William H. Mount vs. The State.
On the trial of the defendant, for suffering a gaming-table to be exhibited in the house occupied by him, the court refused to instruct the jury “^that if the accused had let the rooms of his house in which the exhibition of the ' faro-bank took place, to certain persons, and that at the time when he let them, he had no knowledge or expectation that they would be used for that purpose, they must And for the defendant; held that the instruction was properly refused; and that the tenants of the accused were equally subject to the Statute.
In error from the circuit court of Hinds county; Hon. John H. Rollins, judge.
An indictment having been found against William H. Mount,, for suffering faro to be exhibited in his house, a trial was had in July, 1844, when the following facts were proved:
Robert Brown testified that he saw faro dealing in three rooms of the Eagle Hotel, in [Jackson, kept by the defendant, during the previous winter while the legislature was in session ; that he saw the dealing both day and night, but did not see the defendant in either of the rooms, or about when the dealing took place.
Charles W. Hart testified that he saw the faro dealt in that hotel, both up stairs and down stairs^ at the period spoken of by the other witness; no guard was kept about the rooms, which seemed to be accessible to any one who might claim to go in ; that he did not see the defendant in either of the rooms, but once, while witness was in one of them while the dealing was going on, a negro, belonging to the establishment, was in the room and was called out by the defendant, who came near the door, but did not go in.
Other testimony to the same effect was offered; but by none of the witnesses was it proved that Mount was in the room, or knew of the dealing.
*278The defendant proved that he had leased the rooms to the occupants, in which the exhibition took place, for a month for ¡$ 150 per month, during which time the dealing took place.
The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury, “ That before they could find the defendant guilty it must have been proved to them that he knew of the unlawful gaming in his hotel ” ; this instruction was given by the court with the addition, “ That the jury were authorized to infer such knowledge from circumstances which would authorize the inference.”
The defendant then asked the court to instruct the jury, “ That if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant rented the rooms in which the exhibition took place, and during the tenancy the exhibition occurred; and that he rented the rooms in good faith, without any knowledge or expectation that they would be used for the exhibition of faro-banks, he was not responsible for their exhibition during the continuance of the tenancy.” The court refused to grant this instruction, and the defendant excepted.
The jury found him guilty; and'the court fined him §250 and ordered him to be committed until it and the costs were paid, from which judgment he prosecutes this writ of error.
Howard and Foote, for plaintiff in error.
John D. Freeman, attorney-general, contra.
Mr. Justice Thacher
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an indictment against the plaintiff in error, for knowingly suffering a gaming-table, called a faro-bank, to be exhibited in the house occupied by him.
The court below declined to instruct the jury to the effect, that if the accused had let the rooms of his house, in which the exhibition of the faro-bank is proved to have taken place, to certain persons, and that at the time when he let them he had no knowledge or expectation that they would be used for the purpose of such an exhibition, the jury must find for the defendant.
This charge, we think, was properly refused, for if the accused, *279after he had let the rooms in good faith, and without any knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which they would be used, knowingly permitted them to be occupied and .improved for such an exhibition, he would still be answerable under the statute. The tenants of the accused would be equally subject to the statute. Regina v. Pierson, 2 Ld. Raym. 1197.
In the other respects of this case, the evidence seems to warrant the finding of the jury, and upon close examination, the remaining assignments of error are not found to embrace anything that would warrant a reversal of the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.