361 S.W.3d 560

CITY OF DALLAS, Petitioner, v. David S. MARTIN and George G. Parker, et al., Respondents.

No. 07-0288.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Dec. 17, 2009.

Decided Dec. 16, 2011.

Rehearing Denied April 20, 2012.

Barbara E. Rosenberg, Peter Brooke Haskel, James B. Pinson, Assistant City Attorneys, Madeleine B. Johnson, Southwest Airlines, Office of the Vice President, E. Leon Carter, Munck Carter P.C., Richard A. Sayles, John Andrew Conway, Sayles @ Werbner, P.C., Thomas P. Perkins Jr., Dallas City Attorney, Deborah G. Hankinson, William Richard Thompson II, Hankinson Levinger LLP, Dallas TX, for City of Dallas.

Charles W. McGarry, Law Office of Charles McGarry, Bob Gorsky, Lyon, Gor-sky, Haring & Gilbert, LLP, Dallas TX, Robert C. Lyon, Robert Lyon & Associates, Rowlett TX, for David S. Martin.

Eric G. Calhoun, Travis & Coulhoun, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Dallas Police.

Philip A. Lionberger, Office of the Attorney General, Assistant Solicitor General, Austin, TX, for amicus curiae State of Texas.

Justice JOHNSON

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which Chief Justice JEFFERSON, Justice HECHT, Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice MEDINA, Justice GREEN, Justice GUZMAN, and Justice LEHRMANN joined.

This appeal involves issues of governmental immunity from suit. With the exception that this matter is a class action, which does not affect our analysis or conclusions, and one argument that we address separately, the material facts, procedural background, issues, and arguments presented are similar to those we considered in City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368 (Tex.2011). Thus, our conclusions and holdings are the same as those in Albert.

The matter1 arises out of a dispute over whether the City of Dallas paid its firefighters and police officers in accordance with a 1979 ordinance adopted pursuant to a voter-approved referendum.2 Claiming the City had not properly paid them, some firefighters and police officers (collectively, the Officers) brought a class action assert*561ing breach of contract claims and seeking a declaratory judgment.

As it did in Albert, the City filed a counterclaim, later filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, and then dismissed its counterclaim. The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and the City filed an interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(8). While the appeal was pending at the court of appeals, the Legislature amended the Local Government Code to provide for a limited, retroactive waiver of certain local governmental entities’ immunity from suit. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 271.152.3 In light of judicial4 and legislative proceedings that took place after the trial court made its rulings, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for reconsideration by the trial court. 214 S.W.3d 638, 644 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006).

For the reasons set out in Albert we conclude that: (1) the ordinance’s adoption by means of referendum did not result in the City’s loss of immunity from suit; 354 S.W.3d at 368; (2) the City has immunity from suit as to the declaratory judgment action; 354 S.W.3d at 368; (3) by non-suiting its counterclaim the City did not reinstate immunity from suit as to the Officers’ claims that were pending against the City when it non-suited the counterclaim; 354 S.W.3d at 368; and (4) the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether the Legislature waived the City’s immunity by amending the Local Government Code. 354 S.W.3d at 368.

In addition to arguments made in Albert and addressed above, the Officers in this case assert that the City’s immunity from suit is waived because the suit implicitly involves the validity of pay resolutions adopted by the city council. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.006(b) (“In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance ... the municipality must be made a party....”). However, the Officers’ pleadings do not support this contention. Their pleadings reference the ordinance as having become a term of their employment contracts and two resolutions as possible bases for calculating their damages. They do not question the validity of either the ordinance or a resolution.

We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Justice WILLETT filed a dissenting opinion.

Justice WILLETT,

dissenting.

For the reasons stated in my dissent in Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 383, I would decline to reach the issues decided by the Court, and would instead remand to the trial court to consider first whether amend*562ments to Chapter 271 of the Local Government Code effect a waiver of the City’s immunity.

City of Dallas v. Martin
361 S.W.3d 560

Case Details

Name
City of Dallas v. Martin
Decision Date
Dec 16, 2011
Citations

361 S.W.3d 560

Jurisdiction
Texas

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