The petitioners, Joe Nathan Wright and Lola H. Wright, appeal the decision of the United States Tax Court denying their claim for abatement of interest assessed on their unpaid income tax liabilities for tax years 1993 and 1994. For essentially the reasons stated by the Tax Court in its Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion dated March 18, 2004, we affirm. T.C. Memo 2004-69.
Section 6404 of the Internal Revenue Code gives the IRS discretion to abate interest assessments in limited circumstances.2 Because the Wrights reported their tax liability due on their 1993 and 1994 returns, this is not a deficiency case, in which unpaid taxes are identified by the IRS. Accordingly, § 6404(e)(1)(A) does not apply. Section 6404(e)(1)(B) allows abatement only if any error or delay in payment *549is caused by the IRS error or being dilatory in performing a ministerial act, that occurred after the IRS contacted the taxpayer in writing about the payment and where the taxpayer did not significantly contribute to the error or delay. For the taxpayer to prevail, he must also show “that the Commissioner exercised this discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact or law.” Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23, 1999 WL 9947 (1999).
The Wright’s case fails on all counts. First, it is not clear that the IRS was erroneous or dilatory in performing a ministerial act. Treasury regulations define a ministerial act as “a procedural or mechanical act that does not involve the exercise of discretion, and that occurs during the processing of a taxpayer’s case after all prerequisites to the act, such as conferences, have taken place. A decision concerning the proper application of federal tax law (or other federal or state law) is not a ministerial act.” Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-2T(b)(l). Although neither party cites any case law on this point, it is clear to us that deciding whether to accept or how to respond to an offer in compromise is not a “procedural or mechanical act that does not involve the exercise of discretion.”
Second, it is not clear that the Wrights did not contribute to the error or delay. The taxpayers reported their own tax liability. They made partial payments of approximately $30,000 that did not come close to satisfying the approximately $120,000 originally due. Nothing the IRS did prevented the Wrights from paying the balance. As stated in Cannon v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2002-205, “Generally, the relief provided by section 6404 is not available under those circumstances [taxpayer reported but unpaid tax liability]. As noted in the legislative history of that section, ‘if a taxpayer files a return but does not pay the taxes due, [section 6404] would not permit abatement of this interest regardless of how long the IRS took to contact the taxpayer and request payment.’ S. Rept. 99-313 (1985), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol.3) 1, 208; see also Smith v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2002-1.”
In addition, as noted by the Tax Court, the taxpayers’ proposed findings of fact state that they had net assets of about $20,000 on given dates in 1996 and substantially less in 1998, supporting the Tax Court’s conclusion that the petitioners delayed paying their 1993 and 1994 tax liabilities as a result of their own inability to pay, not as a result of any fault of the IRS.
AFFIRMED.