue that this is a misleadingly idealized picture. They contend that a very different perspective is revealed by the empirical criticism of the system presented in the record of this case and confirmed by published studies of foster care.
From the standpoint of natural parents, such as the appellant intervenors here, foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of the poor. See, e. g., Jenkins, Child Welfare as a Class System, in Children and Decent People 3 (A. Schorr ed. 1974). And see generally tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origins, Development and Present Status (pt. I), 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (1964); (pt. II), 16 Stan. L. Rev. 900 (1964); (pt. III), 17 Stan. L. Rev. 614 (1965). It is certainly true that the poor resort to foster care more often than other citizens. For example, over 50%- of all children in foster care in New York City are from female-headed families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Foundation for Child Development, State of the Child: New York City 61 (1976). Minority families are also more likely to turn to fos*834ter care; 52.3% of the children in foster care in New York City are black and 25.5% are Puerto Rican. Child Welfare Information Services, Characteristics of Children in Foster Care, New York City Reports, Table No. 2 (Dec. 31, 1976).33 This disproportionate resort to foster care by the poor and victims of discrimination doubtless reflects in part the greater likelihood of disruption of poverty-stricken families. Commentators have also noted, however, that middle- and upper-income families who need temporary care services for their children have the resources to purchase private care. See, e. g., Rein, Nutt, & Weiss 24, 25. The poor have little choice but to submit to state-supervised child care when family crises strike. Id., at 34.
The extent to which supposedly “voluntary” placements are in fact voluntary has been questioned on other grounds as well. For example, it has been said that many “voluntary” placements are in fact coerced by threat of neglect proceedings 34 and are not in fact voluntary in the sense of the product of an informed consent. Mnookin I 599, 601. Studies also suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds, perhaps unconsciously, incline to favor continued placement in foster care with a generally higher-status family rather than return the child to his natural family, thus reflecting a bias that treats the natural parents’ poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the child. Rein, Nutt, & Weiss 42-44; Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1973). This accounts,35 it has been said, for the hostility of agencies to the *835efforts of natural parents to obtain the return of their children.36
Appellee foster parents as well as natural parents question the accuracy of the idealized picture portrayed by New York. They note that children often stay in “temporary” foster care for much longer than contemplated by the theory of the system. See, e. g., Kadushin 411-412; Mnookin I 610-613; Wald 662-663; Rein, Nutt, & Weiss 37-39.37 The *836District Court found as a fact that the median time spent in foster care in New York was over four years. 418 F. Supp., at 281. Indeed, many children apparently remain in this “limbo” indefinitely. Mnookin II 226, 273. The District Court also found that the longer a child remains in foster care, the more likely it is that he will never leave: “[T]he probability of a foster child being returned to his biological parents declined markedly after the first year in foster care.” 418 F. Supp., at 279 n. 6. See also E. Sherman, R. Neuman, & A. Shyne, Children Adrift in Foster Care: A Study of Alternative Approaches 3 (1973); Fanshel, The Exit of Children from Foster Care: An Interim Research Report, 50 Child Welfare 65, 67 (1971). It is not surprising then that many children, particularly those that enter foster care at a very early age38 and have little or no contact with their natural parents during extended stays in foster care,39 often develop deep emotional ties with their foster parents.40
*837Yet such ties do not seem to be regarded as obstacles to transfer of the child from one foster placement to another. The record in this case indicates that nearly 60% of the children in foster care in New York City have experienced more than one placement, and about 28% have experienced three or more. App. 189a. See also Wald 645-646; Mnookin I 625-626. The intended stability of the foster-home management is further damaged by the rapid turnover among social work professionals who supervise the foster-care arrangements on behalf of the State. Id., at 625; Rein, Nutt, & Weiss 41; Kadushin 420. Moreover, even when it is clear that a foster child will not be returned to his natural parents, it is rare that he achieves a stable home life through final termination of parental ties and adoption into a new permanent family. Fanshel, Status Changes of Children in Foster Care: Final *838Results of the Columbia University Longitudinal Study, 55 Child Welfare 143, 145, 157 (1976); Mnookin II 275-277; Mnookin I 612-613. See also n. 23, supra.
The parties and amici devote much of their discussion to these criticisms of foster care, and we present this summary in the view that some understanding of those criticisms is necessary for a full appreciation of the complex and controversial system with which this lawsuit is concerned.41 But the issue presented by the case is a narrow one. Arguments asserting the need for reform of New York’s statutory scheme are properly addressed to the New York Legislature. The relief sought in this case is entirely procedural. Our task is only to determine whether the District Court correctly held that the present procedures preceding the removal from a foster home of children resident there a year or more are constitutionally inadequate. To that task we now turn.
II
A
Our first inquiry is whether appellees have asserted interests within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of *839“liberty” and “property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 571 (1972).
The appellees have not renewed in this Court their contention, rejected by the District Court, 418 F. Supp., at 280-281, that the realities of the foster-care system in New York gave them a justified expectation amounting to a “property” interest that their status as foster parents would be continued.42 Our inquiry is therefore narrowed to the question whether their asserted interests are within the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The appellees’ basic contention is that when a child has lived in a foster home for a year or more, a psychological tie is created between the child and the foster parents which constitutes the foster family the true “psychological family” of the child. See J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). That family, they argue, has a “liberty interest” in its survival as a family protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, ante, p. 494. Upon this premise they conclude that the foster child cannot be removed without a prior hearing satisfying due process. Appointed counsel for the children, appellants in No. 76-5200, however, disagrees, and has consistently argued that the foster parents have no such liberty interest independent of the interests of the foster children, and that the best interests of the children would not be served by procedural protections beyond those already provided by New York law. The intervening natural parents of children in foster care, appellants in No. 76-5193, also- oppose the foster parents, arguing that recognition of the procedural right claimed would undercut both the substantive family law of New York, which favors the return of children to their natural parents as expeditiously as possible, see supra, at 823, *840and their constitutionally protected right of family privacy, by forcing them to submit to a hearing and defend their rights to their children before the children could be returned to them.
The District Court did not reach appellees’ contention “that the foster home is entitled to the same constitutional deference as that long granted to the more traditional biological family.” 418 F. Supp., at 281. Rather than “reach [ing] out to decide such novel questions,” the court based its holding that “the pre-removal procedures presently employed by the state are constitutionally defective,” id., at 282, not on the recognized liberty interest in family privacy, but on an independent right of the foster child “to be heard before being ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’ Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 . . . (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).” Ibid.
The court apparently reached this conclusion by weighing the “harmful consequences of a precipitous and perhaps improvident decision to remove a child from his foster family,” id., at 283, and concluding that this disruption of the stable relationships needed by the child might constitute “grievous loss.” But if this was the reasoning applied by the District Court, it must be rejected.43 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 224 (1976), is authority that such a finding does not, in and of itself, implicate the due process guarantee. What was said in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570-571, applies equally well here:
“The District Court decided that procedural due process guarantees apply in this ease by assessing and balancing *841the weights of the particular interests involved. . . . [A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake. . . . We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”44
*842We therefore turn to appellees’ assertion that they have a constitutionally protected liberty interest — in the words of the District Court, a “right to familial privacy,” 418 F. Supp., at 279 — in the integrity of their family unit.45 This assertion clearly presents difficulties.
B
It is, of course, true that “freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974). There does exist a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944), that has been afforded both substantive46 and procedural47 protection. But is the relation of foster parent to foster child sufficiently akin to the concept of “family” recognized in our precedents to merit similar protection?48 Although considerable difficulty has attended the task of defining “family” for purposes of the Due Process *843Clause, see Moore v. East Cleveland, ante, pp. 494 (plurality-opinion of Powell, J.), 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 541 (White, J., dissenting), we are not without guides to some of the elements that define the concept of “family” and contribute to its place in our society.
First, the usual understanding of “family” implies biological relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have stressed this element. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972), for example, spoke of “[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one’s children” as essential rights, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). And Prince v. Massachusetts, stated:
“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” 321 U. S., at 166.49
A biological relationship is not present in the case of the usual foster family. But biological relationships are not exclusive determination of the existence of a family.50 The basic foundation of the family in our society, the marriage relationship, is of course not a matter of blood relation. Yet its importance has been strongly emphasized in our cases:
“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights — older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better *844or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 486 (1965).
See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967).
Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in “promot[ing] a way of life” through the instruction of children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 231-233 (1972), as well as from the fact of blood relationship. No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship.51 At least where a child has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family.52 For this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of unrelated indi*845viduals. Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974).
But there are also important distinctions between the foster family and the natural family. First, unlike the earlier cases recognizing a right to family privacy, the State here seeks to interfere, not with a relationship having its origins entirely apart from the power of the State, but rather with a foster family which has its source in state law and contractual arrangements. The individual’s freedom to marry and reproduce is “older than the Bill of Rights,” Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 486. Accordingly, unlike the property interests that are also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 577, the liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law,53 but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in “this Nation’s history and tradition.” Moore v. East Cleveland, ante, at 503. Cf. also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Here, however, whatever emotional ties may develop between foster parent and foster child have their origins in an arrangement in which the State has been a partner from the outset. While the Court has recognized that liberty interests may in some cases arise from positive-law sources, see, e. g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 557 (1974), in such a case, and particularly where, as here, the claimed interest derives from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with the State, it is appropriate to ascer*846tain from state law the expectations and entitlements of the parties. In this case, the limited recognition accorded to the foster family by the New York statutes and the contracts executed by the foster parents argue against any but the most limited constitutional “liberty” in the foster family.
A second consideration related to this is that ordinarily procedural protection may be afforded to a liberty interest of one person without derogating from the substantive liberty of another. Here, however, such a tension is virtually unavoidable. Under New York law, the natural parent of a foster child in voluntary placement has an absolute right to the return of his child in the absence of a court order obtainable only upon compliance with rigorous substantive and procedural standards, which reflect the constitutional protection accorded the natural family. See nn. 46, 47, supra. Moreover, the natural parent initially gave up his child to the State only on the express understanding that the child would be returned in those circumstances. These rights are difficult to reconcile with the liberty interest in the foster family relationship claimed by appellees. It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like associations into which they have freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law recognition of the relationship. It is quite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the face of another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human right — an interest the foster parent has recognized by contract from the outset.54 Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the *847foster family as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.
As this discussion suggests, appellees’ claim to a constitutionally protected liberty interest raises complex and novel questions. It is unnecessary for us to resolve those questions definitively in this case, however, for, like the District Court, we conclude that “narrower grounds exist to support” our reversal. We are persuaded that, even on the assumption that appellees have a protected “liberty interest,” the District Court erred in holding that the preremoval procedures presently employed by the State are constitutionally defective.
Ill
Where procedural due process must be afforded because a “liberty” or “property” interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection, there must be determined “what process is due” in the particular context. The District Court did not spell out precisely what sort of preremoval hearing would be necessary to meet the constitutional standard, leaving to “the various defendants — -state and local officials — the first opportunity to formulate procedures suitable to their own professional needs and compatible with the principles set forth in this opinion.” 418 F. Supp., at 286. The court’s opinion, however, would seem to require at a minimum that in all cases in which removal of a child within the certified class is contemplated, including the situation where the removal is for the purpose of returning the child to his natural parents, a hearing be held automatically, regardless of whether or not the foster parents request a hearing;55 that the hearing be *848before an officer who has had no previous contact with the decision to remove the child, and who has authority to order that the child remain with the foster parents; and that the agency, the foster parents, and the natural parents, as well as the child, if he is able intelligently to express his true feelings, and an independent representative of the child’s interests, if he is not, be represented and permitted to introduce relevant evidence.
It is true that “[bjefore a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind of a hearing, ‘except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’ ” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 570 n. 7, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971). But the hearing required is only one “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). See, e. g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). Only last Term, the Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional *849or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). Consideration of the procedures employed by the State and New York City in light of these three factors requires the conclusion that those procedures satisfy constitutional standards.
Turning first to the procedure applicable in New York City, SSC Procedure No. 5, see supra, at 831, and n. 29, provides that before a child is removed from a foster home for transfer to another foster home, the foster parents may request an “independent review.” The District Court’s description of this review is set out in the margin.56 Such a procedure would appear to give a more elaborate trial-type hearing to foster families than this Court has found required in other contexts of administrative determinations. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 266-271. The District Court found the procedure inadequate on four grounds, none of which we find sufficient to justify the holding that the procedure violates due process.
*850First, the court held that the “independent review” administrative proceeding was insufficient because it was only-available on the request of the foster parents. In the view of the District Court, the proceeding should be provided as a matter of course, because the interests of the foster parents and those of the child would not necessarily be coextensive, and it could not be assumed that the foster parents would invoke the hearing procedure in every case in which it was in the child’s interest to have a hearing. Since the child is unable to request a hearing on his own, automatic review in every case is necessary. We disagree. As previously noted, the constitutional liberty, if any, sought to be protected by the New York procedures is a right of family privacy or autonomy, and the basis for recognition of any such interest in the foster family must be that close emotional ties analogous to those between parent and child are established when a child resides for a lengthy period with a foster family. If this is so, necessarily we should expect that the foster parents will seek to continue the relationship to preserve the stability of the family; if they do not request a hearing, it is difficult to see what right or interest of the foster child is protected by holding a hearing to determine whether removal would unduly impair his emotional attachments to a foster parent who does not care enough about the child to contest the removal.57 Thus, consideration of the interest to be protected and the likelihood of erroneous deprivations,58 the first two *851factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, as appropriate in determining the sufficiency of procedural protections, do not support the District Court’s imposition of this additional requirement. Moreover, automatic provision of hearings as required by the District Court would impose a substantial additional administrative burden on the State. According to appellant city officials, during the approximately two years between the institution of SSC Procedure No. 5 in August 1974 and June 1976, there were approximately 2,800 transfers per year in the city, but only 26 foster parents requested hearings. Brief for Appellants in No. 76-180, pp. 20-21. It is not at all clear what would be gained by requiring full hearings in the more than 5,500 cases in which they were not requested.
Second, the District Court faulted the city procedure on the ground that participation is limited to the foster parents and the agency, and the natural parent and the child are not made parties to the hearing. This is not fatal in light of the nature of the alleged constitutional interests at stake. When-the child’s transfer from one foster home to another is pending, the interest arguably requiring protection is that of the foster family, not that of the natural parents. Moreover, the natural parent can generally add little to the accuracy of factfinding concerning the wisdom of such a transfer, since the foster parents and the agency, through its caseworkers, will usually be most knowledgeable about conditions in the foster home. Of course, in those cases where the natural parent does have a special interest in the proposed transfer *852or particular information that would assist the factfinder, nothing in the city’s procedure prevents any party from securing his testimony.
Much the same can be said in response to the District Court’s statement:
“[I]t may be advisable, under certain circumstances, for the agency to appoint an adult representative better to articulate the interests of the child. In making this determination, the agency should carefully consider the child’s age, sophistication and ability effectively to communicate his own true feelings.” 418 F. Supp., at 285-286.
But nothing in the New York City procedure prevents consultation of the child’s wishes, directly or through an adult intermediary. We assume, moreover, that some such consultation would be among the first steps that a rational fact-finder, inquiring into the child’s best interests, would pursue. Such consultation, however, does not require that the child or an appointed representative must be a party with full adversary powers in all preremoval hearings.59
*853The other two defects in the city procedure found by the District Court must also be rejected. One is that the procedure does not extend to the removal of a child from foster care to be returned to his natural parent. But as we have already held, whatever liberty interest may be argued to exist in the foster family is significantly weaker in the case of removals preceding return to the natural parent, and the balance of due process interests must accordingly be different. If the city procedure is adequate where it is applicable, it is no criticism of the procedure that it does not apply in other situations where different interests are at stake. Similarly, the District Court pointed out that the New York City procedure coincided with the informal “conference” and post-removal hearings provided as a matter of state law. This overlap in procedures may be unnecessary or even to some degree unwise, see id., at 285, but a State does not violate the Due Process Clause by providing alternative or additional procedures beyond what the Constitution requires.
Outside New York City, where only the statewide procedures apply, foster parents are provided not only with the procedures of a preremoval conference and postremoval hearing provided by 18 N. Y. C. R. R. §450.10 (1976) and Soc. Serv. Law § 400 (McKinney 1976), see supra, at 829-830, but also with the preremoval judicial hearing" available on request to foster parents who have in their care children who have been in foster care for 18 months or more, Soc. Serv. Law § 392. As observed supra, at 832, and n. 32, a foster parent in such case may obtain an order that the child remain in his care.
The District Court found three defects in this full judicial process. First, a § 392 proceeding is available only to those foster children who have been in foster care for 18 months or more. The class certified by the court was broader, including *854children who had been in the care of the same foster parents for more than one year. Thus, not all class members had access to the § 392 remedy.60 We do not think that the 18-month limitation on § 392 actions renders the New York scheme constitutionally inadequate. The assumed liberty interest to be protected in this case is one rooted in the emotional attachments that develop over time between a child and the adults who care for him. But there is no reason to assume that those attachments ripen at less than 18 months or indeed at any precise point. Indeed, testimony in the record, see App. 177a, 204a, as well as material in published psychological texts, see, e. g., J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 40-42,49 (1973), suggests that the amount of time necessary for the development of the sort of tie appellees seek to protect varies considerably depending on the age and previous attachments of the child. In a matter of such imprecision and delicacy, we see no justification for the District Court’s substitution of its view of the appropriate cutoff date for that chosen by the New York Legislature, given that any line is likely to be somewhat arbitrary and fail to protect some families where relationships have developed quickly while protecting others where no such bonds have formed. If New York sees 18 months rather than 12 as the time at which temporary foster care begins to turn into a more permanent and family-like setting requiring procedural protection and/or judicial inquiry into the propriety of continuing foster care, it would take far more than this record *855provides to justify a finding of constitutional infirmity in New York’s choice.
The District Court’s other two findings of infirmity in the § 392 procedure have already been considered and held to be without merit. The District Court disputed defendants’ reading of § 392 as permitting an order requiring the leaving of the foster child in the same foster home. The plain words of the statute and the weight of New York judicial interpretation do not support the court. See supra, at 832, and n. 32. The District Court also faulted § 392, as it did the New York City procedure, in not providing an automatic hearing in every case even in cases where foster parents chose not to seek one. Our holding sustaining the adequacy of the city procedure, supra, at 850-851, applies in this context as well.61
Finally, the § 392 hearing is available to foster parents, both in and outside New York City, even where the removal sought is for the purpose of returning the child to his natural parents. Since this remedy provides a sufficient constitutional preremoval hearing to protect whatever liberty interest might exist in the continued existence of the foster family when the State seeks to transfer the child to another foster home, a fortiori the procedure is adequate to protect the lesser interest of the foster family in remaining together at the expense of the disruption of the natural family.
We deal here with issues of unusual delicacy, in an area where professional judgments regarding desirable procedures are constantly and rapidly changing. In such a context, restraint is appropriate on the part of courts called upon to *856adjudicate whether a particular procedural scheme is adequate under the Constitution. Since we hold that the procedures provided by New York State in § 392 and by New York City’s SSC Procedure No. 5 are adequate to protect whatever liberty interests appellees may have, the judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.