In the circuit court in. chancery plaintiff was granted a decree of divorce- .on the grounds of extreme cruelty and nonsupport, and provision was made in the decree for division of' property. Defendant has appealed.
These parties, now approximately 40. .years of age, were married in 1919 and the final separation occurred in October, 1933. No children were born of the marriage. During the major portion of the marriage period plaintiff has been and still is employed as a teacher in the public schools of Detroit. At one time defendant was employed as a motor*125man. by tbe Detroit department of street railways, bnt in recent years he has followed tbe trade of a carpenter. By their mutual efforts tbe parties have accumulated some property. For a number of years they seemed to have lived and worked together harmoniously; but since 1928 or thereabouts they have experienced much domestic infelicity. Divorce proceedings were instituted by tbe wife in 1929 but dismissed upon reconciliation of tbe parties. Other court proceedings of like character have been instituted- and dismissed. Tbe bill of complaint in tbe instant case was filed February 28, 1935. Review of tbe record discloses ample testimony to sustain tbe decree of divorce granted to plaintiff. In tbe prayer for relief at tbe conclusion of appellant’s brief be does not ask that tbe decree for divorce be set aside. On tbe oral argument it was conceded and it conclusively appears from tbe record that there is no possibility of reconciliation between these parties.
Tbe major controversy concerns tbe provisions in tbe decree touching tbe property rights of tbe parties. Tbe real estate owned by them consists of a two-family flat and two vacant lots. Tbe personalty consists of household furnishings bought by plaintiff and two life insurance policies in which defendant is tbe insured. Tbe premiums on these policies have been paid from tbe joint earnings of tbe parties. One of tbe policies is for a thousand dollars of paid up insurance having a cash surrender value of approximately $500. Tbe other is a 20-pay life policy on .which premiums remain to be paid for only two or three -years. The decree entered in the circuit court makes practically an equal division of both tbe real and personal property between these parties. Our review of the record satisfies us that *126this is as nearly an equitable disposition of the property as can be made. Recital of the details of the method adopted by the trial judge to accomplish this result would not be helpful. Where physical division was possible he has used that method; and his provision for the sale of the two-family flat and an equal division of the net proceeds is both practical and fair. The record discloses no just reason for disturbing the circuit judge’s determination of the property rig'hts of the respective parties. The decree entered in the circuit court is affirmed, with costs to appellee.
Fead, C. J., and Wiest, Bijtzel, Bushnell, Sharpe, Potter, and Chandler, JJ., concurred.