The issue before the court is whether Ferro Corporation (“Ferro”) is entitled to a jury trial in an action brought by the United States under Section 309(b) and (d) of the Clean Water Act.1
The court finds that Ferro is not entitled to a jury trial. Therefore, the motion of *509the United States to strike defendant’s request for a jury trial is hereby granted.
The United States filed this suit pursuant to Section 309(b) and (d) of the Clean Water Act against Ferro seeking an injunction to prohibit Ferro from violating the Clean Water Act; an order to have Ferro implement a pollution abatement program; and, the imposition of civil penalties for alleged violations. The State of Louisiana has intervened in this action seeking substantially the same relief. After the suit was filed, Ferro filed its demand for a jury trial. Thereafter, the United States filed its motion to strike Ferro’s request for a jury trial.
Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.” Therefore, Ferro would be entitled to a jury trial in this case if such a right is given by the Clean Water Act or if the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution so requires. Ferro does not contend that the provisions of the Clean Water Act grant it a right to a jury trial. Therefore, the sole issue before the court is whether Ferro is entitled to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment.
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved....” This right necessarily is limited to a suit whose nature reflects an action existing at common law at the time the amendment was adopted.2 This right to a jury trial is limited to those actions in which legal issues, as opposed to equitable issues alone, are to be resolved.3 Furthermore, it is “the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action” that determines whether one is entitled to a jury trial.4 In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970), the Court stated:
... the “legal” nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply. [Citation omitted.]
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. at 538, n. 10, 90 S.Ct. at 738, n. 10.5 The fact that both legal and equitable issues are presented in the same case does not rescind a party’s right to have a jury determine the legal issue.6 If both legal and equitable issues are presented in the same action, the factual issues common to both the legal and equitable claims are to be submitted to a jury for a determination of the legal claim before the court makes a determination of the equitable claim.7
Thus, the specific issue before the court is whether or not there is any issue to be resolved in this case that is “legal” in nature. If there is a legal issue involved, Ferro would be entitled to a trial by jury on such a claim. In addition, Ferro would be entitled to have any factual issues common to the legal claim and any equitable claim submitted to a jury prior to the court’s *510determination of the equitable claim.8 In order for the court to determine whether there is a legal issue presented in this case, the court must determine whether the imposition of civil penalty under the Clean Water Act is legal in nature.9
Ferro contends that when the government sues to collect a civil penalty, the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a trial by jury. In support of its contention, Ferro relies upon three Supreme Court cases: Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115, 29 S.Ct. 474, 479, 53 L.Ed. 720 (1909);10 United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47, 34 S.Ct. 213, 216, 58 L.Ed. 494 (1914);11 and Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977).12 In addition, Ferro cites a number of circuit cases as jurisprudential authority in support of its argument that it has a right to a jury trial when the government sues to collect a civil penalty for the violation of a statute.13 Finally, Ferro argues that the congressional intent in imposing civil penalties under the Clean Water Act is to punish the violator and, therefore, act as a deterence to prevent other violations. Ferro contends that if the civil penalties are considered in this manner, the penalties would be similar to punitive damages, which is a legal issue. For the reasons which follow, the court finds that there is no right to a trial by jury in an action brought by the United States pursuant to the Clean Water Act, even in those cases wherein the government seeks the imposition of a civil penalty.
The court could find no case decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which has ruled on the issue now pending before the court. However, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals and one district court have refused to grant a jury trial when the government sought civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501 rehearing denied 778 F.2d 793 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Lambert, 19 E.R.C. 1055 (M.D.Fla.1983). This court fully agrees with the conclusion reached in these cases and, therefore, finds that Ferro is not entitled to a jury trial in this action.
*511Although Ferro relies heavily on Hep-ner,14 Regan,15 and Atlas,16 these cases did not decide the issue before the court. The language in these three cases relied on by Ferro is clearly dicta. Furthermore, the express reservation by the United States Supreme Court in Atlas on whether the Seventh Amendment has any application in suits filed by the United States is clear indication that the Supreme Court has not required jury trials under the Seventh Amendment where the United States seeks civil penalties.17
In the Tull case, the Fourth Circuit applied the traditional legal versus equitable analysis in holding that a litigant was not entitled to a jury trial when the government filed suit under the Clean Water Act for the imposition of civil penalties.18 Relying upon Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1009, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), the Fourth Circuit stated that “[t]he Supreme Court has not gone ‘so far as to say that any award of monetary relief must necessarily be legal [as opposed to equitable] relief’ for purposes of determining the right to trial by jury.”19 Both the Tull and Lambert courts relied upon the fact that the penalty to be awarded is completely within the discretion of the court rather than on a set penalty.20 , This distinction is important because any reliance upon Hepner and Regan to provide a basis for a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment for collection of a civil penalty must be diminished when such discretion in the amount to be awarded is involved because the Supreme Court characterized *512both Regan and Hepner21 as “actionfs] in debt.”22
In United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir.1985) the Eleventh Circuit held that actions brought pursuant to the Clean Water Act were equitable in nature and, therefore, there was no right to a trial by jury, even if the government did seek the imposition of civil penalties. The court, in reaching its conclusion that such actions were equitable in nature, relied upon Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1806, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that the Clean Water Act allowed “the exercise of a court’s equitable discretion, whether the source of pollution is a private party or a federal agency, to order relief that will achieve compliance with the Act.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 318, 102 S.Ct. at 1806 quoted in United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d at 1507.
Finally, the court finds that Ferro’s contention that the penalties involved in this case are the equivalent of punitive damages is without merit. The Tull court correctly disposed of this contention as follows:
... [T]he assessment of penalties intertwines with the imposition of traditional equitable relief. The district court fashions a “package” of remedies, one part of the package affecting assessment of the others. (Footnote reference omitted.) This combined relief serves several goals, including environmental preservation and fairness to third party property buyers as well as deterrence. In such circumstances, the seventh amendment is inapplicable. See [NLRB v.] Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. [1] at 48-49, 57 S.Ct. [615] at 629-630 [81 L.Ed. 893 (1937)], quoted in Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 453, 97 S.Ct. at 1268 (seventh amendment inapplicable where “recovery of money damages is an incident to [nonlegal] relief even though damages might have been recovered in action at law,” since equity courts historically granted such monetary relief.)23
For these same reasons, the court finds that Ferro is not entitled to a jury trial based on the contention that the civil penalties are equivalent to punitive damages.
To summarize, the court finds that Ferro is not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment in the present action. This conclusion is based upon an equitable versus legal analysis of the claim asserted by the United States under the Clean Water Act. The court finds that the relief sought by the United States under the Clean Water Act is equitable in nature, *513even if the government does seek the imposition of civil penalties.24
Therefore:
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of the plaintiff, the United States of America, to strike the demand of the defendant, Ferro Corporation, for a trial by jury be, and it is hereby GRANTED.