Appellant, O’Kon and Company, Inc., has appealed a non-final order entered pursuant to Rule 9.130, Fla.R.App.P., granting partial summary judgment. The following issues were raised for our review: (1) whether there were sufficient facts to support the trial court’s summary invalidation of appellant’s lien and the immediate release of the lien funds; (2) whether the trial court erred by not following the mandatory statutory procedures in discharging and invalidating appellant’s lien; and (3) whether the trial court should be ordered to reinstate the cash bond or order that appellee provide equivalent security. We affirm as to issues two and three. As to issue one, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant partial summary judgment with respect to appellant’s lien, but reverse parts of the order and remand for further proceedings as follows.
Appellant (O’Kon) is a Georgia corporation engaged in design and engineering with respect to hotel projects. Appellees proposed to construct a hotel on property in Leon County, Florida, and contracted with O’Kon for architectural, engineering and project management services. Subsequently, problems arose between the parties. Eventually O’Kon filed a mechanic’s lien on April 23, 1987, for its services on *837the real property in Leon County. In reaction to the filing of the mechanic’s lien by O’Kon, appellees brought suit alleging (1) slander of title, and (2) breach of a statute-tort, alleging that appellant’s lien was fraudulent as provided in section 713.31, Florida Statutes. O’Kon thereafter counterclaimed to enforce its mechanic’s lien and for breach of contract. During the pendency of the proceeding, the real property subject to O’Kon’s lien was sold, and pursuant to section 713.24, Fla.Stat., appel-lees placed a cash bond of $191,260 with the clerk of court representing the lien amount plus interest and costs.
The court rendered an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of ap-pellees. The court summarily found that because O’Kon is not registered as an architect in Florida, O’Kon’s lien was invalid and therefore the court directed the clerk to release the money in the court registry to appellees.1
*838The pertinent laws governing the issues raised in this appeal are found in Chapter 713, Part I, Mechanics’ Liens,2 and Chapter 481, Part I, Architecture.3 We examine the *839statutes in pari materia to resolve the questions raised as a result of the trial court’s order.
O’Kon contends that as a corporation, O’Kon acted not as an architect, but rather as a project manager, and therefore was not required to meet the regulatory provisions of the pertinent statutes governing the practice of architecture in Florida. We disagree. The parties’ contract is entitled “Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect,” and directly under this title is stated:
BETWEEN The owner: RSW Hotel Associates, Ltd.
and the Architect: as used herein Architect shall refer to and mean:
O’Kon and Company, Inc.
44 Broad Street NW, Suite 810
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
As appellant contends, this agreement is signed by O’Kon as “project manager,” and the designation “architect” is crossed out. (Appendix 133). The record reflects that in this case, O’Kon and Company, Inc., regardless of the labels to which it ascribes, has acted in at least a supervisory capacity over the architect and the architecture involved. The legislature intended Chapter 481 to protect the public from improper design and improper construction supervision by architects of buildings primarily designed for human habitation. Further, Chapter 713 which provides for profession*840als offering services to file a lien for services, does not include “project managers.” In the contract between O’Kon and appel-lee, it is stated “[t]he architect warrants that he is properly licensed to carry out the terms of the agreement.” (Appendix 133). Under this statement appellant is represented as “Project Manager, O’Kon and Company, Inc.” Further, under compensation for additional services, it is stated, “any additional services of the architect or consultants hired by the architect ...” (Appendix 131.) We agree with appellees’ arguments that the record supports the determination that O’Kon’s principal, Mr. James O’Kon, was holding himself and his corporation out as “architect” while knowing that he was not registered, certified or otherwise authorized to practice architecture in the state of Florida, contrary to section 481.223, Florida Statutes.
In his deposition, the only licensed architect in the design team, Warren Dixon, stated that O’Kon never had an office in Florida, and that he and his firm were supposed to serve as the Florida branch of O’Kon, but that never came to pass. Dixon testified that he was under the impression that the filing for a registration for O’Kon had begun, but he was not sure that it had, and the first phase of the work had already been done before it was even discussed. He further stated that he did not know of any specific steps that Mr. James O’Kon took to become registered as an architect in Florida. Dixon admitted that he knew that the state of Florida required O’Kon to be registered in the state if they were going to practice architecture in the state, and he participated in extensive conversations with Mr. James O’Kon regarding this issue during their first conference. (Appendix 24-27). A review of Dixon’s deposition reveals that O’Kon was aware of the statutory requirements involving the practice of architecture in Florida, but never acted on. the provisions to meet the statutory requirements.
Gaisford v. Neushcatz, 201 So.2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied 207 So.2d 689 (Fla.1967), cited by O’Kon, is not applicable. In that case, appellant, an out of state architect, had applied for his Florida certificate, and while a waiting its arrival, completed the requested plans and specifications for a motel and delivered them to the appellee. He received his certificate within months of delivering the plans. The court found that the preparation and delivery of the plans prior to certification was an isolated act and did not constitute practicing architecture in Florida which would render the contract unenforceable. There was no issue involving a lien, and no facts approaching the magnitude of appellant’s ongoing, unauthorized, participation as an architect in the instant case.
Rolls v. Bliss & Nyitray, Inc., 408 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), appeal dismissed, 415 So.2d 1359 (Fla.1982), cited by the trial judge in paragraph four of its order, is also inapplicable, for therein no reference was made to a mechanics’ lien, in contrast to the focus of the instant case.
We disagree with appellant’s basic argument, that section 713.03, Florida Statutes, “liens for professional services” allows for unauthorized architects (labelled here as project managers), practicing in Florida in violation of section 481.219, Florida Statutes, to file a lien on real property in Florida to collect for services rendered. To interpret the phrase “[a]ny person who performs services as architect ...” in section 713.03, Florida Statutes, to mean one practicing in violation of the professional regulation statutes would render attempts at professional regulation ineffective. We agree with appellees that is not what the legislature intended. We believe that the only way O’Kon could assert a valid lien under Chapter 713 to enforce a claim for architectural fees would be through the mechanism of section 713.02(2), Florida Statutes. O’Kon did not pursue certification pursuant to section 481.219, Florida Statutes, and therefore it may not avail itself of the mechanics’ lien provisions.
We find that, as appellees argue, the trial judge had before him all the facts necessary to conclude that O’Kon as a non-registered architect, could not legally enforce a claim for architectural fees through the mechanism of statutory lien law. In the instant case appellant’s contract was *841based on O’Kon’s warranty that the firm was authorized to practice architecture in the state of Florida. The certificates of nonregistration found in the appendix support the trial judge’s finding that O’Kon was neither registered nor authorized under the pertinent statutes, during the period that the firm engaged in the business of providing architectural services in Florida, from December 1, 1984, when the initial contract was formed, through April 23, 1987, when the lien was filed.
The state’s regulation of a corporate entity that seeks to provide architectural services is accomplished through certification. See section 481.219(l)(a) and (b), where it is provided that a corporation offering architectural services to the public may practice in this state if, (a) one or more of the principal officers or partners and all personnel who act in its behalf as architects are registered, AND (b) the corporation has been issued a certificate of authorization by the department as provided in section 481.213, Florida Statutes. (Emphasis supplied.) This statute does not limit its application to those corporations, who unlike appellant, offer only architectural services. We agree with appellees that without this statute, (as well as section 481.219(5), Florida Statutes), the state does not have a way to control the corporate offering of architectural services in the state. Obviously, the legislature thought it was important to provide for the regulation of both the individual and the corporate entity offering architectural services, as revealed by separate statutory criteria governing each. We find the above mandatory language to be very clear and straightforward, and find that appellant has not justified its failure to comply with the requirements of the regulatory statute.
Further, in response to this court’s request for supplemental argument, appellant and appellee correctly distinguished between section 713.03(1) and section 713.-01(2), Florida Statutes, and agreed that section 713.03(1) is limited to circumstances where property has been improved, so is not applicable to the facts of this case, whereas section 713.03(2) applies when the lienor is an architect who has a direct contract with the property owner. We agree with appellees that section 713.03(2) should be read in pari materia with section 481.-203, which refers to an architect in terms of a registered architect. Also, as appel-lees argue, section 713.03(2) provides that only an architect with a direct contract (with the owner) may qualify for a lien. In the instant case, the one Florida registered architect in O’Kon’s design team, Mr. Dixon, does not have a direct contract with the property owners, and O’Kon, who has the direct contract with the owner, is not an architect. We note the significance of the connector “and” in the statute, where it is provided that “[a]ny architect ... who has a direct contract and who in the practice of this profession ... shall perform services and subject to said compliances and limitations, shall have a lien ...” See Warshaw v. Pyms, 266 So.2d 355 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972), wherein the third district reversed a summary judgment because it found a triable issue relating to agency of an architect to employ an engineer for the owner, where the engineer had filed a mechanic’s lien for services. Although we did not find this case supportive of appellant’s argument that it, as the corporate entity, is entitled to a mechanic’s lien under section 713.03(2), Florida Statutes, the opinion does explain the distinction between section 713.-03(1) and section 713.03(2), Florida Statutes.
Neither the provisions in section 713.03(1) nor section 713.03(2) allow O’Kon to file a mechanic’s lien for architectural services performed while not in compliance with state statutes regulating the practice of architecture. Mechanics’ liens are purely creatures of statute, and must be strictly construed. See Falovitch v. Gunn & Gunn Construction Company, 348 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). Also, unless the lien is expressly created by the mechanics’ lien law, it does not exist. Fell v. Messeroff, 145 So.2d 238, 239 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1962). It is undisputed that O’Kon, as a corporate entity, complied with none of the statutory provisions regarding certificate of authority, registration, or licensing. Appellant has not shown how it substantially fol*842lowed the steps prescribed by the mechanics’ lien statute, therefore, according to an early decision of the Florida Supreme Court, the lien does not exist. Biscayne Trust Company v. Wolpert Realty & Improvement Company, et. al., 100 Fla. 1070, 130 So. 611, 613 (1930). See also W.N. Robbins Electric, Inc. v. Intercontinental Group, Inc., 374 So.2d 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
However, we find that the circumstances and ambiguities involved in this case preclude it from being susceptible to a partial summary judgment with respect to the validity of the underlying contract at the time the order appealed was entered. Further, we find that the trial court’s order goes too far in paragraph four where it declares that the contract is invalid and unenforceable at law. None of the pertinent statutes examined regarding licensing or liens require that the entire contract in question be invalidated at this time. There are still issues of fact that must be decided in regard to the contract. Therefore, paragraph four should be stricken from the order.
We affirm the trial court’s order, paragraphs five and six, where it abolishes the mechanic’s lien and orders the funds released; however, we reverse on paragraphs four and seven of the order, where the court found that the contract is in violation of Chapter 481 Florida Statutes, and therefore unenforceable at law. The order of the trial court should only be construed as prohibiting appellant from using the mechanics’ lien statute as a vehicle to protect its contract. To the extent that the trial court’s order renders the entire contract invalid, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
SMITH, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur.