MEMORANDUM OPINION ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Court heretofore ordered that this matter be referred to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, for consideration pursuant to applicable law and orders of this Court. The Court has received and considered the Report of the United States Magistrate pursuant to such order, along with the record, pleadings and all available evidence. No objections to the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge were filed by the parties.
Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the United States Magistrate Judge are correct and the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED. A final Judgment will be entered separately, remanding this action to the Commissioner.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review, hearing if necessary, and submission of a report with recommended , findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2001) and Loe. R. CV-72 & App. B, R. 1(H) for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges, and Beaumont General Order 00-02.
*500I.Nature of Case
Plaintiff asks the court to review a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner), who denied plaintiffs claim for social security disability benefits.1 Through an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the Commissioner determined that although plaintiff has “severe impairments,”2 plaintiff is not disabled because she retains “residual functional capacity”3 for a wide range of “light work”4 which enables her to perform her “past relevant work”5 as accounting clerk. Because ability to perform regular previous employment is considered “substantial gainful activity,”6 the Commissioner determined that she is ineligible for disability benefits.7
Here, plaintiff complains that the Commissioner ignored or impérmissibly disregarded evidence from three treating physicians who are unanimous in their opinions that plaintiff is no longer able to work. Especially significant, in plaintiffs view, is that two treating physicians opined that her impairments will- result in excessive absenteeism. Because a “vocational expert” 8 testified that a person absent from work as often as treating physicians foresee in plaintiffs case cannot maintain employment, plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
*501II. Factual Background
At the time of her evidentiary hearing before ALJ John Jarrett, plaintiff was 60 years of age and had undergone a successful heart transplant five years earlier. Her application claimed disability because “[t]he stress of holding down a job is very hard on [her] transplanted heart]’9 Tr. 126. ALJ Jarrett reviewed medical evidence from all treating sources, the plaintiff, and a “medical expert” 10 retained by ALJ Jarrett. All treating physicians unanimously agreed that plaintiffs current point of debilitation is such that she can (and should) no longer work.11 Moreover, a medical expert, Dr. Carl Beard, M.D., a cardiologist, opined that treating physician Dr. Edward K. Massin, M.D., had “quite adequately outlined his assessment of [plaintiffs] Junctional limitations ” and he stated that he saw “no real reason on the basis of the medical record to disagree with this.” Tr. 63. After considering all this evidence, ALJ Jarrett acknowledged:
“Given the serious nature of heart transplants in general, it would not be unreasonable to expect a patient to encounter several debilitating symptoms even years after a successful transplant. Thus, there is a medical nexus than can give some credence to the assessments offered by [treating physicians] Dr. Keller and Dr. Massin.”
Tr. 26. Nevertheless, ALJ Jarrett found the treating physicians’ assessments to be “materially inconsistent with the claimant’s self described level of daily activities ” (Id.), and found that plaintiff has residual functional capacity for a wide range of light work, with certain limitations. ALJ Jarrett then posed a hypothetical question to the vocational expert, Kay Gilreath,12 as to whether a person with *502that residual functional capacity can perform work as an accounting clerk. Responding to the specific elements of that hypothesis, VE Gilreath testified that such a person could work as an accounting clerk. Tr. 77. In cross-examination, claimant’s attorney amended the hypothesis to subsume a person with expected absences of more than three times a month, VE Gilreath stated:
A One would have problems maintaining employment with that rate of absenteeism.
Q So they would not be able to maintain employment? Is that right?
A Right.
III. DiscussioN and Analysis
Plaintiff argues generally that ALJ Jarrett improperly weighed opinions of treating physicians.13 The focus, however, of plaintiffs argument is more narrow. Plaintiff argues that ALJ Jarrett ignored or improperly discounted treating physician opinion on whether plaintiff can perform work duties on a regular and continuing basis. The court, therefore, must address two distinct issues: (1) degree of deference due a treating physician’s opinion; and (2) relevance of an individual’s ability to work on a sustained basis. This section gives a brief overview of both concepts, then concludes with an application of relevant principles of analysis.
A. Substantial Gainful Activity Means Sustained Work
Ability to engage in substantial gainful employment precludes eligibility for disability benefits. In social security parlance, substantial gainful employment contemplates employment on a regular and continuing basis. Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir.1986); White v. Heckler, 740 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir.1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(1). Both 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b) and Soc. Sec. R. 96-8p (1996) set forth the general rule that determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity requires consideration of whether a claimant is able to perform work duties on a continuous basis.14 Hence, a valid residual functional capacity finding must be based on this overarching principle.
Generally, there is no requirement that an ALJ make an explicit “regular and continuing basis” finding absent evidence of a waxing and waning nature of the claimant’s symptoms, such that the impairments interfere with the claimant’s ability to maintain employment on a continuing basis. Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.1986) (mental impair*503ments); Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.2002) (physical impairments); Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618 (5th Cir.2003) (holding it is a claimant’s responsibility to first establish waxing and waning of symptoms). Moreover, when the record contains no evidence that claimant’s ability to maintain employment is compromised, an ALJ’s mere citation to the appropriate regulation and ruling permits the court to infer that the ALJ determined that the claimant could perform the work in question on a regular and continuing basis. Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003).
B. Deference to Treating Physician Opinion
Both the Commissioner’s regulations and governing circuit precedent presuppose that a treating physician’s medical opinion is entitled to great deference.15 However, treating physicians’ opinions regarding medical issues may be rejected or discounted for good cause. 16 Good cause may exist when the physician’s statements are conclusory and brief; when statements are unsupported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory, or diagnostic techniques; otherwise unsupported by the evidence; or when the treating physician is not credible because (s)he is “leaning over back-wards to support the application for disability benefits.” See Myers, 238 F.3d at 621; Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d at 455-56; Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237; Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir.1990); Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d at 485. A treating physician’s statements may be rejected also when the record contains contradictory opinions from other treating physicians. See Milam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir.1986).
Finally, when an ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the Commissioner prescribes a six-factor analysis for determining what weight to give that physician’s medical opinions. Those factors are:
1. Examining relationship;
2. Treatment relationship, specifically
a. Length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination,
b. Nature and extent of treatment relationship;
3. Supportability;
4. Consistency;
5. Specialization; and
6. Other factors brought to the adjudicator’s attention.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d)(2004).
C. Application
ALJ Jarrett did not make an express finding that plaintiff has residual *504functional capacity to perform light work on a regular and continuing basis. He cited the regulation (20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b)(2004)) and ruling (Soc. Sec. R. 96-8p (1996)) which require assessment of an individual's ability for sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting. However, this is not an instance in which mere citation to the applicable standard permits the court to infer that ALJ Jarrett found that plaintiff has the capacity for sustained work. Treating cardiologist Dr. Edward Massin, M.D., provided evidence that plaintiffs ability to function varies from day to day, and that she is unable to work on a sustained basis for 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week. See n. 11, supra. This is “waxing and waning” evidence that triggers an affirmative legal duty to make an express finding of ability to work on a regular and continuing basis. See Singletary v. Bowen, and progeny through Dunbar v. Barnhart, above. Hence, there is a facial error in ALJ Jarrett’s decision.
The court cannot disregard this error as harmless. ALJ Jarrett committed a second error by failing to conduct the six-factor analysis to determine how much weight to afford treating physician opinion. Had ALJ Jarrett complied with that legal duty, he likely would have found that some of the six factors (e.g., specialization, treatment relationship, consistency with other physician opinion) favored giving the treating physicians’ opinion great weight. Other factors (e.g., supportability, other information brought to his attention) might suggest giving those opinions lesser weight. The court cannot say for certain how ALJ Jarrett or another administrative law judge might rank those factors. Since the court itself does not have the prerogative to weigh those factors de novo, this action must be remanded to the Commissioner for that purpose.17
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, and the action remanded with instructions that the Commissioner weigh treating physician opinion regarding plaintiffs inability to work on a regular and continuous basis in accordance with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (2003).
V. OBJECTIONS
Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within ten days after being served with a copy of this report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.Civ.P. 1(a), 6(b), and 72(b).
A party’s failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir.1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, Douglass v. *505 United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc).
April 8, 2005.