delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Washington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the newspapers during the years 1973, 1978, and 1979. The five articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical “stones” that had been “expelled” from his body. One article referred to Rhinehart’s conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an “extravaganza” sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One article described a “chorus line of girls [who] shed their *23gowns and bikinis and sang . . . .” App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular television program, “The Incredible Hulk.”
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of the articles, and the spouses of the authors. Five female members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs.1 The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements that were “fictional and untrue,” and that the defendants— petitioners here — knew, or should have known, they were false. According to the complaint, the articles “did and were calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession as a spiritual leader.” Id., at 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: “[T]he articles have, or may have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the membership and public and thereby diminished the financial ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes.” Id., at 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation’s “choir” and falsely implied that female members of the Foundation had “stripped off all their clothes and wantonly danced naked . . . .” Id., at 6a. The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy.2
*24Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses.3 Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart’s income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information,4 the identity of the Foundation’s donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its members during that period.
Petitioners filed a motion under the State’s Civil Rule 37 requesting an order compelling discovery.5 In their supporting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents’ “refusa[l] to permit any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of *25their wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general.” Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing in particular that compelled production of the identities of the Foundation’s donors and members would violate the First Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from disseminating any information gained through discovery. Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors who made contributions during the five years preceding the date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The court also required respondents to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished membership. Relying on In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 257, 598 F. 2d 176 (1979),6 the court refused to issue a protective order. It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant a finding of “good cause” as re*26quired by Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 26(c).7 The court stated, however, that the denial of respondents’ motion was “without prejudice to [respondents’] right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically described discovery materials and a factual showing of good cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials.” Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and Rhinehart — including several that threatened physical harm to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also described incidents at the Foundation’s headquarters involving attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general, the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists would adversely affect Foundation membership and income *27and would subject its members to additional harassment and reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the discovery process that pertained to “the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.” App. 65a. The order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating, or using the information in any way except where necessary to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process.8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners’ right to publish information obtained by discovery, but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to avoid the “chilling effect” that dissemination would have on “a party’s willingness to bring his case to court.” Record 63.
Respondents appealed from the trial court’s production order, and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
*28The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 98 Wash. 2d 226, 654 P. 2d 673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court reasoned:
“Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a ‘prior restraint of . free expression’, we are convinced that the interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is sufficient to meet the ‘heavy burden’ of justification. The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like CR 26(c) which authorizes a trial court to protect the confidentiality of information given for purposes of litigation.” Id., at 256, 654 P. 2d, at 690.9
The court noted that “[t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression.” Id., at 256-257, 654 P. 2d, at 690. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its discretion in issuing the protective order.10
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court *29of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 257, 598 F. 2d 176 (1979),11 and applies a different standard from that of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981).12 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.13 464 U. S. 812 (1983). We affirm.
HH I — I H-l
Most States, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 (1977).14 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” It further provides that discovery is not limited to matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the information sought “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis*30covery of admissible evidence.” Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. Rule 26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 758, 763, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2008 (1970).15
The Rules do not differentiate between information that is private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the Rules, the only express limitations are that the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties.16 If a litigant fails to comply with a request for discovery, the court may issue an order directing compliance that is enforceable by the court’s contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. Rule 37(b).17
Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the *31effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and that therefore the information is “protected speech” for First Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this-' case to disseminate any information gained through discovery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however:
“When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression.” Brief for Petitioners 10.
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial court to oversee the discovery process.
<1
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents. This interest may well include most — and possibly all — of what has been discovered as a result of the court’s order under Rule 26(b)(1). It does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that “[f]reedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time.” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394-395 (1950).
*32The critical question that this case presents is whether a litigant’s freedom comprehends the right to disseminate information that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that both granted him access to that information and placed restraints on the way in which the information might be used. In addressing that question it is necessary to consider whether the “practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and whether “the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976).
A
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court’s discovery processes. As the Rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (“The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information”). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the same specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 287, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).18
*33Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial.19 Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. See id., at 396 (Burger, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, *34supra, at 399 (Powell, J., concurring). As in this case, such a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court’s processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party’s ability to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for protective orders contained in the Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First Amendment.
B
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, supra, at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to litigation to obtain information “relevant to the subject matter involved” that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for abuse.20 This abuse is not limited to *35matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties.21 The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain— incidentally or purposefully — information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145-146 (1888). As stated by Judge Friendly in International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (CA2 1963), “[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no question as to the court’s jurisdiction to do this under the inherent ‘equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices’ ” (citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under *36a State’s discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization of protective orders.22
C
We also find that the provision for protective orders in the Washington Rules requires, in itself, no heightened First Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. The Legislature of the State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery.23 The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.
V
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have noted, the trial court’s order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents — among other *37things — to identify all persons who had made donations over a 5-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found that dissemination of this information would “result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression.” 98 Wash. 2d, at 257, 654 P. 2d, at 690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the highest court in the State found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to issue a protective order pursuant to a constitutional state law. We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.24
The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed.