The plaintiff, Herbert W. Smith, of Port Huron, on December 1, 1926, executed a series of first mortgage six and one-half per cent, serial gold bonds, totaling $75,000, and to secure the payment thereof he executed a trust mortgage on December 20, but as of December 1, 1926, on certain real estate to the Union Trust Company, now Union Guardian Trust Company. The bonds were payable in part on December 1, 1928, and every six months thereafter, except that the final payment of $33,000 was to be made on December 1, 1936. After certification by the trustee, they were sold to the general public. Payments were made of those maturing on December 1, 1930, and prior thereto, amounting to $9,000. All interest coupons due prior to September 1, 1931, were paid.
On September 15, 1931, a bondholders’ protective committee was formed, of which the defendants Peck, McCallum and Langan are members, under an agreement entered into by all of the bondholders except the defendants Andres, Miller and Munnecke, who each own a $1,000 bond, and bonds in the amount of $3,100, the owners of which could not be ascertained.
Being unable to secure the deposit of all of the bonds, the protective committee sought relief under *121the provisions of Act No. 114, Pub. Acts 1933. A supplemental indenture was prepared, to be executed by the mortgagor and the trustee, which, after reciting .the execution of the trust mortgage and the real estate described therein, and that $66,000 of the bond issue was yet outstanding, and that upwards of 51 per cent, of the holders of the bonds, who owned more than four-fifths of' those outstanding, had agreed in writing to the execution thereof, provided:
1. That the maturity of all outstanding bonds be fixed at December 1, 1946.
2. That the interest rate be reduced from six and one-half per cent, to four per cent, per annum.
3. That all interest due from and including September 1, 1931, and including December 1, 1933, be canceled.
This proposed agreement was submitted to the public trust commission, as required by Act No. 89, Pub. Acts 1933, and approved and accepted by it on August 16, 1933. It was then presented to the trustee, and it declined to execute it for the reason that all of the bondholders had not deposited their bonds with the committee and that, unless the provisions of said Act No. 114 were broad enough, in their scope to authorize the amendment to the trust mortgage as proposed, it was without the authority or power to do so.
These facts were set up in the bill of complaint, and a declaration of rights, construing said Act No. 114 and declaring that the proposed agreement is within its terms and, when executed, will be binding upon all of the holders of said bonds who do not present their claims to the court in the manner- provided for therein, was prayed for.
*122On petition of the attorney general, lie was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff. After the submission of proofs, the trial court found that Act No. 114 was constitutional and valid, but that the provisions in the supplemental agreement were not within the purview and scope of the act. A decree was entered in conformity therewith, from which this appeal has been taken.
The first section of the act referred to the acute financial and economic condition which had arisen in the State, thus creating a public emergency, and stated that in order to protect the public welfare, peace', health and safety, and to conserve, safeguard and protect the depositors in banks and the holders of securities in the nature of trust mortgage bonds, it was declared necessary to provide ways and means to conserve the value of such bonds, and for that purpose the police power of the State was invoked.
The second section defines the terms ‘ ‘ trust mortgage,” “trust indenture,” “trustee,” and “bonds” secured by a trust mortgage. The third and fourth sections are set forth in full in the margin.* The *123attorney general urges that the words “or other payments” in, the third section, which we have caused to he italicized, should be construed as referring to the rate of interest provided for in the trust mortgage. We cannot place such a construction upon them.
In Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655 (88 A. L. R. 1263), handed down on April 4, 1932, more than 14 months before this statute was enacted, this court in an exhaustive opinion, *124written by Mr. Justice Bittzel, discussed tbe rights of persons holding bonds secured by trust mortgages, and the conclusion was reached that such rights are contractual and are protected by the provisions of both the Federal and the State Constitutions.* With this opinion presumptively before the legislature, it seems clear that, if it determined that it had the power and authority to affect such rights in the manner disclosed by the supplemental indenture, express language would doubtless have been used therefor and its intent not left dependent upon the construction to be placed upon the words “or other payments.”
The purpose of the act is clearly expressed in the first section thereof. It was deemed necessary “to provide ways and means to conserve the value of such bonds.” While “it is a familiar principle of law that, in construing a statute, we must consider the occasion of its enactment and the purpose to be accomplished” (Bennett v. Michigan Pulpwood Co., 181 Mich. 33, 40), this court may not read into it provisions which affect both the vested and future interests of bondholders unless the intent to do so be fairly expressed therein.
In our opinion the statute did not authorize the inclusion in the supplemental agreement of the provisions therein relating to interest, and for that reason the action of the trustee in declining to execute it was warranted. In reaching this conclusion it must be understood that we are not passing upon, or deciding, whether the act would be constitutional if it expressly provided for the modification of the trust mortgage in the manner disclosed by the supplemental agreement.
*125Section 6 of the act reads as follows:
“From and after the first day of March, nineteen hundred thirty-five, this act shall cease to be in force: Provided, That any action taken under the provisions of this act shall be in force and effect until maturity of various issues.”
As further proceedings under it may not be taken in this case, it is unnecessary to discuss or pass upon the constitutionality of the provision requiring dissenting bondholders after notice to “apply to a court of chancery” to have a determination of “their claims therein, ’ ’ as provided for in the third section of the act.
A decree may be here entered dismissing the bill of complaint. No costs will be allowed.
Potter, C. J., and North, Fead, Wiest, Buxzel, Bushnell, and Edward M. Sharpe, JJ., concurred.