Opinion
The plaintiff, New England Pipe Corporation, appeals from the trial court’s judgment dismissing its action for injunctive relief in connection with an arbitration proceeding between the plaintiff and the defendants, Northeast Corridor Foundation, Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc., Mass Electric Construction Company, and J.F. White Construction Company.1 The plaintiff brought an action seeking an order, under General Statutes § 52-422,2 permanently enjoining arbitra*331tion between the parties or, alternatively, an order, under § 52-422, enjoining the arbitration panel (panel) from hearing expert testimony offered by the defendants. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff appealed.3 We conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs action. We also conclude, however, that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under § 52-422.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In 1998, Vincent Douthwright and Sandra Douthwright filed an action (Douthwright action) against the plaintiff and the defendants for injuries that Vincent Douthwright had sustained at a construction site. The Douthwrights reached a settlement with the parties, who thereafter agreed to submit to binding arbitration “all questions” relating to the allocation of liability arising from the Douthwright action. The arbitration agreement provided, inter alia, that “[cjounsel for the respective parties will supply expert disclosures by July 1, 2002, which disclosures shall comply with the requirements of [Practice Book §] 13-4 (4),”4 and that “[e]ach party shall conduct and *332complete all expert witness depositions by October 15, 2002 . . . .” The arbitration agreement also provided that all “parties agree that the arbitrators shall consider their appointment and their chief duties under this agreement an honorable engagement rather than merely a legal obligation. However, the arbitrators will apply Connecticut law to all substantive legal issues and will follow Connecticut rules of procedure and evidence unless otherwise agreed to by the parties . . . .”
On June 20, 2002, at the defendants’ request, the parties stipulated to an extension of thirty days, until July 31, 2002, for the disclosure of experts. On July 25, 2002, the defendants again contacted the plaintiff and requested an additional “couple of weeks” to disclose their experts. The plaintiff expressed no objection to that request.5 The defendants disclosed the identity of their experts on August 26, 2002. The plaintiffs expert *333disclosure was limited to the disclosure that it had made in connection with the Douthwright action.
In ensuing communications with the panel, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants had failed to identify their experts in a timely manner and, consequently, were barred from adducing any expert testimony during the arbitration proceeding. The defendants maintained that their expert disclosure was timely and, furthermore, that the plaintiffs disclosure was insufficient. After the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, the panel, over the plaintiffs objection, issued a ruling requiring both parties to make expert disclosure in accordance with Practice Book § 13-4 (4) on or before January 1, 2003. The panel also required that all expert witness depositions be completed by March 1, 2003.6
On January 17, 2003, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking an order, under § 52-422, permanently enjoining arbitration of the parties’ dispute regarding the allocation of liability arising out of the Douthwright *334action or, alternatively, enjoining the arbitration panel from hearing any expert testimony offered by the defendants. In support of its claim for injunctive relief, the plaintiff argued that the panel’s ruling extending the deadline for the disclosure of experts until January 1, 2003, was arbitrary and in excess of its authority.7 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that § 52-422 does not provide a jurisdictional basis for judicial review of an interlocutory ruling by an arbitration panel. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, concluding that § 52-422 cannot “be used as the jurisdictional basis for the review of an interlocutory ruling by an arbitration panel” because “the very purpose of arbitration [would] be impermissibly frustrated if [such] interlocutory matters [were] subject to court review as they occur.” This appeal followed. Although we agree with the plaintiff that the trial court improperly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the merits of its claim.
“Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 348, 844 A.2d 211 (2004). In other words, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. ... A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once *335it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. ... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727-28, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999). Finally, “[w]e have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alexander, 269 Conn. 107, 112, 847 A.2d 970 (2004).
“An application for an order pendente lite pursuant to § 52-422 is a special statutory proceeding. The statute confers a definite jurisdiction upon a judge and it defines the conditions under which such relief may be given .... In such a situation jurisdiction is only acquired if the essential conditions prescribed by statute are met. If they are not met, the lack of jurisdiction is over the subject-matter and not over the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodson v. State, 232 Conn. 175, 180, 653 A.2d 177 (1995).
General Statutes § 52-422 provides in relevant part: “At any time before an award is rendered pursuant to an arbitration . . . the superior court . . . may make forthwith such order or decree ... as may be necessary to protect the rights of the parties pending the rendering of the award and to secure the satisfaction thereof when rendered and confirmed.” In the present action, the plaintiff, a party to an arbitration proceeding in which an award had not yet been rendered, alleged that injunctive relief was “necessary” to protect its rights pending the rendering of an award. Accordingly, the allegations of the complaint satisfied the essential conditions of § 52-422. The trial court, therefore, had *336the power—that is, it had subject matter jurisdiction— to adjudicate the plaintiffs claim.
“Although related, the court’s authority to act pursuant to a statute is different from its subject matter jurisdiction. The power of the court to hear and [to] determine, which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused with the way in which that power must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fusco v. Fusco, 266 Conn. 649, 652, 835 A.2d 6 (2003). Under § 52-422, a trial court is empowered to grant injunctive relief during an ongoing arbitration proceeding only when such relief is “necessary” to protect the rights of a party prior to the rendering of an award. Conversely, if such relief is not “necessary” to protect a party’s rights during the pendency of the arbitration proceeding, the trial court is not authorized to grant relief under § 52-422.
The term “necessary” is not defined either in § 52-422 or elsewhere in chapter 909 of the General Statutes, which is entitled “Arbitration Proceedings.” See generally General Statutes §§ 52-408 through 52-424. “In the absence of a statutory definition, words and phrases in a particular statute are to be construed according to their common usage. E.g., Verna v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 261 Conn. 102, 109-10, 801 A.2d 769 (2002); see General Statutes § 1-1 (a).8 To ascertain that usage, we look to the dictionary definition of the term. E.g., State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188, 200 n.12, 736 A.2d 790 (1999).” State v. Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 552, 821 A.2d 247 (2003). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the term “necessary” as “[something] *337that cannot be done without: that must be done or had: absolutely required: essential, indispensable . . . .”
We reasonably cannot conclude that judicial intervention was “absolutely required” to protect the plaintiffs rights during the pendency of the arbitration proceeding. On the contrary, the parties’ disagreement regarding the disclosure of experts was nothing more than a run-of-the-mill discoveiy dispute, the resolution of which had been reserved, under the parties’ agreement, to the sound discretion of the panel. See footnote 6 of this opinion. In such circumstances, there simply is no basis on which to conclude that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff pursuant to § 52-422 was essential or indispensable to safeguard its rights regarding such disclosure.
The fact that the legislature has authorized judicial intervention under § 52-422 only in extraordinary circumstances is fully consistent with, if not mandated by, the strong public policy favoring arbitration. “Arbitration is [a] favored [method of dispute resolution] because it is intended to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and vexation of ordinary litigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) L & R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank, 246 Conn. 1, 11, 715 A.2d 748 (1998). Unless a party to an arbitration proceeding affirmatively can establish that its rights will be lost irretrievably in the absence of judicial intervention, permitting that party to obtain interlocutory judicial review of an unfavorable ruling by an arbitration panel would seriously undermine the essential purpose of arbitration, namely, to avoid the expense and delay of litigation. Thus, although the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs action, the plaintiffs assertion of harm falls far short of the showing necessaiy to *338warrant judicial intervention under § 52-422.9 The plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief, therefore, must be denied on the merits.
The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendants on the merits of the plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.