Opinion
In this appeal from the judgment of dissolution of the parties’ marriage, the defendant, Alexa Robelle-Pyke, claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied her motions for a continuance to allow her treating psychiatrist to testify at trial regarding claimed severe depression, (2) ruled on her application for a guardian ad litem to protect her interests, (3) denied her motion for a continuance to secure evidence relative to the present value of the plaintiffs pension and (4) entered financial orders. We agree with the defendant’s first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
*819The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. The action was commenced on May 21, 2001. On August 27, 2002, a case management agreement was submitted stating that the matter would be limited contested.1 On December 23, 2002, counsel for the defendant received notice that the matter had been assigned for trial on January 2, 2003. A motion for a continuance, filed by the defendant on December 24, 2002, was denied by the court, Bozzuto, </., on the same day. The motion noted that (1) the defendant had been diagnosed as suffering from major depression, (2) Elizabeth Taylor, a board certified psychiatrist and the defendant’s treating psychiatrist, would be testifying as to the defendant’s mental health at trial, (3) Taylor, who practices psychiatry in Indiana, had left the country on vacation and was due to return on January 7, 2003, (4) counsel, because of the defendant’s mental condition, would find it difficult to prepare for trial on the issue of mental health and (5) the motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the defendant was pending, but unresolved.2
*821On January 2, 2003, the defendant renewed her motion for a continuance, setting forth the identical reasons as in her written motion and noting that her mental health was a criterion that the court was statutorily obligated to consider. In pursuing the motions for a continuance and for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the defendant read excerpts from a video deposition of Taylor.* *3
The court, White, J., denied the motion for a continuance and the motion for the appointment of a guardian *822ad litem, concluding that no persuasive evidence had been presented that the defendant was not competent.
Following the plaintiffs testimony, the defendant took the witness stand and acknowledged that (1) she was taking four medications, Remeron, Zyprexa, Klo-nopin and Xanax, (2) they were prescribed by Taylor, (3) she did not know whether they would affect her ability to testify, and (4) they did affect her memory and ability to focus. Following the defendant’s completed testimony, the offer was made to submit a transcript of Taylor’s video deposition, together with medical records. Following the submission, the defendant sought a continuance to update Taylor’s evaluation, which was about six months old. The request was denied.
The transcript4 reveals that the court found that “[t]he [defendant] is suffering from clinical depression. She’s under treatment. She’s willing to get better and making *823efforts to do so and is able to manage her daily affairs. In fact, [the court found], from her testimony, on the stand, that she — her thought process is organized and she seems to be oriented as to time, and she seems to understand the responsibility she has. And she’s employed currently as a cashier at a Barnes and Noble in the state of Indiana.”
“At the outset, we note our standard of review. A trial court holds broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a continuance. Appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for a continuance is governed by an abuse of discretion standard that, although not unreviewable, affords the trial court broad discretion in matters of continuances. ... An abuse of discretion must be proven by the appellant by showing that the denial of the continuance was unreasonable or arbitrary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, 71 Conn. App. 565, 574, 803 A.2d 919, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941, 808 A.2d 1132 (2002).
A party’s health is one of the statutory criteria that must be considered in the court’s exercise of its broad discretion in awarding alimony; General Statutes § 46b-82; and distribution of assets; General Statutes § 46b-81. “Once the defendant put[s] her health in issue, it [is] incumbent on her to offer pertinent evidence to support her position.” Tevolini v. Tevolini, 66 Conn. App. 16, 27, 783 A.2d 1157 (2001).
The record clearly reflects that the defendant’s chronic and severe depression disorder was an issue and that the plaintiff was aware of it,5 6 and also that the matter had not previously been scheduled for trial.6 *824There is nothing in the record to reflect that any prejudice would have occurred if a continuance had been granted to allow Taylor time to return from vacation and appear to testify. Under the particular circumstances of this case, the defendant requested a continuance to provide the court with what she claimed was essential medical testimony crucial to an evaluation of her health, which also necessarily implicated her employability, and may have been “pertinent evidence to support her position”; id.; regarding her health. A party should be entitled to present evidence relevant to an issue to be determined by the court; the court is free to give whatever weight it deems proper to that evidence. Under those circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have denied the defendant’s requests for a continuance.7
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.