*79OPINION
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury on an information alleging two separate incidents of criminal conduct involving two victims. Evidence was adduced at the trial that would indicate that appellant was drinking prior to the incidents. The degree of intoxication was a disputed issue at the trial.
Appellant’s trial occurred several weeks before our decision in Turner v. State, 96 Nev. 164, 605 P.2d 1140 (1980) but after the early decision of State v. Sala, 63 Nev. 270, 169 P.2d 524 (1946). Both Sala and Turner construed NRS 200.3801 and held that the specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of his property is an element of the crime of robbery. We held in Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503, 634 P.2d 1226 (1981) that the holdings of Sala and Turner were misconstructions of the robbery statute.
In the instant case, Hickson requested an instruction on specific intent as defined in Sala. The court instructed the jury, over appellant’s objection, on the elements of robbery as defined by NRS 200.380 and as approved in Litteral. The issue presented on appeal is whether the overruling decision of Litteral applies to appellant’s case.
Litteral was not a determination of whether “tainted” evidence is admissible (e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)) or a procedural reform which had an impact on the integrity of the fact-finding process (e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)). We merely concluded in Litteral that NRS 200.380 had defined robbery as a general intent crime from the time of its passage in 1911. Thus, retroactivity of Litteralis not at issue here. We must simply determine whether the acts for which Hickson was convicted were proscribed by the statute as originally defined by the legislature. See People v. *80Mutch, 482 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1971).2 Because Sala and Turner erroneously added an element to be proved by the state, the conviction will be affirmed if sufficient evidence has been adduced to support a finding that appellant was guilty of the general intent crime of robbery as defined by NRS 200.380.
Here, we conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that the jury was properly instructed as to the elements of the crime and that sufficient evidence was presented to show that the acts for which Hickson was convicted were proscribed by NRS 200.380.
Other issues raised by appellant are without merit.
Affirmed.