Defendants appeal from an order of the lower court forfeiting the $20,000 bond that had been posted to assure compliance with a consent judgment. Defendants complain *211that they were deprived of either an evidentiary hearing or jury trial on the issue of whether compliance had taken place.
In 1975, defendant The Stolaruk Corporation was given permission by plaintiffs board of zoning appeals to mine gravel in contravention of plaintiffs zoning ordinance. The permission was conditioned on Stolaruk’s promise to conclude the mining and restore the property involved by the summer of 1978. On May 17, 1978, the deadline was extended, at Stolaruk’s request, to December 1, 1978. When the mining continued beyond that date, plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the Oakland County Circuit Court. A consent judgment was entered into on February 16, 1979, providing that all work and restoration was to be completed by July 1, 1979, and that Stolaruk’s failure to comply would result in automatic forfeiture of the $20,000 bond. On September 11, 1979, the circuit court entered a delayed order extending the completion date to September 7, 1979.
The lower court issued a show causé order on October 19, 1979, requiring defendants to demonstrate why the bond should not be forfeited. The order was not preceded by either a written motion or supportive affidavits. Although no evidence was introduced at the October 24, 1979, hearing, the lower court concluded "as a matter of law” that the consent judgment had not been complied with.1 *212Plaintiff contends on appeal that photographs proving noncompliance were shown to the court in chambers and attaches those photos, as well as the affidavit of the photographer, to its brief. Because the materials were not made a part of the record below, we will not consider them with regard to this appeal. Philips Industries, Inc v Smith, 90 Mich App 237, 249-250; 282 NW2d 788 (1979).
Forfeiture of the bond was contingent on the resolution of a factual issue — whether Stolaruk had complied with the modified consent judgment by concluding operations by September 7, 1979. The lower court erred in ruling on the matter as a question of law. GCR 1963, 525 provides that judgment of liability on a bond may be entered "on motion and a showing that the condition has occurred giving rise to liability on the bond”. Although the proceedings below consisted of a show cause hearing, the law requires that when liability on a bond is alleged due to the breach of a condition, the burden is on the party claiming liability to prove that the breach has occurred. Young v Stephens, 9 Mich 500, 503-504 (1862). *213Since no evidence was entered at the hearing, it is plain that this burden has not been met and that reversal is mandated.
Defendants’ contention that a jury trial is in order is without merit. Historically, the right to trial by jury is a fundamental one and is preserved by our state constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 14. However, the court rules provide for more summary disposition in proceedings on bonds that are ancillary to other actions. GCR 1963, 525, 763. Determination of compliance with the consent judgment is necessarily a matter for the trial court and not an issue to be presented to a jury.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.