Admire v. Auto-Owners Insurance 494 Mich. 10

Zahra, J.

At issue in this case is whether Michigan’s no-fault insurance act1 requires defendant, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, to pay the entire cost of a van modified to accommodate the plaintiffs wheelchair, including both the base price of the van and the separately introduced modifications. We conclude that defendant is only required to pay for the modifications because only the modifications are allowable expenses “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation” under MCL 500.3107(l)(a). Because the base price of the van is an ordinary transportation expense — an expense that is as necessary for the uninjured as the injured — and is easily separated from the modifications, defendant is not required to pay for it under the no-fault insurance act. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to the extent it held otherwise. Furthermore, at the trial court, plaintiff, Kenneth Admire, never argued that defendant had contractually agreed to reimburse him for the base price of the van, thereby waiving that issue. Thus, we need not determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the parties’ agreement was ambiguous, and we vacate that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. Plaintiffs application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant is denied, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in defendant’s favor.

*15I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1987, plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a car being operated by an insured of defendant. Plaintiffs injuries left him unable to speak or walk and rendered his entire right side virtually useless. A family member tends to all of plaintiffs personal and financial affairs.

Plaintiff requires wheelchair-accessible transportation to go to work five days a week, visit his family, attend medical appointments, and get around the community. On three prior occasions, defendant agreed to pay the full cost of purchasing a van large enough for plaintiff to get in and out while remaining in his wheelchair. Defendant also agreed to pay the cost of modifying the vehicle to make it wheelchair-accessible. In 1988, 1994, and 2000, plaintiff and defendant entered into contracts under which defendant purchased a van and paid for the necessary modifications with the expectation that the van would last for seven years. At the end of the van’s life, plaintiff would give defendant notice of his intent to purchase a new van, and the parties would enter a new agreement. The most recent “Transportation Purchase Agreement” was executed on April 26,2000. It specified that plaintiff was to notify defendant 60 days before purchasing a new van and that the old van’s value would be applied to the purchase price of the new van.

In December 2006, plaintiff, through his guardian, notified defendant that it was time to purchase a new van. In January 2007, defendant informed plaintiff by letter that it had determined that it was not obligated to pay the base purchase price of a new van under the transportation purchase agreement or the no-fault insurance act. Defendant acknowledged that, pursuant to the transportation purchase agreement, the “current *16van should be traded in toward the price of a new van” should plaintiff choose to purchase a new van himself. Defendant further stated that it would “pay for the necessary medical modifications needed on any vehicle purchased... as well as . . . any medical mileage incurred in relation to Mr. Admire’s motor vehicle accident . . . .” Plaintiffs guardian purchased the van for him, and after the modifications were reimbursed and the trade-in value was applied, plaintiff was left with out-of-pocket expenses of $18,388.50.

Plaintiff sued defendant for reimbursement of the $18,388.50, claiming that it was an allowable expense under Michigan’s no-fault insurance act. Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that this Court’s decision in Griffith v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co2 required it to pay for medically necessary modifications, but not the base price of the van. Plaintiff argued that conflicting precedent interpreted the no-fault insurance act to require reimbursement for the entire modified van. The Ingham Circuit Court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition and instead granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff.

Defendant appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished decision.3 In dicta, the Court of Appeals panel concluded that the transportation purchase agreement was ambiguous regarding who had the responsibility to pay the base price of a new van:

On its face, the contract does not provide that defendant is required to buy a new van. It says that the van shall be *17traded in on a replacement van but it does not say that defendant will pay for the replacement. However, the contract also does not say that plaintiff is responsible for buying the new van.[4]

Accordingly, the panel held that “the trial court erred in evidently concluding that the transportation purchase agreement mandated that it grant summary disposition to plaintiff.”5

The Court of Appeals panel then proceeded to address whether Michigan’s no-fault insurance act required reimbursement for both the purchase price of a van and the modifications to accommodate the insured’s disability. Defendant again relied primarily on this Court’s decision in Griffith, which held that the no-fault insurance act did not require the insurer to reimburse the insured for food costs absent evidence that the food was somehow different than what was required before the plaintiffs accident.6 So, reasoned defendant, the base price of the van was not compensable because plaintiff required transportation before and after the accident; the modifications were, however, compensable because they were not required before the accident.

The panel disagreed with defendant’s characterization of Griffith, instead relying on its own decision in Begin v Michigan Bell Telephone Co.7 As in this case, Begin involved an insurer that had refused to compen*18sate a claimant for a modified van. The panel in this case agreed with the reasoning in Begin that a van and its modifications are “so blended . . . that the whole cost is an allowable expense if it satisfies the statutory criteria for being sufficiently related to injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. . . .”8 Thus, like the Begin Court, the panel reasoned that a modified van was more like food provided at a care facility (which Griffith acknowledged was covered by the no-fault insurance act) than ordinary food eaten at home by an injured person (which Griffith determined was not covered). The panel concluded that because plaintiff could not drive an unmodified vehicle, unlike the Griffith plaintiff who could still eat ordinary food, the modified vehicle must be covered in its entirety.9

Defendant sought leave to appeal. After hearing oral arguments on the application,10 we granted leave to appeal to determine whether the no-fault insurance act requires reimbursement for the entire cost of the modified vehicle.11

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether MCL 500.3107(l)(a) requires an insurer to reimburse an insured claimant for the full cost of a vehicle and modifications necessary to accommodate the insured claimant’s disability is a question of statutory interpretation that this Court reviews de novo.12

*19III. ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND

MCL 500.3107(l)(a) permits an injured person to recover personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from an insurer for “[allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” This Court has often been called on to determine the reach of this provision.13 This case particularly implicates our 2005 decision in Griffith, in which we interpreted the clause “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”14 The plaintiff’s husband in Griffith, Douglas Griffith, suffered from severe brain damage stemming from a motor vehicle accident.15 For the duration of Griffith’s hospitalization and his stay at a 24-hour nursing facility, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, covered ordinary expenses, including Griffith’s food.16 On his return home he still required assistance with basic tasks like eating and bathing. State Farm refused to reimburse the plaintiff for Griffith’s food *20because it determined that the food costs were not an “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(l)(a).17

In determining whether the particular expense was for “ ‘reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation,’ ” this Court defined the terms “care,” “recovery,” and “rehabilitation.”18 This Court gave “recoveiy” and “rehabilitation” their dictionary definitions, defining “recovery” as “ ‘restoration or return to any former and better condition, [especially] to health from sickness, injury, addiction, etc.,’ ” and “rehabilitate” as “ ‘to restore or bring to a condition of good health, ability to work, or productive activity.’ ”19 Defining “care” required this Court to consider the term’s meaning in light of the statutory terms “recovery” and “rehabilitation”:

Generally, “care” means “protection; charge,” and “to make provision.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). Thus, taken in isolation, the word “care” can be broadly construed to encompass anything that is reasonably necessary to the provision of a person’s protection or charge. But we have consistently held that “[c]ourts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002). Therefore, we must neither read “care” so broadly as to render nugatory “recoveiy and rehabilitation” nor construe “care” so narrowly that the term is mere surplusage. “Care” must have a meaning that is related to, but distinct from, “recovery and rehabilitation.”

*21As an initial matter, it is important to note that the statute does not require compensation for any item that is reasonably necessary to a person’s care in general. Instead, the statute specifically limits compensation to charges for products or services that are reasonably necessary “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.) This context suggests that “care” must be related to the insured’s injuries.

“Care” must have a meaning that is broader than “recovery” and “rehabilitation” but is not so broad as to render those terms nugatory. As noted above, both “recovery” and “rehabilitation” refer to an underlying injury; likewise, the statute as a whole applies only to an “injured person.” It follows that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the term “care” to expenses for those products, services, or accommodations whose provision is necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident. “Care” is broader than “recovery” and “rehabilitation” because it may encompass expenses for products, services, and accommodations that are necessary because of the accident but that may not restore a person to his preinjury state.[20]

Having determined at the outset that Griffith’s food could not be for recovery or rehabilitation because it lacked curative properties, this Court proceeded to explain that ordinary food also could not be for Grif*22fith’s care. This Court determined that Griffith’s food costs failed to satisfy the requirements of MCL 500.3107(l)(a) because the food was Griffith’s “ordinary means of sustenance” and “if Griffith had never sustained, or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary needs would be no different than they are now.”21 Therefore, this Court concluded, the food costs were not an allowable expense under the statute.22

This Court drew an important distinction between ordinary food eaten by an injured person at home and ordinary food provided by a hospital during the injured person’s stay, stating that

it is “reasonably necessary” for an insured to consume hospital food during in-patient treatment given the limited dining options available. Although an injured person would need to consume food regardless of his injuries, he would not need to eat that particular food or bear the cost associated with it. Thus, hospital food is analogous to a type of special diet or select diet necessary for an injured person’s recovery. Because an insured in an institutional setting is required to eat “hospital food,” such food costs are necessary for an insured’s “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” while in such a setting. Once an injured person leaves the institutional setting, however, he may resume eating a normal diet just as he would have had he not suffered any injury and is no longer required to bear the costs of hospital food, which are part of the unqualified unit cost of hospital treatment.[23]

This Court specifically noted that MCL 500.3107(l)(a) requires insurers to cover hospital food as an allowable expense for the care of an injured person because the person is required to eat hospital food precisely because of *23his or her need for care in the hospital.24 Finally, this Court concluded that requiring an insurer to reimburse the insured for ordinary, everyday expenses merely because of a remote relationship to the insured’s care undermines the no-fault insurance act’s goal of cost containment.25

Several Court of Appeals decisions have attempted to interpret MCL 500.3107(1)(a) in light of Griffith, yet they have taken inconsistent approaches in Griffith’s application. For instance, the Court of Appeals applied Griffith to housing expenses in Ward v Titan Insurance Co.26 The majority adopted an incremental approach to allowable expenses and stated the following:

Under the Griffith analysis, plaintiffs housing costs are only compensable to the extent that those costs became greater as a result of the accident. Plaintiff must show that his housing expenses are different from those of an uninjured person, for example, by showing that the rental cost for handicapped accessible housing is higher than the rental cost of ordinary housing. In the absence of that kind of factual record, the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff was entitled to housing costs compensation merely on the basis of the amount plaintiff was currently paying in rent, for a residence that the record does not even demonstrate was handicapped accessible.[27]

As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s award of the entire amount of the insured’s postinjury housing, instead holding that an insurer is only liable for the increase in housing costs attributable to the injury.

Similarly, in Hoover v Michigan Mutual Insurance Co,28 the Court of Appeals applied Griffith to other *24household expenses, including real estate tax bills, utility bills, homeowner’s insurance, home maintenance, telephone bills, and security system costs. The Hoover Court understood Griffith as requiring “but for” causation between the claimed expense and the injury:

At its core, the holding in Griffith requires a court to determine whether expenses would not have been incurred but for the accident and resulting injuries. Stated otherwise, the question is whether the expenses would have been incurred in the course of an ordinary life unmarred by an accident. And if they would have been incurred, like the ordinary food costs at issue in Griffith, a causal connection between the expenses and the accidental bodily injury would be lacking and it could not be said that the act of providing products, services, and accommodations was necessitated by the accidental bodily injury.[29]

The Hoover Court understood Griffith as requiring a comparison of the injured person’s preinjury expenses to the injured person’s postinjury expenses, with the insurer covering the difference.30

But the Court of Appeals adopted a different approach in Begin, which presented a similar factual situation to the instant case: a dispute over whether an insurer was responsible for the base price of a van for the insured plaintiff.31 The Begin Court disavowed any interpretation of Griffith that required a comparison to the injured person’s preinjury expenses:

[T]he Griffith Court, when discussing the cost of food provided to an injured person in an institutional setting, did not suggest that only the marginal increase in the cost of such food served in an institutional setting would be an allowable expense. Nor did the Court suggest that only the *25marginal cost of modifying regular shoes would be a recoverable “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Rather, in each example, the product, service, or accommodation used by the injured person before the accident is so blended with another product, service, or accommodation that the whole cost is an allowable expense if it satisfies the statutory criteria of being sufficiently related to injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident and if it is a reasonable charge and reasonably necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).[32]

Thus, Begin held, if a particular product, service, or accommodation satisfies the requirements of MCL 500.3107(1)(a), then the insurer must also cover as “allowable expenses” all associated expenses that are “blended” with the qualifying expense.33 This view directly conflicts with the “setoff” analysis promulgated in Ward and Hoover. Because the statutory language plainly cannot support these divergent interpretations, we now seek to clarify the reach of MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

B. INTERPRETATION

As stated, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) permits an injured person to recover PIP benefits from an insurer for, “[allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” Under Griffith, this provision requires that “an ‘allowable expense’ must be ‘for’ one of the following: (1) an injured person’s care, (2) his recovery, or (3) his rehabilitation.”34

*26This case requires us to clarify when a particular product, service, or accommodation is actually “for” the injured person’s “care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” In this context, the word “for” as a preposition “implies a causal connection”35 and is defined as “ ‘with the object or purpose of. . ..’ ”36 Accordingly, a claimant can recover as an allowable expense the charge for a product, service, or accommodation that has the object or purpose of effectuating the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. The causal connection is further implied in the statutoxy language making compensable only those products, services, or accommodations that are “for an injured person’s care, recovery, and rehabilitation.”37 This language suggests that any product, service, or accommodation consumed by an uninjured person over the course of his or her everyday life cannot qualify because it lacks the requisite causal connection with effectuating the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. An ordinary, everyday expense simply cannot have the object or purpose of effectuating an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation because it is incurred by everyone whether injured or not. For instance, Griffith explained that “the food that Griffith consumes is simply an ordinary means of sustenance rather than a treatment for his ‘care, recovery, or rehabilitation,’ ” because “if Griffith had never sustained, or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary needs would be no different than they are now.”38 In sum, an ordinary, everyday product, service, or accommodation is not compensable under *27MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because that expense cannot he for the claimant’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.39

Further, nothing in the statutory language of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) supports the notion that postinjury allowable expenses should be reduced by the margin of the injured person’s preinjury expenses of the same character. Complying with MCL 500.3107(1)(a) and determining what products, services, and accommodations are actually for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation requires a careful examination of the injured person’s postaccident expenses. A mere change in the injured person’s postaccident expenses is insufficient to satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a); the new expense must be of a wholly different essential character than expenses borne by the person before the accident to show that it is for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. But if an expense is new in its essential character, and thus actually for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires that it be covered in full regardless of whether the expense represents an increase or decrease in the injured person’s preaccident costs.40 Indeed, the provision states that allowable expenses consist of “all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary *28products, services and accommodations . .. .”41 Thus, if a product, service, or accommodation satisfies the statutory criteria, it is fully compensable.

Special accommodations or modifications to an ordinary item present a particular challenge. A “combined” product or accommodation results from an ordinary expense, unchanged as a result of the injury, being joined with an accommodation or product that is actually for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. An “integrated” product or accommodation involves the blending of an ordinary expense with one that is for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation in a way that the resulting product or accommodation cannot be separated easily into unit costs. Unlike an integrated product or accommodation, a combined product or accommodation can be separated easily, both conceptually and physically, so that the fact-finder can identify which costs are of a new character and are thus for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation and which costs are ordinary, everyday expenses that are unchanged after the accident. As this Court suggested in Griffith, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires the insurer to cover a truly integrated product or accommodation in full because the entire expense, including the portions that might otherwise be considered ordinary, is necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.42 But because a combined product or accommodation can be easily separated into components related to the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation and components unrelated to that care, recovery, or rehabilitation, only the *29related expenses are actually compensable.43 MCL 500.3107(1)(a) mandates this result because, when the product or accommodation can be easily separated into an ordinary expense and an expense for care, recovery, or rehabilitation, requiring the insurer to pay for the ordinary expenses would destroy the cost-containment aspect of the no-fault insurance act, something of which this Court has long been mindful.44

This analysis is consistent with this Court’s application of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) in Griffith. In its discussion of insurance coverage for hospital food during the insured’s hospital stay, the Griffith Court stated that compensation was required because the insured was required to eat “that particular food.”45 This is an example of an integrated accommodation. The food, clothing, shelter, and any other ordinary products that are provided by the hospital as part and parcel of the hospital stay are not easily separated from the products, *30services, and accommodations provided by the hospital for the injured person’s care. Thus, the statute requires the insurer to pay the entire cost. The same could be said for the custom medical shoes briefly discussed in Griffith.46 When a medical products company produces a custom shoe, the shoe is an integrated product because the medical nature of the shoe, which is for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation, cannot be separated from the ordinary need for shoes by an uninjured person. Thus, the entire cost of the shoe is an allowable expense.

In sum, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) only requires an insurer to pay for products, services, and accommodations that are reasonably necessary to the object or purpose of “an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” Post-accident expenses of a wholly new essential character satisfy the statutorily required causal connection that expenses be for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Ordinary expenses that are the same for an injured and an uninjured person are not recoverable at all because the claimant cannot show that the expense is for his or her care, recovery, or rehabilitation. However, if an expense satisfies the statute, then it is recoverable in full; there is no setoff based on the injured person’s preinjury expenses of the same character. Some products, services, or accommodations might otherwise be ordinary but are so integrated with a product, service, or accommodation that is actually for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation that the entire product, service, or accommodation must be included as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(l)(a). But if the ordinary expense is merely combined with a product, service, or accommodation for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation in *31a way that is physically and conceptually separable, the ordinary expense fails to satisfy the statute and is not compensable.47

C. APPLICATION

Applying this standard here, we conclude that the base price of the van is not an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The statute only entitles plaintiff to reimbursement for products, services, and accommodations that are actually for his care, recovery, or rehabilitation, and only the van’s modifications rise to that standard. The base price of the van is an ordinary transportation expense of the same essential character as plaintiff would have incurred regardless of whether he was injured in an accident. While plaintiffs choice of transportation before his injury might not have been a van, the essential character of plaintiffs preinjury need for transportation has not changed. Like Griffith’s need for sustenance, had plaintiff never sustained his injury, or were he to fully recover, his need for ordinary transportation would be unchanged. Accordingly, the *32statute does not require that defendant reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van.

Certain transportation expenses may be recoverable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because they are part of plaintiffs care, recovery, or rehabilitation. For instance, plaintiff requires some form of transportation to and from his medical appointments. Medically necessary transportation needs represent a change in character from plaintiffs preinjury requirements because the trips would not have been necessary in a life unmarred by injury. But by paying for the van’s modifications and so-called medical mileage, defendant has met its statutory obligations. Indeed, defendant has made it possible — through mileage and modifications — for plaintiff to use his otherwise ordinary transportation to reach medical appointments. But plaintiff cannot show that the van itself, an ordinary form of transportation, is actually for his care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Thus, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) does not require defendant to compensate plaintiff for the base price of the van.

This Court’s decision in Griffith leads inexorably to this result. The van itself is akin to the food that Griffith was eating at home. The character of plaintiffs general need for transportation — like Griffith’s food requirements — did not change as a result of the accident. And unlike the hospital food in Griffith, the van does not constitute an integrated product because the modified van, as a whole, was not actually for plaintiffs care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Hospital food is com-pensable because the injured person is required to eat that particular food during the hospital stay for his or her care and recovery.48 The Court likened hospital food to a special diet.49 But plaintiff only requires some form *33of transportation for his care, not any particular form, so his transportation needs are not akin to a special diet. Indeed, if defendant provided plaintiff with a taxi service that accounted for his disability, defendant would only be required to provide that service for those trips that had the object or purpose of plaintiffs care, recovery, or rehabilitation.

The parties agreed that plaintiff should have a vehicle with modifications as the means for transporting plaintiff on his medically necessary trips. But because the van and the modifications are easily separable, we must determine which expenses are actually for plaintiffs care, recovery, and rehabilitation and which are not.50 The modifications indisputably have the object or purpose of effectuating plaintiffs care, recovery, or rehabilitation because without the modifications plaintiff could not make use of his ordinary transportation for medically necessary trips. Thus, defendant was required to and did compensate plaintiff for the cost of the modifications pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a). But the van is just a van; and while a van may not have been plaintiffs transportation preference, it remains an ordinary means of transportation used by the injured and uninjured alike.51

*34Because the character of plaintiffs ordinary transportation needs remains unchanged, he is free to meet those needs in the way that best suits him. If plaintiff had already owned a van, defendant could have modified that van. If plaintiff wanted a Mercedes van, he could pay for the added luxury, and defendant could modify the van as required by statute. However, only the modifications and medical mileage — separable elements that actually represent a change in character from plaintiffs general preinjury transportation requirements — must be compensated pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

IV CONCLUSION

Our decision in Griffith was sound, and we reaffirm that decision here. To the extent that the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Ward, Hoover, or Begin are inconsistent with this opinion, they are overruled. In concluding that the base price of the van was compensable, the Court of Appeals in this case misapplied our holding in Griffith. We therefore reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals erred by unnecessarily concluding that the parties’ transportation purchase agreement was ambiguous regarding whether defendant was contractually obligated to reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van regardless of the no-fault insurance act’s requirements. In fact, plaintiff waived the contractual argument by failing to raise it in *35his complaint or argue it to the trial court at any point.52 Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment regarding the parties’ contract. Plaintiffs application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant is denied, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant.

YOUNG, C.J., and Markman and KELLY, JJ., concurred with ZAHRA, J.

Cavanagh, J.

(dissenting). For nearly a decade now, a majority of this Court has employed what I believe to be an erroneous and confusing statutory interpretation of MCL 500.3107(1)(a). I have often dissented from this approach to Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. See, e.g., Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521, 542-554; 697 NW2d 895 (2005) (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting), Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 179-197; 802 NW2d 281 (2011) (HATHAWAY, J., dissenting), Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 207; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in the result proposed by HATHAWAY, J., dissenting), and Douglas v Allstate Ins Co, 492 Mich 241, 279-295; 821 NW2d 472 (2012) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Instead, I have argued in favor of Michigan’s previously well-established interpretation of MCL 500.3107(1)(a). See, e.g., Griffith, 472 Mich at 549 (MARILYN Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Manley v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 425 Mich 140, 168; 388 NW2d 216 (1986) (BOYLE, J., concurring in part), and Reed v Citizens *36Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443; 499 NW2d 22 (1993), overruled by Griffith, 472 Mich 521). Because the majority’s opinion today is an extension of the Griffith majority’s erroneous interpretation, I respectfully dissent.

I. APPLYING THE GRIFFITH DISSENT

The key provisions of the no-fault act applicable to this case are MCL 500.3105(1)1 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a).2 I continue to believe that Justice MARILYN KELLY provided the proper interpretation of these statutes in her Griffith dissent. See Griffith, 472 Mich at 542-554 (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting). Specifically, MCL 500.3105(1) establishes that an insured is eligible for certain benefits as long as the insured is injured in a motor vehicle accident. Thus, the only limitations placed on the benefits are the limitations stated in MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Id. at 543-546. This is true because “the Legislature did not expressly limit the expenses recoverable in no-fault cases to those that the injured person did not require before the injury.” Id. at 548. Thus, it was the Griffith majority, not the Legislature, that created the additional restriction that personal injury *37protection (PIP) benefits are not recoverable for expenses that were necessary before the injury. Id.

Applying the Griffith dissent’s interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions to this case, plaintiff clearly satisfied MCL 500.3105(1) given the catastrophic injuries plaintiff suffered in the motor vehicle accident. Next, it is necessary to determine whether the cost of the van is “reasonably necessary” for plaintiffs “care.” As Justice MARILYN KELLY explained, in order to ensure that the word “care” in MCL 500.3107(1)(a) has a meaning independent of the words “rehabilitation” and “recovery,” the word “care” should be defined as “the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and protection of someone.” Griffith, 472 Mich at 547 (citation and quotation marks omitted).3 Although a van is not as obviously necessary for a person’s “welfare and protection” as the food at issue in Griffith, I think that the facts presented in this case adequately indicate that the van is reasonably necessary for plaintiffs care because a van is the only mode of personal transportation available that will accommodate plaintiffs severe injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident.

The simplicity of applying the Griffith dissent’s interpretation of the plain language of MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a) is consistent with the long-held principle that the Legislature intended that the no-fault *38act be construed liberally “in favor of the persons intended to benefit from it.” Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 28; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). Likewise, the Griffith dissent’s approach addresses this Court’s oft-repeated concern regarding cost containment, because the dissent’s approach would eliminate much of the costly litigation spawned by the Griffith majority’s erroneous analysis, which will only be perpetuated by the majority opinion’s modifications to the Griffith majority’s analysis in this case.4 Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

II. THE MAJORITY’S ERRONEOUS ANALYSIS

The straightforward application of the statutes’ plain language under the Griffith dissent stands in stark contrast to the majority’s effort to apply the Griffith majority’s confusing analysis to this case because, in attempting to clarify Griffith, the majority takes an approach that is divorced from the statutory language. Specifically, I agree with the majority that “nothing in the statutory language of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) supports the notion that postinjury allowable expenses should be reduced by the margin of the injured person’s preinjury expenses of the same character.” Ante at 27. However, the majority is forced to inject a variety of terms and phrases not found in the statutory language in an effort to “clarify” Griffith in its purported attempt to avoid an incremental approach to allowable expenses. The result *39is an overly narrow construction of the statute that is inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent regarding MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

For example, the majority states that an “ordinary, everyday expense” cannot qualify as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). However, the phrase “ordinary, everyday expense” is amorphous and, more importantly, absent from the statutory language. Rather, the statute simply provides that allowable expenses are “all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a) (emphasis added). In my view, “all reasonable charges” could encompass a so-called “ordinary, everyday expense” and thus satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a) if that expense is reasonable and reasonably necessary for the injured person’s welfare and protection.

The majority also proclaims that “the new expense must be of a wholly different essential character than expenses borne by the person before the accident. . . .” Ante at 27 (emphasis added). Again, this undefined statement of what an insured must now show to be eligible for benefits finds no support in the statutes or caselaw. Moreover, the majority’s explanation of expenses that satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a) will not add clarity to this area of the law because the majority’s examples are not truly “of a wholly different essential character.” For instance, the majority states that a “custom shoe” would qualify as an allowable expense. However, no matter how much a shoe is customized or modified, it retains its “essential character” as a shoe, i.e., it protects a person’s foot while walking. I question how the bench and bar are to apply the majority’s opinion consistently and fairly when the majority itself struggles to do so.

*40Next, the majority attempts to draw a distinction between a “combined” product, which it deems insufficient to satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a), and an “integrated” product, which, according to the majority, does satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a).5 Again, that distinction does not appear in the statutory language, and the majority is unable to cite any support for its judicially created distinction. Moreover, the majority’s explanation of the difference between a “combined” product and an “integrated” product evidences that the majority’s approach is entirely standardless.

Specifically, the majority defines a “combined” product as one that “can be separated easily, both conceptually and physically, so that the fact-finder can identify which costs are of a new character and are thus for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation and which costs are ordinary, everyday expenses that are unchanged after the accident.” Ante at 28. Given the unique nature of modified products, however, this explanation provides little assistance to the bench and bar. Indeed, the majority concludes that “ [w]hen a medical products company produces a custom shoe, the shoe is an integrated product because the medical nature of the shoe . . . cannot be separated from the ordinary need for shoes by an uninjured person.” Ante at 30. Presumably, the majority considers a “custom shoe” integrated because it cannot be separated “conceptually or physically.” Yet, the majority reaches a different conclusion in this case despite the fact that, as explained later in this opinion, the same is true of plaintiffs modified, or “custom,” van. In short, al*41though the majority claims to reject the “incremental” approach used in Ward v Titan Ins Co, 287 Mich App 552; 791 NW2d 488 (2010), and Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 617; 761 NW2d 801 (2008), the majority implicitly adopts that very rule by defining the preinjury need too broadly while simultaneously defining an “integrated product” too narrowly. The majority’s further deviation from the clear statutory language will only perpetuate the confusion that began with the Griffith majority’s erroneous analysis.6

III. APPLYING THE MAJORITY’S NEW RULE •

Although I would apply the Griffith dissent, I believe that plaintiff is entitled to benefits even under the majority’s faulty statutory interpretation. As the majority acknowledges, what might otherwise be considered an “ordinary, everyday expense” could constitute, under certain circumstances, an “integrated” product. Specifically, under the Griffith majority, food provided in an institutional setting is an “integrated” product, despite the fact that the exact same food is merely an “ordinary, everyday expense” when provided in a non-institutional setting. Likewise, although plaintiffs van is at its core “transportation,” it is nevertheless an “integrated” product because plaintiff is required to use “that particular” form of transportation, given that *42plaintiff is ventilator dependent and wheelchair bound as a result of the motor vehicle accident. Griffith, 472 Mich at 537.

The majority apparently believes that plaintiff is not limited to a particular form of transportation, but that is simply not true, as even defendant conceded.7 Thus, plaintiffs need for transportation cannot be easily separated from a van on conceptual grounds because no other type of vehicle can accommodate plaintiffs wheelchair. Stated differently, contrary to the majority’s unsupported conclusion that “the character of plaintiffs ordinary transportation needs remains unchanged,” ante at 34, because of his injuries the only personal vehicle that plaintiff can travel in is a van. Thus, plaintiff s postaccident transportation needs are significantly different from his preaccident transportation needs. In fact, it bears repeating that the van itself is for plaintiffs care because a van is the only type of vehicle that can accommodate plaintiffs postaccident condition. Before the accident, plaintiff did not require the modifications that the majority concedes are covered by MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because the modifications are for plaintiffs care. Likewise, before the accident, plaintiff did not require a van. After the accident, however, plaintiff cannot operate a personal vehicle unless it is modified and it is a van. Thus, there is no meaningful difference between the modifications and the van itself for purposes of the majority’s analysis. Plaintiff required neither before the accident, but, because of his motor-vehicle-related injuries, plaintiff now requires both for his care.8

*43The majority implicitly acknowledges that plaintiffs condition limits him to transportation in a van when it states that “[i]f plaintiff had already owned a van, defendant could have modified that van. If plaintiff wanted a Mercedes van, he could pay for the added luxury . . .Ante at 34 (emphasis added). Fear that an insurer could be automatically required to pay for the full cost of any van an insured selects is misplaced because, as the plain language of MCL 500.3107(1) establishes, the cost of the van must be “reasonable,” and “the question whether expenses are reasonable . .. is generally one of fact for the jury . ...” Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich 33, 55; 457 NW2d 637 (1990). Thus, if an insured selects “a Mercedes van,” the insurer would be free to argue to the jury that the insured’s choice is not reasonable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Likewise, an insurer would be free to argue that any type of personal van is not reasonable because wheelchair-accessible public transportation is reasonable under the specific circumstances. See Wilcox, 488 Mich at 932 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). How*44ever, as the majority admits, the parties in this case agreed that plaintiff should have a personal vehicle for transportation. Thus, because a van is the only mode of personal transportation available to plaintiff given the injuries he sustained in the motor vehicle accident, plaintiffs need for transportation cannot be easily separated from a van on conceptual grounds. Thus, the van itself is for plaintiffs care, and plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for the full cost of the van even under the majority opinion because the modified van is an “integrated” product.

IV PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAIVE THE CONTRACT ISSUE

Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff waived the argument that defendant had contractually agreed to reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van. As the Court of Appeals noted, the basis for the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for summary disposition and instead grant plaintiff summary disposition was not a model of clarity. However, in my view, the transcript of the hearing on the motion for summary disposition reveals that the trial court based its decision on its conclusion that the “Transportation Purchase Agreement” (TPA) required defendant to pay for the reasonable purchase price of a van.9 Moreover, the Court of Appeals opinion clearly considered the issue and ultimately determined that the TPA is ambiguous. See Admire v Auto-Owners Ins Co, *45unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 15,2011 (Docket No. 289080), pp 2-3. Accordingly, both the trial court and Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the TPA contractually requires defendant to pay for the purchase price of the van. Thus, although I do not think that it is necessary to reach the issue because, in my view, plaintiff is entitled to the purchase price of the van under the no-fault act, even accepting the majority’s contrary conclusion on the no-fault issue, I would remand to the trial court for further consideration of the contractual issue.

V CONCLUSION

I dissent from the majority’s decision to expand the erroneous majority opinion in Griffith. Moreover, even under the majority’s faulty statutory interpretation, I believe plaintiff is entitled to benefits because the van in this case is no different from the “integrated” products that the majority offers as examples of allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Finally, because both lower courts considered the argument that defendant contractually agreed to reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van, I would not hold that the issue was waived. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, or, at a minimum, remand to the trial court for further consideration of the contractual issue.

McCormack and Viviano, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.