This is a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs are respectively the widow and daughter of George R. Todd, who died of a heart attack suffered while watching his automobile being removed from a ditch. The defendant, William D. Langwell, was the driver of the vehicle which struck the decedent’s parked automobile and knocked it into the ditch. Also named as defendants are Langwell’s employer, Cabot Corporation, and his insurer, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company. The district judge awarded the widow $25,000 and the daughter $5,000. Defendants appealed.
*539The issue is whether Langwell’s negligence, in striking the decedent’s parked automobile, was the legal cause1 of Mr. Todd’s death.
There is little dispute as to the facts. On the night in question, Mr. Todd was a guest in the house in front of which he had parked his automobile on the street. The vehicle driven by the defendant Langwell struck the parked automobile and knopked it approximately 30 feet forward into a ditch paralleling the roadway. The occupants of the house heard the impact. Mr. Todd went out and got into his automobile, started the motor and attempted to remove it from the ditch by its own power, with the help of others pushing, but without success. He then got out of his automobile, went to the rear of the Cabot vehicle and wrote the name of Cabot Corporation on a pad. Due to the fact that it was raining, Todd was advised by his friends, who knew of his serious heart condition, to go back into the house and get a raincoat. He returned to the residence, obtained a raincoat and then walked back across the street to where several men were engaged in an effort to remove his vehicle with a chain attached to another automobile. Shortly thereafter, several people noticed that Mr. Todd had fallen to the ground and was gasping for breath. An ambulance was called and he was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
The expert medical testimony showed that plaintiff had suffered a severe heart attack in 1954, at which time his condition was diagnosed as coronary arteriosclerosis. He continued to have angina, which became progressively worse. These attacks of pain were related to excitement, overeating or overexertion. The experts expressed the opinion there is a reasonable and medical probability that Mr. Todd’s death was caused by the excitement, mental anguish and physical exertion following his discovery that his automobile had been damaged and knocked into the ditch.
1. PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINATION OF LEGAL CAUSE
Plaintiff argues that in Louisiana a wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him.2 Hence, in the present case defendant is liable where his victim was suffering from pre-existing heart disease and died as a result of mental anguish caused by damage to his property.
On the other hand, defendant relies on the general rule that “negligence is conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to others.” Defendant contends that Mr. Todd’s mental distress and resulting death were such unusual and unforeseeable consequences of this accident that defendant cannot be held'liable.
In the landmark case of Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System v. American Beverage Company, 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962) our Supreme Court established guidelines applicable here for a determination of legal cause. In that case defendant’s truck was illegally stopped at night, on the main traveled portion of the highway, without flares or signals. A vehicle which had been leased by plaintiff to Gulf States Screw Products Company collided with defendant’s parked truck. Plaintiff sued for the value of its rented vehicle. The principal defense was that any negligence on defendant’s part was not the “proximate cause” and that the intervening negligence of the driver of the Dixie vehicle relieved defendant of liability. The court said:
“There is no universal formula for the determination of legal cause. In the instant case it bifurcates into two distinct inquiries: whether the negligence of the *540obstructing driver was a cause-in-fact of the collision; and whether the defendants should be relieved of liability because of the intervening negligence of the driver of the Dixie truck.”
In the Dixie case, the court had little difficulty finding that the negligence of the obstructing truck was a “cause-in-fact” of the collision. The essence of this inquiry was whether the collision would have occurred “but for” the conduct of the driver of the obstructing truck. It was clear that the accident would not have occurred without it.
In discussing the second inquiry, i. e., whether the defendant should be relieved of liability because of the intervening negligence of the driver of the Dixie vehicle, the court laid down certain principles which are particularly applicable in the present matter:
“The essence of the present inquiry is whether the risk and harm encountered by the plaintiff fall within the scope of protection of the statute. It is a hazard problem. Specifically, it involves a determination of whether the statutory duty of displaying signal flags and responsibility for protecting traffic were designed, at least in part, to afford protection to the class of claimants of which plaintiff is a member from the hazard of confused or inattentive drivers colliding with stationary vehicles on the highway.” 3
*541Applying the above quoted principles to the facts of the present matter, the first inquiry is whether defendant’s negligence was a cause in fact of Mr. Todd’s death. Clearly it was. But for the fact that the defendant struck Mr. Todd’s automobile and knocked it in the ditch, Mr. Todd would not have suffered the mental anguish which, according to the expert medical testimony discussed above, was the immediate cause of his death. -
The second inquiry established in the Dixie case presents a more serious problem. As applied to the present matter, the inquiry is whether the duty not to run into parked automobiles on the street includes protection against such consequences as occurred here. The inquiry calls for more than a mechanical application of the rule that “the wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him.” This is not a rule of causation. It is a rule of the extent of recovery. It does not come into play until after liability has been established. In the present case, we do not reach the question of damages for wrongful death, until after we have decided whether defendant’s action was the legal cause of the mental distress resulting in Mr. Todd’s death.
As our Supreme Court wisely stated in the Dixie case, there is no universal formula for determining legal cause in - every case. Ultimately, the decision in many cases will rest on legal policy.4 With *542this in mind, we will turn to a consideration of the jurisprudence concerning liability for mental anguish, without physical injury, caused by damages to ones property.
II. LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE, LIABILITY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH CAUSED BY DAMAGE TO ONES PROPERTY
Plaintiff contends the jurisprudence of Louisiana is now established that damages may be recovered for mental anguish, without any physical injury, caused by damage to ones property. Defendant argues, on the other hand, that all of the cases, relied on by plaintiff, involved willful and intentional acts, as distinguished from unintentional negligence. Hence, that the present case is distinguishable on this basis.
It is true that most of the cases cited by plaintiff involved deliberate and intentional acts.5 However, there are at least 3 cases, all from our intermediate courts of appeal, which have awarded damages for mental anguish, without physical injury, caused by damage to ones property, where the basis of the cause of action was unintentional negligence.
In Holmes v. LeCour Corporation, 99 So. 2d 467 (Orl.La.App.1958) defendant’s large truck left the highway and crashed into plaintiff’s building, in which he operated a restaurant, bar and service station, causing it to burn. Plaintiff suffered no physical injury, but he was present during the crash and the burning of his building. In addition to the actual property loss, the court awarded $200 in damages for mental anguish and nervousness caused by the accident.
Lambert v. Allstate Insurance Company, 195 So.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1967) was a suit by the owners of a general store against a motorist whose automobile crashed into the store front. Plaintiffs were present and saw their property damaged. The court awarded $750 for “mental pain and anguish”, citing the Holmes case, supra.
In Cooper v. Christensen, 212 So.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1968) defendant’s automobile crashed into plaintiff’s residence. There was considerable property damage but plaintiff received no “physical impact”. She testified she thought the noise was a bomb, was concerned for her safety and subsequently became very upset about the damage to her home and the time it took to repair it. The court awarded $1500 for men*543tal anguish “due to damage to ones property.” 6
Both counsel have also discussed Sahuc v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 320 F.2d 18 (Sth Cir. 1963), in which plaintiff sought damages for mental anguish as a result of a fire destroying his home and furnishings. The court did not consider, and the decision does not disclose, whether the fire was caused by a deliberate act or unintentional negligence. Plaintiff was not present when the fire started and there was a dispute as to whether he saw the fire before it was extinguished. After reviewing the jurisprudence of Louisiana, the Federal Court concluded that in all Louisiana cases allowing damages for mental anguish, caused by damage to ones property, the plaintiff was actually present and saw his property damaged. Sahuc was not present during the fire. On this basis, recovery was denied.
From the above discussion of the jurisprudence, it is seen that at least 3 cases from our Courts of Appeal have allowed damages for mental anguish, without physical injury, caused by damage to ones property, where the cause of action was based on unintentional negligence, as distinguished from willful and deliberate acts. There was no application for writs of cer-tiorari in any of these 3 cases and we do not find our Supreme Court has ever considered the question.
III. OUR CONCLUSIONS
We recognize the desirable simplicity and ease of administration of a rule that damages for mental distress caused by injury to ones property will be allowed only for intentional acts and not for unintentional negligence. However, we think the question of intent is but one of the factors which should be considered.7
In our view, a better rule is one similar to that established by our Supreme Court in the Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System v. American Beverage Company case, supra. Once causation in fact has been established, the question is whether defend*544ant’s duty to the plaintiff includes protection against the consequences which actually occurred. This is a question of legal policy which recognizes that there must be some limitation of liability for unforeseeable consequences of the defendant’s actions.8
Applying the principles discussed above to the facts of the present matter, the inquiry is whether the duty not to run into parked automobiles on the street includes protection against the hazard that the owner of the vehicle may be in a house nearby and may become so mentally distressed over the damages to his vehicle that illness or bodily harm may result. A mere statement of the question almost gives the answer. As a matter of legal policy we hold that defendant’s duty did not include protection against such unforeseeable consequences as occurred here. Defendant’s acts, of course, were not willful or intentional. Nor did he intend to cause mental distress to anyone. His acts were unintentional. They did not involve an unreasonable risk of causing mental distress to a person who was not even in the parked automobile.
A factor which has also influenced our policy decision in this case is the present state of our jurisprudence. Our courts have until now refused to allow even parents to recover damages for mental anguish caused by physical injuries to their children.9 It would be highly illogical to allow damages for mental anguish caused by injury to ones automobile under the circumstances of this case and refuse to allow damages for mental suffering caused by injuries to ones child.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is reversed and set aside. It is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that plaintiffs’ suit be dismissed at their costs. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiff appellee.
Reversed and rendered.
On Application for Rehearing.
En Banc. Rehearing denied.